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The University of Kentucky, College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education, was organized in Fall of 1973, as the first permanently
staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures with the threefold purpose of assisting
Kentucky lawyers: to keep abreast of changes in the law resulting from statutory enactments, court decisions and administrative rulings;
to develop and sustain practical lawyering and litigation skills; and to maintain a high degree of professional competence in the various
areas of the practice of law.
An enormous debt of gratitude is owed to those who contribute their time, expertise and practical insight for the advance planning,
the instructional presentations, and the written materials that make our seminars possible.
The Office of Continuing Legal Education welcomes correspondence and comment regarding our overall curriculum, as well as our in-
dividual seminars and publications. We hope the seminars and the materials distributed in conjunction with them provide attorneys with
the invaluable substantive and practical information necessary to resolve society's increasingly complex legal problems in an efficient
and effective manner. To the extent that we accomplish this, we accomplish our goal.
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~rhe 1986 Kentucky General Assembly enacted the following new
sections or amendments to the Kentucky Revised Statutes which
affect the banking industry. All legislation is listed by KRS
section amended or added and, unless otherwise noted, became
effective on July 15, 1986.
KRS 36.085 and 36.086 - DEPOSITS BY NATIONAL GUARD ARMORIES - SB
229 created new sections of KRS Ch. 36 to authorize the Department
of Military Affairs to establish installation management fund
accounts in local banks for national guard armories and deposit in
such accounts funds derived from the use of buildings and grounds
by local civic and non-military organizations for receptions,
meetings and other events.
KRS 205.835 - REPORTS OF ACCOUNTS OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS -
HB 135 created a new section of KRS Ch. 205 requiring banks,
savings and loan assoications, credit unions, insurance companies
and other financial institutions to disclose information to the
Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources concerning accounts of
applicants and recipients of public assistance if written consent
to such disclosure is given by the applicant or recipient. The
bill also amended KRS 205.175 to prohibit unauthorized use of such
information and imposes a fine upon any financial institution for
refusing to comply with a request for information.
KRS 271A.270 and 273.247 - CORPORATIONS - SB 337 amended various
sections of KRS Chs. 271A and 273, relating to the business and
non-profit corporations, to require, among other things, that the
articles of incorporation of such corporations contain the address
(including street and number, if any) of the corporations'
principal office which is defined to mean the place (in or out of
Kentucky ) where the principal executive offices of the
corporations are located.
KRS Cll. 287 - DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' BILL - HB 709
was a comprehesive revision to a number of sections of KRS Ch. 287
enacted at the request of the Kentucky Department of Financial
Institutions. The bill's provisions are discussed in detail in
EXHIBIT A to this Outline.
KRS 2B7.013 - FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BOARD - HB 213 increased from
10 to 12 the number of persons serving on the Financial
Institutions Board and reduced the terms of office of the board's
members.
A-I
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KRS 287.100 - BANK INVESTMENTS - SB 370 authorized a bank, in
addition to the investments already permitted by KRS 287.100, to J
invest in the shares of a mutual fund registered under the
Securities Act of 1933 if the fund's investments include any
obligations in which a national bank is permitted to invest in
directly. J
KRS 287.105 - MOTOR VEHICLE LEASING - SB 156 amended KRS 287.105 to
authorize state banks to lease motor vehicles as well as other J
personal property to their customers. Prior to the amendment, KRS .
287.105 prohibited a state bank from entering into lease transac-
tions covering motor vehicles; bank holding companies and national t
banks were, however, permitted to enter into such transactions. j
KRS 287.280 and 287.100 - LENDING LIMITS AND REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS
- HB 202 amended KRS 287.280, relating to a bank's lending limits,
and KRS 287.100, relating to bank investments. The amendment to
KRS 287.280 deleted the provision prohibiting bank directors or
officers from becoming indebted or obligated as a guarantor or
surety to the bank in an amount exceeding 10% of the bank's capital
stock without securing the excess by collateral double in value of
the amount of the excess and substituting in its place provisions
permitting an executive officer or director to become indebted to
the bank or obligated as guarantor or surety in the same amount as
other customers. However, the bill required extensions of credit
to directors and executive officers be approved by the noninterested
members of the bank's board and not be preferential or contain
terms more favorable than those available to the public.
The amendment to KRS 287.100 authorized a bank to invest in real
estate in the bank's generally accepted banking market so long as
each investment does not exceed 10% of the bank's actual paid-in t
capital and surplus and to permit investment and improvements in j
real estate acquired in satisfaction of a debt previously contracted
so long as such investment does not exceed 10% of the bank's paid-
in capital and surplus.
Provisions similar to those in HB 202 were also contained in the
Department of Financial Institutions' bill (HB 709) discussed in I
EXHIBIT A. The statute reviser reconciled the two acts, and the ~
reconciliation is now contained in KRS 287.280.
KRS Ch. 355 - AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - SB 28 adopted J
the 1972 amendments to Article 9 (relating to secured transactions)
of the Uniform Commercial Code and the 1977 amendments to Article 8
(relating to investment securities) of the Code. The bill also j'
amended various sections of KRS Chs. 186 and 186A, relating to
perfection of security interest in motor vehicles, so as to
intergrate the procedure for perfecting such security interests J.
with the motor vehicle title law. The amendments become effective
on July 1, 1987.
KRS 365.205 - CHECKS - HB 417 created a new section of KRS Ch. 365 J
requiring that checking accounts opened after the effective date of .
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the bill have the numerical month and year in which the account was
opened printed on the face of the checks.
KRS 371.065 - GUARANTY AGREEMENTS - HB 286 required that guaranty
agreements not incorporated in the debt instrument specify the
maxim\~ liability of the guarantor thereunder and the date on which
the guaranty terminates. The termination does not, however, affect
extensions of credit in existence on the date of termination.
KRS 382.365 - RELEASE OF REAL PROPERTY LIENS - HB 622 amended KRS
382.365 by reducing the time within which a lien on real property
must be released from 60 to 30 days after the date of satisfaction
of the obligation secured by the lien and providing that a lien
holder who fails to do so is liable to the owner of real property
for the actual expenses incurred in securing the lien release.
KRS 382.530 - FUTURE ADVANCE CLAUSE - HB 246 amended KRS 382.520,
relating to future advance clauses in real estate mortgages, to
provide that a mortgagor or his agent or attorney, may request a
mortgaLgee to release the amount of a mortgage lien securing an
additi.onal unadvanced indebtedness by delivering to the mortgagee a
writte!n request specifying the mortgage containing the future
advance clause and the nature, amount and holder of the lien or
encumbrance which the mortgagor intends to place upon the property.
If the mortgagee does not release the future advance clause within
ten days after receipt of the written request, the mortgagor may
record the request in the appropriate county clerk's office. After
recording, any advance made by the holder of the mortgage
containing the future advance clause is subordinate to the lien or
the encumbrance described in the written request except that a
"line of credit" is not subordinate unless the written request
specifically, and not by implication, describes the line of credit
by account or other identifying number and states that any advance
thereafter made pursuant to such plan is intended to be
subordinated.
KRS 385.012 to 385.242 - TRANSFERS TO MINORS - HB 466 repealed the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act and substituted in its place the
Uniform Transfer to Minors Act approved by the National Conference
on Uniform State Laws in July, 1983.
KRS 386.030 and 287.230 - INVESTMENT IN MUTUAL FUNDS AND IN AFFILI-
ATED TRUST FUNDS - HB 807 amended KRS 386.030, relating to invest-
ments by fudiciaries, and KRS 287.230, relating to common trust
funds. The amendment to KRS 386.030 permits fiduciaries, including
banks and trust companies, to invest in securities of an open-end
or closed-end management type investment company or investment
trust registered under the federal Investment Company Act of 1940,
i.e. mutual funds, irrespective of the fact that the fiduciary also
provides services to the mutual fund as an investment advisor,
custodian, transfer agent, registrar or otherwise. The amendment
to KRS 287.230 (which was originally introduced as a separate bill)
permits investments of funds held by a bank acting in a fiduciary
A - 3
capacity in common trust funds established by itself or an affili-
ated bank. As used in the bill, an ~'affiliated bank" means a bank
in an affiliated group within the meaning of Section 1504 of the
Internal Revenue Code relating to filing of consolidated tax
returns by corporations connected by stock ownership with a common
parent corporation.
KRS 286.023 - INVESTMENTS IN MUTUAL FUNDS - HB 700 added a new
section to KRS Ch. 386 to provide that if an instrument establish-
ing a fiduciary relationship requires, directs or authorizes the
fiduciary to invest in obligations of, or guaranteed by, the United
States government and does not contain an express provision to the
contrary, the fiduciary may invest in a mutual fund registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the portfolio of which is
limited to obligations of, or unconditionally guaranteed by, the
United States government or repurchase agreements fully collater-
alized by such obligations.
KRS 434.655 - ~RAUDULENT USE OF CREDIT OR DEBIT CARD - HB 642
amended KRS 434.655 to increase the penalty for fraudulently using
a credit or debit card to obtain money, goods or services by
reporting a card as lost, stolen or never received from a fine of
not more than a $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year,
or both, to a fine of not more than $3,000 or confinement in a
penitentiary for not more than five years, or both, if the money,
goods or service furnished or received exceeds $300 in any six
month period. If the value of the money, goods or services is $300
or les in any six month period, then the penalty remains a fine of
not more than a $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year,
or both.
KRS 514.040 - THEFT BY DECEPTION - Hb 772 amends KRS 514.040,
relating to theft by deception, to permit a county attorney to
impose a $5 fee for giving notice to the issuer of a bad check that
the drawee has refused payment and requiring the holder of the
check to pay such fee if the check is subsequently paid.
B. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR 1988 GENERAL ASSEMBLY
1. Multibank Holding Company Issues:
(a) Removal of 15% deposit limit [KRS 287.900(3)]
(b) Ability to convert holding company affiliated banks to
branches, with county-wide branching rights.
(c) Ability to purchase thrift institutions and convert to
banks; and to purchase newly converted thrifts.
2. Increased Powers:
A - 4
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(a) Underwriting of revenue bonds, commercial paper and
corporate securities.
(b) Underwriting and sale of life insurance.
3. glectronic Funds Transfer Legislation
4. Revolving Credit Rate Limitations
5. Guaranty Statute (KRS 371.065) - Amend to clarify ambiguities
concerning listing of maximum indebtedness and termination
date.
6. E:quity Lines of Credit: Clarify the revelant statutes with
respect to (i) future advances; (ii) exemptions for business
loans; (iii) the ability to charge "points" and fees; and (iv)
how the $15,000 usury limit relates to unfunded or partially
funded lines of credit.
7. l,ending Limits: Clarify KRS 287.290 regarding the exemption
Cif loans secured by government securities.
8. Establish central filing system for perfection of security
interests in farm products.
9. Miscellaneous:
(a) Amend KRS 355.3-106(e) regarding the negotiability of
notes that provide for the collection of attorney fees.
(b) Clarify KRS 376.390 regarding rights of consumers to
refinance consumer loans, especially those over $15,000.
(c) Provide for a system to register security interests in
boats, similar to that used for automobiles.
(d) Clarification of bank's right to move trust assets among
affiliates.
(e) Elimination of usury limitations on extensions of credit
(other than revolving credit) by banks .
10. Department of Financial Institutions Proposals
C. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
1. Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-198) - effective December
24, 1986.
Section 1324 entitled "Protection for Purchasers of Farmr Products" preempts the "farm product" exception of UCC 9-307. See
EXHIBIT B attached to this outline.
r A - 5
J
2. Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-554) - effective
November 26, 1986.
Creates a new Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code - entitled,
"Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer with Regular Annual Income"
- modeled after existing Chapter 13 of the Code with modifications
3. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (Title H of P.L. 99-570)
- generally effective October 27, 1986.
Among other things, the Act:
(a) Establishes civil and criminal penalties for individuals
who launder money and attempt to evade federal currency
reporting requirements set forth in the 1970 Bank Secrecy
Act, under which financial institutions must report cash
transactions of at least $10,000 to the Internal Revenue
Service.
(b) Makes illegal the evasive structuring of cash transac-
tions by individuals in order to avoid reporting require-
ments, the so-called "smurfing" practice. "Smurfing" is
the name given a practice through which criminals evade
bank currency reporting rules by dividing illegally
earned sums of money into parcels of less than $10,000
before laundering those crime proceeds.
J
j
J
J
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J
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(c) Allows for the seizure of cash and property of "smurfers"
and would require financial institutions to adopt proce-
dures to comply with the law. The Treasury is granted
summons authority, under the Act, to improve enforcement
of the' Bank Secrecy Act.
\
J
(d) Permits limited good-faith disclosure of identifying
information such as names and account numbers, in cases
of suspected criminal activity, and allows courts to
direct financial institutions to delay notifying cus-
tomers of subpoenas or of information being furnished to
a grand jury. Notification currently is required by the
1978 Right to Financial Privacy Act.
J
.1
J
JFinancial institutions will be protected from customer-initiated lawsuits, under the Act, for volunteeringinformation to law enforcers in cases of suspected money
laundering activity by customers.
4. Bank Bribery Amendments Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-370) - effective
September 3, 1986.
The amendment now defines the crime of bank bribery to require J
specific. rather than general intent. A thing of value must be
"corruptly" offered to or accepted by a financial institution's J"
officers or personnel for the offense to occur. The law also .
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specifically does not apply to "bona fide" salary, wages, fees,
other compensation, and expenses paid or reimbursed. Under prior
law, some bankers' salaries were technically bribes.
The amendment gave the financial institution regulators wide
authority to establish enforcement criteria. They are directed to
"jointly establish such guidelines as are approrpiate to assist an
officer, director, employee, agent, or attorney .•• to comply
with this section."
5. Section 1521 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) -
effective for transactions closed after December 31, 1986.
The new section requires a new Form 1099-B to be filed in
connection with certain real estate transactions closed after
December 31, 1986. See EXHIBIT C attached to this Outline.
II.
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
1. CREDIT PRACTICE RULE (FRB REG. AA) - CONTINUING GUARANTEES:
Effective November 1, 1986, the Federal Reserve Board updated
its guidelines under Regulation AA - the Credit Practice Rule.
Under the rule a natural person who guarantees an extension of
consumer credit must be furnished with the cosigner notice pre-
scribed by the rule. The answer to Question 14(b)-13 of the
revised guidelines, among other things, makes it clear that where a
cosigner executes a continuing guaranty, a bank should modify the
cosigner notice to accurately reflect the extent of the guarantor's
obligation. If, for example, the guaranty applies to all future
debts, the first sentence of the notice should indicate that the
cosigner is being asked to guarantee not only the first loan, but
also the future debts of the borrower (up to a certain date or
amount, if appropriate).
Thus, if, for example and in order to comply with KRS 371.065
(enacted by the 1986 General Assembly), a bank's continuing guaranty
agreement terminates on December 31, 1987, and the maximum liability
is $50,000, the first sentence of'the cosigner notice should be
modified to read:
"You are being asked to guaranty this debt, as
well as all future debts of the borrower
entered into with this bank through December
31, 1987, up to a maximum liability of $50,000."
2. SEC RULE 14b-2 - SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS BY BANKS ACTING AS
FIDUCIARIES:
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The Securities and Exchange Commission has adopted a new Rule
14b-2 prescribing the obligations of a bank in connection with the
forwarding of proxy materials to beneficial owners and communica-
tions by registered companies (under the 1934 Act) with beneficial
owners of securities registered in the bank's name. The rule
implements the Shareholder Communications Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-222)
which gave the SEC authority to require banks exercising fiduciary
powers to perform tasks with respect to proxy voting and the
distribution of proxies. The new rule parallels Rule 14b-1, which
governs similar obligations of brokers and dealers, and is intended
to insure that the beneficial owners of securities held in street
name timely receive proxy material and other corporate
communications.
Generally, the system for forwarding proxy materials to
beneficial owners whose securities are held by banks will require
registered companies to ask each bank for the number of proxies and
other proxy soliciting material or annual reports needed by the
bank for forwarding to beneficial owners. After receiving a
request, the bank must respond within seven business days, indicat-
ing the number of sets of proxy materials and annual reports
needed. The company will supply the bank with sufficient copies
for forwarding to beneficial owners, and the bank will be required
to forward such materials directly to beneficial owners on whose
behalf it holds securities within five business days after they are
received. However, a bank is not required to forward proxy mate-
rials nor provide the beneficial owner information referred to
below unless it receives assurances that its reasonable expenses
will be reimbursed by the company.
Under the direct communications system, a bank will be
required, on request, to provide a registered company with the
names, aqdresses and securities positions of certain beneficial
owners of the company's securities on whose behalf the bank holds
securities. The beneficial owners of accounts opened on or before
December 28, 1986, must affirmatively consent to disclosure of
their identities. However, for accounts opened after that date,
the beneficial owner will be deemed to have consented to the
disclosure if the owners have not affirmatively objected to the
disclosure. Accordingly, it will be necessary that a bank solicite
the consent of beneficial owners on whose behalf it holds securities
to determine whether disclosure is appropriate.
New Rule 14b-2 generally became effective on December 28,
1986. However, the provisions of the rule which prescribe a bank's
duties in connection with obtaining and forwarding proxy materials
do not take effect until July 1, 1987.
3. NOMINATION OF NATIONAL BANK DIRECTORS:
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In Banking Bulletin 86-21, effective September 25, 1986, the
Comptroller of the Currency rescinded Part 17 of Title 12 of the
Code of Federal Regulations which provided that a national bank may j
require any shareholder who intends to nominate a candidate to its
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board of directors, other than the candidate proposed by the bank's
management, to notify the bank and the Comptroller of the Currency
at least 14 and not more than 50 days in advance of the shareholder
meeting called for the election of the directors.
In rescinding the .regulation, the Comptroller determined that
no significant regulatory purpose was served by Part 17 and it was
not required in order for national banks to have notification
requirements. Moreover, the recission of the regulation did not,
the Comptroller stated, affect existing notification requirements
in a bank's Articles of Association or Bylaws nor would it prevent
a bank from adopting reasonable notification requirements in the
future.
4. EXPANDED NONBANKING ACTIVITIES:
Effective December 15, 1986, six new activities were added to
the list of nonbanking activities generally permissible for bank
holding companies. The list was issued as part of Regulation Y
enumerating the nonbanking activities that the Federal Reserve
Board has determined to be generally permissible for the BHCs under
Section 4(c) (8) of the Bank Holding Company Act.
The added activities are: personal property appraisals;
commodity trading and futures commission merchant advice; consumer
financial counseling; tax preparation and planning; check guaranty
services; and operation of ~ collection agency and credit bureau.
5. SECURITY INTEREST IN FARM PRODUCTS
In Banking Circular 221, issued December 22, 1986, the Comp-
troller of the Currency has explained the conditions under which
loans involving farm products collateral will be considered to be
secured by national bank examiners. Under the Comptroller's new
policy, such loans will be considered secured only if two things
have occurred: First, the bank's security interest has been
perfected in accordance with applicable state law and, secondly,
the bank has made reasonable efforts to satisfy the notice
requirements of the Food Security Act of 1985 discussed in Section
I.C1 above.
According to the Comptroller, perfection pursuant to appli-
cable state law alone is no longer sufficient to protect the bank's
security interest in farm products. Reasonable efforts to comply
with Section 1324 include, according to the Comptroller, either
registration with a qualifying state central filing system or, (if,
as is true in Kentucky, a qualifying state central filing system
has not been established) notification of local buyers of farm
products and prospective buyers designated by the borrower. The
Banking Circular also advises banks to consider other available
options to perfect their security interests in farm product
collateral and encourages consult~tion with legal counsel.
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III.
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
J
J
A. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
1
J
1. DISCOUNT BROKERAGE OFFICES - McFADDEN ACT RESTRICTIONS
On January 14, 1987, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the Comptroller of the Currency's determination that national bank
offices offering only discount brokerage services are not "branches"
subject to the geographic restrictions of the McFadden Act. Clark
v. Securities Industry Association; Security Pacific National Bank
v. SIA, U.S. Nos., 85-971 and 85-972. (1987)
The majority opinion, written by Justice Byron White, holds
that "the operation of a discount brokerage is not a core banking
function" subject to the McFadden's Act geographic restrictions.
In so doing, the Court upheld the 1982 ruling by the Comptroller to
the effect that the McFadden Act only covers activities like
deposit taking, checking accounts and lending. This could leave
almost the entire realm of other financial services available to
national banks without branching restrictions.
2. NATIONAL BANKS CAN BRANCH LIKE S&Ls
On February 9, 1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in New Orleans rendered a decision which, if unheld, could
have a substantial impact upon branch banking. Department of
Banking and Consumer Finance of Mississippi v. Clarke, F.2d
(5th Cir. 1987), No. 85-4722. In that case, the court upheld
the Comptroller of the Currency's approval of a national bank
branch in a location which would have been permitted under
Mississippi law for a savings and loan association but not for a
commercial bank. Mississippi savings and loan associations have
state wide branching rights. On the other hand, Mississippi banks
are permitted to branch only within 100 miles of the bank's main
office.
In the Mississippi case, the Comptroller of the Currency had
approved a national bank's branch located 160 miles from its main
office. The Court of Appeals upheld the Comptroller's decision and
agreed that savings and loan associations "are engaged in the
banking business" and banks should be accorded equal treatment for
branching purposes. In so doing, the court compared the services
and products offered by both banks and savings and loan associations
and upheld the Comptroller's decision as being "neither arbitrary
nor compricious. It is patently correct."
Preliminary indications are that the u.S. Supreme Court will
be asked to review the decision. If upheld, the decision is
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significant and could stimulate further interest in branch banking
laws.
3 • NONBANK BANKS
On January 22, 1986, the u.S. Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Reserve Board's attempt to regulate so-called nonbank banks
under the Bank Holding Company Act by attempting to redefine the
term "bank" in Regulation Y so as to include institutions offering
NOW accounts and purchasing money market instruments. Federal
Reserve Board v. Dimension Financial Corp., u.S. (1986).
Writing for a unanimous court (Justice Byron White not parti-
cipating), Chief Justice Warren Burger declared that the Fed's
definition of "bank" under Regulation Y differed from the Bank
Holding Company's definition at 12 USC 1841(c) in a way that
exceeded the Board's authority. Although both the statute and the
regulation had defined a bank as an institution that offered demand
deposits and engaged in the business of making commercial loans,
Regulation Y has included NOW accounts (on the ground that they
were "withdrawable on demand as a matter of practice") and money
market activities such as certificates of deposit or commercial
paper (on the ground that they are "commercial loan substitutes").
The Supreme Court found that NOW accounts are simply not "deposits
that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand" under
12 USC 1841(c) (1), and that money market activities do not fit
under the generally accepted definition of "commercial loans."
Although the decision is important in the long standing
nonbank bank controversy, what may prove more important, however,
is the Supreme Court's apparent rejection of the principle of
"functional regulation" in the face of contrary statutory language.
The Board had argued that the Bank Holding Company Act's plain
purpose" required that it regulate nonbanks; it further cited 12
USC 1844(B), which permits the Board to issue regulations "neces-
sary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of [the
Bank Holding Company Act] and prevent evasions thereof."
The court opined that the "plain purpose" approach "takes no
account of the processes of [legislative] compromise and, in the
end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent."
4. SEC BANK BROKERAGE RULE INVALID
In July, 1985, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued
the Rule 3b-9 (effective January 1, 1986) requiring certain banks
engaging in the discount brokerage business to register as broker-
dealers. On November 4, 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the Commission exceeded its
authority in issuing the rule, saying (American Bankers Association
v. Securites and Exchange Commission, F.2d (D.O. Cir.
1986) :
A-II
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"Whatever regulatory coherence Rule 3b-9 would bring to the
field of securities brokerage, we conclude the SEC has no
authority to regulate banks as broker-dealers, and Rule 3b-9 J
is invalid.
"Here, as in Dimension Financial [discussed in Paragraph 3
above], the 1934 Act may be imperfect in not allowing SEC
regulation of banks that engage in discount brokerage activi-
ties, but here, as in Dimension Financial, the statutory
definition of 'bank' precludes the agency from issuing a
regulation fundamentally altering that imperfect definition."
B. KENTUCKY DECISIONS
1. INTEREST AND USURY
On March 18, 1986, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the
practice of Kentucky banks of making installment loans in excess of
$15,000 free of any usury or other limitations. Duff v. Bank of
Louisville & Trust Co., Ky., 705 S.W. 2d 920 (198~ In that case,
the bank had made precomputed interest installment loans which
contained interest, fees, charges and penalties in excess of those
permitted by KRS 287.215. Plaintiffs asserted that in making the
loans, the bank was limited to only those changes permitted by KRS
287.215, while the bank defended on the ground that since the
original principal amount of the loans exceeded $15,000, it could,
under KRS 360.010, change any rate of interest and impose such
charges and fees as were agreed to by the borrowers. In upholding
the position of the bank, the Court, adopted the Circuit Court's
opinion saying ide 925:
"Therefore, it is this court's finding that under the statutes
and authorities cited, based on the amendments referred to
herein, banks are authorized to execute loans under either KRS
287.215 or KRS 360.010. On over $15,000.00 loans, banks may
structure their loans under KRS 360.010, including provisions
for charges, rebates and fees, similar to those provided for
and required under KRS 287.215, if it so elects and the
parties agree thereto.
"It is the court's finding that KRS 287.215 does not bar
parties by contract from including any of its provisions in a
loan over $15,000.00 structured outside of its statute."
2. EXTENSION/NOVATION - RELEASES OF MORTGAGE
In Nolin· Production Credit Association v. Citizens National
Bank, Ky. App., 709 S.W. 2d 466 (1986), decided on May 9, 1986, a
husband and wife borrowed $98,000 from the Nolin PCA secured by a
mortgage containing a future advance clause "opened ended to
$120,000" covering farms in Nelson and three other counties. The
borrowers were subsequently divorced and the husband thereafter
executed a new $314,506 note (which included the $65,700 unpaid
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balance of the previous loan to him and his former wife) secured by
a new mortgage cover1ng the farms in the three counties but not the
Nelson County farm. Folowing bankruptcy of the husband, a contro-
versy developed between a subsequent mortgagee of the Nelson County
property and the Nolin PCA as to who was entitled to the sale
proceeds of the Nelson County farm. The subsequent mortgagee
contended the first loan was satisfied by the execution of the
$304,506 note, and its mortgage thereby released even in the face
of its future advance provision. On the other hand, Nolin PCA's
position was that the first note was not paid off but was extended
and consequently the future advance provision protected Nolin PCA
as to the Nelson County property.
The court found that Nolin PCA intended a novation by execu-
tion of the second note and applied the well settled rule that a
renewal note will not extinguish an obligation. However, a renewal
note that is a novation which operates to extinguish an original
debt is to be distinguished. Whether a second note is a renewal of
an original obligation or a novation thereof, depends upon the
intentions of the parties. As as result, the court held:
" ••• that if the new note extinguished the
old debt, the mortgage securing it also fails
as to the first debt and the future advances
protection with it, since there is no obliga-
tion upon which to base an advance."
The decision is important because of the court's holding as to
the effect of the novation upon the future advance clause in the
first mortgage - particularly as applied to revolving credit
transactions secured by real estate mortgages. If the revolving
credit account is paid down to "zero", is the mortgage securing the
account released? The Nolin PCA case appears to say it is.
3. LOCATION OF SIGNATURES
Although not directly involving banking law, the decision by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Consolidated Aluminum Corporation
v. Krieger, Ky. App., 710 S.W. 2d 869 (1986) could have an impact
upon the prepartion of loan and other bank documents. In that
case, a sale contract contained twenty-two "terms and conditions"
of sale on the reverse side of the document. While the front side
of the document was signed and contained language incorporating by
reference the terms and conditions on the reverse side, the
incorporation language appeared below the signature line. In
holding that the terms and conditions on the reverse side were not
a part of the contract because the language incorporating them was
below the signature line, the Kentucky court said:
"In Kentucky, a writing 'shall not be deemed to be signed
unless the signature is subscribed at the end or close of the
writing.' KRS 446.060(1). Kentucky courts consistently hold
that the Uniform Commercial Code does not displace KRS
A - 13
446.060(1) •••• Therefore, any part of a commercial
writing appearing below the signature line does not become a
part of the contact • • . •
"We do not mean to suggest the KRS 446.060(1) abolishes
incorporation of terms and conditions by reference in com-
mercial contracts. That is clearly not the case ••••
However, any incorporating language must appear above the
signature line of the contract in order to be valid and
enforceable in the courts."
4. FUTURE ADVANCE CLAUSES
Many security agreements contain a provision to the effect
that the security interest granted in the collateral secures not
only the obligation incurred at the time the security agreement is
entered into but also secures obligations thereafter incurred by
the debtor. This is the so-called future advance or "spreader"
clause. The decision is Dalton v. First National Bank of Grayson,
Ky. App., 712 S.W. 2d 954 (1986) casts some question upon the
effectiveness of these clauses.
In that case, the bank had been granted a purchase money
security interest in mobile home trailer. As characterized by the
court:
"On the back of the security agreement was a boilerplate
future advance clause which purported to agree that the
trailer would also secure any other debt owned by the
[debtors] then or thereafter to the bank."
Subsequently, one of the debtors had an overdraft at the bank
which then asserted that its security interest in the trailer also
secured repayment of the overdraft. In subsequent litigation, the
bank's claim was rejected, the court saying:
"We hold, therefore, that broad, boilerplate future advance
clauses in adhesion contracts are not enforceable as to future
transactions which are of different type or class than the
original secured transaction. Specifically, such clauses in
purchase money security agreements for consumer goods will be
enforceable only where the latter transaction concerns a
similar purchase money loan for consumer goods .'"
5. DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured party, after
obtaining possession of collateral, must do one of two things:
either retain possession of the collateral in satisfaction of the
debt (KRS 355.9-505), or sell the collateral at a commercially
reasonable public or private sale and apply the sale proceeds
against the debt (KRS 355.9-504)
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A recent decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Owens
v. First Com. Bank of Prestonsburg, Ky. App., 706 S.W. 2d 414
(1986) has held, however, that a judicial sale is available to the
lender as a third non-code remedy.
Under the facts of the decision, the bank elected to adopt a
procedure akin to a real estate foreclosure by suing on the debt
and then obtaining an order from the court directing the court
commissioner to sell the collateral at public auction. After the
sale, the trial court entered judgment for the deficiency between
the debt and the amount raised at the auction. On appeal the Court
of Appeals held that the judicial sale was an "appropriate" alterna-
tive method of disposing of the collateral.
The decision is also important because, even though the bank
purchased the collateral at the commissioner's sale for $50,000 and
later sold it for $65,000, the court held that the $15,000 "profit"
on the second sale belonged to the bank and the debtor was not
entitled to credit the same against the bank's deficiency.
6. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH TERMS OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
If it becomes final, the January 23, 1987, decision of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in Utica Mutual Insurance Company v.
Walker, K.J.S. (although decided under New York's Uniform
Commerical Code) again emphasizes that a bank issuing a letter of
credit is not obligated to honor a sight draft drawn.upon the
credit unless the letter's beneficiary strictly complies with the
terms of the letter of credit.
In holding that valid policy reasons exist for adhering to the
strict compliance rule, the Kentucky court quoted with approval
from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d
230, 236 (5th Cir. 1983):
"the rejection of strict compliance as a doctrine would
vitiate the economic value of a credit transaction; for not
only would the issuer be compelled to assume the risks of the
underlying contract's nonperformance, it would also be required
to assume the additional risks of judicial realignment of its
obligations under the credit:
"[T]he peculiar values of the letter of credit are (1)
that they provide the assurance of payment, (2) that they
can provide that assurance in respect to any transaction,
and (3) that they are inexpensive. These values will be
lost if performance of the letter of credit is to be
infected by the nonperformance of the underlying trans-
action because when that happens the letter of credit is
not an assurance of payment and because if that happens
the cost of a letter of credit must include the issuer's
problematic litigation expense.'"
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KENTUCKY BANKERS ASSOCIATION
SOO PORT\.AND BUI\.DING. SECOND. BROADWAY. \.OUISVILLE. KENTUCKY ..0202
February 28, 1986
NUMBER 4
TO: Members, KBA
FROM: Willis G. Moremen, Executive Vice President
ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' BILL (HB 709)
As reported in Legislative Bulletin No.3, Representative
Bruce has introduced House Bill 709 on behalf of the Department of
Financial Institutions. The bill makes numerous revisions to KRS
Ch. 287 relating to banks and a section by section analysis of the
major substantive provisions of HB 709 follows.
The bill has been reported out of the House Banking and
Insurance Committee and could be voted on by the full House as
early as Monday, March 3, 1986. Your Association has gone on
record in support of the bill. If you concur in the Association's
position,_ please ask your legislator to support House Bill 709.
Your immediate action is needed.
1. Collateral for Loans. KRS 287.030 currently prohibits a
bank from making a loan on the security of shares of the bank's
stock. The bill amends this section by providing that such loans
can also not be secured by the shares of stock of the bank holding
company which controls the bank to the extent that the loan
"exceeds the amounts permitted by Section 23(A) of the Federal
Reserve Act (12 USC Sec. 371c)". Since national banks, state
member banks and state nonmember insured banks are already subject
to the provisions of Section 23A, and thus are already prohibited
from making loans secured by holding company stock in excess of the
amounts and under the circumstances prescribed by Section 23A, the
amendment to KRS 287.030 would not, appear to require any
substantive changes in the loan practices currently followed by
banks in Kentucky.
2. Number of Directors. The bill amends KRS 287.040 to
require that banks, trust companies and combined banks and trust
qompanies have a minimum number of directors. Under the amendment,
a bank would be required to have a minimum of five directors while
trust companies and combined banks and trust companies would be
required to have a minimum of seven directors.
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3. New Banks. KRS 287.050- currently requires that befpre the
Articles of Incorporation of a newly organized bank, trust company
or combined bank and trust company can be filed and recorded, a
copy of the articles must be submitted to the Commissioner of
Financial Institutions who shall, in approving the organization of
the new bank, "investigate the financial standing, moral character
and capability of each of the incorporators." The amendment to
KRS 287.050 would require that the Commissioner also investigate
the financial standing, moral character and capability of each of
the bank's "proposed executive officers and directors, if known."
In addition, a new section is added to KRS 287.050 requiring that
amendments to the Articles of Incorporation of a bank, trust
company or combined bank and trust company be approved by the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions before filing with the
Secretary of State. Thi~ new section merely codifies the existing
regulatory requirement.
4. Directors' Qualifying Shares and Duties. Presently, KRS
287.065 requires that a director's qualifying shares have an
aggregate value of at least $500. The bill amends KRS 287.065 to
require that the qualifying shares have a book value of at least
$1,000. The bill also adds a new subsection 3 to KRS 287.065
requiring that (a) each director "exercise such ordinary care and
diligence as necessary and reasonable to administer the affairs of
the bank in a safe and sound-manner," (b) the bank furnish each
director with a copy of an appropriate publication outlining the
duties of the director and an updated copy of Kentucky's banking
laws and that the bank maintain updated copies of Federal banking
laws. The appropriate publication and what constitutes Kentucky
banking laws and Federal banking laws are to be determined by
administrative regulation.
5. Bank Capital. KRS 287.080 is amended to make it clear
that none of the original minimum capital of a financial
institution may be designated as undivided profits.
6. Permitted Investments. KRS 287.100, relating to the
investment of a bank's funds, is amended to specifically authorize
a bank to:
(a) Invest in bonds or other interest bearing
obligations of the United States; bonds or other obligations
issued or guaranteed by any instrumentality incorporated by
authority of an act of congress; and general obligation or
revenue bonds issued or guaranteed by any state, county or
municipal government.
(b) Invest in real estate in the bank's generally
accepted banking market so long as each investment does not
exceed 10% of the bank's actual paid-in capital and surplus
calculated at the time such investment is made.
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(c) Invest in improvements to real estate acquired in
satisfaction of a debt previously contracted so long as each
such investment does not exceed 10% of the bank's paid-in
capital and surplus calculated at the time such investment is
made. Any real estate so improved must be disposed of within
five (5) years of the date of acquisition with the
Commissioner being authorized to extend the period of such
disposition on a year to year basis not exceeding five (5)
additional years.
(d) Own or operate a discount brokerage service either
through the bank or a bona fide bank subsidiary.
(f) Own or operate a travel agency either through the
bank or a bona fide ,bank subsidiary.
The newly authorized investments specified in subsection (a)
above are subject to the lending limit provisions of KRS 287.280
and 287.290 and in computing the maximum investment in bonds, notes
or other such investments, book value is required to be used.
Accreted book value is required to be used for discount or zero
coupon bonds.
Finally, the amendment to KRS 287.100 requires that a bank
which acquires real estate in satisfaction of a debt previously
contracted shall write down the acquisition at 10% per year.
7. Branches. The bill amends KRS 287.180, relating to
establishment of branches, to require that the Commissioner, in
approving or disapproving an application to establish a branch,
must determine that there is a reasonable probability of the
successful operation of such branch "based upon the financial and
managerial impact of the branch on the bank establishing the
branch." In addition, the amendment specifies that such
application must be approved or disapproved by the Commissioner
based upon the facts existing at the date of the filing of the
application except for the financial condition of the bank
purposing to establish the branch office, which condition is
subject to a review until an order ruling on the application is
made. Finally, the amendment makes it clear that in connection
with a merger of banks in the same county, the charter of the bank
which does not survive the merger must be surrendered.
8. Lending Limits. Presently, KRS 287.280 provides that if a
loan to a director or officer exceeds 10% of the bank's paid-in
capital, the excess must be secured by collateral double in value
the amount of the excess. The bill would amend KRS 287.280 to
delete this double collateral requirement with the result that a
bank's lending limits applicable to any person are also applicable
to loans to the bank's directors and executive officers. However,
the amendment further provides that loans to the directors and
executive officers must be made on substantially the same terms,
including interest rates and collateral, as those prevailing at the
time for comparable transactions by the bank with other persons and
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cannot involve more than the normal risk of repayment or present
other unfavorable features. Moreover, each loan or extention of
credit to a director or executive officer must be approved in
advance by a majority of the board of directors with the interested
party abstaining from participating directly or indirectly in the
voting.
Finally, KRS 287.280 is also amended to provide that, in
computing the indebtedness of any person to the bank, the liability
of any partnership in which the person acts as general partner
shall be included.
9. Examination Reports. PresentlYi KRS 287.470 prohibits an
officer or employee of the Department of Financial Institutions
from releasing any information contained in an examination report
except so far as necessary in performance of his official duty as
provided by law. The bill amends KRS 287.470 to specifically
provide that reports of examination are considered confidential
information and no officer or director of a bank or trust company
as well as any officer or emloyee of the Department of Financial
Institutions shall release such report or any information contained
in the report except (a) when required in a proper legal proceeding
in which a subpoena and protective order insuring confidentally has
been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (b) the
information is referred to a prosecuting attorney for possible
criminal proceedings, or (c) the information is referred to outside
persons providing professional services to the bank or for the
purpose of evaluating the bank for possible acquisition. Before a
report can be released to an outside person as aforesaid, a written
request must be submitted by such outside person and release of the
information approved by the board of directors or an executive
committee. of the bank.
10. Reports to Commissioner. The bill would add a new
subsection to KRS 287.490 requiring any officer, director or the
board of directors of a bank or trust comp~ny to immediately notify
the Commissioner of Financial Institutions concerning any
information relating to the institution of which they have personal
knowledge involving fraud, defalcation, misfeasance or violation of
KRS Chapter 287. Failure to do so is grounds for officer or
director removal pursuant to KRS 287.690.
11. Multi-bank Holding Companies. Currently, KRS 287.900,
relating to multi-bank holding companies, prohibits, until July 13,
1989, an individual or bank holding company from acquiring control
of a bank or bank holding company in Kentucky if as a result the
individual or company would acquire control of more than three
banks in Kentucky during any twelve month period. The bill would
amend this provision to permit a holding company to acquire control
of a holding company in Kentucky controlling more than three
Kentucky banks if such acquisition is approved by the Commissioner
of Financial Institutions so long as (a) such acquisition only
occur once; (b) the banks acquired by such acquisition in excess of
the three bank per year limitation be counted against future
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acquisitions occurring prior to July 13, 1989; and (c) the total
banks in Kentucky acquired by the holding company not exceed 15
banks during the five year period ending
July 13, 1989.
12. Approval of Multi-bank Holding Company Acquisitions. KRS
287.905, relating to approval by the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions of acquisitions by multi-bank holding companies,
currently requires the Commissioner to approve such acquisitions
within 60 days after acceptance of a completed application unless
he finds that the terms of the acquisition are not in accordance
with Kentucky law or the financial condition, competence,
experience or integrity of the holding company or its principals
are such as will jeopardize the financial stability of the bank or
holding company to be acquired or the public convenience and
advantage will not be served by the acquisition.
The bill amends these requirements by extending the time
within which the Commissioner shal-l act on the application from 60
to 90 days and adding to the criteria for approval of the
acquisition the requirement that no federal regulatory authority,
whose approval is required, has disapproved the transaction because
it would result in a monopoly or substantially lessen competition.
In addition, the bill authorizes the Commissioner to, among other
things, enter into cooperative agreements with federal or state
regulatory authorities to examine an out-of-state bank that is
controlled by a Kentucky bank holding company or by a bank holding
company which includes a state chartered bank and to exchange
confidential information and reports of examinations relating to
interstate acquisitions of banks and bank holding companies.
13. Non-bank Bank Prohibition and Director/Officer
Disqualification. The bill adds two new sections to KRS Chapter
287. The first would prohibit the operation of non-bank banks in
Kentucky by making it illegal for an individual, corporation or
bank holding company to acquire, control, hold, charter, convert or
operate any bank in Kentucky which is an FDIC "insured bank" or
eligible to make application to become an "insured bank" and which
does not both accept demand deposits and actively engage in the
business of making commercial loans. The second new section
prohibits any bank officer or director who has been removed from
office pursuant to KRS 287.690 from serving as a officer or
director of any other Kentucky state bank without the prior written
approval of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions.
14. Penalties. The bill amends the penalty section of KRS
Chaper 287 (KRS 287.990) by increasing the fines for engaging in
private banking in Kentucky, for failing to submit reports required
by law or for submitting false reports or failing to submit to an
examination. In addition, new fines are imposed on a bank for
failing to comply with the new provisions of KRS 287.065 (paragraph
4 above) and for exceeding the real estate investment limitations
of the new section to KRS 287.100 (paragraph 6 above). Finally,
any officer or director who violates the provisions of KRS 287.280
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relating to the bank's debt limit is subject to a fine of not less
than $100 nor more than $500 for each violation and any officer or
director who violates KRS 287.280(2), relating to prior approval of
loans to directors or executive officers, is subject to fine of not
less than $500 nor more than $2,000 for each violation.
15. Repeal. The bill repeals KRS 287.120 requiring one-half
of the capital stock of a combined bank and trust company to be
invested for the institution's trust business and KRS 287.500
making examination and other reports concerning a bank or trust
company prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the report.
The provisions of KRS 287.500 are, however, re-enacted by the bill
and made a part of KRS 287.470.
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March 27, 1986
TO: Members, KBA
FROM: M. Brooks Senn, General Counsel
RE: Enforcement of Security Interests Against Purchasers of
Farm Products
Section 9-307 of the Uniform Commercial Code (KRS 355.9-307)
provides that a buyer in ordinary course of business, other than a
purchaser of farm products from a farmer, takes free of a security
interest created by his seller. This has the effect of permitting
a lender having a security interest in farm products to enforce
that interest against the purchaser or selling agent if the
farmer/debtor does not apply the proceeds of sale of the farm
products in payment or reduction of the debt. This is the
so-called "farm products exception."
Kentucky long ago recognized that this exception creates a
problem for the buyer of farm products as well as the farmer and
his commission merchants and agents. As a result, Kentucky has
amended KRS 355.9-307 of the ·Code in an attempt to accommodate all
competing interests. Essentially, the Kentucky amendments require
a lender, desiring to preserve its security interest in tobacco,
livestock, grain, soybeans or race horses sold through or to a
licensed warehouse, stockyard or an organization engaged in the
business of selling race horses at auction, to give notice of its
security interest to the warehouse, stockyard or horse auctioneer
prior to the sale of the collateral. If such notice is not given,
a bona fide purchaser as well as the warehouse, stockyard or
auctioneer takes free of, and is not liable to the lender for the
value of, its security interest.
Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-198)
which becomes effective on December 24, 1986, and is entitled
"Protection for Purchasers of Farm Products," preempts state law in
this area and provides that a buyer, commission merchant or selling
agent of farm products is not subject to a security interest in the
products unless one of two alternative approaches are followed by
which lenders can continue to enforce their farm product liens
against purchasers. A copy of Section 1324 is attached to this
Bulletin. It should be carefully examined since it defines a
number of the terms used in the federal act and this memorandum~
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i fhe subject of this Bulletin involves legal principles or requirements, the· applicability of which may vary dependina upon the circumstances. AccordinllY.
leeal counsel should be consulted in applyinl the same.
In short, the federal act provides in Sections 1324(d) and
, 1324(g) (1) that, notwithstanding conflicting state law, farm
product buyers, commission merchants and selling agents "take free
of" a security interest in farm products created by the
farmer/seller unless (a) the secured party/lender or the farmer
prenotifies - much like the present practice in Kentucky - the farm
product buyer, commission merchant or selling agent of the
existence of the lender's security interest or (b) the state in
which the farm products are produced has established a central
filing system for filing financing statements covering farm
products on a state wide basis.
Kentucky does not presently, and will not on December 24,
1986, have a central filing system. Thus, farm products lenders in
Kentucky must, on the effective date of the federal act, comply
with the prenotification provisions of the act in order to preserve
their security interests in farm products against the claims of
buyers, commission merchants or selling agents of such products.
In order to do so, written notice of such security interest must be
received by the buyer, commission merchant or selling agent within
one year before the sale of the farm products. If, after receipt
of such notice, the buyer, commission merchant or agent fails to
comply with the payment obligations imposed by the lender as a
condition for waiver or release of the security interest specified
in such notice, then the lender's security interest remains
unaffected by the sale and the lender can recover the value of the
collateral from the buyer, commission merchant or selling agent if
the farmer fails to remit the sale proceeds to the lender.
The federal act provides that what constitutes receipt of such
notice is determined by state law. KRS 355.1-201(26) provides that
a person receives a notice when (a) it comes to his attention1 or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the
contract was made or at any other place held out by him as the
place for receipt of such communications.
The contents of the notice required by the federal act is
somewhat more elaborate than required by present Kentucky law in
that the notice must be organized according to farm products and
contain:
I,
.J
J
J
J
,
.J
j
,
...
J
f
...
J
The name and address of both the debtor and the secured
partY1
1.
2.
3.
f,
...The social security (or taxpayer identification) number of
the debtor1 and
.JA description of the farm products subject to the security
interest, including the amount of such products where
applicable, the crop year, and a reasonable description,
including county, of the property.
In addition, the notice must specify any payment obligations
imposed upon the buyer, commission merchant or selling agent by the ~
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lender as a condition for waiver or release of the security
interest. For example, the lender could require that the check for
the sale proceeds be made to the joint order of the lender and the
farmer.
While the federal act provides that the notice lapses on the
earlier of the expiration period of the financing statement or the
transmission date of a notice signed by the secured party that the
statement has lapsed, the requirement that the notice be received
within one year before the sale of the farm products limits the
effective duration of the notice. For example, if a lender
finances the purchase of- feeder calves which farmer does not intend
to sell for two years, a notice given at the time of the financing
would not appear to be effective for a sale of the calves at the
end of the two year period. In addition, the notice must be
amended within three months of any material changes in the
information included in the original notice.
Finally, the federal act provides that the security agreement
signed by the farmer and granting the security interest in the farm
products may require the farmer to furnish a list of buyers,
commission merchants and selling agents to or through whom the
farmer may sell the farm products. If the products are sold
through a person not included on the list, the farmer may be fined
the greater of $5,000 or 15% of the value or benefit received from
the farm products described in the security agreement unless the
farmer notifies the lender of the identity of the buyer, commission
merchant or selling agent at least seven days prior to the sale or
accounts to the lender for the proceeds of the sale not later than
ten days thereafter.
As indicated above, the federal act becomes effective on
December 24, 1986. Sales before that date will be subject to the
Kentucky notice requirements of KRS 355.9-307 while sales after
that date will be subject to the notice requirements of the federal
act. Since it is believed that a certified mail, return receipt
requested, notice satisfying the federal requirements will also _
satisfy existing Kentucky law requirements, farm product lenders
find it desireab1e and feasible to send federal notices prior to
the effective date of the federal act. Banks are urged to consult
with their legal counsel in this connection.
To assist banks and their counsel in redesigning the required
notice, the requirements of the federal notice and the present
Kentucky notice are indicated in the following table:
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
Kentucky Notice
Required for tobacco, grain,
soybeans, livestock and race
horses
Notice required to be mailed
certified mail, return receipt
requested
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Federal Notice
Required for all farm products
No specific requirement
(certified mail, return
receipt requested is advised)
PROTECTION FOa PURCUASZRS 01' FAllM I>RODUcrs
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SEC. 1324. (a) Congress finds that- . ,
(1) certain State laws permit a secured lender to enforce liens
against a purchaser of farm products even it the purchaser does
not know that the sale of the producta violates the lender's
security interest in the products, lacks any practical method for
discovering the existence of the security interest, and has no
reasonable means to ensure that the ~ller uses the sales pro-
ceeds to repay the lender; ..
, (2) these laws subje<:t the purchaser of farm products to
double payment for the products, once at the time of purchase,
and again when the seller fails to repay the lender;
(3) the exposure of purchasers of farm products to double
payment inhibits free competition in the market for farm prod-
o ucts; and '" . '
(4) this exposure constitutes a burden on and an obstruction
to interstate commerce in farm products.
(b) The purpose of this section is to remove such burden on and
obstruction to it:1terstate commerce in farm products.
(c) For the purposes of this section-
(1) The term "buyer in the ordinary course of business"
means a person who, in the ordinary course of business, buys
faun products from a person engaged in farming operations who
is Ul the business of selling farm products. .
(2) The term "central filing sYs"tem" mearu a system for ruing
effective financing statements or notice of such financing state-
ments on a statewide basis and which has been certified by the
Se<:retary of the United States Department of Agriculture; the
Se<:retary shall certify such system it the system complies with
the requirements of this S81:tion; specifically under such
system-
(A) effective financing statements or notice of such
rmancing statements are med with the office of the Sec-
retary of State of a State;
(B) the Secretary of State records the date and hour of the
filing of such statements;
(e) the Secretary of State compiles all such statements
into a master list-
(i) organized according to farm products:
(ii) arranged within each such product-
m in alphabetical order according to the last
name of the individual debtoI'3, or, in the case of
,.'debtors doing business other than as individuals,
the first word in the name of such debtors; and
(II) in numerical order according to the social
security number of the individual debtors or, in the
case of debtors doing business other than as
individuals, the Internal Revenue Service taxpayer
identification number of such debtors; and .
(lID geographically by county or parish: and
(IV) by crop year;
(ill) contaming the information referred to in para-
graph (4XD):
(D) the Secretary of State maintains a list of all buyers of
(arm products, commission merchants, and selling agents
who register with the Secretary of State, on a form
indicating- .
(i) the name and address of each buyer, commission
merchant and selling agent;
(ii) the interest of each buyer, commission merchant,
and selling agent in receiving the lists described in
subp,aragraph (E); and
(iJj) the farm products in which each buyer. commis-
sion merchant, and selling agent has an interest;
(E) the Secretary of State distributes regularly as pre-
scribed by the State to each buyer, commission merchant,
and selling agent on the list deset:ibed in subparagraph (D)
a copy in written or ~rinted form of those portions of the
master list described in paragraph (C) that cover the farm
products in which such buyer, commission merchant, or
selling agent has registered an interest; .
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(F) the Secretary of State furnishes to those who are not
registered pursuant to (2)(0) of thi.t section oral confirma-
tion within 24 hours of any effective financing statement oit
request followed by written confirmation to any buyer of
farm products buying from a debtor. or commission mer-
chant or selling agent selling for a :reller covered by such
statement. .
(3) The term "commission merchant" means any person en-
gaged in the business of receiving any farm product for sale, on
commission, or for or onJlehalf of another person••.
(4) The term "effective fmancing statement." means a state-
mentthat- -
(A) is an original or reproduced copy thereof;
(B) is signed and filed with the Secretary of State of a
State by the secured party;
(0 is signed by the debtor;
(1) contains, .
(i) the name and address of the secured party;
(ii) the name and address of the person indebted to
the secured party; .
. (ill) the social security number of the debtor or. in the
case of a debtor doing business other than as an
individual. the Internal Revenue Service taxpayer
identification number of such debtor:
(iv) a description of the farm prOducts subject to the
_I security interest created by the debtor. including the
ainount of such products where applicable; and a
reasonable description' of the property, including
county or parish in which the property is located;
(E) must be amended in writing. within 3 months. simi-
lar!y signed and med, to reflect material changes;
(F) remains effective for a period of 5 r.ears from the date
of mingo subject to extensions for additional periods of 5
years each by refiling or filing a continuation statement
within 6 months beforp. the e~piration of the initial S. year
period;
(G) lapses on either the e~pirationof the effective period
of the statement or the filing of a notice signed by the
secured party that. the statement has lapsed. whichever
occurs first;(ID is accompanied by the requisite flling fee set by the
Secretary of State; and
<D substantially complies with the requirements of this
subparagraph even though it contains minor errors that are
not seriouslx: misleading.
(5) The tenn 'farm product" means an agricultural commod-
ity such as wheat. corn, soybeans. or a species of livestock such
as cattle. hogs, sheep, horses. or poultry used or produced in
(arming operations, or a product of such crop or livestock in its
unmanUfactured state (such as ginned cotton. wool<lip. maple
syrup, milk, and eggs). that is in the possession of a person
engaged in farming operations.
(6) The tenn "knows" or "knowledge" means actual knowl-
edge.
(7) The term "security interest" means an interest in farm
products that secures payment or performance of an obligation.
(8) The term "selling agent" means any person. other than a
commission merchant, who is engaged in the business of nego-
tiating the sale and purchase of any farm product on behalf of a
person engaged in farming operations.
(9) The term "State" means e:lch of the 50 States, the District
or Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Guam, the
Virgin Islands of the United States, American Samoa, the
Commonwealth of the Northern :\Ianana Islands. or the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.
(10) The term "person" means any individual, partnership,
corporation. trust, or any other business entity.
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(11) The term "Secretary of State'· means the Seq:etary or
State or the designee of the State. ".
(d) Except as provided in subsection (e) and notwithstanding any
other provision of Federal; State, or local law, a buyer who in the
ordinary course ot busmess buys a farm product from a seller
engaged in farming operations shall take free of a security interest
created by the seller, even though the security interest is perfected;
and the buyer knows of the existence of such interest.
(e) A buyer of farm products takes subject to a security interest
created by the seUer if-
(lXA) within 1 year before the sale of the fann products, the
buyer has received from the secured party or the seller written
notice of the security interest organized according to farm
products that- 0
(i) is an original or reproduced copy thereof;
(ii) contains,
<D the n8I}le and address of the secured party;
<ID the nhIne and address of the ~rson indebted to
the secured party;
(Ill) the social security number of the debtor or, in
the case of a debtor doing business other than as an
individual, the Internal Revenue Service taxpayer
identification number of such debtor; .
(IV) a description of the farm products subject to the
~ security interest created by the debtor, 'including the
amount of such products where applicable, crop year,
county or parish, and a reasonable description of the
property; and
(iii) must be amended in writing, within 3 months, simi-
larly signed and transmitted. to reflect material changes;
(iv) will lapse on either the expiration period of the
statement or the transmission of a notice signed by the
secured party that the statement has lapsed. whichever
OCCUIS first; and
(v) any payment obligations imposed on the buyer by the
secured party as conditions for waiver or release of the
security interest; and .
(B) the buyer has failed to perform the payment obligations.,
or
(2) in the case of a farm product produced in a State that has
established a central filing system- .
(A) the buyer has failed to register with the Secretary of
State of such State prior to the purchase of farm products;
and
(B) the secured party has filed an effective financing
statement or notice that covers the farm products being
sold; or
(3) in the case of a farm product produced in a State that has
established a central ming system. the buyer-
(A) receives from the Secretary of State of such State
written notice as provided in subparagraph (cX2XE) or
(c)(2)(F) that specifies both the seller and the farm product
being sold by such seller as being subject to an effective
fmancing statement or notice; and
(B) does not secure a waiver or release of the security
interest specified in such effective fInancing statement or
Dotice from the secured party by performing any paYment
obligation or otnerwise; and(0 What constitutes receipt. as used in this section. shall be
determined by the law of the State in which the buyer resides.
(g)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and notwithstanding
any other provision of Federal. State. or local law, a commission
merchant or selling agent who sells. in the ordinary course of
business. a farm product for others. shall not be subject to a security
interest created by the seller in such farm product even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the commission mer-
chant or selling agent knows of the existence of such interest.
(2) A commLo;sion merchant or selling agent who sells a farm
product for others shall be subject to a security interest created by
the seller in such farm product if-
A - 32 ...
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(A) within 1 year before the sale of such farm product the
commission merchant or selling agent has received (rom the
secured part,. or the selIer written notice of the security in-
terest; organized according to farm products, that-
(i) is;m original or reproduced copy thereof;(ll) contains, . >
mthe name and address of the secured party;
, (Ill the name and address of the person ind~bted to
the secured party;
(Ill) the social security number of the debtor or, in
the case of a debtor doing business other than as an
individual, the Internal Revenue Service taxpayer
identification number of such debtor,
(IV) a description of the farm products subject to the
security interest created by the debtor, including the
amount of such products, where applicable, crop year,
county or parish, and a reasonable description of the
property, etc.; and .
(iii) must be amended in WTiting, within 3 months, simi-
larly signed and transmitted, to reflect material changes;
'. (iv) will lapse on either the expiration period of the
statement'or the transmission of a notice signed by the
secured party that the statement has lapsed, whicheveJ
occurs first; and
(v) any payment obligations imposed on the commission
merchant or selling agent by the secured party as condi-
'tions for waiver or release of the security interest; and
(B) the commission merchant or selling agent has failed to
perfonn the payment obligations; .
(0 in the case of a farm product produced in a State that has
established a central ming system-
(il the commission merchant or selling agent has failed to
regist~r with the Secretary of State of such State prior to
the purchase of farm products; and .
(li) the secured party has filed an effective financing
statement or notice that covers the farm products being
sold; or
CD) in the case of a farm product produced in a State that has
established a central ming system, the commission merchant or
selling agent-
(i) receives from· the Secretary of State of such State
written notice as provided in subsection (cX2XE) or (c)(2XF>
that soecifies both the seller and the farm products being
sold by such seller as being subject to an effective financing
statement or notice; and ,
(ii) does not secure a waiver or release of the security
interest specified in such effective financing statement or
notice from the secured party by performing any payment
obligation or otherwise.
, (3) What constitutes receipt, as used in this section, shall be
determined by the law of the State in which the buyer resides.
(h)(1) A security agreement in which a person engaged in farming'
operations creates a security interest in :1 farm product may require
the person to furnish to the secured party a list of the buyers.
commission merchants. and selling agents to or through whom the
person engaged in farming operations may sell such farm product.
(2) If a security agreement contains a provision described in
paragraph (1) and such person engaged in farming operations sells
the farm product collateral to a buyer or through a commission
merchant or selling agent not included on such list, the person
engaged in falming operations shall be subject to paragraph (3)
unless the person- .
(A) has notified the secured party in writing of the identity of
the buyer, commission merchant, or selling agent at least 7 days
prior to such sale; or .
(B) has accounted to the secured party for the proceeds or
such sale not later than 10 days after such sale.
(3) A person violating paragraph (2) shall be fined $5,000 or 15 per
centum or the value or benefit received for. such farm product
described in the security agr~ment,whichever is greater.
(i) The Secretary of Agriculture shall prescribe regulations not
Jatek' than 90 da)'3 after the date of enactment of this Act to aid
States in the implement.:ltion and management of a central ming
system.
(j) This section shall becomo effective 12 months after the date of
enactment of this Act. A -, .,3.3
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TO: Members, KBA
FROM: M. Brooks Senn, General Counsel
RE: New Reporting Requirement for Real Estate Transactions
Closed after 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 added a new section 6045(e) to the
Internal Revenue Code requiring that certain information be reported
to the Internal Revenue Service in connection with real estate
transactions closed after December 31, 1986.
While the IRS has not yet issued any regulations specifying
what transactions must be reported and what data-must be collected,
a newly issued revised Form 1099-B indicates that the names,
addresses and federal identification numbers of the buyer and
seller, the gross proceeds of sale and a description of the real
estate involved will be required'to be reported by the person
(including any attorney or title company) responsible for closing
the transaction. However, if there is no person responsible for
closing the transaction, then the mortgage lender must file the
report. Thus, depending upon how the closing iS,handled, banks
financing a real estate sale or their attorneys, if any of them
"close" the sale, may be required to file the new report.
Until IRS regulations are issued, banks financing a real
estate sale should be sure that the following information is
collected at the closing of the transaction:
1. The date of the sale;
2. The sellerls gross proceeds;
3. The name and address of the seller;
4. The name and address of the buyer;
5. The taxpayer identification numbers of both the buyer and
seller (social security number of individuals and federal 1.0.
numbers of corporations or partnerships); and
6. A brief description of the property sold (including
whether it is a principle residence).
As soon as regulations are issued by the IRS, a supplemental
r bulletin will be issued to KBA members.The subject of this BUlletin involves lelal principles or requirements, the applicability of which may vary dependin. upon the circumstances, Accordingly,legal counsel should be consulted in applyin. the same.
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Rnldon af Form 1099-8, Sb'temerrt for
RoQpIants of PrtX:eeds From Real E.rtata,
Broler, Jnd B.uter ExclW1ca TrJJmdfons
Announ~men1 86-115
Form 1099-B has been revised to pro-
vide for the reporting of real estate trans-
actions closing after 1986. as required by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. which added
section 6045(e) to the Internal Revenue
Code.
New Box Ib "Real estate" has been
added for reponing gross proceeds (rom
a real estate transaction. and two check-
boxes have been added to Box 5 to iden-
tify the nature of the property involved
in the transaction. Other minor changes
have also been made to the (arm.
A c:opy of the revised torm. whic:h ~i11
be available in [ntema] Revenue Semce
offices in early January. appears below.
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1986 TAX DEVELOPMENTS AND 1987 TAX
STRATEGIES FOR BANKS AND BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES
Chris Trower
BROWN, TODD & HEYBURN
Louisville/Lexington, Kentucky
I. INCOME TAX RATES
A. Individuals.
In 1987, individual taxpayers will be subject to a maxi-
mum rate of 38.5% on ordinary income and 28% on capital gains.
The highest rate of 38.5% will apply to marginal taxable
income as follows.
Tax Rates for 1987
Married,
Tax Filing Joint Heads of Single
Rate Returns Household Individuals
38.5% Over $90,000 Over $80,000 Over $54,000
For tax years beginning in 1988, the tax rates for indi-
viduals will be condensed into two rate brackets of 15% and
28%, applied to taxable income as follows.
Tax Rates Beginning in 1988
Married,
Tax Filing Joint Heads of Single
Rate Returns Household Individuals
15% $ 0-$29,750 $ 0-$23,900 $ 0-$17,850
28% Over $29,750 Over $23,900 Over $17,850
Congress eliminated the benefit of the 15% bracket for
taxpayers with substantial income, by placing an additional 5%
surcharge on upper bracket taxable income beginning at approx-
imately $72,000 for married taxpayers and approximately
$43,000 for single individuals. Income above these levels
B-1
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will be taxed at a marginal rate of 33% (up to approximately
$190,000 for married taxpayers and $100,000 for single indi- ..I'
viduals), but the effective rate of tax will never go above
28%.
B. Corporate Tax Rates. J
For taxable years beginning on or after July 1, 1987,
corporations will be subject to the following rates on taxable
income:
Tax Rate
Taxable Income Current Law New Law
$25,000 or less 15% 15%
$25,001-$50,000 18% 15%
$50,001-$75,000 30% 25%
$75,001-$100,000 40% 34%
*$100,000-$335,000 46% 39%
over $335,000 34%
* An additional 5 percent tax up to $20,250 is imposed on taxable
incane in excess of $1,000,000. Corporations with taxable incane of at
least $1,405,000 pay a flat rate of 46 percent.
For tax years beginning before and including July 1, 1987 (~, 1987
calendar year returns), a blended rate will apply. The blended rate is
calculated by prorating the tax calculation based on the number of months
before and after July 1, 1987. For a calendar year corporation, the top
rate for 1987 will 40 percent (6 x 46% plus 6 x 34% = 480% divided by
12 = 40%) .
C. Planning Points.
A number of strategies are suggested for 1987 by the
change in individual and corporate tax rates.
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1. Capital Gain Preference. For 1987 only, capi-
tal gains are still taxed at a rate which is a little over 70%
of the ordinary income rate (28% max vs. 38.5 max). Careful
attention should therefore be paid to 1987 transactions to
maximize capital gain elements and minimize ordinary income/-
recapture elements. This will be particularly true in
* Asset sales -- depreciation recapture.
3. Hump Planning. The additional 5% tax which is
added to the maximum individual and corporate taxes to phase
out the effect of the lower brackets means that a premium will
be placed upon planning between tax years to stay out of the
5% surcharge area.
2. Installment Sales. In an installment sale, the
entire amount of ordinary income recapture must be reported in
the first year, regardless of the amount of cash received.
Don't be misled into thinking that an installment sale will
push ordinary income out of 1987 (at the 38.5% rate) and into
1988 (at the 28% rate). Rather, by careful planning it is
possible to structure the sale so that it does not close for
tax purposes until 1988.
r
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tion.
* Stock redemptions dividend/capital transac-
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4. Choice of Business Entity. As more fully
explained below, the inversion of the corporate and individual
rates - so that for the first time in tax memory corporate
rates are higher than the individual rates - will mean that
almost all new business ventures should be structured as S cor-
porations or partnerships.
II. CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
The new law essentially eliminates the preferential treat-
ment for capital gain. But the distinction between capital
and ordinary income is still retained in the Code, and has
several significant impacts.
A. Individuals.
In 1987, when the top individual rate on ordinary income
will be 38.5%, the top capital gain rate is 28%.
For ~988, capital gain income will be taxed at the same
rate as other income - including the 33% marginal rate for
income and gain between approximately $72,000 and $200,000.
B-3
However, the concept of capital gain is preserved. Thus,
capital losses will be allowed as a deduction in full against
capital gains as under prior law, and against up to $3,000 per
year of ordinary income to the extent capital losses exceed
capital gains.
It will therefore be important, for example, to continue
to make sure that regular corporations qualify for § 1244
(capi tal gain/ordinary loss) treatment on their stock. It
will also be very important in transactions where an economic
loss will be suffered to try to structure the loss as an ordi-
nary loss rather than a capital loss. Otherwise, the taxpayer
will suffer a significant economic detriment without a corre-
sponding tax offset, except to the limited extent that capital
losses can offset ordinary income.
B. Corporations.
The Act eliminates the preferential tax rate for corpo-
rate capital gains. For gains includable in income on or
after January 1, 1987, corporate net capital gain is taxed at
the regular corporate rate, with a maximum tax rate of 34%.
Capital losses are still deductible only against capital
gains.
C. Changes in Strategies.
Advance planning designed to produce capital assets and
capital gains will be beneficial under the law only for tax-
payers who have, or anticipate having, capital losses. The
overriding incentive under prior law to always plan to create
capital assets and capital gains to achieve lower tax rates no
longer exists. If a particular transaction ultimately pro-
duces a loss, taxpayers will continue to be motivated to avoid
capital asset classification in order to avoid the limitation
on deductibility of capital losses.
1. Downside Protection. Since the incentive to
produce capital gains will apply only to selected taxpayers,
most initial tax planning for conventional business transac-
tions is likely to focus on the avoidance of capital asset
status as insurance against the omni present possibility
(albeit unintended) that the transaction will ultimately pro-
duce a loss which, if a capital asset is involved, cannot be
deducted against ordinary income to any significant extent.
Planning of this sort will, however, be overshadowed in many
si tuations by other considerations: primarily, the need to
deal with the new, tougher alternative minimum tax, the new
limit on passive activity losses, the increased restrictions
on the deductibility of interest expense, and, in the short
B - 4
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run, the effect of the multitude of transition rules in the
Act and the possibility of future legislation reinstating a
preferential rate for capital gains.
2. Impact Areas. We see immediate and drastic
effects on the following types of transactions and related
planning: depreciation and other recapture provisions; col-
lapsible corporation strategies; partnership hot assets and
§ 736 redemption strategies; § 1239 restrictions on related
party sales; restricted property and § 83 (b) elections for
employees; and incentive stock option plans.
3. Acquisitions and Business Entity Choices. The
elimination of preferential treatment of corporate and share-
holder capital gains, and the imposition of a double tax on
corporate liquidation sales and distributions will drastically
change planning strategies for the purchase and sale of
closely held corporations, and for the choice of business
form.
III. DEPRECIATION AND TAX CREDITS
The investment tax credit is eliminated, retroactive to
January 1, 1986. Depreciation schedules will be lengthened,
wi th a resulting increase in the net after tax cost of pur-
chasing equipment.
A. Depreciation.
The Act provides eight classes of depreciable property,
each having a prescribed recovery period and depreciation
method; several other types of property will be individually
treated for depreciation purposes. Residential real property
(apartments) will be depreciable over 27-1/2 years, and non-
residential real property (office buildings and shopping cen-
ters) will be depreciable over 31-1/2 years, each using the
straight line method.
Personal property is assigned a recovery period of 3, 5,
7, 10, 15 or 20 years, based upon the current ADR midpoint
life. Property in the 3-year, 5-year, 7-year, and 10-year
classes will be depreciated using the 200% declining balance
method. Automobiles and light trucks will be in the five-year
class; seven-year class property will include furnishings and
fixtures used in apartments, offices, motels, and hotels.
Property in the IS-year and 20-year classes will be depreci-
ated using the 150% declining balance method.
B - 5
One element which will have to be included in the depre-
ciable basis of property is construction period interest
incurred after December 31, 1986. Rather than being amortized
over 10 years as under current law, construction period inter-
est will have to be capitalized and depreciated over the
depreciable life of the property as a construction cost.
Interest paid after December 31, 1986 will qualify for present
law treatment if substantial construction occurred before
March 1, 1986.
B. Investment Tax Credit.
The general investment tax credit for equipment is
repealed for all property placed in service on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1986. Property placed in service on or after that
date, but which was subject to a written binding contract to
construct or acquire as of December 31, 1985, will be eligible
for a reduced credit if it was placed in service by January 1,
1987 for property with a class life of 5 to 7 years, or by
July 1, 1986 for property with a class life of less than
5 years.
If property is eligible for the investment tax credit
under the transition rule, the amount of the allowable credit
is reduced by 17.5% for taxable years beginning in 1987 and
35% for taxable years thereafter. The reduction in credit
also applies to any credits carried forward from prior taxable
years. A full basis adjustment for the credit claimed will be
required.
A modified investment credit was, however, retained for
historic rehabilitation expenditures and low income housing
expenditures.
IV. MAJOR CHANGES IN ACQUISITION AND SALE
OF BUSINESS STRATEGIES
A. Frame of Reference.
Tax planning for the acquisition or disposition of corpo-
rate businesses has historically focused on the following
techniques.
* If the purchaser was buying stock, the purchaser
would consider making a § 338 election to get a tax basis for
the assets equal to the price paid for the stock.
* I f the purchaser was buying assets, the selling
corporation would make a § 337 election to avoid tax on the
sale of assets at the corporate level. Shareholders of the
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selling corporation would pay tax only at capital gain rates
on the liquidating distribution.
* If a corporate business was to be divided among
shareholders, and tax-free reorganization treatment for a
split-off under § 355 was not available, the preferred strat-
egy was to use a one-month liquidation under § 333 to avoid
tax at the corporate and individual levels.
* If a~ individual purchased stock of a corpora-
tion, results similar to the § 338 election (available only to
corporations) could be achieved by liquidating the acquired
corporation and operating as a partnership or sole proprietor-
ship. The liquidation would be taxable, but no liability
would be generated because the price paid for the stock would
ordinarily equal the fair market value of the assets distri-
buted.
The 1986 Tax Act repeals or undercuts all these rules,
and, subject to certain exceptions for closely held corpora-
tions which will expire at the end of 1988, requires that all
acquisition strategies and activities be immediately reviewed.
In addition, corporations which expect to be acquired or liq-
uidated at any time in the future must seriously consider
shifting to partnership or S corporation status now, or accel-
erating plans for acquisition or liquidation prior to the end
of 1988.
New Law Provisions.B.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
t
r
Under the new law (and subject to the exceptions noted
below), the following changes are made.
* A corporation which distributes assets in kind to
its shareholders is taxed at the corporate level as if it sold
the assets for their fair market value. In addition, the
shareholders pay a tax on the value of the assets received.
* The favorable provisions of § 337, permitting a
tax-free sale of corporate assets as part of a liquidation,
are repealed.
* The favorable provisions of § 333, permitting an
in-kind distribution with no tax at corporate or at individual
levels, are repealed.
The effect of these changes is that (assuming maximum
rates), a dollar of income or gain at the corporate level will
be SUbject to corporate and individual taxes of 52.5% (as
opposed to a maximum individual rate of 28%) before it reaches
B - 7
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C. Converting to S Status: A Loophole?
* The technical ways of avoiding the double tax in
the sale of a business have been eliminated.
* Preferential treatment for capital gains on the
sale of corporate stock (versus ordinary income) has been
repealed.
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* Earnings can no longer be accumulated at the cor-
level with lower tax rates than at the individual
Planning Point - if a corporation converts to S status,
there should be an adequate contemporaneous record of assets
and valuation to determine built-in gain for future planning
purposes. Such adequate documentation will be invaluable if a
later significant asset value increase occurs and the business
is sold. Allocation among assets in future acquisitions will
also be important.
porate
level.
Gains on sale or distributions of assets by S corpora-
tions will be presumed to be built-in gains, except to the
extent that the taxpayer can establish that the appreciation
accrued after the conversion. Built-in gain will be taxed at
the maximum corporate rate applicable to the particular type
of income for the year in which the disposition occurs.
It is true that a sale of stock will still only be taxed
at one level. But that's too easy. Buyers of stock will know
that they cannot get a stepped up basis for the underlying
assets without payment of the second tax; we therefore expect
to see stock sales at substantial discounts to reflect the
true economic difference to the buyer (versus an asset sale).
the shareholders' hands. In other words, there will almost
always be a double tax on the build up in value of a closely
held corporation which is not currently siphoned off by sal-
aries or other compensation. This requires all closely held
businesses to completely rethink their strategies and plans
for the future. This is true for three basic reasons.
Converting to S status will avoid the double tax on
appreciation in value at the corporate level, but only on
increases in value that occur after the conversion. Under the
new law, even if a corporation shifts to S status, a corporate
level tax will be imposed on any gain that arises prior to
conversion (so-called built-in gain) which is recognized by
the S corporation, through sale or distribution, wi thin ten
years after the date of the Selection.
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D. Exceptions - Closely Held Corporations.
Closely held corporations are entitled to present law
treatment with respect to liquidating sales and distributions
(and therefore may use § 333, § 336, and § 337) for transac-
tions occurring before January 1, 1989, provided the liqui-
dation is completed before that date.
To be eligible for the special transitional rule for
closely held corporations, a "closely held corporation" is a
corporation whose value which does not exceed $10,000,000 and
more than 50% of its stock must be owned by ten or fewer indi-
viduals who have held their stock for five years or longer.
If a corporation's value does not exceed $5,000,000, full
relief is available. If the value is between $5,000,000 and
$10,000,000, the relief is phased out 20% for each $1,000,000
of value.
Corporations which qualify as closely held under the
exception provisions may also make an S election prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1989, without becoming subject to the special S corpo-
ration built-in gain rules under the new law.
For purposes of the transition rule, a corporation's
value will be the higher of the value on August 1, 1986 or its
value as of the date of the adoption of a plan of liquidation.
Al though the exceptions are available until the end of
1988, the transaction involved will require major economic and
tax choices to be made by the owners of closely held busi-
nesses. Every closely held corporation should be carefully
reviewed and consideration for an Selection, conversion to
partnership status, or a complete liquidation should be care-
fully explored and analyzed well before the end of 1987, leav-
ing 1988 to implement the strategies (Which may include struc-
turing family redemptions, ESOPs, third party purchases, or
other corporate financing transactions).
V. PLANNING FOR THE INVERSION OF
CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL RATES
When the Act is fully effective, the maximum corporate
rate will be 6% higher than the top individual rate: 34% (39%
including the phase-out) versus 28% (33% including the phase-
out). The, combined effective rate on corporate income which
is distributed to individual shareholders will be 52.5% under
the Act (34% plus 28% of 66%, without regard to the phase-
out) •
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The elimination of the capital gain preference means that
the time-honored gambit of retaining the maximum possible
earnings at the corporate level with a view towards reducing
the tax ultimately paid by shareholders is no longer avail-
able. An individual shareholder who realizes the value of his
interest in retained corporate earnings through a sale of his
shares or the receipt of distributions in liquidation of the
corporation will be subject to the same rate of tax as if he
had simply received a fully taxable dividend.
Moreover, inasmuch as the General Utilities doctrine will
be repealed, along with Sections 333, 336 and 337, the share-
holder's ability to have corporate earnings reinvested in
property which appreciates, followed by a sale of stock or
assets with only one level of taxation, will be eliminated.
Under the Act, the deferral of the distribution of corporate
earnings can only defer, rather than reduce, the second tax
ultimately paid by a shareholder. For individual share-
holders, the only true escape from double taxation, as under
present law, is to die while still owning the shares.
The substantial rate differential in favor of individuals
and the advent of a purer form of double taxation of corporate
earnings, combined with the many other provisions of the Act
which are unfavorable to corporations (such as the new corpo-
rate alternative minimum tax which includes an adjustment for
50% of the excess of pre-tax financial statement over alter-
native minimum taxable income), creates substantial incentives
for new businesses to be structured in a noncorporate (or
S corporation) form and for existing C corporations to con-
sider shifting to either S corporation or partnership status.
A. Incentives to Form New Businesses as Partnerships.
Under the Act, partnerships are likely to become the pre-
ferred form of business organization for Kentucky clients,
except for those businesses where protection from tort liabil-
ity is essential. Many new businesses should be organized
initially as partnerships and should retain the partnership
form throughout their existence. Existing incorporated busi-
nesses which can be liquidated without great tax cost should
be liquidated into partnerships. For closely held corpora-
tions with a value of less than $5,000,000, the liquidation
needs to be accomplished by the end of 1988.
The advantages of the partnership form over the more tra-
ditional corporate form of business organization are numerous
and substantial. The major benefits are as follows.
B - 10
J
J
J
j
J
j
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
,.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
1. Avoiding Double Tax. If all taxpaying entities
are in the maximum tax brackets, the effective current rate on
the earnings of the business will be six percentage points
lower if a partnership rather than a corporation is used. If
any of the-earnings of the business are distributed to share-
holders, or if the corporation is subject to the accumulated
earnings or personal holding company tax, the differential
will be even larger. Moreover, the true differential over
time will be even larger because of the shareholder-level tax
that will ultimately be paid in most situations on a sale of_
the business, and because of the compounding effect of net
after tax investment. Use of the partnership form completely
avoids, as a practical matter, any double tax in connection
with distributions of earnings to the equity owners of the
business.
2. Flow Through of Losses. Tax losses generally
flow through directly to the equity owners as current deduc-
tions of a partnership, but not of a corporation (subject,
however, to the new limitation on the deductibility of passive
activity losses).
3. No Double Tax on Sale or Liquidation. No dou-
ble tax occurs on the sale or liquidation of a partnership
business.
B. Possible Tax Disadvantages of Conversion.
The foregoing tax advantages of the partnership form are
so substantial that, in most situations, they should overwhelm
the following tax and business arguments against utilization
of the partnership form.
1. No Reorganization Treatment. There are no provi-
sions comparable to the Section 368 reorganization rules which
would generally allow corporations to acquire partnerships in
tax-free transactions. This problem can be overcome through
careful planning in many situations.
2. Familiarity. The corporate vehicle is better known
and understood by investors and their advisers, and the law
relating to corporations is more developed and better defined
than the law relating to partnerships.
3. Employee Benefits and State Law. Generally, the
quantity and quality of tax-favored retirement benefits and
other fringe benefits that can be made available to an employ-
ee are the same under federal law regardless of whether the
employer is a corporation or a partnership. But there may be
B - 11
some distinctions under state law in favor of corporate
employees.
4. Liability. Use of a corporation generally insulates
its shareholders from the debts and liabilities of the corpo-
rate business, but in closely held corporations this invari-
ably applies only to trade creditor debts and most types of
tort liability. Bank financing or any significant credit
arrangements invariably require shareholder guaranties, which
as a practical matter cut deeply into the limits on liability
provided by a corporation ..
Although a partnership does not automatically offer lim-
ited liability to its partners, reasonable protection against
creditors of the business often can be achieved through the
formation of a limited partnership, possibly with a corpora-
tion as its sole general partner, or the judicious use of
insurance.
c. Exceptions.
There will, of course, continue to be some situations in
which it will be desirable to operate businesses in the corpo-
rate form. The owners of a small business which has no real
growth potential may find it desirable to form a corporation
to take advantage of the 15% corporate rate on the first
$50,000 of annual income. The 15% rate is sufficiently lower
than the 28% individual rate so that deferral of the share-
holder-level tax for a reasonable period of time (six to eight
years) will reduce the present value of the entire double tax
to less than a current 28% rate.
Similar considerations may apply in other situations
where all or most of the owners of the business will be active
in the management and control of the business, thereby jeop-
ardizing their status as limited partners for state law pur-
poses. Similarly, there will be situations in which the need
to insulate the owners of a business from its liabilities dic-
tates that· the maximum protection afforded by the corporate
form be availed of. On balance, however, it seems clear that
many fewer businesses should be incorporated than under prior
law.
D. New and Old Businesses: The SElection.
Utilization of an S corporation will be less attractive
under the Act than the formation of a partnership, but more
attractive than staying in a regular C corporation.
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The Code contains four major incentives for the use of
ESOP's for corporate financings and acquisitions.
6. Distributions of Appreciated Property. An S
corporation cannot distribute assets in-kind to its sharehold-
ers tax-free. A partnership can.
2. Limits on Losses. The ability of S corporation
shareholders to deduct entity losses is more limited than that
of partners.
4. Special Allocations. A partnership can, sub-
ject to certain limitations, make special allocations of tax-
able income and loss among its partners. An S corporation
cannot.
Limits on Stock. Only one class of stock can
VI. ESOP LOANS AND SECURITIES SALES
1. Limits on Shareholders. The 35-shareholder
limit, as well as restrictions on the types of shareholders
that an S corporation (no corporate or partnership sharehold-
ers; no 80% subsidiaries) may have, prevent an S election in
many situations. The 35 shareholder limit is particularly
troublesome for closely held-corporations which aspire to pub-
lic ownership, since it will eventually force them to choose,
in connection with public ownership, between a potentially
expensive liquidation and the termination of their Selection
in favor of conventional, tax-disfavored C corporation status.
3. State Taxes. Although Kentucky recognizes and
respects S corporation status, many other states do not. A
corporation which is organized as an S corporation but oper-
ates in states other th~n Kentucky must consider this poten-
tial problem.
7.
be issued.
5. Contributions of Appreciated Property. A part-
nership takes account of pre-contribution appreciation or
depreciation in the value of property in allocating taxable
income and losses among its partners. An S corporation can-
not.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
A. Lower Costs of Capital.
A properly structured loan to an ESOP, the proceeds of
which are used to purchase employer securities, entitles a
financial institution lender to exclude from income 50 percent
of the interest received.
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VII. TAX SHELTERS, PASSIVE LOSSE: . AND
INVESTMENT INTEREST
The second major benefit under curren"! law is that a
seller of stock to an ESOP is, assuming CE tain regulatory
requirements are met, entitled to defer incom! tax entirely on
gain from the sale, provided sale proceeds ar! reinvested in a
portfolio of United States operating comp nies. Gain is
deferred until the portfolio is liquidated. ' lis is an excel-
lent deferral device for senior executives re, 1y to sell their
companies whose intention is to retire and Ii e off the earn-
ings from their stock portfolio.
This benefit to the lender results in
rate for the borrower. Typically, negotiat
lender and borrower will produce an interes
between the institution's tax-free lending ra
its taxable lending rate (on regular obligati,
B. Deferral of Gain.
c. Deductible Principal Payments.
Because company contributions to an ESC
ESOP to make principal and interest paymentE
the technique can produce major real dol
effect, the purchase price of stock (the
investment) can be deducted. For a seller of
for deferral treatment, the ability to rei
sales proceeds in a stock portfolio (without
pay taxes to the _ IRS) dramatically increa
return and the real dollar return.
D. New Law: Estate Benefits.
Under the new law, these important bene:
and, in some cases, expanded. The new law ex
cent interest income exclusion to loans made
corporation as well as to the ESOP if secur
ferred to the ESOP within 30 days and the tel
no greater than seven years. An estate t,
50 percent of the proceeds from the qualified
securities to an ESOP has also been added to
Essentially, the new law - through a cc
rules - eliminates the use of tax sheltel
estate, oil and gas, and equipment leasing,
nary income from business activities. InterE
a tax shelter investment is included within i
and may not be deducted against other inc
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rate somewhere
~ (on IDB's) and
1S) •
) to enable the
are deductible,
~r savings: in
~lassic capital
;tock qualifying
rest the entire
first having to
~s the rate of
ts are retained
~nds the 50 per-
to the employer
ties are trans-
of the loan is
exclusion for
;ale of employer
le new law.
plex network of
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J
J
J
J
J
J
J
j
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
j
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
interest - interest paid to carry stocks, bonds, and other
investment property - will be deductible only to the extent of
investment income. Personal interest is nondeductible.
A. Passive Losses.
Any tax losses from a "passive activity," which is
defined as any business activity (regardless of what type of
entity is utilized) in which the taxpayer does not "materially
participate" (which is defined as actual involvement in oper-
ations), may not be utilized to offset salary income or income
from stocks, bonds or other portfolio items. This essentially
eliminates the use of multiple writeoff tax shelters to indef-
initely defer tax on current income from positive sources.
Losses from tax shelters can be utilized to shelter
income from other tax shelters. But economically this simply
puts shelters on the same footing as other investments. Tax
shelter losses can also be utilized to offset ordinary income,
but only when the tax shelter investment is completely termi-
nated. Since at the end of the tax shelter investment there
will normally be substantial recapture, the effect of this
rule is that tax shelter "losses" won't be available to offset
ordinary income unless the investor actually lost money on the
tax shelter.
B. Interest.
Under pre-1986 law, all personal interest (such as inter-
est on credit cards, car loans, and similar matters) was fully
deductible. Investment interest incurred to purchase or carry
stocks or similar assets was deductible up to the amount of
investment income, plus an additional $10,000.
The new law repeals the deduction for personal interest
entirely. With the exception of interest paid on a first or
second home (limited to the amount of the cost of the home as
opposed to its value), nonbusiness interest will not be deduct-
ible at all. Investment interest will be fully deductible,
but only to the extent of investment income.
The general effect of the limitations on use of passive
losses and the nondeductibility of personal and investment
interest will be that taxpayers can no longer count on a fed-
eral income tax subsidy for particular types of investments or
spending choices. Those investments and spending choices will
have to be made with after tax dollars rather than borrowed
money carried by interest at pre-tax dollar rates.
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VIII. SPECIAL 1986 TAX CHANGES APPLICABLE TO BANKS
AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 included a number of provi-
sions specifically applicable to banks and other financial
institutions, and several other provisions which will have
significant impact on banks.
A. Net Operating Loss Carryovers/Carrybacks.
Under the new law, a corporation will be permitted to
utilize net operating losses following a change in ownership
only to the extent of the "applicable Section 382 limitation."
This amount is determined by multiplying (i) the value of the
loss corporation on the day of the acquisition, ~ (ii) the
applicable federal long term rate.
For example, if the value of the loss corporation is $3
million, and the applicable federal long term rate is 6 per-
cent, then the "applicable Section 382 limitation" will be
$180,000 per year. Regardless of the size of the loss corpo-
ration's NOL, no more than $180,000 per year may be utilized
to offset post-acquisition income. Given the maximum IS-year
carryforward, the maximum NOL which could be utilized would be
$2,700,000 (15 times $180,000), even if the loss corporation's
NOL was $5 million prior to the change of ownership.
Prior law permitting financial institutions to carry NOLs
back ten years and forward five was repealed by the 1986 Act
for losses incurred in taxable years beginning after December
31, 1986. Such losses will be eligible for a three-year
carryback and a fifteen-year carryforward. The ten-year
carryback is retained for NOL' s incurred before 1994 to the
extent a loss is attributable to commercial bank bad debts.
These losses will be available as carry forwards to the suc-
ceeding five years.
B. Elimination of Bad Debt Reserves for Large Banks.
If a bank is a "large bank," i.e., one with an average
adjusted tax basis of all assets in excess of $500,000,000 for
any year after December 31, 1986, the bank may not use the
reserve method of computing its bad debt deducti~ Rather,
the bank must charge off and deduct bad debts under the spe-
cific chargeoff method. A bad debt deduction will be allowed
only in the year in which a loan is determined to be wholly or
partially worthless.
In addition, "large" banks will be required to recapture
existing bad debt reserves beginning in the "year of
B - 16
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disqualification," i.e., the year in which the adjusted basis
of the bank's assets exceeds $500,000,000, under one of the
following two methods.
* Fixed percentage recapture - 10%/20%/30%/40% over
four years, or at the bank's election an amount greater than
10% the first year and then 2/9's, 3/9's and 4/9's in succeed-
ing years.
* Cutoff-method recapture - chargeoffs and recov-
eries on loans in the portfolios as of the end of the taxable
year preceding the disqualification year would be treated as
adjustments against the reserve; additional deductions or
income would be taken/reported only when the reserve is re-
duced to zero.
Careful planning to document the worthlessness or partial
worthlessness of a bad debt will be necessary for large banks.
C. TEFRA Disallowance.
Under § 291 (e) (1) (B), 20 percent of a financial insti-
tution's interest expense allocable to indebtedness incurred
to carry tax-exempt obligations is treated as a "preference
item" for which no deduction is allowed. Under prior law, §
291(e) applied to obligations acquired after December 31,
1982.
Under § 265 (b) of the new law, no deduction is allowed
for the portion of a financial institution's interest expense
which is allocable to tax-exempt obligations, determined by
multiplying the gross interest expense by a ratio the numera-
tor Of which is the average adjusted basis of tax-exempt obli-
gations acquired after August 7, 1986, and the denominator of
which is the average adjusted basis for all assets of the
financial institution.
The increase in the TEFRA disallowance from 20 percent to
100 percent will have a major impact on the structuring of
acquisi tions. Taxable acquisitions will be treated as pur-
chases of obligations after August 7, 1986, with an attendant
100 percent TEFRA disallowance for the target's tax-exempt
interest expense. Nontaxable acquisitions structured as reor-
ganizations will permit a carryover basis and a carryover of
the 20 percent TEFRA disallowance.
D. Accrual Accounting Required.
Under prior law, a bank may use the cash receipts and
disbursements method of accounting for tax purposes as opposed
B - 17
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E. NOL Planning Opportunities.
to the accrual method of accounting. The cash method general-
ly permits a bank to control its income by accelerating pay-
ment of expenses and deferring collection of income items at
year end, and to benefit from the cash flow generated by tax
deferral.
The net adjustment from the change in accounting method
will generally be included in income over four years. Timing
for recognition of the net adjustment is determined under a
complex series of alternative rules, but it is possible in
certain circumstances that the entire adjustment would have to
be taken into effect in the first year that a bank's gross
receipts exceed $5,000,000.
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a § 338 election, or a liq-
337, may be valuable to an
the repeal of the General
Under the new law, banks and other taxpayers with average
annual gross receipts greater than $5 million for taxable
years beginning in 1987 and thereafter must change their
method of accounting for tax purposes to the accrual method,
subject to an election to remain on the cash basis with re-
spect to certain real property transactions, any loan or
lease, or any transaction with a related party, entered into
on or before September 25, 1985.
Average annual gross receipts are domputed by dividing
the sum of the gross receipts for as many of the previous
three taxable years (not including the current taxable year
and including only taxable years beginning after December 31,
1985) that the bank conducted business, by the number of such
taxable years. For purposes of the $5 million test, gross
receipts for any taxable year of less than 12 months are annu-
alized. Thus, for an existing calendar year bank, the annual
gross receipts test for 1987 will be based solely on calendar
year 1986.
Three situations exist where
uidation and sale pursuant to §
acquiring entity notwithstanding
Utilities doctrine.
* The first situation is where the seller bank has
NOL carryforwards. An election can be made with the consent
of the seller to use the seller's NOLs to offset the taxable
income generated immediately from the step-up in tax basis of
the acquired bank's assets. This method of utilizing NOL
carryovers may be particularly advantageous where the NOLs
would otherwise be limited by the new change of ownership
rules. § 338 (h) (10).
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* The second situation in which a § 338 election
may be advantageous is when the acquired bank has NOL carry-
overs that will be subject to the consolidated return separate
return year limitation rules. These rules limit the utiliza-
tion of NOL carryovers to the post-acquisition taxable income
of the acquired bank. A § 338 election step-up in the tax
basis would create increased future tax deductions not subject
to the SRLY rule. The tax liability resulting from the step-
up can be offset by the acquired bank's NOL carryovers. Thus,
with minimal additional tax costs, SRLY deductions can effec-
tively be converted into future deductions that can be used
wi thout limi tation to offset future taxable income of other
members of the group.
The third situation is where small, closely held corpo-
rations qualify for an exception from the repeal of General
Utilities. Banks which qualify for this exception would
generally not recognize gain or loss upon distribution of
assets in liquidation occurring prior to January 1, 1989,
where the liquidation (or stock purchase in the case of a §
338 election) is completed by that date. Gain or loss would
be recognized, however, for ordinary income assets and capital
assets held for less than six months. Investments will prob-
ably be classified as ordinary income assets. A small closely
held corporation is defined as any corporation whose value
does not exceed $5,000,000 and more than 50 percent of whose
stock is owned for a substantial period of time by 10 or fewer
individuals. There is a partial exception (a phase out) for
closely held corporations whose value is between $5,000,000
and $10,000,000.
F. Intangible Assets and Goodwill Allocations.
Under prior law, the Service and taxpayers fought a run-
ning battle as to whether a premium paid for assets in excess
of the fair market value of tangible and identifiable intangi-
ble assets (such as core deposit premiums, trust department
customer lists, and the like) could be allocated in a second
tier across all assets, including goodwill (the value of which
would normally be determined by appraisal). The Service took
the position that no second tier allocation was permissible,
and that the entire amount of any premium had to be allocated
to nonamortizable goodwill or going concern value.
The 1986 Act requires that any premium be allocated using
the "residual" method to nonamortizable goodwill rather than
being allocated ratably among all assets, effective for all
direct asset purchases, including purchases pursuant to § 337,
effective for any acquisition occurring after May 6, 1986.
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Regulations currently in effect require the use of the residu-
al method in § 338 deemed asset purchases.
Note that the new law does not require that any premium
in excess of book be allocated to nonamortizab1e goodwill.
Rather, the law requires that any premium paid for assets
which are not tangible assets or identifiable intangible
assets must be allocated to goodwill. Negotiations on future
acquisitions should therefore focus on the identification of
additional intangible assets which may not currently be on the
target's books.
G. Trust Department Changes.
The 1986 legislation creates a number of new rules which
will significantly alter traditional trust and estate planning
techniques used by families to reduce their overall income,
gift and estate tax burdens.
1. Unearned Income of Minor Children. Unearned
income in excess of $1,000 of a child under 14 will be taxed
at the parents' rates. Current techniques used to transfer
income tax burden to children under 14 will be significantly
affected. Tax savings on the first $1,000 of income (repre-
senting, perhaps, $10,000 to $15,000 of property) will still
be available, and there is no such income restriction for
children 14 years of age or older.
In practice, the new law encourages shifts from custodial
accounts to § 2503(c) trusts which permit accumulation of in-
come. If the trust income is not required to be distributed,
and is not in fact distributed, the unearned income on trust
property will not be reportable by the child, and thus will be
outside the scope of the new law. When the dependent reaches
age 14, the trust can make discretionary distributions to
equalize the tax brackets of the trust and the beneficiary.
Investments which defer recognition of income until after age
14 will also be encouraged under the new law.
2. Taxable Years of Trusts and Estates. Both
existing and newly created trusts (other than charitable
trusts) must now take taxable years ending on December 31,
effective for 1987. If a trust has a fiscal year, the trust
will have two tax years for 1987: its regular year, plus a
short period return ending December 31, 1987. The taxable
income to a beneficiary attributable to any short taxable year
must be spread ratably over a four-year period beginning with
the year of the change.
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3. Rate Schedule of Trusts and Estates. The tax
rate schedule for trusts and estates will be revised effective
for taxable years beginning in 1988. The first $5,000 of tax-
able income will be taxed at 15 percent, and any taxable
income in excess of $5,000 will be taxed at 28 percent. The
benefit of the 15 percent bracket will be phased out where
taxable income is between $13,000 and $26,000.
4. Clifford and Spousal Remainder Trusts.' The new
law eliminates the· benefits of Clifford trusts and spousal
remainder trusts by treating a trust in which the grantor or
his spouse has retained a reversionary interest in excess of 5
percent as a "grantor trust." A "grantor trust" is ignored
for income tax purposes, and the grantor is treated as the
owner of the trust property, so that all income is taxed
directly to him. The change applies to transfers made to
trusts after March 1, 1986.
Trust departments will have a double recordkeeping respon-
sibility for grantor trusts, Clifford trusts and spousal re-
mainder trusts for at least 10 years. The necessity for the
double recordkeeping is for transfers made to the entities
before and after March 1, 1986, which is the trigger date for
the new provisions.
5. Generation Skipping Transfer Tax. The new law
amends the present generation skipping transfer tax retroac-
tive to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, to impose a flat-rate tax
not only on transfers involving a sharing in benefits by more
than one generation, but also on direct transfers that skip
generations. A $1,000,000 per transferor specific exemption
is provided, with transfers in excess of that amount being
subject to tax at a rate equal to the maximum gift and estate
tax rate. In addition, the new law provides an additional
exemption of $2,000,000 per donee on direct skips to grand-
children until January 1, 1990. The provision is effective
for testamentary transfers made after the date of enactment
and for inter-vivos transfers made after September 25, 1985.
Since the current law is repealed retroactive to 1986,
banks will generally have to amend any reported generation
skipping tax return where a tax was paid. The change in the
generation skipping tax will not affect completely the taxa-
tion of trusts, because trusts for different generations can
still be used to reduce the overall tax burden: direct skips
will be taxed on a net-of-tax basis, while taxable distribu-
tions and terminations will be taxed on a tax-inclusive basis.
Direct skips will be required for the use of the grandchild
exemption.
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H. Current Inclusion of Discharge of Debt Income.
Pre-1987 law generally provided that gross income
includes income from the discharge of indebtedness. Excep-
tions were provided, however, for (i) discharges in Title 11
cases, (ii) discharges where the taxpayer was insolvent out-
side the bankruptcy, and (iii) discharges of "qualified busi-
ness indebtedness" of a solvent taxpayer, provided that an
election was made to apply the amount excluded to reduce the
basis of the taxpayer's depreciable property.
The 1986 Act eliminates the exclusion for discharge of
"qualified business indebtedness" of solvent taxpayers. The
effect of the change is to require that any discharge of debt,
other than in a Title 11 case or where the taxpayer is insol-
vent outside bankruptcy, results in the immediate recognition
of income in the amount of the discharge. The amount of the
discharge will be equal to the difference between the face
amount of the debt and any consideration (which may be none)
given by the debtor to effect the discharge.
An exception is provided for "qualified farm indebted-
ness" so that a solvent farmer may avoid current recognition
of discharge of debt income and reduce the basis of assets
instead.
I. Bankruptcy Exception to NOL Limitation Rules.
The 1986 Act creates an exception to the § 382 limitation
rules if (i) the loss corporation, before the ownership
change, is in Title 11, and (ii) the shareholders and credi-
tors of the loss corporation (determined immediately before
the ownership change) own, immediately after, stock of the
corporation that has at least 50 percent of the total combined
voting power and 50 percent of the value of the stock of the
loss corporation.
If the exception applies, then pre-change losses and ex-
cess credits that can be carried to a post-change year are
computed as if 50 percent of the amount which would have been
includable in gross income from an exchange of stock or debt
(but for the bankruptcy exception of § 108) had been so
included. In making the determination, NOL carryforwards to
any post-change year are determined as if no deduction was
allowed for interest paid or accrued by the loss corporation
on debt that was converted into stock under the Title 11 case.
If during the two years immediately following an ownership
change to which the bankruptcy exception applies, a second
ownership change occurs, the § 382 limitation amount with re-
spect to the second change will be zero.
B - 22
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
r
r
r
The AMTI will be reduced by a $40,000 exemption on a con-
trolled group .basis before the 20 percent tax is applied. But
this exemption is reduced by 25 percent of the amount by which
AMTI exceeds $150,000. Therefore, no exemption will be al-
lowed if alternative minimum taxable income is more than
$310,000.
Under the new law, the present add-on corporate minimum
tax is replaced with an alternative minimum tax. In general,
AMT will be computed by applying a rate of 20 percent to the
corporation I s alternative minimum taxable income, determined
by increasing regular taxable income by certain specified tax
preferences and adjusting that amount for special items. Cor-
porate taxpayers will in effect pay the greater of the AMT or
the regular tax.
A loss corporation may elect not to have the bankruptcy
exception apply. A new loss corporation should consider mak-
ing this election if the § 382 limitation is large enough to
make it likely that the loss corporation will be able to use
up substantially all of its carryforwards within a reasonable
time. While making the election will cause the new loss cor-
poration to be subject to the § 382 limitation, it will keep
the corporation from having to reduce the amount of its avail-
able carryforwards for discharge of debt income and interest
paid to creditors who exchange their debt for stock. In some
situations, it may be better to have the § 382 limitation on
utilization apply to the full amount of carryforwards, rather
than to have no utilization limitation apply to a lesser
amount of carryforwards (due to the 50 percent rule).
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J. Corporate Minimum Tax.
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available, and will be
or 20 percent times the
preference items. This
be carried over to future
An AMT credit carryforward is
equal to the lesser of the AMT paid
deferral (as opposed to permanent)
credit, subject to limitations, may
years to offset regular tax.
Tax preference items which will affect AMT calculations
for banks will include (i) deductions for losses and bad debts
of financial institutions in excess of an amount computed un-
der the experience method, (ii) accelerated depreciation on
real property in excess of straight line for pre-1987 acqui-
sitions, (iii) for real or personal property placed in service
after 1986, the difference between ACRS depreciation and depre-
ciation calculated under the alternative depreciation system
of 40 years straight line for real property and ADR midpoint
life with 150 percent declining balance for personal property,
(iv) tax-exempt interest on specified private activity bondsr
r
r
r
r
r
issued after August 7, 1986, and (v) one-half of the excess of
the adjusted net book income of the taxpayer over the alterna-
tive minimum taxable income computed without regard to this -
preference item.
* * *
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INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT CHANGES
AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT
William D. Roberts
,.
I. Introduction.
Eligibility.
B. The Tax Reform Act does make sweeping changes to
the rules which govern the deductibility of contribu-
tions to IRAs.
A. The Act generally leaves the rules governing eligi-
bility unchanged. An individual must have com-
pensation (or earned income in the case of a self-
employed individual) and, for all practical purposes,
not have attained age 70-1/2 in the year in which
the contribution is made.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "Act") has substan-
tially changed many of the provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code ("IRC") which affect individual
retirement accounts ("IRAs"). Many changes have
been made to simplified employee pensions ("SEPS"),
too. In the case of IRAs, the changes make IRA
contributions less attractive for those who are
more highly compensated. The SEP changes may make
these programs more attractive for small companies
although the effect on retirement savings through-
out the country is not likely to be large in the
short run.
A.
B. The changes in the law reflect the apparent atti-
tude of the drafters of the Act that a tax advan-
tage should be given to encourage only a basic
level of retirement benefits. Middle and low
income taxpayers should be provided incentives to
increase retirement savings because absent these
incentives, these groups are less likely to save
for retirement. High income taxpayers should not
receive incentives to save for retirement because
they are more likely to be able to adequately provide
for themselves without incentives. The new rules
will result in a lower level of benefits being
provided from individual retirement plans at a
higher administrative cost.
II.
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III. Deductibility of Cont~ibutions.
A.
B.
The general rule has not changed. An individu~l
may make a deductible contribution to an IRA up to
the lesser of $2,000 or 100% of the participant's
compensation (earned income in the case of a se1f-
employed individual) for a taxable year.
If an individual or the individual's spouse is an
active participant in a qualified retirement plan,
the dollar limit on the amount of the deduction
for a taxable year may be reduced (but never below
zero). IRC Section 219 (g) (1) •
1. The qualified plans which prevent an individual
from receiving a full deduction include: pen-
sion, profit sharing or stock bonus plans
qualified under IRC Section 40l(a); annuity
plans described in IRC Section 403(a); plans
established for federal, state or local govern-
ment employees by an agency or an instru-
mentality of such governmental bodies (exclu-
ding, however, deferred compensation plans
described in IRC Section 457); annuity con-
tracts or custodial accounts described in IRC
Section 403(b); SEPs as described in IRC Sec-
tion 408(k); or a trust described in IRC Sec-
tion 501 (c) (18) •
a. Participation in the Social Security or
Railroad Retirement (Tier 1 or Tier 2)
system is not active participation which
would preclude a deductible contribution.
IRS Notice 87-16, A-7. See Appendix A.
...
2. What is active participation? Different rules
will apply depending upon whether the plan is
b.
c.
A U.S. Armed Forces reservist who has
less than 90 days of active duty during
a taxable year is not considered to be
an active participant in a qualified
plan. IRS Notice 87-16, A-12. IRC
Section 219 (g) (6) (A) •
A volunteer firefighter who has accrued
an annual benefit not in excess of $1800
under a plan based upon his or her volun-
teer firefighting efforts is not considered
an active participant. IRC Section
219 (g) (6) (B) •
-
..
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a defined benefit plan or a defined contribu-
tion plan, but the following generally apply.
a. Retired employees who are receiving pen-
sion payments are not considered active
participants. IRS Notice 87-16, A-8.
Individuals who make employee contribu-
tions to qualified plans are considered
active participants. IRS Notice 87-16,
A-lO. Active participation is determined
without regard to the extent to which an
individual is vested in his benefit, if
at all. IRS Notice 87-16, A-14.
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b.
c.
For a plan which begins in 1986 and ends
in 1987, a special "overlap plan year"
rule applies. These plans are considered
to have two short plan years, one ending
December 31, 1986 and the other beginning
January 1, 1987. Actions attributable
to the 1986 short plan year that would
normally make an individual an active
participant for the year will not make
an individual an active participant for
the 1987 taxable year. In addition,
employer contributions or forfeitures
allocated during the 1987 portion of the
overlap plan year will be treated as
allocated on December 31, 1986, to the
extent the contributions are attributable
to compensation that would have been
paid (but for a deferral of salary) in
1986, was actually paid before January
1, 1987, or was attributable to services
performed before January 1, 1987. There-
fore, it may be possible to terminate a
non-calendar tax year plan and make an
allocation based on 1986 compensation.
This rule would also benefit those
employees who retired or terminated
service on or before December 31, 1986
and who will receive an allocation based
on compensation during that portion of
the year. IRS Notice 87-16, A-II.
Married individuals filing separate
returns are not affected by the active
c~
d.
participation of their spouses. IRS
Notice 87-16, A-3. Note, however, the
deductibility limits for married indivi-
duals' filing separate returns, infra.
page 6. Marital status is determined
as of the last day of the taxable year.
Therefore, if an individual is not married
at the end of this taxable year, the
active participation of his or her former
spouse is irrelevant. If an individual
marries during the year and the indivi-
dual's spouse is an active participant,
the individual will be treated as an
active participant if a joint tax return
is filed. IRS Notice 87-16, A-4.
The surviving spouse of a deceased tax-
payer who was not an active participant
for the taxable year is not treated as
an active participant even if a joint
return is filed for the taxable year of
death. However, the applicable dollar
limitation for adjusted gross income
(nAGI") purposes is $40,000 (see discus-
sion, infra. page 6). SUbsequent
taxable years are unaffected by the par-
ticipant's death and active participation
insofar as the surviving spouse is con-
cerned except that the $40,000 AGI limi-
tations may continue to apply. See IRC
Section 2(a). IRS Notice 87-16, A-S.
J
j
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3. For defined benefit plans, an individual is
an active participant if he or she is not
excluded under the eligibility provisions of
the plan for the plan year ending with or
within the individual's taxable year. Par-
ticipation for any portion of a plan year,
even one day, may preclude an individual
from making a fully deductible contribution.
IRS Notice 87-16, A-17.
a. If a participant declines to participate,
he is still considered to be an active
participant. The same rule applies if
the individual fails to make mandatory
contributions or if the individual has
failed to perform the minimum service
required to accrue a benefit under the
plan. IRS Notice 87-16, A-IS.
C-4
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b. But if the plan is a "frozen" defined
benefit plan, the individual is not con-
sidered an active participant. IRS Notice
87-16, A-16. That is, if benefit accruals
under the plan have ceased, the individ-
ual is not an active participant. But
if the individual's compensation increases
and the compensation could increase the
amount of benefit he or she receives,
the plan will not be considered fr~zen.
c. Distribution in a year of a benefit
accrued in prior years is not active
participation so long as the individual
was excluded under the eligibility pro-
visions for the plan year in which the
distribution is made. IRS Notice 87-16,
A-18.
In the case of a defined contribution plan,
an individual is considered an active partici-
pant if employer contributions, employee con-
tributions or forfeitures are allocated to
his or her account with respect to a plan
year ending with or within the individual's
taxable year.
a. Individuals who do not meet the require-
ments of a plan for performance of a
specified number of hours (most often,
1,000 hours of service in a plan year)
or employment on a given date (most often,
the last day of the plan year) so as to
receive a contribution or allocation are
not considered active participants. IRS
Notice 87-16, A-20.
b. An indiviudal may receive allocations of
earnings on an existing account balance
without becoming an active participant,
so long as the individual is not eligible
for an allocation of forfeitures or con-
tributions. IRS Notice 87-16, A-19. If
the individual is eligible for an alloca-
tion of forfeitures or contributions,
but the sponsoring organization fails to
make a contribution, the individual is
an active participant. IRS Notice 87-
16, A-2l.
c- 5
c. Those who receive a contribution as required
by IRC Section 416, Special Rules for
Top Heavy Plans, are active partici-
pants. Any amount contributed or allocated
(other than earnings), even if it is only
$1, will result in active participation.
See IRS Notice 87-16, A-22 and A-13.
Likewise, those individuals who defer
compensation under Cash or Deferred
Arrangements ("CODAs") under IRC Section
40l(k) are considered active participants.
IRS Notice 87-16, A-23, A-24 and A-25.
,
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B. The amount an individual may deduct depends upon
marital status and AGI as well as active partici-
pant status.
1.
2.
Individuals who are not active participants
in qualified plans or whose spouses are not
participants in qualified plans may make a
fully deductible IRA contribution.
No deduction is allowed if an active partici-
pant's AGI exceeds a specified amount. The
amount depends on the individual's filing
status as follows:
FILING STATUS
Single
Married filing jointly
Married filing separately
AGI
$35,000
$50,000
$10,000
3. If an individual is an active participant and
if his AGI is less than a specified dollar
amount, he or she will be able to make a fully
deductible IRA contribution. The applicable
amount is determined as follows:
FILING STATUS
Single
Married filing jointly
Married filing separately
AGI
$25,000
$40,000
$ 0
4. For individuals whose adjusted gross income
falls between the upper and lower applicable
amounts as outlined above, the deductible J
J
r
r
r
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dollar limit is phased out. For each $1,000
of compensation above the lower limit, a par-
ticipant loses $200 of deduction on a full
$2,000 contribution.
a. To estimate the deduction an individual
may take, IRS Announcement 86-121 provides
a table. See Appendix B.
Special Rules may apply.
The announcement also provides a formula
by which the exact amount of the deduc-
tion limit may be calculated. Presumably,
the formula will be used on the individ-
ual's 1040 Form.
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b.
c.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
The deduction limit is not reduced
below $200 until the deduction for
active participants reaches $0.
IRC Section 219 (g) (2) (B) •
If the deduction limit is calculated
and is not a multiple of $10, it
must be reduced or rounded down to
the next lowest multiple of $10.
IRC Section 219 (g) (2) (C) •
AGI is calculated after taking into
account any passive loss limitations
under IRC Section 469 and any taxable
Social Security benefits under IRC
Section 86. Therefore, adjusted
gross income is calculated first
for the purposes of passive loss
limitationsi second, for purposes
of determining the Social Security
benefits that are taxablei and third,
for purposes of the limit on IRA
deductions.
In determining the adjusted dollar
deduction limit for married indivi-
duals filing a joint return, the
couple's adjusted gross income is
aggregated. IRS Notice 87-16, B-1.
Nondeductible Contributions.IV.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
To restate the obvious, a taxpayer may now make a
non-deductible IRA contribution to the extent of
the excess of the lesser of $2,000 ($2,500 in the
case of a spousal IRA) or 100% of compensation
offset by the amount of the IRA contribution which
is deducted. IRC Section 408(a) (1). Nondeductible
contributions may be made in lieu of deductible
contributions. Earnings on contributions, whether
deductible or nondeductible, are not taxed until
the income is distributed.
In order to make a nondeductible contribution, the
contribution must be designated as such on the
individual's tax return for the appropriate taxable
year. If the taxpayer overstates the nondeductible
portion of a contribution on his tax form, he or
she may be subject to a $100 penalty for each over-
statement. An exception is provided if the over-
statement is due to a reasonable error and the
taxpayer has taken action to correct the overstate-
ment. See IRC section 6693(b).
Both deductible and nondeductible contributions
may be made to the same IRA. The individual is
not required by the Internal Revenue Code to dis-
tinquish between deductible and nondeductible con-
tributions to the institution holding the IRA.
IRS Notice 87-16, C-1.
Amounts contributed to an IRA, whether deductible
or nondeductible, may be treated as excess contri-
butions and withdrawn by April 15th of the year
following the year for which the contribution was
made. Any earnings on the excess contribution
which must be distributed as required by IRC Sec-
tion 408 (d) (4) (C) will be sUbject to the 10% addi-
tional income tax imposed by IRC Section 72(t).
IRS Notice 87-16, C-2. Although no additional
contributions may be made after April 15 of the
year following the year for which contributions
are made, a designation of a contribution as
deductible or nondeductible may be changed by amend-
ing the tax return prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations. IRS Notice 87-16, C-3.
An individual may not rollover employee contribu-
tions from a qualified plan into an IRA even though
C- 8
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Total Nondeductible Contributions
All IRA Balances + Distribution + Outstanding Rollovers
the character of nondeductible IRA contributions
is similar to nondeductible contributions.
Distribution rules with respect to IRAs which con-
tain only deductible contributions have not changed.
To determine what portion of a distribution includ-
ing nondeductible contributions is deductible, the
Service provides the following formula:
Distributionx Amount
An outstanding rollover is a distribution
received in one taxable year from an IRA (but
not rolled over in that year) which may still
be rolled over into another IRA in the follow-
ing taxable year. This is a distribution for
which the 60 day rollover period begins in
one taxable year and ends in another.
For purposes of the formula, an individual
must treat all individual retirement accounts,
individual retirement annuity contracts, SEP
account balances, and rollover IRAs as a single
IRA. Qualified voluntary employee contribu-
tions are not aggregated.
The total IRA account balance is the fair
market value, including realized and unrealized
appreciation, of all IRA vehicles, determined
as of the last day of the taxable year in
which the distribution is made. IRS Notice
87-16, D-l. Distributions for one taxable
year are aggregated and valued as of the day
of distribution.
1.
2.
3.
G.
F.r
r
i
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
4.
5.
Excess contributions returned pursuant to IRe
Section 408(d) (4) of the Code do not enter
the calculation.
Individuals may not designate a distribution
as coming from nondeductible contributions.
Each withdrawal is treated as a pro rata
recovery of both non-taxable and taxable por-
tions. IRS Notice 86-17, D-2. These rules
r
r
I
may not be avoided by taking a total with-
drawal from an IRA and rolling over an amount ~
equal to the portion which would otherwise be
taxable, but for the rollover. In such a
case, the amount withdrawn, less the amount
rolled over, is the amount actually distribu-
ted. Again, the pro rata distribution rule
will apply to this portion. IRS Notice 87- J
16, 0-3. Therefore, nondeductible IRA con- -
tributions not only may, but must be rolled
over from one IRA to another in the same
manner as deductible contributions. ~
6.
7.
Loss on an IRA may be recognized only when
all amounts have been distributed and when
amounts distributed are less than the indivi-
dual's unrecovered basis. IRS Notice 87-16,
0-6.
IRAs belonging to a participant's spouse are
not aggregated for the purposes of determining
the individual's account balance.
,j
v. Administrative Issues for Custodians and Trustees.
-A. IRS Announcement 86-121 provides a "non-technical
explanation" of the provisions of the Act as they
affect IRAS. The announcement may and should be
used by master and prototype IRA sponsors to
update disclosure statements. The announcement is
designed to meet the requirements of Treasury
Regulation Section 1.408-6.
1•. Note, however, that the disclosure need not
be provided to those who are making contribu-
tions for the 1986 tax year.
I
...
2. The regulations imply and Treasury officials
unofficially agree that the disclosure would
be necessary only in the case of contributions
made for tax years beginning after December
31, 1986.
B. An IRA trustee or custodian has no duty under the
Act to differentiate between deductible and nonde-
ductible contributions. That is, the trustee need
C-10
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Spousal IRA.
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VI.
C.
D.
E.
A.
B.
not maintain records which account for the basis,
if any, that a contributor has in an IRA. The
taxpayer is responsible for calculating the taxable
amount on an IRA distribution. IRS Notice 87-16,
D-ll.
For purposes of withholding on distributions from
IRAs, the payor is required to assume that the
entire amount of an IRA distribution is taxable.
IRC Section 3405 (d) (1) (B) •
An individual's employer or former employer must
inform the individual as to whether he or she is
an active participant for each taxable year. Active
participation status will be reported on the form
W-2. IRS Notice 87-16, A-I.
The Treasury will promulgate regulations which
will detail trustee and custodian reports to the
IRS concerning IRAs. Copies will be furnished to
depositors no later than January 31 of the calendar
year following the calendar year to which the
reports relate. IRC Section 408 (i) (1) •
The Act has made a change in the spousal IRA rules
of which some taxpayers may be able to take advan-
tage. Under prior law, spousal IRAs could be estab-
lished for a participant and his spouse if they
filed a joint return and if the spouse had no com-
pensation. The deductible amount increased from
$2,000 to $2,250, although only $2,000 could be
contributed into one account. If one spouse had
some compensation, but not $250 in compensation,
that lower-earning spouse could establish the IRA
only up to the amount of compensation received.
Under the Act a couple may elect on their income
tax form to treat the lower-earning spouse as having
no compensation at all for the taxable year. IRC
Section 2l9(c) (1) (B) (ii). Therefore, a spousal
IRA will be available for that spouse. This provi-
sion is effective for taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1985. No deduction is allowed for
taxable years before 1986.
Qualified voluntary Employee Contributions Eliminated.
A. Qualified.voluntary employee contributions ("QVECs")
have been eliminated for tax years beginning after
December 31, 1986. The repeal does not affect
contributions on behalf of the 1986 tax year so
long as they are made before April 15, 1987 and
designated as made for the 1986 tax year.
Gold and Silver Coins.
VII.
VIII.
B.
A.
B.
C.
Qualified plans which retain these IRA-like contri-
butions need not amend plan documents to repeal
them until the last day of the first plan year
beginning on or after January 1, 1989. In addi-
tion, the funds need not be distributed.
An IRA may not be invested in a "collectible" with-
out the amount invested being considered distributed.
Coins are generally collectibles. See IRC Section
408 (m) •
An exception under the Act, however, allows an IRA
to invest in gold or silver coins issued by the
U.S. IRC Section 408(m) (3). The investment is
available for contributions made prior to December
31, 1986, as well as contributions made after that
date.
An IRA may not invest in a coin which has been
made into jewelry. These coins are still consi-
dered collectibles. IRS Notice 87-16.
1
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IX. Miscellaneous issues.
A.
B.
Effective date of the provisions relating to lRAs
is the first taxable year beginning after December
31, 1986 unless otherwise noted. Because the Act
generally affects individual deductions and not
individual retirement arrangements themselves and
because most taxpayers are calendar year taxpayers,
the provisions generally apply beginning in calendar
year 1987.
No date is specified in the Act for amending model
lRAs, master lRAs or prototype lRAs. The IRS will
notify custodians, trustees, and sponsors as to
C-12
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when they should amend their documents. IRS Notice
87-16.
Simplified Employee Pensions.
To maintain a salary reduction SEP, an employer
can have no more than 25 employees at any time
during the preceding tax year. IRC Section
406 (k) (6) (B). An election to defer salary for a
year must be made by at least 50% of all employees
of the employer. The sponsoring employer may not
be a state or local government agency or tax exempt
organization. IRC Section 408 (k) (6) (E). These
sponsors are required to use the deferral provi-
sions of IRC Section 457.
Among other objectives, the Act was intended to
reduce the administrative burdens for SEPs. It
also provides for a new kind of SEP which is main-
tained pursuant to a salary reduction arrangement.
See IRC Section 408(k) (6). Thus, an employee may
reduce his current salary and have his employer
contribute the money to an IRA account, thereby
reducing his income taxes and saving money. The
employer incurs little expense in operating the
program.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
t
,
,.
,
r
,.
1
r
r
r
I
A.
B.
1. In operation, at~least two kinds of tests
will limit the salary reduction type of con-
tributions.
a. The contribution on behalf of an employee
may not exceed the lesser of 15% of the
employee's compensation or the dollar
limit in effect for the year on annual
additions to qualified defined contribu-
tion plans. This limit is currently
$30,000 and is likely to remain at this
level for a number of years. See IRC
Section 4l5(c) and (d). Elective defer-
rals under SEPs are aggregated with CODA
election deferrals for purposes of the
$7,000 limit of IRC Section 402(g}(3).
b. The elective deferrals are also subject
to an Average Deferral Percentage ("ADP")
test. The deferral percentage for each
highly compensated employee (as defined
C-13
s
in IRC Section 4l4(q» eligible to par-
ticipate may not be more than 1.25 times
the average of the deferral percentages
for the year for all employees of the
employer who are eligible to participate
and who are not highly compensated
employees.
i.
ii.
iii.
The deferral percentage is deter-
mined by dividing the elective
employer contributions actually
paid to the SEP on behalf of an
employee by the employee's compen-
sation. Compensation of all
employees who are eligible for a
contribution, whether or not they
elect to have contributions made on
their behalf, is aggregated for the
purpose of this test. The deferral
percentage of the non-highly compen-
sated is reduced for those who elect
not to have contributions made on
their behalf.
Although this test is similar to
that used for CODAs, it differs
because each highly compensated
employee's deferral percentage is
measured against the average of all
non-highly compensated employees.
In addition, the 200% and 2% limit
portion of the test applicable to
CODAs does not apply. SEP non-
elective contributions may not be
combined with elective SEP deferrals
to increase the deferral percentage
for non-highly compensated so as to
allow the highly compensated to
contribute a greater percentage
amount.
Excess deferrals made on behalf of
the highly compensated participants
will be returned to them in a
manner which is consistent with the
rules governing CODAs under IRC
Section 401 (k) (8). IRC Section
408 (k) (6) (C) •
i
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2. Contributions made under salary reduction
SEPs are exempt for income tax, unlike other
I
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C.
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E.
F.
SEP contributions which are included in income,
but deductible.
The age at which an employee is eligible for par-
ticipation in all SEPs has been lowered from 25 to
21 to be consistent with plans qualified under IRC
Section 401 (a). See IRC Section 408 (k) (2) •
The Act adds a minimum compensation requirement
for the first time. IRC Section 408(k) (2). Employ-
ees who receive less than $300 in annual compensa-
tion may be excluded from participation in a SEP.
The $300 amount will be adjusted for inflation
beginning in 1988 (in the same manner as the dollar
limitation for defined benefit plans qualified
under IRC Section 40l(a».
Employers may now elect to have their SEPs main-
tained on a fiscal year basis. IRC Section
408 (k) (7) (C) •
One of the more important aspects of the SEP changes
is the provision which allows plans to integrate
with Social Security just as defined contribution
plans do. IRC Section 408 (k) (3) (D) and 401 (1) (2) •
SEP distributions are to be included in the gross
income of a payee or distributee in the same manner
as distributions from IRAs are treated under IRC
Section 408(d). IRC Section 402(h).
r,
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G.
1.
2.
Salary deferral SEPs may not take advantage
of the new integration rules.
These provisions are generally effective for
plan years beginning after December 31, 1988.
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Amnplllnll ...... Ta Act"
1986
fIGticI 87-16
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (die Act)
substantially modified the p~ions of
the Internal Revenue Code relating to In,
dividual Retirement Arrangements
(IRAs). Specifically, provisions of tile Act
reduce and, In some cases, eliminate lie-
ductlons for IRA contributiolll, allow
nondeductible IRA contributions, and
change some of the current rules con-
cerning collectibles and spousal IRAs. In
general, these provisions are effective for
taxable years beginning after December
31, 1986.
This Notice provides guidance con-
cerning these provisions, and, until ap-
plicable regulations are publisheli,
taxpayers may rely on the guidance pro-
vided in this Notice to resolve the issues
which are specifically conside~d. How-
ever, some issues related to the treatmept
of lRAs are not addressed in this Notice.
No conclusions should be drawn with reo
spect to these· issues or the rulOns for
their exclusion from this Notice.
T'""C4IlIIInII
I. Deductible Contributions to
lRAs
A. Active Participant Status
B. Adjusted Gross Income
II. Nondeductible Contriblltions
to IRAs
III. Distributions
IV. Spousal IRAs
V. Collectibles
VI. Withholding
VII. Deductible Employee Contri-
butions
VIII. IRA Arrangements
I. Deductible ContributiollS to lRAs
A. Active Panicipant Status
An Individual who is not an active par-
ticipant in a retirement ammgemellt spec-
ified in section 219(g)(5) of the Cpde may
make a deductible IRA contriblldan fot
the taxable year of up to tile 19'5er of
$2,000 ($2,250 for spousal IRAs) or 100%
of compensation. An individual who is
married and files a joillt federal Income
tax return will be treated as lilt active par-
ticipant If such Individual's spouse is an
active participant.
Section 21~)oftheColle~ tNtt
if an Individual Is an active "rtl~pant In
lIuch a reti~ment arran~ment for II ~.
able y~ar, the S2/000 ($2.2,50 (or srousal
IRAs) dollar limit on~ ifIdivjdual11l de-
4uctlon may be redu~or .1"ate4 fQr
sllch year. Accordingly, the f1~t step ill
determining fhe permissible IJlA deClw;·
tion for a year is to determille active par-
ticipant status for the tlillable year.
For purposes af the IRA lieliuction
rules, an Individual shall be lUI "active
Participant" for a ~able year if eithllr
the individual or the individual's IIPOuse
(with whom the individual files a joint tax
return) actively participates in any of tlle
foHowing:
1) a qllalifled plan dl(~bed In sec.
tlon401(a) of thc Code,
2) an annuity plan dClscril>ed in sec-
tion 403(a) of the Code,
3) a plan eStllblls/lell for its !!m-
pIoyees by fhe federal. $ta~e qr local
governlllent or by an agency or in'
strumentll~tyther~f (other than a
plan described In setfion 457 of *e
Code),
4) an annuitY ~ntract or custodial
account described in section 403(b)
of the C<x1e,
5) a simplifh;d employee pcpslon
described in section 408(11.) of the
Code, or
6) a trust described in sClction
501(c)08) of the Code.
See Questions Al thrPllgh At4 for ac-
tive participant rules that llpply to all plans.
In deteTllllning when lin individual· ill
an actjve: participant in a retire/Dcnt aI'
rangllment for II taxable Yllar, dlffeyellt
rules are applied, depending jlPOn whether
the retiremllnt ammgement Is a defined
benllfit or a defineli· contribution plan.
Delll1ed Benefit Plan Rule
In the ClIse of a defined benefit plan,
an indlvidullI who is not el'cl"lded UJldllr
the eligibility prpvislQn$ of the phm for
the plan year Ilndill8 with or within t~e
individual's ~axable year shall be lUIllctive
participant in the plan. rC$ardlc:ss of
whether such Individual has elected to de-
cline particlPlltion III the plan, has failed
to make a mandatory co"tpbution 1IpeC"
ifled pn4!!r the plan or h~ failed to per-
form the mlnimllm service reqllired to
accrue a benefit ll11der the plan. For ex-
IUDple;
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An individllal is a calendar year tax-
payer who is not e1tcluded from partie-
!palion under the provisions of a defined
benefit pian with a july 1 to June 30
pI"" year· The incfividual separates from
IlCrv~ onDe~ber31, 1987. Because
tlt-C illdivillual Is not excluded under the
pIlln's eligilJility "ravisions for the plan
year ending in such individual's 1988
taable year. $uch Individl1al shall be an
ac;tlve participant fQr the 1988 taxable
year.
See Questions A15 through A18 for de-
fined benefit plan active participant rules.
Defined ContribQtion Plan Rule
Generally, in the case of a defined con-
tribution pian, an individual shall be an
active participant if employer or em·
p10Yee I:ontributions or forfeitures are al-
located to such individual's account with
r~ctto aplan year ending with or within
the jndividual~s taxable year. For exam-
ple:
Company B sponsors a mOlley pur-
chase pension plan with a plan year
~ding on June 30. The plan provides
that contributions must be allocated as
of the last day Qf the plan year. On
Decembllr 31,1987, an Individual em-
ployed by the Company separates from
service. The contribution for the plan
year ending on June 30, 1988 is not
IDade until February 15,1989, when the
Company jiles its corporate return. In
this case, the Individual Is an active par-
ticipant for such individual's 1988 tax-
able year.
A special rule applies to certain plans
in which it Is impossible to determine
whether or not an amount (other than
earnings) will be allocated to ..n individ-
ual's account for a given plan year. If,
with respect to a particular plan year, no
aIDount attributable to forfeitures, em-
ployer contributions or employee contri-
butions has been allocated to an
individual's account by the last day of the
plan year, and contributions to the plan
arc purely discretionary for the plan year,
slll;h Individual shall not be an active par·
licipant for the taxable year in which such
plan year ends. If, however, after the end
of such plan y.ear, the employer contrib-
l,UeS an amount for such plan year, an
individual to whose account an allocation
Is ma4e shall be an active participant for
-----------------------------~~--~~
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the taxable year in which the contribution
is made.
Contributions shall be treated as purely
discretionary for the plan year if, as of the
end of the plan year, the employer is not
obligated under the law or tenns 9' the
plan to make a contribution for the pi<,jl
year, and whether or not cQntributions
are made to the plan is ultimately de-
pendent upon the employer's decision or
factors within the COntrol oHhe employer.
Contributions are not purely discretion-
ary merely because they are dependent
on profits. For example:
An individual covered by a profit-
sharing plan separated from service on
December 31, 1987. The plan year runs
from July 1to June 30. Under the terms
of the plan, emp)(;>yer contrib~tions, if
any, shall be made at the complete dis-
cretion of the Board of the pirec;tors
and shall be contributed to the plan
prior to the due date for filing the em-
ployer's tax return. Such contributions
are allocated as of thel last day of the
plan year, and a11~tions are made to
the accounts of individuals who have
any service during the plan year. As of
June 30, 1988, no employer or em-
ployee contributions has been made that
are allocated to the June 30, 1988 plan
year, and no forfeitures had been al-
located within the plan year. In addi-
tion, as of such date, the employer was
not obligated to make a contribution
for such plan year and it was impossible
to determine whether or not a contri-
bution would be made with respeCl to
the plan year. On December 31,1988,
the Board of Directors agreed to' con-
tribute a specified amount to the plan,
with respect to the plan year ending
June 30, 1988; on February IS, 1989,
such contribution was made to the plan.
As a result of the amount allocated to
such individual's a<;count as of June 30,
1988, the individual is an active partic-
ipant in the plan for the 1989 calendar
year but not for the 1988 year.
See Questions A19 through A26 for tlie
defined contribution plan rules.
General Active Participant Que$tions
AI: How will an employer report active
participant status for a taxable year?
A: An individual's employer (or for-
mer employer) must inform an individllal
of active participant st!ltus for the taxable
year of the individual. This status \1Iust
be reported on a Form W-2.
A2: If .n individual is nqt an active
participant, bllt such individ~al's spouse
is an active participant, will the illdividual
be treated !Is an active participant?
A: If the couple files a joint federal
income tax return 'or tbe 1lpplicable year,
4lC:~\';' ~~~-:~;:r::::':'",: ;".,~:':l~~'r ~r'''~:-~e ',"_'1E
cause both spouses to be IreMc,d a~ active
participant. But see QUllstipn A3.
A3: If an individuld is married but files
a separate tax return, \Will active partici-
pation by his or her spouse affect the in-
dividual's active participallt status?
A: No. Section 219(g)(4) of tlie Code
provides that a married individual who
files a separate tax return is considered
single for purposes of determining active
participant status. l1,,'\s, if tbe individual
is not an active participllnt, tbe fact that
his or her spouse is an active participant
will not limit such individual's IRA de-
duction.
A4: If II married individllal obtains a
divorce dunllg his or her taxable year (and
does not remarry during such year), is the
individual considered all active partici-
pant merely because the former spouse is
an active participant for the year?
A: /110. Marital statlls is determined as
of the end of the year. ThIlS, if the indi-
vidual is not married at the end of the
year, tlie fact thatliis or lier former spouse
is an active participant will not cause the
individual to be treated as an active par-
ticipant. Similarly, if an individual mar-
ries during the year, lind the individual's
new spouse is an active participant, the
im:Jividual sh~1I be treated as an ~ctive
participal1t for the entire nar if the cou-
ple files a joint tax retllrn.
A5: If a married individu~1 dies during
a taxable year and is an active participant
for such tax~ble year, will the sl\rvivor be
treated as an active participant for pur-
poses of section 219(g) pf the Code?
A: Yes. In the taxable year of death,
active participati(;lD is determined as if the
decea~dspouse was still !Ilive. Thus, if
the deceased spouse was an active partic-
ipant for the taxable year of death and a
joint return is filed for the taxable year of
death, the survivor will also be treated as
an active participant. In such a case, the
applicable dollar limitation for AGI pur-
poses is $40,000. (See I. B., below.) For
taxable years follQwing lhll taxable year
of death, the deceased spouse's status as
an active participant in tlie year of death
has no effect on the survivor's status as
an active participant because the survivor
is not treated as married to the deceased
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spouse for purposes of the active partic-
ipation rules. However, for AGI pur·
poses, in those cases in which the survivor
meets the filing status requirements under
section 2(a) of the Code, the survivor will
use the 5~rn~ $40,000 applicable dollar
Ilmitatic,,· "S~': by ma:r:ed taxpayers filing
jointly.
A6: An individual has an amount de-
ferred for a taxable year in a plan de-
scribed in section 457 of the Code. Does
participation in such a plan cause the in-
dividual to be an active participant?
A: No. Section 219(g)(5) of the Code
specifically exempts unfunded deferred
compensation plans described in section
457 of the Code from the definition of
relevant plans for purposes of determin-
ing who is an active participant. Partici-
pation in any retirement plan established
by a state or local government, other than
a plan described in section 457 of the Code,
is active participation for purposes of sec-
tion 219(g)(5) of the Code.
A7: Is an individual who is covered un-
der Social Security or Railroad Retire-
ment (Tier I or Tier II) an active
participant?
A: No. Under Section 219(g)(5), nei-
ther Social Security nor Railroad Retire-
ment (Tier I and Tier II) is a retirement
arrangement for purposes of determining
active participant status.
A8: Is a retired ipdividual who is re-
ceiving pension annuity payments an ac-
tive participant?
A: No. An individual will not be treated
as an active participant merely because
the individual receives benefits under a
retirement arrangement described in sec-
tion 219(g)(5) of the Code.
A9: If an individual in ineligible for
benefit accrual in a retirement plan that
is integrated with Social Security solely
because the compensation of that individ-
ual is below the integration level or be-
cause the full benefit will be offset by Social
Security, is the individual an active par-
ticipant?
A: No. In the case of a defined benefit
plan, an individual who is not excluded
under the eligibility provisions of the plan,
but who is nonetheless ineligible to accrue
a benefit under a plan because compen-
sation is below the intf"gration level or
whose benefit will be fully offset by social
security for the plan year ending with or
within the taxable year, shall not be an
active participant in such plan. (Note: This
is an exception to the gcneral rule appli-
cable to defined benefit plans, and it is
l
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limited to the facts let fonh in the pre-
ceding sentence.) Similarly, in a defined
contribution plan, if an individual is in-
eligible' for an, alIoc:ation in a plan year
because of the individual's compensation
is bel9w the intearatioo level, such indio
vidual shall DOt be an, active participant
for the taxable year with or within which
such defined contribution plan year ends.
AI0: Is an individual who makes em·
ployee contributions to a qualified plan
described in section 219(g)(5) an active,
participant?
A: Yes. If an individual makes either
voluntary or mandatory employee con-
tributions to a plan, such individual shall
be an active participant for the individu-
al's taxable year containing the end of the
plan year in which the contributions are
allocated.
All: In the case of a plan year that
begins in 1986 and ends in 1987, will ac·
tions attributable to the 1986 part of the
plan year that would normally make an
individual an active participant for a year,
make an individual an active participant
for the 1987 taxable year?
A: No. For purposes of determining
whether an individual is an active partic-
ipant for 1987, a plan year beginning in
1986 and ending in 1987 (an "overlap plan
year") is to be treated 85 two short plan
years, the first ending on December 31,
1986 and the second beginning on January
I, 1987. In addition, any employee con-
tributions or employer contributions or
forfeitures allocated during the 1987 por·
tion of the overlap plan year shall be treated
85 allocated on December 31,1986 to the
extent such contributions are attributable
(i) to compensation that would have been
paid (but for a deferral election) or was
actually paid before January I, 1987 or
(ii) to services performed before January
1,1987.
For example, if a participant in a cash
or deferred arrangement that is part of a
plan with an overlap plan year elects to
have no elective deferrals made out of
compensation that would have been paid
(but for the deferral election) in the 1987
portion of the overlap plan year, such par-
ticipant will not be treated 85 an active
participant for the 1987 taxable year merely
because of the elective deferrals made out
of compensation that would have been
paid (but for the deferral election) before
January 1,1987. Similarly, if a participant
in a defined contribution plan with an
overlap plan year separates from service
from the employer on December 31, 1986,
such participant will not be treated as an
active participant for the 1987 taxable year
merely because all employer contribution
that is based on the participant's com-
pensation and service before January I,
1987 is allocated to such participant's ac-
count as of the last day of the overlap plan
year.
A12: Is an individual considered an ac-
tive participant merely because such in-
dividual participates in a plan as an Armed
Forces reservist if the individual has less
than 90 days of active duty during the
year, or participates in a plan described
in section 219(g)(5)(A)(iii) of the Code,
based on activities as a volunteer fire-
fighter?
A: No. Such individual is not an active
participant pursuant to section 219(g)(6)
of the Code.
A13: If only a single dollar is allocated
to an individual's account for a plan year
(in a defined contribution plan), or an in-
dividual accrues a benefit of only one dol-
lar for a plan year (in a defined benefit
plan), is such an individual an active par-
ticipant in such plan?
A: Yes.
A14: If an amount is allocated to an
individual's plan account for a plan year
in a defined contribution plan, or an in-
dividual accrues a benefit for a plan year
in a defined benefit plan, but such indi-
vidual has no vested interest ill such ac-
count or accrual, is such an individual an
active participant in such plan?
A: Yes. Active participant status is de··
termined without regard to vesting.
Defined Benefit Plan Active Participation
Questions
A15: In many defined benefit plans a
participant's right to benefit accruals is
conditioned upon the performance of a
prescribed number of hours of service. If
an individual does not complete the req-
uisite hours of service needed in order to
accrue a benefit in a plan year, is the in-
dividual an active participant for such year?
A: Yes. If the individual is not cx-
c1uded under the eligibility provisions of
the plan for the plan year with or within
the individual's taxable year, the individ-
ual is an active participant.
A16: If an individual participates in a
defined benefit plan in which benefit ac-
cruals are frozen for the entire plan year
ending with or within the individual's tax-
able year, is such individual an active par-
ticipant in such plan for the taxable year?
A: No. When a plan is frozen, i.e.,
'..
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when benefit accruals under • pIID bavo
ceased for all participants, an individual
in such a plan is not an active participant.
However, where a beneftt may vary with
future compensation, all accruals wiD DOt
be considered to have c:eued. For ex-
ample, a "High 3" plan, in wbicb future
accruals have c:eued but the actual beDeftt
will depend upon future compensation,
will not be considered u • plan in whicb
accruals have ceased for all participants.
A17: Ifa calendar year defined benefit
plan terminates on January 2, 1988, is an
individual who is covered under the plan
an active participant for such individual's
1988 taxable year?
A: Yes. If an individual is not excluded
under the eligibility provisioDs of the plan
for any portion of the plan year ending
with or within the taxable year, the in-
dividual is an active participant. Accord-
ingly, an individual covered by the pIID
shall be an active participant for the tax·
able year in which the plan year ends,
whether or not the plan terminated.
A18: If a calendar year defined benefit
plan terminates on November 30, 1987,
but does not commence distributions until
January 31, 1988, is an individual covered
under the plan an active participant in
either plan year?
A: As noted in question A17, the in-
dividual will be an active participant for
the taxable year within which the plan
terminates (1987) because such individual
was not excluded under the eligibility pr0-
visions of the plan in the plan year which
ended with or within the taxable year. In
the 1988 plan year, a participant is ex-
cluded under the eligibility provisions for
the plan year which ends with or within
the participant's taxable year because the
plan has terminated.
Defined Contribution PlIIIa Active
Participation Questions
A19: Is an individual an active partic-
ipant merely because eaminp are allo-
cated to such individual's lICCIOlIDt?
A: No. An individual is DOt an active
participant merely because eaminp have
been allocated to such individual's ac-
count.
A20: Certain defined contribution plans
rondition the right to an allocation on the
performance ofa specified numberolbours
(e.g., 1,000) or on the employment of the
participant on a certain day. In such a
plan, if an individual does DOt meet the
condition for a particular plan year, is the
individual an active participlDt with reo
active patticipant merely due to eligibility tributions to a clilcretioaary defIDecI con-
to plllticipa'-e ill a CODA. tributionpianfortwoplaDyearuremade
A25: If an individual makes an elective in one calendar year, IOleIy for the pur-
deferral during a plan year, but later has poses of determiJliDa aetiw putidput
the deferral distributed from the plan as status, the contributions for the later plan
an excess deferral, pursuant to section year are deemed to be made in the nat
402(g)(2) of the Code, is such individual tallableyear.lnthefadpatterndellCribed
an active participant for the taxable year above, the contribution made on Novem·
with or within which ends the plan year? ber 30, 1988 is deemed to be made in
A: Yes. For purposes of determining taxable year 1989. Thus, the individual is
active participant status, if an individual an active participant in both the 1988 and
chooses to make an elective deferral to a 1989 taxable years.
plan, the individual is an active partici· B. Adjusted Grou Income
pant for the plan year as of which the An active participant with AGI below
deferral rontribution is allocated, regard- the "applicable dollar limitation" rnay
less of whether the rontribution remains make a deductible contribution to an IRA
in the individual's aecount. up to the limits of section 219(b)(1) or
A26: A profit shaling plan has a July (c)(2)(A) of the Code, as applicable. The
1 to June 30 plan year. Under the terms "applicable dollar limitation" for an in-
of the plan, employer contributions, ifany, dividual's taxable year is $25,000 for sin-
are made at the sole discretion of the Board gle taxapyers, $40,000 for married taxpay-
of Directors. As of June 30, 1987, no em- ers filing a joint tax return, and zero for
ployee or employer contributions have married individuals who file separately.
been made and no amounts have been The AGI used for purposes of section
forfeited for the plan year ending June 219(g)(3)(A) (IRA deductions for active
30, 1987. Moreover, it is impossible to participants) is calculated iIfter takiDg into
determine whether a contribution will be account social security benefits (section 86
made for the plan year ending on June of the Code) and losses or gains on passive
30, 1987. On January 15, 1988, the em- investments (section 469 ofthe Code). IRA
ployer makes a contribution for the plan contributions are not deducted.when de-
year ending on June 30, 1987. On No- termining the relevant AGI.
vember 30, 1988, the employer makes a If an individual is an active participant
contribution for the plan year ending June with AGlless than $10,000 above the apo
30, 1988. plicable dollar limitation, the individual
On June 30, 1989 it is again impossible may make a deductible contribution to an
to determine whether a contribution will IRA equal to the lesser of (i) the adjusted
be made for the plan year ending on that dollar deduction limit, or (ii) 100% of
date, and no contribution is made by De- compensation. Such adjusted dollar de-
cember 31,1989, Will a participant in the duction limit is based upon the amount
plan described above be an active partic- by which the AGI exceeds the applicable
ipant only for the 1988 taxable year? dollar limitation. This is calculated using
A: No. In such a situation, when con- the following formula:
$10,000 - (Excess AGI) Maximum Permissible _ Adjusted nollar
$10,000 )( Dollar Deduction . Deduction limit
spect to the taxable year within which such
plu year ends?
A: No. An individual is not an active
puticipant in a defined contributon plan
if, under the terms of the plan, the indi-
vidual is not entitled to an allocation of
c:ontributions or forfeitures to the indi-
vidual's account with respect to the plan
year ending with or within the individual's
taxable year.
A21: If an employer sponsoring a de-
fined contnbution plan is required to make
a contribution to an individual's aecount
but fails to do so (whether or not in vi-
olation of section 412(d) of the Code), is
an individual for whom an allocation is
required an active participant in the plan
for the plan year ending in the individual's
taxable year?
A: Yes. In the case of such a plan, if
an allocation must be made to an individ-
ual's account with respect to a particular
plan yeu, such individual shall be an ac-
tive participant in the taxable year in which
IUcb plan year ends, regardless of whether
the contribution is made.
A22: If a plan is required to make a
top heavy minimum allocation for the plan
year, and must make an allocation to the
account of an individual who would not
otherwise be entitled to an allocation for
the plan year, is the individual an active
participant merely because a top heavy
minimum allocation is made to such in-
dividual's account?
A: Yes. If a top heavy minimum is re-
quired to be allocated to an individual's
account, the individual is an active par·
ticipant for the taxable year in which ends
the plan year with or within which the
allocation is required to be made.
A23: If an individual elects to defer
compensation under a section 401(k) cash
or deferred arrangement (CIDA), is such
individual an active participant?
A: Yes. An individual who elects to
defer compensation pursuant to a plan de-
lICribed in section 401(k) shall be an active
participant. The same rule applies to elec-
tive deferrals and salary reductions under
sections 408(k), SOl(c)(18), and 403(b).
A24: If an individual who is eligible to
make elective deferrals under a CODA
declines to make elective deferrals for a
year, and no other contributions or for-
feitures are allocated to such individual's
IlXOUDt for the plan ye8J. ending with or
within the individual's taxa\)le y$r, is such
individual an active participant for that
year?
A: No. An individual shall not be an
El'cc.s AGI is the amount by which the
individual's AGI exceeds the applicable
dollar lin,itation.
The maximum permissible dollar de-
duction is the section 219(b)(I)(A) limit
of $2,000, 0, ,he section 219(c)(2)(A)(i)
limit of $.2,250, in the case of a spousal
IRA.
If the adjl.r.~teddollar deduction limit is
not a n"~rtipie of 10, it is rounded up to
the fie~ highest $10 increment. If the
amount Sf' calculated is below $200, but
above zel'O, tile adjustable dollar deduc-
ilv'lllimit equals $200. The 100% of com·
pensatiol) limit is unaffected by these
adjustments to the dollar limit.
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An individual is never permitted to take
a deduction in excess of IUcb individual's
compensation. Thus, if the individual's
compensation is less than the adjusted
dollar deduction limit, the adjusted dollar
deduction limit is equal to 100% of com-
pensation. (See example 4).
Example 1: An individual who is single
and an active participant in a section 403(b)
annuity contract arrangement for a tax·
able year has an AGI for the taxable year
of $33,000 (this is determined iIfter the
403(b) salary reduction). To calculate the
individual's adjusted dollar deduction limit
the following steps must be taken:
J
>1
..Ii
-
J
J
«
..
I
J
510,000 - $8,000 12 000 S400 ad' d doD d d . I"$10,000 .' '" x ," Juste ar e uetJon 1DIIt.
Applicable Dollar Limitation .. 525,000
Excess AOI .. ($33,000 - 125,000) .. 18,000
Maximum Permissible Dollar Deduction - 52,000
Applicable Dollar Limitation .. $40,000
Excess AGI - (S46,SSS - $40,000) .. S6,SSS
Maximum Permissible Dollar Deduction .. 52,250
510,~O:;':'SSS x $2,250 = 5775, rounded to 5780.
The adjusted dollar deduction limit for Exfl11lPle 4: A married individual filing a
the cx>uple is S780. Second, to determine separate tax return is an active participant
the maximum portion of this amount that for a taxable year. The individual's AGI
may be aJlocated to a lingle account, the and compensation are 51,500 for the tax-
method in example 2 is used. Thus, no able year. The adjusted dollar deduction
more than S690 of the S780 adjusted dol- limit is calculated as foDows:
lar deduction limit may be contributed to
either of the two 1RAa.
Applicable Dollar Limitation - $0
Excess AGI - 51,500
Maximum Permissible DoDar Deduction - 52,000
A: When QOII1putin& the adjulted d0l-
lar deduction limit for each spouse _
a joint tax return, the couple's agrepte
AGI is used. (See example 2 above.)
B2: How is the adjusted dollar deduc-
tion limit ealculated when an individull's
compensation for a taxable year is leas
than 52,OOO?
The adjusted dollar deduc:tion limit is
first calculated under section 219(b)(1)(A)
or section 219(c)(2)(A)(1). The iIIdivid-
ual may then make a deduc:tible contri-
bution to an IRA to the extent of the
lesser of the adjusted dollar deduction limit
and the 100% of compensation limit of
section 219(b)(I)(B) or section 219(c)
(2)(A)(ii). (See example 4 above).
II. Nondethlctible Contributimu to IRh
Section 408(0) of the Code provides
that a taxpayer may make a n0ndeducti-
ble IRA contribution provided that such
amount does not exceed the amount de-
scribed in section 219(b)(1) or (c)(2)(A)
of the Code (as applicable) reduced by
the IRA contribution which are deducted '
for the year. Thus, an individual may mate
nondeductible contributions to the extent
of the excess of (1) the leaser of $2,000
($2,250 in the case of a apouaaJ IRA) or
100 percent of compensation, over (2) the
amount of the IRA contribution which is
deducted. An individual may make n0n-
deductible contributions in lieu of de-
ductible contributions. Earninp attribu-
table to deductible or nondeductible IRA
contributions will not be subject to in-
come tax until distribution.
When a taxpayer makes a 1IOIIdeduct-
ible IRA contribution, any nondeductible
portion of the IRA contribution must be
indicated on the tax return for the year
in which the contribution is made and ill
each subsequent year until the amount is
fully recovered (section 408(0)(2)(C) of
the Code). A taxpayer who OYentales the
nondeductible designation on the tax form
is subject to a 5100 penalty per overstate-
ment unless the overstatement is due to
reasonable cause and the taxpayer dem-
onstrates that steps have been taten to
correct the overstatement (see section
6693(b) of the Code).
Nondeductible IRA Contribution
Questions
Cl: May nondeductible aDd deducti-
ble contributions be made to the same
IRA?
A: Yes. Section 408(0) of the Code
provides that an individual need DOl des-
ignate a contribution as dedlK1ible or
elected to be treated as having no com-
pensation, a spousal IRA could be estab-
lished for that individual. To calculate the
maximum amount of a spousal IRA con-
tribution which may be contributed to an
account, the individual must use a two
step process. First, the adjusted dollar de-
duction limit for the couple is calculated
(assume the combined AGI is the same
as in Example 2):
Dethlctibility Questioll$
Bl: In determining the adjusted dollar
deduction limit, is the calculation de-
scribed above performed on each spouse's
separate AGI or on the couple's aggre-
pteAGI?
x 12,000 .. 51,700
Each spouse may establish an IRA and
may mate a deductible contribution of
S690 lot the taxable year. Neither spouse
may make a deductible contribution ill
exccaa of that amount; that is, ifone spouse
mates a deductible contribution of only
$100, the other spouse's deductible con-
tribution is still limited to S690.
Ezfl11IPIe 3: If either spouse, in example
2, had no compensation for the year, or
Exfl11lPle 2: AD illdiyiduans DOlan active aation in excess of 52,000. Their AGI is
participant ill a plan, but the illdividual's S46,sSS. The adjusted dollar deduction
spouse is an active participant lot the tax- limit for each spouse is calculated as fol-
able year. They file a joint tax return for lows:
the taxable year and each baa QOII1pen-
Applicable Dollar Limitation .. $40,000
Excess AGI .. (S46,SSS - $40,000) - S6,SSS
Maximum Permissible Dollar Deduction
for the individual .. 12,000
Maximum Permissible Dollar Deduction
for the individual's spouse .. 12,000
-,1;;;O.!,::;,000~-~6z:::,SS=S;... 12 000 S689 S690
- x, .. , rounded to .
10,000
$10,000 - 51,500
510,000
The adjusted dollar deduction limit is
51,700. However, because the individual
may not deduc:t an amount ill excess of
100% of compensation, in this example,
the iIIdivict_ may mate a deductible
contribution of ~Iy $1,500.
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nondeductible until the tax return is filed.
Moreover, the individual is f1ot, undel' thi
Cock, required to report the noudedm:;l'
ible status of the cootribution to the bank
or institution holding the IRA. Accord··
inJIY, both deductible and nondeductible
contributions may be made to asingle IRA.
C2: What is the rule for removing ex-
cess contributions?
A: Prior to the Act, section 400(d)(4)
do the Code permitted individuals who had
made excess contributions to an IRA to
witbdraw such excess IRA contributions
with earnings by April 15 of the year fol·
lowing the year for wbich the contribution
was made. By withdrawing the excess in
sucb manner, the individual was abie to
avoid the excise tax under section 4973 of
the Code applicable to excess IRA COil"
tributions. Under the Act, amounts con-
tributed to an IRA for an individual.'s
taxable year (both deductible and non-
deductible contributions) may be treated
as excess contributions and withdrawn by
the individual by April 15 of the following
if all individual is not yet
iim.~ of the withdrawal, upon
'/"ili."'.i ~"it.;.; :"iell amounts the individual
,iill te; j';i.\,',h"j tc pay the early with-
dr"w~l .SiC mld", J<:ction 72(t) on the
,,,,..,ill'._ (if ;mf) {or the year for which
th" col1,I'ibutimtwas made.
(3: May II taxpayer change a deduct-
ihk tiolljeJllctible designation of a
cm".riblitiilll '" an IRA on a prior year's
retum?
,,".: 'Ita. designation may be
';M.qji.d h'} "",ending the tax return prior
to -:xpin"i,j/t of the statute of limitations
un <.ssessmen!s, pursuant to section 6501
of llll'; C,,,1<:. Of course, since contribu-
liens l;n,s, be made by April 15 of the
yeac f"li,Ydh,g the year for which the con-
t,i!mticIl arc made, no additional cootri-
b,.itic'~15 may be made after that date.
04: May be an individual roU over em-
ployee: wntributions from a qualified plan
to a.1 iRA.
A: Nn. :jGi.'tion402(a)(5)(B) continues
~:Lj Ih'ohibit f.uch a rollover.
.
111. DiltribllliolU
In general, the rules of lIedioa 12, iD-
duding section 72(e)(8), wiD apply to the
taxability of distributions from lRAa. To
the extent that the followin& rules are iD-
consistent with the rules let forth in sec-
tion 72, the rules in this Notice govern.
For example, if an individual bas a lingle
IRA annuity contract the rules herein,
which generally treat such a distribution
as being an amount not received as an
annuity under section 72(e), sbal1 apply
rather than thole let forth in section 72
for annuities.
An individual who bas made IlODde-
ductible contributions bas, with respect to
the IRA, investment in the cootract (i.e.,
basis). In such a case a portion of the
distribution will be treated as a nontax-
able return of the nondedue:tible cootri-
butions (return of basil). The portion of
the distribution attributable to the return
of nondeductible cootributions is deter-
mined by using the following formula:
-
...
)
.Total Nombillctiill<:;. C~mtlii:mtions
Total IRA Account Balance + Distribution Amount x Distribution Amount
+ Om5tal'lding Rollover
C,,,mi,k: individual makes the fol-
}.)Wi:t~g{:{H'lt:ttbution;3:
....
ductible contributions, in 'this case
$1,714.30. Thus, the reduced nondeduc-
tible contribution balance equals $6,000
minus $1,714.30, or $4,285.70. The por-
tion of the distribution which is not inclu-
dible in gross income for 1993 is calculated
as follows:
$4,285.70 $3000 S926 64
$10,875 + $3,000 x , - .
$926.64 of the $3,000 distribution consists
of return of basis. The remainder is in-
cludible in the individual's income.
1be c:aJculation to determine the DOn-
taxable portion must be made each year
in which a distribution is received.
See D7 below for an example involving
outstanding rollovers.
DiltribUlion Qumioru
Dl: How is the return of basis in a
distribution calculated ifan individual has
a number of accounts and annuity con-
tracts but only wishes to take a distribu-
tion out of one account?
A: Section 408(d)(2) provides that, for
purposes of calculating the tax on IRA
distributions during a calendar year, all
IRA accounts and contracts (including
SEPs and rollover 1RAs) are treated as a
single IRA, taken at fair market value at
Nondeductible
$0
$0
$0
$1,000
$1,000
$2,000
$2,000
$6,000
Dedu~'tible
$2,000
$2,000
$2.,000
$J ,OCIO
$1,00.)
$0
1!'L.,_..
.,,:,'Ount balance on Decem-
$10,875. There are no out-
.,n.;j\',~"'. The total nondeductible
made to any IRA must be
• J !'OItion of prior distribu-
31 h;bulahle to return of nonde-
19;~4
1985
1986
i9~fj
1988
198"9
1990
31., 1992, the individual
"\,Ge;' ;;Oil " tlishiblllion of $5,000. At the
.::ml year, the total IRA account
li. $U,500. There are no out-
·,t:iL:.i'T,g n:Akwers. lhe portion of the dis-
'dh·!'/m,,,/hi;;!l is not includible in gross
1992 is calculated as follows:
ii.dude amounts previously
wit!i'ldnawn vunmant to section 408(d)(4)
of lhe (A)O,,:.
An "outstanding rollover" is any amoum
distributed by an IRA within 60 days of
the end of the taxable year, not rolied
over to another IRA by the end of the
year, but rolled over in the following yeal
to another IRA before the 60 days end.
When making these computations the
individual shall treat aU IRAs, whether
accounts or annuity contracts, maintained
by the individual as a single IRA. This
includes amounts held in Simplified Em-
ployee Pension (SEP) IRAs and 1'0110\1(:1
1RAs. In general, the total IRA account
balance is the fair market value ofall lRAs,
Q>mputed as of the last day of the. taxable
year in which a distribution was made
The fair market value includes both reo
alized and unrealized appreciation. The
distribution amount is the sum of iill dis-
tributions from the IRA during til" UlK
able year. Each distribution is valu~d as
of the day of distribution. Neither the llti
merator nor the denominator of the "t·uv£
S6,0IJ()__,
$12,500 ... $5 /n:~)
$1,714.30 of the $5,000 distribution Wi"
sists of a return of basis. The remaindei
is includible in the individual's inl".cm,·.
On June 30, 1993, the individual
ceives a distribution of $3,000. No ",ekE
tional contributions are made in 1993; and
22
r($23,000 + >; $300 = $59.41
$7,000) + 5300
(IRA Account Balance .... .'. .
+ Outstanding Rollover)(DlsuwullOn)
$10.000$14,000 x 56,000 = $4,285.71
The remaining balance is S14,000 - 56,000 = $8,000
The remaining basis is 510,000 - $4,285.71 = $5,714.29
JM.ll. S23000$20,000 '
~
53,000
from one IRA to another, .. iDdi¥iduII
must roll over amounts Ittriblatable eo
nondeductible c:ontrlbutions as well as de-
ductible c:ontributions.
D5: In what dl'CUlllltalllCe doeIaa in-
dividual rec:oanize a loss from aalRA?
A: A loss from an IRA may be rec-
ognized only when aU amounts bave been
distributed and the amounts distributed
are less than the individual's unrecoverecl
basis. For example:
An individual makes c:ontributlons t0tal-
ing $10,000, all nondeductible, to aa IRA,
The IRA earns $4,000 over the course of
the 5 years. Distributions commence at
the end of the fifth year and the individual
removes $6,000. The nontaxable portion
(return of basis) equals
tion. On January 30, 1990 the individual
rolls over $7,000 to another IRA. Tbe
year-end valuations of the accounts show
the following:
The amount removed from IRA A and
rolled over on January 30, is, of course,
not included in the valuation as of De-
cember 31, 1989; nor is the S300 distrib-
uted from IRA B and not rolled over later.
To calculate the taxability ofthe 1989 dls-
tribution that was not rolled over (the
5300), the "outstanding rollover" (lbe
$7,000) must be added back to the de-
nominator of the fraction used to deter-
mine the portion of the distribution
attributable to basis. The portion of the
distribution attributable to basis is thus
calculated as follows:
72(t)(2)(A)(iv), distributions before age
59V, are not subject to the additional tax
if they are in the form of substantially
equal periodic payments over the life or
life expectancy of the individual, or of the
individual and his or her beneficiary. In
D3: Upon an IRA withdrawal, mayan
individual who has made nondeductible
c:ontributions to an IRA segregate the ba-
sis from the taxable portion of the with·
drawal (using the formula above) and avoid
taking any amount into income by rolling
over the portion which would otherwise
have been taxable?
A: No. In such a case the amount with·
drawn less the amount rolled over is the
amount actually distributed. This amount
would be used in the pro rata calculation
to determine what portion is recovery of
basis, and what part is included in gross
income.
04: May amounts attributable to non-
deductible contributions be rolled over
from one IRA to another?
A: Yes. Indeed, itl rolling over amounts
56,000
ac:c:ount by December 31, but is later !'Oiled
over after December 31 and before the
60th day after the distribution, it is an
"outstanding rollover" and is added to the
denominator of the equation used to de-
termine the portion of the distribution at-
tributabe to basis. If it is not rolled over
in a timely manner, the distribution is not
treated as an "outstanding rollover." For
example:
An individual has two IRAs and has
made a total of 56,000 of nondeductible
IRA contributions.
The individual takes a $30() distribution
from IRA B on October 10, 1989. On
December 11, 1989, the individual re-
ceives $7,000 from IRA A. There has 110t
been any earlier distributions from either
IRA. As of December 31, 1989, the in-
dividual has not yet rolled any amount
into another IRA and thus, the year-end
valuation does not indude the distribu·
this calculation.
D8: Is there any way to mlike an early
distribution of IRA funds before age 59Y2
without incurring the additional tax under
section 72(t)1
A: Yes. Under Code section
the end of the calendar year in which the
distributions are made (with the amount
of the distnbution added bac:k in, other
than distributions roDed over to another
IRA within the year). For purposes of this
sec:tlon it docs not matter whether the in-
dividual rec:eives distributions from one
ac:c:ount or IeVerai ac:c:ounts.
D2: Mayan individual designate a par-
ticular distribution as being from sum in-
dividual's nondeductible contributions?
A: No. Generally, under the new rules,
each withdrawal is treated as a pro rata
rcc:overy of both the nontaxable portion
(basis) and the taxable portion. This is
true regardless of whether the nonde-
ductible contributions are kept in a sep-
arate ac:c:ount with withdrawals only made
from that separate ac:c:ount.
In the next year the IRA sustains a loss
of 55,000. The ac:c:ount balance as of the
end of the year is $3,000, which is less
than the remaining basis. If the individual
withdraws the entire $3,000, no pro rata
calculation is necessary and the individual
may claim a loss of $2,714.29. If the tax-
payer withdraws less than the entire bal-
ance, the pro rata c:aJcuJation is necessary.
D6: How is the taxability of a distri-
bution determined when an individual has
rolled over funds from one IRA to an-
other?
A: Any amount distributed and rolled
over during the taxable year (i.e., com-
pleted before December 31) will be pres-
ent in an IRA ac:c:ount as of the close of
the year and will be reported as part of
the aggregate IRA account balance.
However, if an amount is distributed from
an account within the last 60 days of the
taxable year and is not rolled into another
D7: In calculating the IRA ac:c:ount
balance for purposes of determining the
pro rata distribution, are ac:c:ounts owned
by an individual's spouse included?
A: No. IRAs belonging to another
person are not aggregated for purposes of
r
r
r
r
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1IdditioD, under Mctions72(t)(2)(A)(ii) and
JIii), exceptions are provided for distri-
:Jbutioal attributable to the taxpayer's be·
comina disabled within the meaning of
·aetion 72(m)(7), and distributions made
..10 a beaeficiary after the death of the in·
. divid1lal.
09: .if lIJl individual receives a distri-
bution, prior to age S9~'!&, from an IRA to
which nondeductible contributions have
been made is the entire amount distrib-
uted subject to the additional tax under
leCtion 72(t) of the Code?
A: No, the tax is assessed only against
the portion of the distribution which is
Includible In sross Income.
010: Are IRA trustees required to cal-
c:ulate the amount of the distribution at-
tributable to return of basis for an
Individual?
A: No. Generally, the trustee will not
have the Information needed to make this
calc:ulation. 1be bank of institution bold-
Ina the IRA mUSC· provide the actual ac-
count balance of each IRA, but is not
required to know whether a partic:ular
contribution was deductible or nonde-
ductible and is DOt required to bave a rec-
ord of tbe aggregate nondeductible
contributions. Accordingly, the taxpayer
is responsible for calc:ulating the taxable
amount of an IRA distribution.
IV. Spousal IRAr
Under sedion 219(c)(I)(B) of tile Code,
as amended, a married couple filing a joint
return may elect to treat one spouse as
having no compensation for purposes of
establishing a spousal IRA. This provi-
sion is effective for contributions made
before, on or after the taxable years be-
ginning after December 31,1985.
El: Maya married couple make a con·
tribution to a spousal IRA with respect
to a spouse who made SI00 of compen-
sation during the 1986 taxable year?
A: If the couple elects on their joint
tax return to treat that spouse as bavina
no compensation for the year, they may
establish a spousal IRA.
E2: Maya taxpayer amend his or her
tax returns for the 1985 and prior taxable
years and contribute to spousal IRAs for
. those years?
A: No. Section 219(f)(3) and the reg-
ulations thereunder provide that contri-
butions to an IRA must have been made
no later than the time prescribed by law
for filing tbe return for such taxable year
(excluding extensions).
v. Collectibles
The Act creates an exception to the
general rule set forth in section 408(m)(I)
wider which aquisition of collectibles (as
defined in section 408(m)(2» are treated
as distributions. To the extent that IRA
funds are invested after December 31,
1986, in gold or silver coins issued by the
United States, as specified in 31 USC
5112(a)(7), (8), (9), or 910). or 31 USC
5112(e), such funds will not be treated as
distributed. IRA funds attributable to
contributions made before December 31,
1986, may also be invested in such coins.
An investment by an IRA in a coin
which has been made into jewelry is still
considered an investment in a collectible,
and will be treated as a distribution.
C - 24
VI.W~
UDder secdon 3405(d)(I)(B) of the
Codll. for parpoeeI of witblloldiaa taxes,
die payor must III1IIIIe dIat the entire
amoum ofan IRA distribution is taxable.
VII.lhductibk~~
For taxable years beJinDinl after Jan-
uary I, 1982,. qualified retirement plan
may aDow participants to made deducti-
ble contributions to IeplRte IICCOUDts
within the plan. 1be Act probibits these
qualified voluntary.employee contribu-
tions (OVECs) for years beginning after
December 31, 1986. Plan administrators
may not accept such contributions in any
calendar year after 1986 (except those
made before the April IS, 1987 filing date
speci1Ically for the 1986 year). Plans aeed
DOt be amended for this change until the
amendment date for other retirement plan
c:hanges required by the Act (generally,
the first plan year beginning on or after
January I, 1989).
Plans witb OVECs Deed not immedi·
ately distribute the IIIIOWlt already ac-
c:umulatcd in such acxounts. In addition.
amounts DOW beld in such acxounts are
DOt aggregated with IRA accounts for
purposes of determining the nontaxable
portion of an IRA distributi~.
VIII. IRA A"""8t11te111:f
Trusteesusingmodel IRA,Master IRAs
or Prototype IRAs are not required to
amend their IRA documents to comply
with the new law until aotified to do so
by the Service. The Act general1y affects
individual deductions rather than provi-
sions required to be in most IRA docu-
ments.
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Part IV. Items of General Interest
..... DescrIpIIaII" 1MTn'" Act"
1986 PnwIsIonI AfIIctIaI ..........
.............1 ....
" •••c•••III.121
This announcement highlights some of
the changes made by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (the Act) with respect to Individ-
ual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs). The
announcement is intended to be a non-
technical explanation, rather than a com-
prehensive statement of the new rules
concerning IRAs.
For a nontechnical explanation of the
rules in effect before the new Act, as well
as an explanation of the new law, see In-
ternal Revenue Service Publication 590,
which will be available at any IRS District
office beginning early in January 1987.
This announcement may be used by a
master or prototype IRA sponsor to up-
date its disclosure statement, required by
Treasury Regulations at section l.~.
The Service expects to publish techni-
cal guidance concerning the Act changes
to IRAs in the near foture.
The nontechnical explanation follows:
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (which
we will call the Act) makes a number of
major changes to the law governing the
deductibility of contributions to Individ-
ual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs).
The chanles made by the Act are gen-
erally not effective nntil January I, 1987.
This means that contributions made for
1987 are subject to the Act's new rules;
however, you can still make a contribu-
tion for 19116 as late as April IS, 1987
under the old rules.
ELIGlBILIlY
Under the new law, if neither you, nor
your spouse, is an active participant (see
A. below) you may make a contribution
of up to the lesser of $2,000 (or $2,250 in
the case of a spousal IRA) or 100% of
compensation and take a deduction for
the entire amount contributed. If you are
an active participant but have an adjusted
gross income (AGI) below a certain level
(see B. below), you may make a deduct-
ible contribution as under current law. If,
however, you or your spouse is an active
participant and your combined AGI is
above the specified level, the amount of
the deductible contribution you may make
to an IRA is phased down and eventually
eliminated.
A. Active Partkipant
You are an "active participant" for a
year if you are covered by a retirement
plan. You arc covered by a "retirement
plan" for a year if your employer or union
has a retirement plan under which money
is added to your account or you are eli-
gible to earn retirement credits. For ex-
ample, if you are covered under a profit-
sharing plan, certain government plans, a
salary reduction arrangement (such as a
tax sheltered annuity arrangement or a
401(k) plan), a simplified employee pen-
sion plan (SEP) or a plan which promises
you a retirement benefit which is based
upon the number of years of service you
have with the employer, you are likely
to be an active participant. Your Form
W-2 for the year, starting with the 1987
tax year, should indicate your partici-
pation status.
You are an active participant for a year
even if you are not yet vested in your
retirement benefit. Also, if you make re-
quired contributions or voluntary em-
ployee contributions to a retirement plan,
you are an active participant. In certain
plans you may be an active participant
even if you were only with the employer
for part of the year.
You are not considered an active par-
ticipant if you are covered in a plan only
because of your service as 1) an Armed
Forces Reservist, for less than 90 days of
active service, or 2) a volunteer firefighter
covered for firefighting service by a gov-
ernment plan. Of course, if you are cov-
ered in any other plan, these exceptions
do not apply.
If you are married but file a separate
tax return, your liopouse's active partici-
pation does not affect your ability to make
deductible contributions.
B. Adjusted GwS;.\ Income (AGI)
If you are an active participant, you
must look at you. Adjusted Gross Income
for the year (if you and your spouse file
a joint tax return you use your combined
AGI) to determine whether you can make
a deductible IRA contribution. Your tax
return will show you how to calculate your
AGI for this purpose. If you are at or
below a certain AGI level, called the
C - 25
Threshold Level, you are treated as ifyOu
were not an active participant and can
make a deductible contributioD under the
same rules as a person who is not an active
participant.
If you are single, your threshold AGI
level is $25,000. The threshold level ifyou
arc married and file a joint tax return is
$40,000, and if you are married but file a
separate tax return, the tbresbo1d Ieve1 is
$0.
If your AGI is less than $10,000 above
your threshold level, you wiD still be able
to make a deductible contribution but it
will be limited in amount. The amount by
which your AGI exceeds your Threshold
Level (AGI - Threshold Level) is called
your Excess AGI. The Maximum ADow-
able Deduction is $2,000 (or $2,250 for a
Spousal IRA). Youcane~teyourDe­
duction limit using Table I un Paae 16,
or calculate it as follows:
(Your Deduction Limit may be slightly
higher if you use this formula rather than
the Table).
10,000 - Excess AGI x Muimum AI-
10,000 lowable Deduc-
tion • Ded.uetion
Limit
You must round up the ~t to the
next highest $10 level (the next bighest
number which ends in zero). For ClWII-
pie, if the result is $1,525, you must round
it up to $1,530. If the final result is below
S200 but above zero, your Deduction Limit
is $200. Your Deduction Limit cannot, in
any event, exceed 100% of your compen-
sation.
Example 1: Ms. Smith, a sinaJe person, is
an active participant and bas an AGI of
$31,619. She caIeu1ates her deductible IRA
contribution as follows:
Her AGI is $31,619
Her Threshold Level is $25,000
Her Excess AGI is (AGI - Threshold
Level) or ($31,619 - $25,000) - $6,619
Her Maximum Allowable Deduc1iOD is
$2,000
So, her IRA deduction limit is:
$10,000 - $6,619 x $2,000 - $676
$10,000 (rounded to S680).
&ample 2: Mr. and Mrs. Youna tile a
joint tax return. Each spouse earns more
than 52,000 and one is an active partici-
pant. They have a combilled AGI of
J
j
Total Account Balance of IRAs as of 12131191:
(including distributions in 1991)
Year Deductible NoNleducdbk
1983 $2,000
1984 1,800
1987 1,000 $1,000
1989
-i2!! 1.400
$5,400 $2,400
J
,
J
J
.J
J
...
I
.,
J
1
15,400
2,400
..M!Q.
19,000
Nontaxable distributions
(for the year)
You also add back the distributions taken
during the year.
Example: An individual makes the fol·
lowing contributions to his or her IRAs:
IRA DISTRIBUTIONS
Because nondeductible IRA contribu·
tions are made using income which bas
already been taxed (that is, tbey are not
deductible contributions), the portion of
the IRA distributions consisting of non-
deductible contributions will not be taxed
again wben received by you. If you make
any nondeductible IRA contributions, each
distribution from your IRAs will consist
of a nontaxable portion (return of non-
deductible contributions) and a taxable
portion (return of deductible contribu-
tions, ifany, and account earnings). Thus,
you may not take a distribution which is
entirely tax-free. The following formula
is used to determine the nontaxable por-
tion of your distributions for a taxable
year:
tax return you may then ftaure out bow
much is deductible.
You may withdraw an IRA contribu-
tion made for a year any time before April
15 of the fol1owina year. Ifyou do so, you
must also withdraw the eamiDp attrib-
utable to tbat portion and report the eam·
inss as income for tbe year for which tbe
contribution was made. If some portion
ofyour contribution isnot deductible, you
may decide either to withdraw the non-
deductible amount, or to leave it in the
IRA and designate tbat.portion as a non·
deductible contribution on your tax reo
tum.
Total Distributions
(for the year)
Deductible Contributions:
Nondeductible Contributions:
Earnings on lRAs:
Remaining
Nondeductible contributions x
Year-end total IRA
account balances
To figure the year-end total IRA ac·
count balance you treat all of your IRAs
as a single IRA. This includes all regular
IRAs. as well as Simplified Employer
Pension (SEP) IRAs, and Rollover IRAs.
as well as an account for yourself. The
maximum deductible amount for the
spousal IRA is the lesser of$2,250 or 100%
of compensation. This rule applies for 1986
spousal IRAs as well as 1987 spousaJ IRAs.
NONDEDUCTIBLE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO IRAs
Even if you are above the threshold
level and thus may not make a deductible
contribution of $2,000 ($2,250 for a spousaJ
IRA), you may still contribute up to the
lesser of 100% of compensation or $2,000
to an IRA ($2,250 for a Spousal IRA).
The amount of your contribution which
is not deductible will be a nondeductible
cont.ribution to the IRA. You may also
choose to make a contribution nonde·
ductible even if you could have deducted
part or all of the contribution. Interest or
other earnings on your IRA contribution,
whether from deductible or nondeducti-
ble contributions, will not be taxed until
taken out of your IRA and distributed to
you.
It you make a nondeductible contri·
bution to an IRA you must report the
amount of the nondeductible contribution
to the IRS as a part of your tax return for
the year.
You may make a 52,000 contribution
at any time during the year, if your com·
pensation for the year will be at least
52,000, without having to know how much
will be deductible. When you fill out your
144,255. They may each contribute to an
,IRA and calculate their deductible con-
tributions to each IRA as follows:
Their AGI is $44,255
Their Threshold Level is $40,000
Their Excess AGI is (AGI - Thresh-
old Level) or ($44,255 - $40,(00) ""
$4,255
The Maximum Allowable Deduction for
each spouse is $2,000
So, each spouse may compute his or her
IRA deduction limit as follows:
$10,000 - $4.255 x $2,000 = $1,149
$10,000 (rounded to 51,150).
ExtJmpk 3: If, in example 2, Mr. Young
did not earn any compensation, or elected
to be treated as earning no compensation,
Mrs. Young could establish a Spousal IRA
(consisting of an account for herself and
one for her husband). The amount of de-
ductible contributions which could be made
to the two lRAs is calculated using a Max-
imum Allowable Deduction of $2,250
rather than $2,000.
$10.000 - $4,255 x $2,250 "" $1,293
$10,000 (rounded to $1,3(0).
The $1,300 can be divided between the
two accounts, but neither IRA may re-
ceive a deductible contribution of more
than$l,lSO.
Exampk4: Mr. Jones, a manted person,
files a separate tax return and is an active
panicipant. He bas 51,500 of compensa-
tion and wishes to make a deductible con-
tribution to an IRA.
His AGI is $1,500
His Threshold Level is SO
His Excess AGI is (AGI - Threshold
Level) or (51,500 - SO) = 51,500
His Maximum Allowable Deduction is
$2,000
So, his IRA deduction limit is:
$10.000 - 51.500 $2 000 = $1 700$10,000 x, •
Even though his IRA deduction limit un-
der the formula is 51,700, Mr. Jones may
not deduct an amount in excess of his
compensation, so, his actual deduction is
limited to 51,500.
SPOUSAL IRAs
As noted in Example 3 above, under
the Act you may contribute to a Spousal
IRA even if your spouse has earned some
compensation during the year. Provided
your spouse does not make a contribution
to an IRA, you may set up a Spousal IRA
consisting of an account for your spouse
!
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New Form 84S3-F, U.S. Fiduciary In-
come Tax Declaration for Magnetic: Me-
dialElectronic Filing, and Form 84S3-P,
U.S. Partnership Declaration for Mag-.
netic MedialElectronic Filing, have been
developed for use by estates and trusts,
and partnerships, respectively, partici-
pating in the 1986 electronic/magnetic
media filing pilot program. These entities
can use the program only for tax years
ending on December 31,1986. The details
of the pilot program were published in the
Federal Register, dated March 31,1986.
The Form 84S3-F program is limited
to Forms 1041 with any of the following
attachments:
Schedule D (Form 1041), Capital
Gains and Losses
Schedule K-l (Form 1(41), Bene.
ficiary's Share of Income, De-
ductions, Credits, etc.
Form W-2, Wage and Tax State-
ment
Form 6251, Alternative Minimum
Tax Computation
The Form 84S3-P program is limited to
Forms 1065 with any of the following at-
tachments:
Schedule D (Form 1(65), Capital
Gains and Losses
Schedule K (Form 1(65), Panners'
Shares of Income, Credits. De-
ductions, etc.
Schedule K-l (Form 1(65), Part·
ner's Share of Income, Cndits,
Deductions, etc.
Announc•••llIl16-12I
The Form SSOOEZ may not be lIIed for
a pension plan of a business that:
(a) is a member of an afftUated ..nice
group,
(b) is a member of a controlled pw,
of corporations,
(c) il a member of a poup of bull·
nesses under common control, or
(d) leases employees.
The use of Form SSOOEZ will IIIb1tan-
tialIy reduce the reporting burden for smaB
"one-participant" pension p1aDL
The Form SSOOEZ will be available to
the public in January 1987. It may be liIed
for plan years starting in 1986.
$2.400 x 53,000 "" 5800
59,000
distributions is $9,000. The nontaxable
portion of the distributions for 1991 Is fig-
ured as follows:
.. fonIll2O-W (FY}(I916-87), F1scII
Vw CerporIIIon ElltImItId fa
AIIIauncIalIat 8&-124
New Form 112~W (FY)(1986-87),
Fiscal Vear Corporation Estimated Tax,
has been developed for use by c:orpora-
tions whose tax years begin in 1986 and
end in 1987. The form highlights the
changes made by the Tax Reform Act of
1986 that affect fiscal year taxpayers. It
also provides a prorated tax computation
for taxpayers whose tax years end after
June 30, 1987, and includes a new c:om-
putation of alternative tax under section
1201 of the Internal Revenue Code for all
fiscal 1986-87 filers.
Corporations whose tax years begin in
1986 and end in 1987 should use this form
to compute their estimated tax or rec:om-
pute the amount due for each installment
if estimated tax payments have already
been made.
Form 112~W (FY) (1986-87) will be
available in January 1987.
aets of self-dealing have occurred during
the tax year. Form 112~NDmust also be
filed by trustees or disqualified persons
who engage In acts ofself-dealing with the
fund.
Form l1~NDmust be filed within two
and one-half months after the close of the
taxpayer's tax year. It will be available
beginning in January 1987.
..FlII'III 55OOEZ, AnIluaI Reluni of 0.-
Plltldplllt PIMion ....... PIu
AnIlounceaIIat 8&-125
New Form SSOOEZ, Annual Return of
One-Participant Pension Benefit Plan, has
been developed for use by pension benefit
plans that c:over only an individual or an
individual and the individual's spouse who
wholly own a business. This form may
also be used for a plan or a partnership
that covers only the partners, or the part-
ners and their spouses, as long as the plan
meets the coverage requirements of In-
ternal Revenue Code section 410(b)(I)
without being c:ombined with any other
plan.
In 1991 the individual takes a distri-
bution of 53,000. The total account bal-
ance in the IRAI aD 12/31191 plus 1991
Total nondeduetible QOntributions
Total account ba1aDce in the IRAs pIus distri-
butions
Thus, S800 of the 13,000 distribution
in 1991 will not be included in the indi-
vidual's taxable income. The remaining
$2,200 will be taxable for 1991.
ROLLOVER IRA RULES
The Act made some changes in the rules
for rollovers of partW distributions from
retirement plans into IRAs. (A partial
distribution is one which represents at least
SO percent of the amount owed to you
from a retirement plan.)
After December 31, 1986, if you re-
ceive a partial distribution from an em-
ployer's pension plan after December 31,
1986, and the distribution is paid to you
1) because you separated from service
with the employer.
2) because you became disabled while
working for the employer, or
3) because of the death of your spouse
while he or she was c:overed under
the employer's plan, ifyou are named
as a beneficiary.
then you may deposit that amount into
a Rollover IRA.
IRA ARRANGEMENTS
In general, the above changes affect
individual deduction provisions, rather
than provisions required in IRA docu-
ments. Therefore, until further notice,
trustees using ModeilRAs and IRAs which
have been approved under the IRA Na-
tional Office Master and Prototype pro-
gramneednot amend their IRA documents
to reflect the changes in the laws c;on-
ceming 1RAs.
... ,..1l2O-flD, ....... F ...
DIu • 1111.....F_..CIrtIIa .......
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New Form 112G-ND, Return For Nu-
clear Decommissioning Funds and Cer-
tain Related Persons, has been developed
for use by qualified funds that are created
by public utilities to pay the future QOSts
of decommissioning nuclear power plants.
These funds must file the Form 112~ND
to report contributions received, income
earned, payment of the administrative ex-
penses of the fund, the tax on income
earned, and information on whether any
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CHANGES IN EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW AFFECTING THE BANKING INDUSTRY
(OTHER THAN INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT AND SEPP'S UNDER THE
1986 TAX REFORM ACT)
I. MATTERS UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986
A. Changes Applicable to Tax Qualified Plans Generally
Effective Before 1989
1. 40l(k) plans
r
I
r
r
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r
r
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a.
b.
Maximum deferral is limited to $7,000 effective
for taxable years beginning after December 31,
1986
Tougher nondiscrimination rules effective for
plan years beginning after December 31, 1986
(i) Average deferral percentage (ADP) for
the highly-compensated employees cannot
exceed the greater of
(A) 125% of the average deferral percentage
for the nonhighly-compensated employees,
or
(B) The lower of 200% of the average
deferral percentage for the nonhighly-
compensated employees or the average
deferral percentage for the highly
compensated employees plus 2%
(ii) A comparison of the new ADP ratios versus
the old ADP ratios is as follows:
Maximum Maximum
ADP for ADP for ADP for
Nonhighly Highly Highly
Compensated Compensated Compensated
Employees (Prior Law) (TRA '86)
1 percent 2.50 percent 2.00 percent
2 percent 5.00 percent 4.00 percent
3 percent 6.00 percent 5.00 percent
4 percent 7.00 percent 6.00 percent
5 percent 8.00 percent 7.00 percent
6 percent 9.00 percent 8.00 percent
7 percent 10.50 percent 9.00 percent
8 percent 12.00 percent 10.00 percent
9 percent 13.50 percent 11.25 percent
10 percent 15.00 percent 12.50 percent
11 percent 16.50 percent 13.75 percent
12 percent 18.00 percent 15.00 percent
c. Hardship withdrawals
(i) Withdrawals before separation from service
are limited to the participant's elective
deferrals only (not including earnings
or nonelective contributions), effective
for taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1988
(ii) Withdrawals may be subject to early
distribution excise tax
d. Only one year of service may be imposed as a
condition for eligibility to make deferrals,
effective for plan years beginning after
December 31, 1988
2. Early withdrawals of benefits - the "too soon"
rule - IRe §§ 72(t) and 4974
a. Additional income tax of 10% is imposed on
distributions from all qualified retirement
plans prior to attainment of age 59-1/2
J
J
...
b. Exceptions include
(i) Distributions in the form of an annuity
payable over the life or life expectancy
of the participant or the joint life
expectancies of the participant and his
or her beneficiary
(ii) Distributions made after the participant
has attained age 55, separated from service
D-2
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4 .
and satisfied the conditions for early
retirement under the plan
(iii) Distributions used for payment of certain
deductible medical expenses
(iv) Distributions to an alternate payee pursuant
to a qualified domestic relations order
(v) Distributions received before March 15,
1987 if made on account of a separation
from service in 1986 if the participant
elects to be taxed on the distribution
in 1986
(vi) Certain distributions received from an
ESOP before January 1, 1990
(vii) Distributions after the death of an
employee
(viii) Certain distributions of excess contribu-
tions to and excess deferrals under 40l(k)
plans
Uniform distribution requirements - the "too late"
rule - IRC §§ 401, 408, 457 and 4974
a. Applicable to qualified plans, IRA's, SEPP's,
403(b) annuities
b. Distributions must commence by April 1 follow-
ing the year in which employee attains age
70-1/2
c. Benefits not distributed when required or in
the amount required are subject to an excise
tax of 50% - paid by the participant
d. Effective for year beginning after 12/31/88
Excess distributions and accumulations - the "too
much" rule - IRC § 4981
a. An excise tax is imposed on the recipient of
an "excess retirement distribution" of 15% of
the excess
b. A retirement distribution includes the amount
distributed during the recipient's taxable
year, under
(i) any qualified pension, profit sharing or
stock bonus plan,
D-3
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(ii) any Section 403(a) or 403(b) annuity,
and
(iii) any IRA
Exceptions include
(i) any distribution consisting of after-tax
employee contributions
(ii) any retirement distribution rolled over
to another qualified plan or IRA
(iii) retirement distributions with respect to
an individual after his or her death
(iv) any retirement distributions made with
respect to an individual payable to another
person under a qualified domestic relations
order
J
j
d.
e.
f.
g.
4Generally, an "excess retirement distribution" ~
is a retirement distribution in excess of
$150,000 per year (or $750,000 in the case of .
a distribution which is a "lump sum distribution") j
Federal estate taxes are increased by an amount
equal to 15% of a decedent's "excess retirement
accumulations"
An excess retirement accumulation is the excess
of the value of the decedent's interest in
all qualified plans, tax sheltered annuities
and IRA's over the present value of the maximum
defined benefit limit - a grandfather amount
equal to $562,500 is exempt from the excise
tax
Excise tax applies to excess retirement distribu-
tions made after December 31, 1986 and on
excess retirement accumulations with respect
to decedents dying after December 31, 1986
5. Ten-year averaging and capital gains
a.
b.
c.
Ten-year averaging repealed and replaced with
five-year averaging for lump sum distributions
for those over age 59-1/2
Capital gains for distributions attributable
to pre-1974 contributions is phased out over
a six-year period
Effective date
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(i) Distributions made after December 31,
1986
(ii) Any participant who attained age 50 before
January 1, 1986 may make a one-time elec-
tion to use either five-year forward
averaging using new rates or ten-year
forward averaging using 1986 rates
(A) Election applies without regard to
the requirement of attainment of
age 59-1/2 (but still must otherwise
be a "lump sum distribution")
(B) Such Participant also may elect to
retain the capital gain character
of pre-1974 portion of the distribu-
tion with capital gain taxed at
existing 20% rate
Taxation of voluntary contributions
a. Pre-retirement distributions
(i) Distributions prior to annuity starting
date from plans in which there are
voluntary contributions (i.e., after-tax
employee contributions) are treated as
being made on a pro rata basis out of
both taxable amounts and nontaxable
voluntary contributions
(ii) Effective date
(A) Generally applies to distributions
after December 31, 1986
(B) In the case of a plan that on May
5, 1986 permitted in-service with-
drawals of voluntary contributions,
distributions are treated as made
first out of pre-12/3l/86 voluntary
contributions to the extent of
voluntary contributions made on or
before December 31, 1986
b. Post-retirement distributions
(i) Special three-year basis recovery rule
is repealed for distributions after the
annuity starting date
(ii) Generally effective for distributions
after July 1, 1986
D-5
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a.
b.
c.
$50,000 maximum on plan loans must be reduced
by the participant's highest outstanding loan
balance during the preceding l2-month period
Repayment of a plan loan over a period in
excess of five years is no longer available
for loans used to make home improvements or
to purchase a principal residence of a member
of the participant's immediate family
The deduction for "personal interest", which
includes consumer plan loans, is phased out
over the next four years, as follows:
% Deductible
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
65%
40%
20%
10%
0%
d.
e.
Interest on a plan loan secured by a mortgage
on the participant's residence continues to
be deductible under TRA '86 to the extent the
loan does not exceed the cost of the residence
plus the cost of any improvements on the
residence. But note that even interest on a
mortgage loan from a plan is not deductible
if the loan is made, renewed, renegotiated,
modified or extended after December 31, 1986
and:
(i) the participant is a key employee: or
(i i) the loan is secured by tax deferred
annuities or an elective deferral account
under Section 40l(k) plans
Key employees include persons who own greater
than 5% of a partnership or corporation, 1%
owners earning in excess of $150,000, officers
whose compensation is in excess of $45,000
and any individual who owns one of the 10
highest interests in the employer
Application of Regulation Z to plan loans
D-6
Changes Applicable to Tax Qualified Plans Generally
Effective After 1989
Contributions and benefit limits
Minimum Coverage Requirements
401(k) provisions in master plans
(i) Based on Social Security retirement age
There will be no increase in $30,000 defined
contribution limit until defined benefit limit
(presently $90,000) exceeds $120,000
Defined benefit limit (presently $90,000):
(ii) "Floor" of $75,000 for retirement at age
55 is eliminated
(iii) Reduced 1/10 for each year of participa-
tion less than 10; e.g., after one year
of participation, defined benefit limit
is only $9,000; two years, $18,000, etc.
b.
f. Repayment of loans from qualified plans must
be in substantially level amounts and made at
least quarterly
a. All voluntary contributions (after tax employee
contributions) made after 12/31/86 will count
against annual addition limits
c.
Section 1142 of TRA '86 requires the IRS to begin
accepting applications by May 1, 1987 from sponsoring
organizations of master plans with regard to 401(k)
provisions.
8.
1.
9.
B.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
a. Identification of "Highly Compensated"
b. Alternative Coverage Tests
(i) percentage test - the plan must benefit
at least 70% of employees who are not
highly compensated employees
(ii) Ratio test - the plan benefits a
percentage of nonhighly compensated
employees which is at least 70% of the
percentage of highly compensated
employees benefiting under the plan
,.
I 0-7
(i i) Average benefit test - the plan must benefit I
a nondiscriminary class of employees and ~
the average benefit percentage for nonhighly
compensated employees is at least 70% of the l
average benefit percentage for highly j
compensated employees
2. Minimum participation Requirements
a. Plan must benefit lesser of 40% of all employees,
or 50 employees
3. Minimum vesting Requirements
a. Five-year cliff vesting
4.
b. Seven-year graded vesting
c. Top-heavy vesting still applicable to top-
heavy plans
Compensation in excess of $200,000 not to be taken
into account in determining contributions or benefits
5. Changes in the manner in which plans may be integrated J
with Social Security
C. Welfare Plan Requirements - IRC § 89.
1. Nondiscrimination Rules for Health and Life Benefits
Uniform nondiscrimination rules are extended to
all employer provided health and life benefits for
years beginning after the later of (a) December 31, ~
1987, or (b) the earlier of (i) the date three
months following the issuance of Treasury Regulations ~
or (ii) December 31, 1988. ~
a.
b.
Types of Plans. Health and life benefits
subject to these nondiscrimination rules include
employer maintained group term life insurance,
and accident and health benefit plans (whether
insured or self-insured).
Noncompliance Penalty. If a plan is discimina-
tory, highly compensated employees are taxed
on the value of the "excess benefit" received
for the plan year ending with or within the
employer's taxable year. The "excess benefit"
for a highly compensated employee is the excess
of the employer provided benefit over the
"highest permitted benefit". The highest
permitted benefit is determined by reducing
D-8
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the nontaxable benefits of highly compensated
employees until the plan would not be discrim-
inatory. The value of "excess benefits" under
a discriminatory group term life insurance
plan is the greater of the actual cost of the
excess coverage or the value of the excess
coverage determined from the table under IRe
Section 79(c}. No guidance has been developed
for determining the value of employer provided
benefits under a discriminatory health and
accident plan.
c. Discrimination Test. The purpose of a discimina-
tion test is to insure that a significant
number of rank and file employees are eligible
for and actually receive plan benefits. For
a plan to satisfy the nondiscrimination rules,
it must satisfy either a two-part eligibility
test, plus a 75% benefits test, or an alterna-
tive test.
(i) The Three-Part Test. A plan satisfies
the three-part test if it satisfies each
of two separate eligibility tests (the
50% test and the 90%/50% test), plus a
benefits test. A plan satisfies the 50%
test if at least 50% of the employees
eligible to participate in the plan are
nonhighly compensated employees. A plan
satisfies the 90%/50% test if at least
90% of the nonhighly compensated employees
are eligible to participate in the plan
or in another health plan of the employer,
and the employer provided benefit available
to nonhighly compensated employees under
each plan is at least 50% of the largest
employer provided benefit available to a
highly compensated employee under any
such plan. A plan satisfies the benefits
test if the average employer provided
benefit received by nonhighly compensated
employees under all health plans of the
employer is equal to at least 75% percent
of the average employer provided benefit
received by highly compensated employees
under all such plans.
(ii) Alternative Test. A plan satisfies the
alternative test if at least 80% of the
nonhighly compensated employees are
covered by the plan.
Written Plan Document Requirement. A plan subject
to IRS section 89(k) (2) is required to (a) be in
D-9
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writing (b) provide that employees' rights under
the plan are legally enforceable, (c) be maintained
for the exclusive benefit of employees, and (d) be
established with the intent that it be permanent.
Plans subject to IRC Section 89 include not only
health or accident plans and group term life
insurance plans, but also dependent care assistance
programs, qualified tuition reduction programs,
cafeteria plans, program providing no additional
cost services, qualified employee discounts or
employer operated eating facilities, or plans
providing benefits subject to the nondiscrimina-
tion rules under IRC Section 505. If the listed
requirements are not satisfied with respect to a
plan or program, the value of benefits provided an
employee under the plan are included in the
employee's gross income.
SINGLE-EMPLOYER PENSION PLANS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986
SEPPAA was signed into law on April 7, 1986 as part of the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986.
SEPPAA changes the substantive law and procedures for
termination of a defined benefit pension plan. Plan
terminations are now classified as standard or distress
terminations.
I
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A standard termination occurs if a plan has sufficient funds
to pay all benefits required under the plan. A distress
termination occurs if the plan sponsor (and each substantial
member of its controlled group) is e~ther involved in a
liquidated proceeding, involved in a reorganization proceeding J
or is unable to meet its financial obligations. For purposes of -
the PBGC and the IRS, a purported termination which is not a
standard termination or a distress termination is ineffective.
CONTINUATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE
A. Coverage
COBRA also amended the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA I
to provide that certain employees and their family members ~
be allowed to elect to continue coverage under an employer's
group health plan upon certain "qualifying events". J
B. Qualifying Events
1. Death of a covered employee
0-10
,
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2.
3.
4.
Termination or reduction of hours of a covered
employee
Divorce or legal separation of a covered employee
A covered employee's eligibility for benefits under
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act and (e) loss
of status as a "dependent" under the terms of the
plan.
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Individuals who may elect continuation coverage include
the covered employee, and anyone who on the day before
an event described above was the spouse or dependent
child of a covered employee.
Continuation of coverage is required for group health
plans for plan years beginning on or after July 1, 1986
and applies to plans of employers who normally employ
at least 20 employees on a typical business day.
Continuation applies to conventional insurance plans
and self-insured plans. Church and U.S. government
group health plans are exempt, but state and local
government plans are subject to similar continuation
coverage requirements.
The maximum period of continued coverage is 18 months
in the case of a termination of employment or reduction
of hours, and 36 months in all other situations.
The employer may require the individual electing continua-
tion coverage to pay the premiums for that coverage.
Penalties for failure to comply with these rules include
loss of income tax deduction for the cost of the plan.
Additionally, highly compensated individuals would not
be allowed to exclude from income the employer contribu-
tions to the plan attributable to them. Finally, the
plan administrator is personally liable to a participant
or beneficiary in the amount of $100 a day for each day
he failed to give the required notice.
r
r
r
r
IV. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
P.L. 99-509 amends ADEA, ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code
with regard to participation in employee benefit plans after
attaining "normal retirement age." Benefit accruals in
defined benefit plans and allocations under defined contribu-
tion plans may not cease or decrease merely because a
D-ll
participant attains the normal retirement age specified in
the plan.
Further, unlike prior law, defined benefit plans may no longl~r
exclude from participation an employee hired within five
years of the plan's normal retirement age. However, a defined
benefit plan may provide that the normal retirement age for
employees hired within five years of the plan's normal retire-
ment age will be five years after the employee becomes a
participant in the plan. P.L. 99-509 applies not only to
plans of employees who are subject to ADEA, but also to ERIS}~
plans and tax qualified retirement plans.
P.L. 99-509 is effective for plan years beginning on or aftel:
January 1, 1988 with respect to employees who complete at
least one hour of service after that effective date. For
plans maintained pursuant to collective bargaining agreements
ratified before March 1, 1986, the effective date of (a) the
later of, January 1, 1988 or the termination of the collective
bargaining agreement, or (b) January 1, 1990.
v. GLASS - STEAGALL ACT.
Generally, the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 generally
prohibits banks from becoming involved in the sale and
marketing of securities. The Comptroller of the Currency
issued a ruling approving a bank collective investment fund
to create a collective investment trust, enabling individual
IRA owners to purchase units of beneficial interest in stock
portfolios managed by the bank.
The Comptroller's rulings have been upheld in the Second
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit. Investment
Company Institute v. Clarke, 793 F.2d 220 (CA2, 1986);
Investment Company Institute v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925
(C.A.D.C. 1986).
v. FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY AND PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS, UNDER
ERISA.
A. DOL Information Letter of August 1, 1986 Concerning
"Sweep Services". Attachment 1.
The issue presented in the Information Letter is the
extent to which the practice of banks of "sweeping"
idle cash balances of assets of employee benefit plans
of which it is a fiduciary into its in-house short term
investment vehicles violates the prohibited transaction
provisions of Section 406(a) and (b) of ERISA. Generally,
the Information Letter concludes that a bank engages in
a violation of Section 406(b) of ERISA whenever it uses
its fiduciary authority or control with respect to plan
D-12
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MISCELLANEOUS.
A. G.C.M. 39385, July 19, 1985. In determining whether or
not to make retroactive its revocation of a favorable
ruling with respect to qualified trusts, the employers,
and the plan participants, in the case of a defective
master plan sponsored by a bank, the Commissioner may
consider the imposition on the plan sponsor (i.e., bank)
of sanctions that are voluntarily agreed to by the
sponsor of the master plan.
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B.
C.
D.
B.
funds to increase the amount of its compensation by
determining the time and/or the amount of plan funds to
be transferred into the sweep fund.
DOL Advisory Opinion of August 29, 1986 Concerning
performance Based Fees for Investment Services.
Attachment 2.
ERISA Technical Release No. 86-1 concerning Soft Dollar
and Directed Commission Arrangements, May 22, 1986.
Attachment 3.
Foltz v. U.S. News and World Report, Inc., 627 F. SUpp
1143 (D. D.C. 1986). The court held that a nonfiduciary
of an ERISA pension plan could have co-liability under
ERISA with a fiduciary for violations of Title I of
ERISA if the nonfiduciary "participates" in a breach of
fiduciary duty by the fiduciary, even if the nonfiduciary
does not gain from its conduct.
Rev. Rul. 85-62, 1985-20 I.R.B. 34 (5/20/85). The
sUbject of this ruling are arrangements under which an
institution offers to pay interest in excess of the
market rate on IRA contributions, but only if an
accompanying deposit is made to another account such as
a NOW or regular savings account (which may be paying
relatively low interest). The IRS held that the
substance of these arrangements is that the "excess"
earnings on the IRA should be treated as earned in the
first instance by the taxable savings account and then
contributed to the IRA. Thus, the taxpayer may be
subject to the 6% penalty on excess contributions to an
IRA and may be subject to the 10% premature distribution
penalty when the exc~ss is withdrawn.
ERISA Preemption of KRS 132.020 and 132.043. When
Congress enacted ERISA, it attempted to create a uniform
D-13
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system for regulating employee benefit plans. To assure
that state laws would not inte~fere with this uniform
system, ERISA included a preemption provision, Section 514.
Section 514 states that ERISA "shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan" covered by Title I of
ERISA. ERISA does not preempt state laws relating to
insurance, banking, securities or criminal law, since
these are specifically excluded from the preemption
provisions under Section 514.
The phrase "relate to any employee benefit plan" has
been the major source of court interpretation with
regard to what state laws are preempted by ERISA. The
Supreme Court used the statutory language of Section 514
and its legislative history to interpret the phrase
"relate to" in its broadest statutory meaning. Shaw
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 u.S. 85 (1983). The Court
held that a law related to an employee benefit plan, in
the normal sense of that phrase, if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan. Shaw v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., page 90. The Court did, however, refuse to draw
a bright line between when state laws relate to any
employee benefit plan and when "state actions may affect J.
employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or peripheral ;
a manner" to be preempted under Section 514. Therefore,
courts must continue to intepret whether a state law
"relates to" employee benefit plans in such a way as to
be preempted by ERISA.
1. Preemption of KRS 132.043. KRS 132.040 imposes a
tax of l/lOth of one cent on each $100 of interest
an individual has in a retirement plan. The statute
further sets up a procedure for payment of the tax
on behalf of the individual by the plan administra-
tor, trustee, etc. While the issue has not been
judicially determined, there appears to be little
doubt that KRS 132.043 "relates to" any employee
benefit plan covered by Title I of ERISA under the
Shaw test. The statute covers an individual's
interest in any retirement plan which is exempt
from federal income taxes. Furthermore, it sets
up procedures for the plan's fiduciaries to follow
for payment of the tax. Moreover, since the statute
serves no function other than taxation of retirement
plans, it clearly does not regulate one of the
excluded areas. National Carriers Conference
Committee v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (1978,
DC Conn.) and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Roemer,
603 F. Supp. 7 (1984 DC Minn.).
Note that, if a retirement plan is subject to
KRS 132.043, subsection (2) provides that no other
tax shall be assessed by the state or by any county,
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city, school district or other taxing district on
any such right or interest or against the holder
of any such right or interest.
Premption of KRS 132.020. KRS 132.020 imposes an
ad valorem tax of $.25 per $100 value of money,
stock, notes, bonds, accounts and other credits.
This tax is not assessed directly against employee
benefit plans nor exclusively against assets of
plans, however, the tax does apply to employee
benefit plan assets.
The tax is paid by the trustee. Therefore, this
tax indirectly "relates to" employee benefit plans.
A U.S. District Court in California held that a
similar tax was preempted by Section 514 of ERISA
as it related to employee benefit plans. General
Motors Corporation v. California State Board of
Equalization, 600 Fed. Supp. 76 (1984), which
involved an insurance franchise tax which was
assessed against insurance policies held by an
employee benefit trust. The District Court held
that this tax impeded the discretion of the plan
fiduciary to fund plan benefit guarantees. The
same argument could be made for the ad valorem tax
imposed by KRS 132.020, as a plan fiduciary may be
more likely to invest plan assets in other forms
to avoid the ad valorem tax.
D-15
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; Tbe Department notes that. although section 408(b)(2) of ERISA
provides relief for the furnishing of goods in the course of, and
incidental to, the furnishing of services to a plan, the statutory
exemption for services does not extend to underlying investment
transactions, such as sales or extensions of credit otherWIse de·
scribed in section 406 of ERISA. Rather. section 408(b)(2) provides
relief from the restrictions of section 406/a) only for those service
transactions which satisfy the eonditions of section 408(b)(2) and the
regulations thereunder. For example. if a bank tidudary sells
rl'purchase agreements to a plan under a sweep s('rvice arrange·
ment, st'Ction 408(b)(2) may prOVide rehef for the prOVISIOn of such
sweep service, but docs not providc relief for the acquisitlon of the
repurehase agreements from thl' hank. . .
I In this regard, the Departml'nt expresses no opllllon as to
whether the underlying investment transaction itsl'lf is the subject
of statutory or administrative relil'f. Sec. for examph', sections
40R(h)(4) ami 40R/h)(R) of "~HlSA
ERISA section 408(b)(2) exempts from the prohibitions of
section 406(a) the payment by a plan to a party in interest,
including a fiduciary, for a service (or a combination of
services) if: (1) the service is necessary for the establishment
or operation of the plan; (2) the service is furnished under a
contract or arrangement which is reasonable; and (3) no
more than reasonable compensation is paid for the service.
Accordingly, the mere provision of cash sweep services by a
bank or similar institution would be exempt from the prohi-
bitions of ERISA section 406(a) if the conditions of the
exemption described in section 408(b)(2) were met.'
With respect to the prohibitions in section 406(b), regula-
tion 29 CFR 2550.408b-2(a) indicates that ERISA section
408(b)(2) does not contain an exemption for an act described
in ERISA section 406(b) (relating to conflicts of interest on
the part of fiduciaries) even if such act occurs in connection
with a provision of services which is exempt under section
408(b)(2). As explained in regulation 29 CFR 2550.408b-
2(e)(I), if a fiduciary uses the authority, control, or responsi-
bility which makes it a fidUciary to cause the plan to enter
into a transaction involving the provision of services when
such fiduciary has an interest in the transaction which may
affect the exercise of its best judgment as a fiduciary, a
transaction described in section 406(b) would occur, and that
transaction would be deemed to be a separate transaction
from the transaction involVing the provision of services and
would not be exempted by section 408(b)(2).
As a general matter, a bank engages in violations of
section 406(b)(l) whenever it uses its fiduciary authority or
control with respect to plan funds to increase the amount of
its compensation by determining the timing and/or the
amount of plan funds to be transferred into the sweep fund.'
Conversely, section 29 CFR 2550.408b-2(e)(3) indicates that
if a bank provides sweep services without the receipt of
additional compensation or other consideration (other than
reimbursement of direct expenses properly and actual1y
incurred in the performance of such services within the
meaning of 29 CFR 2550.408c-2(b)(3)), then the provision of
sweep services by the bank would not, in itself, constitute a
violation of section 406(b) of ERISA. Moreover, the provi-
sion by a bank of investment management services, includ-
ing sweep services, under a single fee arrangement which is
calculated as a percentage of the market value of the total
assets under management would not, in itself. constitute an
ATTACHMENT 1
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I Your rcqul'st apllt'ars to bt' Iimih'd to the si.tuation where the
bank tiduciary sWl'eps idll' cash balances mto Its lD·house short·
h'rrn invl'stml'nt vl'hidl'S Accordin~ly. our n'SllOnSl' focuses on that
situation and dO('s not addn'ss tbl' SWI'('P of cash halances into short·
h'rrn vl'hidl's maint;lInl'll hy partu's unrl'latl'd tn thl' hank.
This is in response to your letter requesting our views
regarding the application of the prohibited transaction pre-
visions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) to certain "sweep services" provided to em-
ployee benefit plans by banks acting as trustees and/or
investment managers. Under such arrangements, banks
transfer ("sweep") idle cash balances of customer accounts,
including plan accounts, into short term interest-bearing
investment vehicles such as money market funds or bank-
affiliated short-term collective investment funds. You have
specifically asked whether such "sweep services" would
qualify for the statutory exemptions provided by sections
408(b)(2), 408(b)(6) and/or 408(b)(8) of ERISA.
You indicate that the bank regulatory agencies for many
years have been advising the institutions subject to their
supervision of their duty to institute cash management
procedures and to productively invest trust funds that are
temporarily in their custody. Recent technological advances
have permitted increased investment returns to trust ac-
counts by the sweeping of once idle cash balances into
interest-bearing investment vehicles. You further state that
typical1y, as compensation for its sweep services, a bank
retains as its fee a portion of the daily interest generated by
the sweep fund, which fee is calculated as a percentage of
the daily invested cash balance. In the case of an employee
benefit plan, you believe that this compensation retained by
a bank may violate the prohibited transaction provisions of
ERISA in the absence of an applicable statutory exemption.'
Section 406(a) of ERISA provides, in pertinent part, that a
fiduciary of an ERISA plan shal1 not cause the plan to
engage in a transaction which the fiduciary knows or should
know constitutes a direct or indirect: (1) sale or exchange, or
leasing of any property between the plan and a party in
interest; (2) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities be-
tween the plan and a party in interest; or (3) transfer to, or
use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest, of any assets
of the plan. Section 3(14) defines the term "party in interest"
to include a fiduciary and a person providing services to the
plan. In addition, section 406(b) provides that a fiduciary
with respect to a plan shal1 not: (1) deal with the assets of
the plan in its own interest or for its own account; (2) act on
behalf of or represent a party whose interests are adverse to
those of the plan; or (3) receive <:onsideration from a third
party in conn('ction with a transaction involving plan assets.
Dear Mr. Plotkin:
Mr. Robert S. Plotkin
Assistant Director
Division of Banking Supervision
and Regulation
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
Washington, D.C. 20551
------- ----------------------------------
act described in section 406(b)(I) of ERISA because the bank
would not be exercising its fiduciary authority or control to
cause a plan to pay an additional fee.
The following examples illustrate the application of the
provisions of section 408(b)(2) of ERISA to sweep service
arrangements. The examples assume that the underlying
investment transactions otherwise comply with applicable
statutory exemptions.
(1) A plan enters into a standing arrangement with its
bank investment manager which authorizes the bank to
exercise its discretion to sweep idle cash balances into the
bank's money market fund. For this service, the bank will
charge the plan a fee calculated as a percentage of the daily
invested cash balance in the money market fund. In effect,
the bank would be using its fiduciary authority to cause the
plan to pay an additional fee for a service performed by the
bank in violation of section 406(b)(l) of ERISA. Although
there would be initial approval of the arrangement by the
plan, thereafter the bank would have total discretion to
transfer plan funds into the money market fund and to
determine how long the plan funds remain in such fund,
thereby increasing its compensation. In this respect, we note
that a bank which exercises its fiduciary authority in a
manner which contravenes section 406(b)(l) cannot avoid
liability simply by obtaining the consent of an independent
plan fiduciary after disclosure to that fiduciary. See 29 CFR
§2550.408b-2(f), Example (2).
(2) Bank A proposes to provide investment management
services, including sweep services, to plans under a single
fee arrangement which is calculated as a percentage of the
market value of the plan funds under management. There
will be no separate charges for the provision of sweep
services. Under these circumstances, the provision by Bank
A of investment management services, including sweep
services, would not, in itself, constitute a violation of section
406(b)(1) because the bank would not be using its fiduciary
authority or control to cause a plan to pay additional fees
for a service furnished by the Bank. We are assuming for
purposes of this example that the total fees to be paid by a
plan are reasonable in light of the investment management
services received by that plan.
(3) Trustee Bank B proposes to enter into an arrangement
with a plan for the provision of sweep services under the
following circumstances. The Bank would have a standing
authorization whereby, at the close of each business day, the
Bank would be required to sweep all uninvested cash in
excess of $100 into the Bank's money market fund. For this
service, the Bank will charge the plan a fee calculated as a
percentage of the daily invested cash balance in the money
market fund. Investment Manager C, who is unrelated to the
Bank, is the plan's investment manager as described in
section 3(38) with the power to acquire or dispose of the
plan's assets. C has sole discretion as to when money will be
withdrawn from the fund. The plan's arrangement with the
Bank is subject to immediate termination without penalty
and requires that the Bank notify the plan no less than 30
days prior to any change in the fees to be charged for its
provisions of sweep services. This arrangement does not
violate sectioll 406(b)( 1) because the Bank would not be
exercising any of its tidul'iary authority or control to cause
the plan to pay an additional fee.
You further indicatf.' that som(' banks have been relying on
till' f.'xemption providl'd by section 408(b)(6) of ERISA. Sec-
tion 408(b)(6) exempts from th(' prohibitions of section 406
thl' provision of c('rtain ancillary sf.'rvices by a bank or
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similar financial institution supervised by the United States
or a State to a plan for which it acts as a fiduciary if the
conditions of 29 CFR 2550.408b-6(b) are met. Such ancillary
services include services which do not meet the require-
ments of ERISA section 408(b)(2) because the provision of
such services involves an act described in section 406(b)(l)
or (b)(2) of ERISA. Section 2550.408b-6(b) requires that such
services must be provided at not more than reasonable
compensation; under adequate internal safeguards which
assure that the provision of such service is consistent with
sound banking and financial practice, as determined by
Federal or State supervisory authority; and only to the
extent such service is subject to specific guidelines issued by
the bank or similar financial institution which meet the
requirements of section 2550.408b-6(c). To date, no regula-
tions have been issued clarifying that section. However, the
Department has stated that the condition contained in sec·
tion 408(b)(6)(B) requiring "specific guidelines" is satisfied
(in the absence of such regulations) if the ancillary services
are provided in accordance with specific guidelines issued
by the bank or similar financial institution, and if adherence
to the guidelines would reasonably preclude such bank or
institution from providing the services in an excessive or
unreasonable manner and in a manner that would be incon-
sistent with the best interests of the participants and benefi-
ciaries. (See 47 FR 14806, April 6, 1982.)
A bank which is a fiduciary to a plan may receive
additional fees for additional services rendered only if such
services are "ancillary services." In the Department's view,
the question of whether short-term cash management ser-
vices constitute "ancillary services" within the meaning of
section 408(b)(6) depends on the expectations of the parties
as evidenced by the terms of the governing instrument and
applicable Federal banking law. Thus, for example, the
Department believes that where a plan appoints a bank
trustee or investment manager with complete discretion to
manage the assets placed in its control, and no provision for
short-term cash management is made under the terms of the
governing instrument, the plan does so with the expectation
that such person will minimize uninvested cash balances and
maximize the plan's rate of return in accordance with
evolving technology for short-term cash management. How-
ever, where, for example, a plan appoints an independent
investment manager to manage plan assets, the provision by
a custodial trustee bank of sweep services for any idle cash
balances may constitute an "ancillary service" within the
meaning of section 408(b)(6). At the present time, the De-
partment is not prepared to conclude that section 408(b)(6) is
available in all cases for the arrangements described in your
letter.
You further indicate that some banks appear to be relying
on the exemption provided by ERISA section 408(b)(8) to
invest plan funds in collective trust funds maintained by
such banks. Section 408(b)(8) of ERISA prOVides an exemp-
tion for any transaction between a plan and a common or
collective trust fund maintained by a bank or trust company
supervised by a State or Federal agency, if (a) the transac-
tion is a sale or purchase of an interest in the fund, (b) the
bank or trust company receives not more than reasonable
compensation, and (c) the transaction is expressly permitted
by the instrument under which the plan is maintained, or by
a fiduciary (other than the bank or trust company, or an
affiliate thereof) who has authority to manage and control
thf.' assets of the plan. The Department has been unwilling to
indicate the extent to which section 408(b)(8) provides relief
from the prohibitions of section 406(b) of }<;RISA (8('p 44 FR
BNA Pension Re~ortlll
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44291 n. 3, July 27, 1979). However, if the bank does not
exercise its fiduciary authority to cause a plan to pay an
additional fee or other compensation in connection with the
acquisition by a plan of an interest in a collective trust fund
or for the provisions of services under such fund, the invest-
ment would not, in itself, involve acts described in section
406(b)(1) of ERISA.
We hope these comments have been helpful. However, if
you should have any further questions or if we can provide
any further assistance, please feel free to contact Ivan
Strasfeld at (202) 523-8671.
Sincerely,
Alan D. Lebowitz
Deputy Administrator for
Program Operations j
1
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LABOR DEPARTMENT ADVISORY OPINIONS ON PAYMENT BY PLANS OF PERFORMANCE-BASED
COMPENSATION TO INVESTMENT MANAGERS
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'Under ReorgaOlzation !,lan No.4 of 19711 143 FR 47713, October
17, 1978), the authOrity of Itlf' St'('I'l'lary of thl' Treasury to issul'
rulings undl'r S('t'tlon 497:, (,f the' Codl' has b('en transferred, with
(,l'rtain execptions not tll'n' n·lt·vanl. to Ihl' Secretary of LabOl·.
Therl'forl', tht' rt'fl'rt'Ol'CS in I hIS holtt'r 10 spI~(,IIi(' S(·I·tions of ERISA
rl'ft'r also 10 thl' ('nrrt'sp.,ndlll~', st'dions of till' Codt'.
.You furtht'r mlheal" Ihal plans 01 1I11s siz., gen('rally operat!'
throu!:" illvl'slllll'lIl (·"lIl1l1lllt·l's. whosl' 11It'llIlll'rs art' oftt'n scnior
linallt'i'll olli('('rs of till' ('''fI'''' a\l' l'bll SPOIISOI who havt' ('onsidt'r-
able busint'ss and 1I1V('stllll'nt a('llllll'n Thl'sl' "ollllllittees take an
al'livt' rolt, in dl'l('rllllllllll'. wtll'll' alld III whal fashion plan ass!'ls
should til' invl'st f'd
Dear Mr. Schatfran:
This is in response to your request for an advisory opinion
on behalf of BON Advisers, Inc. (BON) that the payment of
incentive compensation to BON by employee benefit plans
will not result in a violation of section 406(b) of the Employ-
ee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) or
section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the
Code).'
You represent that BON is a corporation registered as an
investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940. BON will manage plan investments in securities on a
discretionary basis for individual accounts and/or as gener-
al partner of limited partnerships having plan investors. The
decision to retain BO!' and to pay an incentive fee will be
made by a plan fiduciary who is independent of BON. Plans
retaining BON as investment manager (or investing in limit-
ed partnerships to which BO!' is a general partner) will be
large plans having total plan assets of $50,000,000 or more.
and no plan will be permitted to place more than ten
percent of its total assets under BON's management.'
BON's fee struclure will t'onsi"t of an "incentive fee" and.
in most instances. a "bdse fet .. You contemplate that the
base fee, subject to arm's-length negotiation in the case of
each client, will be a percentage of the average of the
account's net asset value at the beginning and end of each
quarter during which BDN serves as investment manager
and will be paid on the first day of the following quarter.
The base fee will be charged irrespective of whether BON
has earned an incentivc fcc, for the same period.
The incentive fee. if any has been earned. will be paid by
the client at the end of each year. You anticipate that this
fee will be a perc·entagc. subject to arm's length negotiation
in the case of each client, of the "net capital appreciation"
of the client's assets. "NN capital appreciation" is defined to
mean the increas{' in the value of the assets in the client's
account from the beginning of each year of investment
management through the' \'aluation date which is set forth in
the contract pursuant to whieh BDN is retained.
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Mr. Charles B. Schatfran
Shulte, Roth & Zabel
900 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Re: BON Advisers, Inc.
Identification Number: F-3257A
!l II Ill>
Aug. 29, 1986
OPINION NO. 86-2OA
Sec. 406(b), 404(a), 405
In calculating net capital appreciation on all securities
(including any securities for which market quotations are
not readily available), all realized and unrealized gains and
losses experienced during the year, as well as income reo
ceived during the year, will be taken into account! In the
event that the assets in the client's account have not appre-
ciated during the year, no performance fee will be paid to
BON.
You anticipate that BON will generally invest plan assets
in securities for which market quotations are readily avail-
able within the meaning of Rule 2a-4(a)(1) under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 (17 CFR §270.2a-4).
For purposes of calculating BON's fee, securities which
are listed on a national securities exchange will be valued
based on their last sales price on the national securities
exchange on which such security is principally traded or, if
trading in such securities on such exchange was reported on
the consolidated tape, the last sales price on the consolidat-
ed tape (or, in the event that the valuation date is not a date
upon which such exchange was open for trading, on the last
prior date on which such exchange was so open).
In the event that no sales of securities listed on a national
securities exchange occurred on either of the foregoing
dates, such securities shall be valued based on the mean
between the last "bid" and "asked" prices on the national
securities exchange on which such securities are principally
traded. or, if "bid" and "asked" prices in such securities
were reported on the consolidated tape, the mean between
the last "bid" and "asked" prices on the consolidated tape
(or. in the event that the valuation date is not a date upon
which such exchange was open for trading, on the last prior
date on which such exchange was so open). Securities which
are not listed on a national securities exchange shall be
valued based upon the mean of their representative last
closing "bid" and "asked" prices unless they were included
in the NASOAQ National Market, in which case they shall be
valued based upon their last sales prices (if such prices are
available).
For securities for which market quotations are not readily
available, valuation will be made by the plan's custodian,
trustee or other qualified party selected by the plan, which
party will be independent of BON. The plan will have the
exclusive authority to terminate the party who will value
these securities. The valuation by the independent party will
be binding upon BON:
, You represent that the base fee paid to BON will be subtracted
from the appreciation in the client's account in order to arrive at
"net eapital appreciation."
•For purposes of this opinion, the Department assumes not only
thai the eustodian. trustee or other qualified party selected by the
plan is independent of BDN but also that it will make independent
valuations of the securities on behalf of the plan. In thiS respect, the
issut' of whether a person is independent of an investment manager
and tht' issut' of what (·tmstitutes an independent valuation are
fat'lual qUt'stlOns to be resolved on till' basis of all the surrounding
faels and (·Irt·umstanct's. Tht' Dcpartmt'nl ordinarily does not issue
adVisory opinions on inht'n'nlly faetual issul's Sl'e section 5.01 of
Jo:IlISA I'rtwf'dun' 76 1 (41 FH 36281. August 27,1976)
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You represent that the right of a plan to terminate an
investment management agreement will meet the require-
ments of the Department's regulation section 29 CFR
2550.408(b)-2(c), which requires that service contracts must
be terminable by plans "on reasonably short notice under
the circumstances,"
In the event that an investment management agreement
is terminated during the first year, BON will be paid a fee
based upon a percentage of assets under management which
will be negotiated in advance and set forth in the investment
management agreement. In the event that an investment
management agreement is terminated on other than an
anniversary date, net capital appreciation will be deter-
mined for the period from the commencement of the preced-
ing full year of management of the client's assets through
the termination date. BON's incentive fee for the prior year
will be readjusted in accordance with such calculation.
Should the net capital appreciation for the new period be
less than the net capital appreciation which had previously
been calculated for the prior year, BON will refund to the
client any excess fee it had received.
You represent that BON's incentive compensation ar-
rangement will comply with the terms and conditions of
SEC Rule 205-3 governing performance compensation ar-
rangements (50 FR 40556 (1985) (to be codified at 17 CFR
§275.205-3». You further state that the total fee paid to
BON for each year's performance (the base fee plus the
incentive fee) will in no case exceed reasonable compensa-
tion for services performed by BON.
You have asked for an advisory opinion that the payment
by plans to BON of an incentive fee in accordance with the
arrangement described above will not constitute a violation
of section 406(b) of ERISA.
Section 406(a)(IXC) and (0) of ERISA provides that a
fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to
engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that
such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of
goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in
interest or transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party
in interest, of any assets of the plan. Section 406(bXl) of
ERISA provides that a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall
not deal with plan assets in his own interest or for his own
account. Section 406(b)(2) of ERISA provides that a fiduciary
with respect to a plan shall not in his individual or in any
other capacity act in any transaction involving the plan on
behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are
adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its
participants and beneficiaries.
Section 3(14) of ERISA defines the term "party in inter-
est" to include a fiduciary and a person providing services to
a plan.
Section 408(b)(2) of ERISA exempts from the prohibitions
of section 406(a) any contract or reasonable arrangement
with a party in interest, including a fiduciary, for office
space, or legal, accounting or other services necessary for
the establishment or operation of the plan, if no more than
reasonable compensation is paid therefore. Regulations is-
sued by the Department of Labor (the Department) clarify
the terms "necessary service" (29 CFR 2550.408b-2(b»,
"reasonable contract or arrangement" (29 CFR 2550.408b-
2(c» and "reasonable compensation" (29 CFR 2550.408b·2(d)
and 2550.408c-2) as used in section 408(b)(2). In this regard,
you have not requested an opinion that the proposed provi-
sion of services by BON complies with the requirements of
section 408(b)(2) of ERISA. As a general matter, whether the
requirements of this section are met in each case' involves
questions which an' inherently factual in naturc_ As noted
above. thl' Departml'nt ordinarily docs not issue opinions on
sud matters.
With respect to thE' prohibitions in section 406(b), the
regulation under section 408(b)(2) of ERISA (29 CFR
2550.408b-2(a» states that section 408(b)(2) of ERISA does
not contain an exemption for an act described in section
406(b) even if such ad occurs in connection with a provision
of services which is exempt under section 408(b)(2).
As explained in regulation section 29 CFR 2550.408b-2(e),
the prohibitions of section 406(b) are imposed upon fiducia-
ries to deter them from exercising the authority, control, or
responsibility which makes them fiduciaries when they have
interests which may conflict with the interests of the plans
for which they act. Thus, a fiduciary may not use the
authority, control. or responsibility which makes him a
fiduciary to cause a plan to pay an additional fee to such
fiduciary, or to a person in which he has an interest which
may affect the exercise of his best judgment as a fiduciary,
to provide a service. However, regulation section 29 CFR
2550.408b-2(e)(2) provides that a fiduciary does not engage
in an act described in section 406(bXl) of ERISA if the
fiduciary does not use any of the authority, control, or
responsibility which makes him a fiduciary to cause a plan
to pay additional fees for a service furnished by such
fiduciary or to pay a fee for a service furnished by a person
in which the fiduciary has an interest which may affect the
exercise of his best judgment as a fiduciary.
You represent that BON's fee will be based upon a
percentage of the net appreciation of plan assets, taking into
account both realized and unrealized gains and losses during
a pre-established valuation period. You further represent
that investments will be made in securities for which mar-
ket quotations are readily available or that persons appoint-
ed by the plan and independent of BON will make an
independent valuation of securities for which market quota-
tions are not readily available.
Based on the representations contained in your submis-
sions, it is the Department's view that the payment of an
incentive fee pursuant to the arrangement described above
would not, in itself, constitute a violation of section 406(b)(l)
of ERISA. The amount of compensation which BON would
earn depends solely on the changes in value of the securities
in the individual account or limited partnership, as deter-
mined by readily available market quotations or independ-
ent appraisals.' Therefore, in the situation you describe, it
appears that BON would not be exercising any of its fidu-
ciary authority or control to cause a plan to pay an addition-
al fee. Moreover, it does not appear that BON would be
acting on behalf of, or representing, a person whose inter-
ests are adversE' to the plan merely because it enters into an
agreement to provide investment management services pur-
suant to the arrangement described above. Accordingly,
based on your represenlations, it is the Department's view
that payment of an incentive fee pursuant to such arrange-
ment would not, in itself, constitute a violation of section
406(b)(2) of ERISA. However, because violations of sections
406(b)(l) and 406(bX2) could occur in the course of the
provision of services by BDN, the Department is not pre-
pared to rule thal the described arrangement, in operation,
would not violale those sections. Thus, for example, the
Department is not addressing issul.'s relating to a fiduciary's
. WI' nnlt' th"t you rf'prl'sf'nl thai HIlN will not Iw a market
m:lk,'r wilh r{'spf'{" tu sc'e'lIIlll/'S ill ""h...h il r'aus('s plan assf'b to be
illv,'sf{'ct
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, You represent that if Batterrm~rch mana$es assets of a number
of dilJerent plans which are mamtamed by a ~mgle plan.sponsor and
its affiliates (typically invested on a commmgled baSIS through a
master trust) Batterymarch will consider all of such plans to be a
single .plan f~r purposes of determining whether the $50,000.000
threshold has been satisfied.
I You represent that "time we!ghted rate ~f return" is a method of
calculating the rate of return dlrec.~ly attnb~ta~.le to t~e ~rform·
ance of an investment manager by neutrahz~ng contnbutlons and
withdrawals of money by plan sponso~ which alJect the overa~1
amount of plan assets managed by the mvestment manag~r .. ThiS
measurement methodology is recognized by t~e Bank Ad~lDlstra·
tion Institute and is widely used throughout the IDvestment IDdustry.
You represent that Batterymarch is registered as an
investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940. Batterymarch presently receives compensation for the
provision of investment management services to individual
plan accounts based solely on a percentage of assets under
management. Batterymarch proposes to give each client
plan which has aggregate assets of at least $50,000,000 2 the
option to pay Batterymarch an incentive fee as an alterna-
tive to its standard assets under management fee arrange-
ment. The decision of whether to engage Batterymarch as
an investment manager pursuant to the incentive fee ar·
rangement will be made by an independent plan fiduciary.
Client plans which elect to enter into an incentive fee
arrangement with Batterymarch would pay Batterymarch a
"fulcrum fee" which measures the time-weighted total rate
of return) on the account (including both realized and unrea·
lized gains and losses, and income) in relation to the per-
formance of the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 Index over a
one-year computation period commencing on the date the
incentive fee arrangement becomes effective. During the
computation period, each of these plans will pay quarterly
fees for Batterymarch's services in accordance with the fee
schedule based upon a percentage of assets under manage-
ment (Base Fee). At the end of the computation period, on a
set valuation date, Batterymarch's performance with regard
to each plan account will be measured. If that performance
exceeds the S&P 500 Index by more than 100 basis points,
Batterymarch will be entitled to a bonus calculated as a
percentage of the Base Fee. This bonus will be paid by the
plan to Batterymarch in equal installments during the four
quarters following the initial computation period. Converse-
ly, if Batterymarch's performance during the S&P 500 In-
dex, the plan would receive a credit against fees for services
performed by Batterymarch in the following year. This
credit will be applied in equal quarterly installments over
the four quarters following the computation period. The
incentive fee schedule is as follows:
Incentive Fee Schedule
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Sincerely,
Is/Dennis M. Kass
Assistant Secretary
Mr. John J. Cleary
Goodwin, Procter & Hoar
Exchange Place
Boston, MA 02109
Dear Mr. Cleary:
This is in response to your request for an advisory opinion
on behalf of Batterymarch Financial Management (Battery-
march) that the payment of incentive compensation to Bat-
terymarch by employee benefit plans will not result in a
violation of section 406 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) or section 4975 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (the Code).'
'Under Reorganization Plan NO.4 of 1978 (43 FR 47713, Oc~ober
17, 1978). the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to Iss.ue
rulings under section 4975 of the Code has been transferred. With
certain exceptions not here relevant. to the. Secret~ry of Labor.
Therefore the references in this letter to specific sectIOns of ERISA
refer a180'to the rorrcsponding sections of the Code.
allocation of investment opportunities among accounts over
which he has discretion.
ERISA's general standards of fiduciary conduct also
would apply to the proposed arrangement. Section 404 re-
quires, among other things, a fiduciary to discharge his
duties respecting a plan solely in the interest of the plan's
participants and beneficiaries and in a prudent fashion.
Accordingly, the plan fiduciary must act prudently with
respect to the decision to enter into an incentive compensa-
tion arrangement with an investment manager, as well as to
the negotiation of the specific formula under which compen-
sation will be paid. The Department further emphasizes that
it expects a plan fiduciary, prior to entering into an incen-
tive compensation arrangement, to fully understand the
compensation formula, and the risks associated with this
manner of compensation, following disclosure by the invest-
ment manager of all relevant information pertaining to the
proposed arrangement. In addition, such plan fiduciary must
be capable of periodically monitoring the actions taken by
the manager in the performance of its investment duties.
Thus, in considering whether to enter into an arrangement
of the kind described in your letter, a fiduciary should take
into account its ability to provide adequate oversight of the
investment manager. Finally, we also note that, under sec-
tion 405(a) of ERISA, any plan fiduciary (including an
investment manager) will have co-fiduciary liability for any
breach of fiduciary responsibility of another plan fiduciary:
(1) if he knowingly participates in or conceals such breach;
(2) if by his failure to comply with section 404(a)(1), he
enables another fiduciary to commit such a breach; or (3) if
he has knowledge of the breach of another fiduciary and he
fails to make a reasonable effort to remedy the breach.
This letter constitutes an advisory opinion under ERISA
Procedure 76-1. Accordingly, this letter is issued subject to
the provisions of the procedure, including section 10 relating
to the effect of advisory opinions. This letter relates only to
those issues that you expressly raised in your request.
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You represent that securities in which Batterymarch will
invest pl.," assets will bc almost exclusively securities for
which market quotations are readily available within the
meaning of Rul., 2a-4(a)(l) under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (17 CFR 270.2a-4), although securities for which
market quotations are not readily available may comprise a
small percentage (typically no more than one percent) of
plan account holdings.
Battcrymarch will compute the rate of return on its client
plans' accounts as of the last day of the computation period
by performing mathematical computations on raw data
provided to it by pricing services. Interactive Data Services,
Inc., a pricing service, obtains objective information regard-
ing securities for which market quotations are readily avail-
able from the National Quotations Bureau tape and provides
this information to Batterymarch without charge.
A security listed on a national securities exchange or on
the NASDAQ National Market system will be valued based
on its last sales price on the national securities exchange on
which such security is principally traded. In determining the
value, the absolute last sales price on whatever date the last
prior sale on that exchange occurred is used.
Securities which are traded in the over-the-counter mar-
ket (other than securities listed on the NASDAQ National
Market) will be valued on the basis of the mean between
their last "bid" and "asked" prices.
Each client plan' electing the incentive fee arrangement
will select (and will have the exclusive authority to termi-
nate) the pricing service, independent of Batterymarch, to
value securities for which market quotations are not readily
available. Batterymarch will pay the fee of such pricing
service.'
Computation of the total return (taking into account ap-
preciation or depreciation, and income) for the S&P 500
during the computation period will be performed by
Batterymarch using purely mathematical computations
based upon objective raw data.
Either Batterymarch or plans electing the incentive com-
pensation arrangement may terminate the investment man-
agement contract upon sixty days' notice. If the investment
management contract is terminated by either party prior to
the end of anyone-year computation period, the incentive
fee will not apply to that period, and Batterymarch's fee for
that period will be limited to the Base Fee. However, if a
plan continues the investment management relationship be-
yond the initial one-year period and terminates at any time
during a. succeeding one-year period, the plan would be
obligated to pay to Batterymarch any remaining bonus
which had been earned in the preceding computation period,
but would forfeit any remaining fee credit accrued during
such preceding computation period. If Batterymarch contin-
ues the relationship beyond the initial period and terminates
the relationship during a succeeding period, any remaining
bonus payments with respect to the prior period would
• For purposes of this opinion, the Department assumes not only
that the pricing service is independent of Battermarch but also that
it will make independent valuations of the securities on behalf of the
plan. In this respect, the issue of whethf!r a person is independent of
an investment manager and the issue of what constitutes an inde-
pendcnt valuation are factual questions to bc resolved on the basis
of all thl' surrounding facts and circumstances. The Department
ordinarily will not issue advisory opinions on inherently factual
issucs. See section 5.01 of ERISA Procedure 76-1 (41 FR 36281,
August 27. 1976). However, in the Department's view, the indepen-
dl'nc'!' of a pridn~ sl'rvi<'<> and the independence of its valuations are
not nt'('cssarily alJectl'd by Batl<>rymarch's paY!T1ent of the pricing
S('I"VIl'("S ft", und('1" lh,' ('lrI'Umstam'c's you dl·S(·nIH'.
remain due and Batterymarch would be liable to pay the iI
client any remaining fee credit. Such payments would be J.~
duc within ten days after termination of the investment
management contract. .
Up to thirty days prior to the end of any computation
period, a plan will have the option to elect the incentive fee J'
arrangement or the assets under management fee arrange-
ment for the next computation period. Plans which choose to
determine Batterymarch's fees under the assets under man-
agement fee arrangement will be permitted to switch to the J
incentive fee arrangement at any time and trigger the start '.
of a new one-year computation period to begin on the first
day of the next calendar quarter.
You represent that Batterymarch's incentive fee arrange- J'
ment will comply with the terms and conditions of SEC Rule
205-3 governing performance compensation arrangements
(50 FR 40556 (1985) (to be codified at 17 CFR §275.205-3».
You further state that the total fee paid to Batterymarch for J.
each year's performance (the Base Fee adjusted, as applica-
ble, by a penalty or bonus) will in no case exceed reasonable
compensation for services performed by Batterymarch.
You have asked for an adVisory opinion that the payment j
by plans to Batterymarch of an incentive fee in accordance .J
with the arrangement described above will not constitute a
violation of section 406 of ERISA.
Section 406(a)(I)(C) and (D) of ERISA provides that a J'"
fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to ."
engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that
such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of J'
goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in
interest or transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party
in interest, of any assets of, the plan. Section 406(b)(l) of
ERISA provides that a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall
not deal with plan assets in his own interest or for his own J.'
account. Section 406(b)(2) of ERISA provides that a fiduciary
with respect to a plan shall not in his individual or in any
other capacity act in any transaction involving the plan on j ..•..
behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are
adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its
participants and beneficiaries.
Section 3(14) of ERISA defines the term "party in inter-
est" to include a fiduciary and a person providing services tol
a plan. _
Section 408(b)(2) of ERISA exempts from the prohibitions
of section 406(a) any contract or reasonable arrangement
with a party in interest, including a fiduciary, for office J•.
space, or legal, accounting or other services necessary for
the establishment or operation of the plan, if no more than
reasonable compensation is paid therefore. Regulations is- i
sued by the Department of Labor (the Department) clarify .J
the terms "necessary service" (29 CFR 2550.408b-2(b», •
"reasonable contract or arrangement" (29 CFR
2550.408b-2(c) and "reasonable compensation" (29 CFR
2550.408b-2(d) and 2550.408c-2) as used in section 408(b)(2). J.'
The provision of investment management services by
Batterymarch to plans would be exempt from the prohibi-
tions of section 406(a) of ERISA provided the conditions of
section 408(b)(2) are met. Whether the conditions are met in .JI
each case involves questions which are inherently factual in
nature. As noted above, the Department generally will not
issue opinions on such questions. Therefore, plan fiduciaries J.
must determine, based on all the relevant facts and circum- •
stances, whether the conditions of section 408(b)(2) are
satisfied.
With respect to the prohibitions in section 406(b), the
regulalion under seclion 408(b)(2) of ERISA (29 CFR J'
2550.408b-2(a)) states that s('ction 408(b)(2) of ERISA does .
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not contain an exemption for an act described in section
406(b) even if such act occurs in connection with a provision
of services which is exempt under section 408(b)(2).
As explained in regulation section 29 CFR 2550.408b-2(e),
the prohibitions of section 406(b) are imposed upon fiducia-
ries to deter them from exercising the authority, control, or
responsibility which makes them fiduciaries when they have
interests which may conftict with the interests of the plans
for which they act. Thus, a fiduciary may not use the
authority, control, or responsibility which makes him a
fidUciary to cause a plan to pay an additional fee to such
fidUciary, or to a person in which he has an interest which
may affect the exercise of his best judgment as a fiduciary,
to provide a service. However, regulation section 29 CFR
2550.408b-2(e)(2) provides that a fiduciary does not engage
in an act described in section 406(b)(l) of ERISA if the
fiduciary does not use any of the authority, control, or
responsibility which makes him a fiduciary to cause a plan
to pay additional fees for a. service furnished by such
fiduciary or to pay a fee for a service furnished by a person
in which the fiduciary has an interest which may affect the
exercise of his best judgment as a fiduciary.
You represent that Batterymarch's fee will be based upon
its performance in relation to the Standard & Poor's 500
Stock Index, a predetermined index, taking into account
both realized ,;and unrealized gains and losses during a pre-
established valuation period. You further represent that
investments will be made in securities for which market
quotations are readily available or that persons appointed
by the plan and independent of Batterymarch will make an
independent valuation of securities for which market quota-
tions are not readily available.
Based on the representations contained in your submis-
sions, it is the Department's view that the payment of an
incentive fee pursuant to the arrangement described above
would not, in itself, constitute a violation of section 406(b)(l)
of ERISA. The amount of compensation which Battery-
march would earn depends solely on the changes in value of
the securities in the individual account, as determined by
readily available market quotations or independent apprais-
als, by comparative reference to a predetermined index.'
Therefore, in the situation you describe, it appears that
Batterymarch would not be exercising any of its fiduciary
authority or control to cause a plan to pay an additional fee.
Moreover, it does not appear that Batterymarch would be
acting on behalf of, or representing, a person whose inter-
ests are adverse to the plan merely because it enters into an
agreement to provide investment management services pur-
suant to the arrangement described above. Accordingly,
based on your representations, it is the Department's view
'We note that you represent that Batterymarch will not be a
market maker with respect to securities in which it causes plan
assets to be invested.
that payment of an incentive fee pursuant to such arrange-
ment would not, in itself, constitute a violation of section
406(b)(2) of ERISA. However, because violations of sections
406 (b) (1) and 406 (b) (2) could occur in the course of the
provision of services by Batterymarch, the Department is
not prepared to rule that the described arrangement, in
operation, would not violate those sections. Thus, for exam-
ple, the Department is not addressing issues relating to a
fiduciary's allocation of investment opportunities among
accounts over which he has discretion.
ERISA's general standards of fiduciary conduct also
would apply to the proposed arrangement. Section 404 re-
quires, among other things, a fiduciary to discharge his
duties respecting a plan solely in the interest of the plan's
participants and beneficiaries and in a prudent fashion.
Accordingly, the plan fiduciary must act prudently with
respect to the decision to enter into an incentive compensa-
tion arrangement with an investment manager, as well as to
the negotiation of the specific formula under which compen-
sation will be paid (including, where relevant, the choice of
an appropriate index in relation to which the investment
manager's performance is to be compared). The Department
further emphasizes that it expects a plan fidUciary, prior to
entering into an incentive compensation arrangement, to
fully understand the compensation formula, and the risks
associated with this manner of compensation, following
disclosure by the investment manager of all relevant infor-
mation pertaining to the proposed arrangement. In addition,
such plan fiduciary must be capable of periodically monitor-
ing the actions taken by the manager in the performance of
its investment duties. Thus, in considering whether to enter
into an arrangement of the kind described in your letter, a
fiduciary should take into account its ability to prOVide
adequate oversight of the investment manager. Finally, we
also note that, under section 405(a) of ERISA, any plan
fiduciary (including an investment manager) will have co-
fiduciary liability for any breach of fiduciary responsibility
of another plan fiduciary: (1) if he knowingly participates in
or conceals such breach; (2) if by his failure to comply with
section 404 (a) (I), he enables another fidUciary to commit
such a breach; or (3) if he has knowledge of the breach of
another fiduciary and he fails to make a reasonable effort to
remedy the breach.
This letter constitutes an advisory opinion under ERISA
Procedure 76-1. Accordingly, this letter is issued subject to
the provisions of the procedure, including section 10 relating
to the effect of advisory opinions. This letter relates only to
those issues that you expressly raised in your request.
Sincerely
IslDennis M. Kass
Assistant Secretary
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ERISA TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 86-1, LABOR DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON POLICIES
CONCERNING SOFT DOLLAR AND DIRECTED COMMISSION ARRANGEMENTS
May 22, 1986
(
This statement reftects the views of the Pension and
Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA) with regard to
"soft dollar" and directed commission arrangements pursu-
ant to its responsibility to administer and enforce the provi-
sions of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA). Investment managers, plan sponsors
and other members of the pension community which provide
services to employee plans have expressed a great deal of
interest in the application of the fiduciary responsibility
provisions of ERISA to these arrangements.
"Soft dollar" and directed commission arrangements typi-
cally involve situations in which an investment manager of
an employee benefit plan or other plan fiduciary purchases
goods or services with a portion of the brokerage commis-
sion paid by a plan to a broker for executing a securities
transaction. Prior to the elimination of fixed commission
rates on stock exchange transactions, investment managers
often purchased additional services with commission dollars
beyond simple execution, clearance and settlement of secu-
rities transactions. After the elimination of fixed commis-
sion rates in May 1975, Congress, as part of the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1975, added Section 28(e) to the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) to address the
practice whereby brokers provided investment managers
with brokerage and research services. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (the Commission) administers the
1934 Act and has exclusive authority to interpret the scope
of Section 28(e) and the terms used therein.
Section 28(e) of the 1934 Act prOVides generally that no
person who exercises investment discretion with respect to
securities transactions will be deemed to have acted unlaw-
fully or to have breached a fiduciary duty solely by reason
of paying brokerage commissions for effecting a securities
transaction in excess of the amount of commission another
broker-dealer would have charged, if such person deter-
mined in good faith that the commission was reasonable in
relation to the value of brokerage and research services
provided by the broker-dealer. The limited safe harbor
provided by Section 28(e) is available only for the provision
of brokerage and research services to persons who exercise
investment discretion with respect to an account as that
term is defined in Section 3(a)(35) of the 1934 Act. The
Commission has indicated that if a plan fiduciary does not
exercise investment discretion with respect to the securities
transaction or uses "soft dollars" to pay for non-research
related services, the transaction falls outside the protection
afforded by Section 28(e) of the 1934 Act and may be in
violation of the securities laws and the fiduciary responsibil-
ity provisions of ERISA.
It has come to the attention of PWBA that ERISA fiducia-
ries may be involved in several types of "soft dollar" and
directed commission arrangements which do not qualify for
the "safe harbor" prOVided by Section 28(e) of the 1934 Act.
In some instances, investment managers direct a portion of
a plan's securities trades through specific broker-dealers,
who then apply a percentage of the brokerage commissions
to pay for travel, hotel rooms and other goods and services
for such investment managers which do not qualify as
research Within the meaning of Section 28(e).' In other
instances, plan sponsors who do not exercise investment
discretion with respect to a plan direct the plan's securities
trades to one or more broker-dealers in return for research,
performance evaluation, other administrative services or
discounted commissions. The Commission has indicated that
the safe harbor of Section 28(e) is not available for directed
brokerage transactions.2
A fiduciary for an ERISA plan, such as a trustee or
investment manager, must meet the fiduciary responsibility
standards set forth in part 4 of Title I of EPISA. These
standards are designed to help ensure that the fiduciary's
decisions are made in the best interests of the plan and are
not colored by self-interest.
Section 403(c)(l) provides, in part, that the assets of a plan
shall be held for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits
to the plan's participants and their beneficiaries and defray-
ing reasonable expenses of administering the plan. Section
404(a)(l) sets forth a similar requirement on how a plan
fiduciary must discharge his duties with respect to the plan,
and provides further that such fiduciary must act prudently
and solely in the interest of the participants and beneficia-
ries. These basic provisions are supplemented by the per se
prohibitions of certain classes of transactions set forth in
section 406 of ERISA.
Section 406(a)(I)(D) of ERISA prohibits a fiduciary of an
ERISA plan from causing that plan to engage in a transac·
tion if he knows or should know that the transaction would
constitute a direct or indirect transfer to, or use by or for
the benefit of, a party in interest, of any assets of that plan.
Section 3(14) includes, within the definition of "party in
interest" with respect to a plan, any fidUciary with respect
to that plan. Thus, section 406(a)(I)(D) would not only prohib-
it a fiduciary from causing the plan to engage in a transac-
tion which would benefit a third person who is a party in
interest, but it also would prohibit the fiduciary from simi-
larly benefiting himself. In addition, section 406(b)(l) spe-
cifically prohibits a fiduciary with respect to a plan from
dealing with the assets of that plan in his own interest or for
his own account. Section 406(b)(3) supplements these provi-
sions by prohibiting a plan fiduciary from receiving any
consideration for his own personal account from any party
dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction
involving the assets of the plan.
When investment management responsibility has been
properly delegated to an investment manager, the manager
is responsible for all aspects of the investment process. l The
I See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34·23170 (April 23,
1986).
, See Section VI of Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34·23170
(April 23, 1986).
Section 405 of ERISA limits the liability of certain plan fiducia-
ries if management of plan assets has been properly delegated to an
investment manager.
j
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'In PWBA's view, an investment manager's responsibility to seek
best execution under the circumstances requires the manager to
consider not only the cost of the commissions for the transaction but
the quality and reliability of the execution.
manager, in those cases, is required to act prudently both
with respect to a decision to buy or sell securities as well as
with respect to the decision concerning who will execute the
transaction. If such a delegation has occurred, the named
fiduciary of the plan is not liable for the particular acts or
omissions of the manager but has oversight responsibility to
periodically review the investment manager's performance.
Where an investment manager has entered into a "soft
dollar" arrangement, Section 28(e) of the 1934 Act does not
relieve anyone other than the person who exercises invest-
ment discretion from the applicability of the fiduciary pro-
visions of ERISA. Therefore, the fiduciary who appoints the
investment manager is not relieved of his ongoing duty to
monitor the investment manager to assure that the manager
has secured best execution of the plan's brokerage transac-
tions and to assure that the commissions paid on such
transactions are reasonable in relation to the value of the
brokerage and research services provided to the plan.-
It is PWBA's understanding that where a plan sponsor or
other plan fiduciary directs the investment manager to
execute securities trades for the plan through one or more
specified broker-dealers, the direction generally requires
the investment manager to execute a specified percentage
of the plan's trades or a specified amount of the plan's
commission business through the particular broker-dealers,
consistent with the manager's duty to secure best execution
for the transactions.
A plan sponsor's decision to direct brokerage transactions
must be made prudently and solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries. In directing a plan's broker-
age transactions, the sponsor has an initial responsibility to
determine that the broker-dealer is capable of providing
best execution for the plan's brokerage transactions. In
addition, the sponsor has an ongoing responsibility to moni-
tor the services provided by the broker-dealer so as to
assure that the manager has secured best execution of the
plan's brokerage transactions and that the commissions paid
are reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and
other services received by the plan.
In considering "soft dollar" and directed commission ar-
rangements, ERISA's prohibited transaction provisions also
must be taken into account. A fidUciary with respect to an
ERISA plan is generally prohibited, by section 406(b)(I),
from causing the plan to engage in a transaction if the
fiduciary has an interest in the matter which may affect the
fiduciary'S best judgment as a fiduciary. For example, an
employer which is the named fiduciary for its plan and
which does not exercise investment discretion would nor-
mally be prohibited from directing the plan's brokerage
transactions through a designated broker-dealer who agrees
to utilize a portion of the brokerage commissions received
from the plan to procure goods or services for the benefit of
the employer. (As previously noted, Section 28(e) is unavail-
able for such brokerage transactions.) Each use of the
broker-dealer that results in the receipt of goods and ser-
vices by the employer following that designation would
create an additional violation of sections 406(a)(I)(0) and
406(b)(l) of ERISA. In addition, where the relief provided by
Section 28(e) is unavailable, the receipt by a fiduciary (Le.,
the employer) of goods or services for its own personal
account from a party (i.e., the broker-dealer) dealing with a
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-plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of
the plan would, in the opinion of PWBA, constitute a viola-
tion of section 406(b)(3). Such an arrangement would also
violate sections 403(c)(l) and 404(a)(l) to the extent that the
employer is benefiting from its use of its position.
However, where an investment manager directs broker-
age transactions through a designated broker-dealer to pro-
cure goods and services on behalf of the plan, and for which
the plan would be otherwise obligated to pay, such use of
brokerage commissions ordinarily would not violate the
fiduciary provisions of ERISA, provided that the amount
paid for the brokerage and other goods and services is
reasonable, and the investment manager has fulfilled its
fidUciary duty to obtain best execution for the plan's securi-
ties transactions. This result does not depend on the avail-
ability of the "safe harbor" under Section 28(e) for these
transactions.
In applying the fiduciary responsibility provisions of
ERISA to the various "soft dollar" and directed commission
arrangements that fall outside of the protection of Section
28(e), it is apparent to PWBA that issues are raised under
section 406 of ERISA whenever there is an inducement for
the investment manager or other plan fiduciary to direct
plan brokerage transactions through particular broker-deal-
ers. The follOWing examples illustrate the application of the
fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA to "soft dollar"
and directed commission arrangements:
(1) Employer X instructs the master trustee of its plan
to direct all plan brokerage transactions through Broker-
Dealer B. Part of the commissions are rebated to the
master trustee to reduce its fees. The plan provides that
administrative costs, including the fees of the master
trustee, are to be paid by the plan. Under these circum-
stances, this transaction would not, in itself, constitute a
violation of the prohibited transaction provisions of
ERISA since the "soft dollars" are being used for the
exclusive benefit of the plan which generated the commis-
sions. However, in order to act prudently under section
404(a)(l) of ERISA, Employer X would be obligated to
initially determine that Broker-Dealer D is capable of
providing best execution of the plan's brokerage transac-
tions. In addition, Employer X must also periodically
monitor the execution of the plan's brokerage transactions
and evaluate whether the brokerage commissions paid by
the plan are reasonable in light of the total services
received by the plan. Moreover, Employer X would be
obligated to assure that the arrangement does not result
in the payment of unreasonable compensation to the
master trustee.
(2) Money Manager A enters into an arrangement with
Broker-Dealer B whereby Money Manager A would direct
brokerage on behalf of its managed plan accounts which
would generate fees of $500,000 per year to Broker-Dealer
B. In return, Broker-Dealer B would provide bookkeeping
services that do not constitute research under Section
28(e) for the general corporate purposes of Money Man-
ager A. Money Manager A has engaged in an act prohibit-
ed by sections 406(a)(I)(D), 406(b)(l) and 406(b)(3) of
ERISA since Money Manager A has exercised its fidu-
ciary authority over plan assets to benefit itself. Such a
transaction would also violate the exclusive purpose pro-
visions of sections 403(c)(l) and 404(a)(l) of ERISA. In
these circumstances, the relief provided by Section 28(e)
would not be available because the "soft dollars" are paid
for services other than research.
(3) The named fiduciaries of Plan P retain Money
Manager C to manage part of the assets of Plan P. Money
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Manager C directs the plan's brokerage transactions
through Broker-Dealer D. In return, Broker-Dealer 0 will
provide research on tax-exempt securities to Money Man-
ager C. Although tax-exempt securities would not be a
suitable investment for Plan P, Money Manager C has
determined that this research would be useful to his
managed accounts as a whole. Money Manager C's ar-
rangement with Broker-Dealer 0 is therefore encom-
passed by Section 28(e) of the 1934 Act. However. in
retaining Money Manager C, the named fiduciaries of
Plan P are required under section 404(aXl) of ERISA to
periodically review the execution secured by Money Man-
ager C and ensure that the brokerage commissions paid
by Plan P to Broker-Dealer 0 are reasonable.
The foregoing discussion is intended to provide general
guidance as to the nature of the analysis applicable to these
situations. The discussion should not be viewed as expressing
an opinion with respect to any specific case.
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FEDERAL CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS
AFFECTING BANKS AND BANK COUNSEL:
SELECTIONS
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* * AN OVERVIEW * *
During the past 20 years an entire body of law commonly
referred to as CONSUMER CREDIT LAW -- has developed on the
Federal level. Any bank which makes consumer loans or which
purchases consumer paper from dealers must be aware of this body
of federal law. The effect is felt in two ways:
1. Before the transaction. Banks must be aware of
obligations and duties before transactions take place, as
laws affect the credit granting analysis and decision, the
and content of the contracts and documents and practically
operational procedures.
2. Collectibility of Accounts. While all banks face the
possibility of a suit or a class action filed against them (and
the potential wrath of their regulator) some banks first learn of
the federal laws and feel the effect of those laws by a
counterclaim in a simple debt collection action. At best, a
successful counterclaim will result in a recoupment or set-off
against a valid debt. At worst, such counterclaim may result in
an affirmative recovery against the bank.
The following material is intended merely as a summary of the
major federal statutes and regulations which may affect banks in
their consumer lending activities.
CAVEAT
From time to time in the following material, reference is made to
certain Kentucky statutes. However, the material does not
address all Kentucky law which may modify or enlarge a bank's
duties and responsibilities. As a general proposition, the
federal law governs, unless state law confers greater rights and
privileges on the consumer.
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT - REGULATION B
J
1j
*** *** *** ***
AN OVERVIEW - THE BIG PICTURE
Very often banks and their attorneys overlook the
involvement of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B
in day to day business operations. To achieve compliance and
avoid the possibility of costly litigation, the following general
propositions should be understood and remembered:
j
1.
2.
3.
4.
While the Equal Credit Opportunity Act is one of
several titles in the Federal Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, ECOA is not limited to consumer credit
transactions. Commercial and business credit are also
covered by the act (with the exception of four rather
minor requirements) •
Regulation B issues are present in the general opera-
tions of a bank and the requirements and limitations of
the regulation apply to all aspects of those
operations, from the initial decision to grant the
credit, through in-house collection activity and to the
ultimate legal collection of the indebtedness.
Under -che expanded definition of "applicant" in the
revised regulation, persons who guarantee the debts of
another are also covered and have a direct cause of
action under the act if there is a violation.
A bank which meets the detailed technical requirements
of the act and regulation does not automatically
achieve compliance. Unlike some statutes under which
it is possible to "checklist" all requirements and thus
ensure compliance, this act does not lend itself to
compliance efforts based solely on meeting its techni-
cal requirements. Very often a "change of attitude" is
required.
j
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I. SOURCE OF LAW AND REFERENCES.
A. The Act. 15 U.S.C. Section 1691 et seq.
;j
j
B. Regulation B. 12 C.F.R. 202.
On March 25, 1985, the Federal Reserve Board issued
proposed revisions to RegUlation B and also published a
proposed Official Staff Commentary, intended to replace
the many staff letters and official interpretations
existing before those revisions and generally following
the practices established under RegUlation Z, in the
issuance of Official Staff Commentary. On November 20,
1985, the Federal Reserve Board published and issued
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the final revisions to Regulation B and the final
version of the Official commentary. The revisions
became effective December 16, 1985, but banks had a
grace period until October 1, 1986, when compliance
with the new Regulation B became mandatory.
II. GENERAL RULE PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION.
The Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits
creditors from discriminating against credit applicants
on the basis of race; color; religion; national origin;
sex; marital status; age (provided that the applicant
has the capacity to enter into a binding contract);
because all or part of the applicant's income derives
from any public assistance program; or because the
applicant has in good faith exercised any right under
the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
III. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT AND REGULATION.
A. Applications. Neither the act nor the regulation
require written applications.
1. An application is defined as "any oral or written
request for an extension of credit that is made in
accordance with the procedures established by a
creditor for the type of credit requested."
2. Some form of written application will be required
for the types of credit SUbject to the data
collection requirements of Regulation B Section
202.13, i.e., certain types of dwelling-related
loans.
. B. Information which May be Taken on Applications (Regula-
tion B. Section 202.7).
1. Marital Status. A bank cannot ask for the marital
status of the applicant if individual, unsecured
credit is applied for. Marital status may be
asked if: The credit is to be secured; the credit
involves more than one applicant; or business or
agricultural credit is being sought.
Alimony and Child Support. The bank may not
inquire whether income revealed in an application
is derived from alimony, child support or mainte-
nance unless the bank first discloses that such
income need not be revealed unless the application
so desires.
...
3.
4.
Titles. Courtesy titles may be asked for but only
if the request is preceded by a statement that the
use of such titles is optional.
Age. May be asked for on an application but may
only be used as it relates to a "pertinent element
of credit worthiness."
j
J
.J
5. Names Under Which An Applicant May Apply for
Credit. An applicant may apply for credit in his
or her birth given last name; his or her married
name; or any combination of the two.
6.
7.
8.
Dependants. Information can be asked only about
the number and age of dependants, but only if the
bank consistently asks this question of all
applicants, both male and female.
Information About Spouses. Information about
spouses may be requested only if the spouse is to
be a user of the account; if the spouse isc to bejointly liable on the obligation; or if the
application is relying on the spouses income.
Information about a former spouse may be requested
if the applicant has already indicated that he or
she is relying upon alimony, maintenance or child
support as a basis for repaying the credit.
Income from Part-time EmploYment. Cannot be
disregarded out of hand, although the creditor may
consider if the income is likely to continue.
J
9. Income From Public Assistance Programs. May not
be automatically written off but must be consid-
ered the same as income from any other source.
May be
since
convey
10. Permanent Residence or Immigration Status.
asked in Kentucky in some applications,
state law restricts the rights cof aliens to
and mortgage real property.
C. cosigners. The bank cannot require a cosigner at all
(whether spouse or not) if the applicant qualifies
under the bank's normal standards of credit worthiness
for the type and amount of credit requested.
1. If the bank's credit standards require a cosigner
with respect to a particular transaction, the bank
may not request or suggest that the applicant's
spouse be the cosigner but rather must leave it up
to the applicant to chose the cosigner.
J
Adverse Action and Notification.
1. Adverse action is considered to have occurred when
an application is rejected; when the bank offers
to extend credit but only on terms more burdensome
to the applicant; or when the bank offers to grant
less credit than was requested and the applicant
refuses to accept the lesser amount.
A bank is required to notify an applicant whether
it has accepted or rejected the application within
30 days after receiving a "completed application."
The notification must be in writing (in a business
credit situation, the written notice must be sent
only if the applicant requests it, in writing,
within 30 days after the creditor rejects the
application).
(a) If an application is incomplete, the bank
must notify the applicant in writing.
(b) If an application is "withdrawn" by the
applicant the safe course for the creditor is
to send the adverse action notice.
3.
2.
The adverse action notification must list and
disclose the factors which truly relate to the
reason for the denial of the credit and no factor
may arbitrarily be excluded. According to some
courts, the disclosures should be made with the
idea that the applicant is to be informed of the
"minimal adjustments" needed for credit approval
and to explain "all interactions among factors
that might follow" from the adjustments.
The Effects Test. In general, the effects test is a
rule that originated from the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity area. Basically, this test, which has been
incorporated into RegUlation B, provides that the bank
cannot use or consider any information in evaluating a
credit application if such information would have the
effect of discrimination on a prohibited basis.
E.
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2.
Under this test, the intentions of the bank are
irrelevant and the result is the only thing that
is important.
Almost all loan criteria are suspect under this
test and even the Federal Reserve gave up trying
to define the applicability of the rule. In
drafting Regulation B, the Board elected to merely
incorporate the effects test into the RegUlation
and leave it to the courts to interpret how it
should be applied.
E-5
F. certain Business Credit Exemptions.
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1.
2.
Business Credit is defined as credit extended
primarily for business, commercial or agricultural
purposes.
The only sections of the Regulation not applying
to business credit are:
(a) The bank may inquire as to marital
(but may not use it as a criteria in
the credit decision).
status
making
(b) The section relating to the furnishing of
credit information to credit bureaus does not
apply.
(c) The record retention requirement (25 months
following the application) does not apply.
(d) The bank has no affirmative duty to notify of
adverse action in writing, unless requested
by the applicant. However the official
commentary makes it clear that a bank which
denies business credit or takes other adverse
action is required to not~fy the applicant in
some manner.
IV. CIVIL REMEDIES AND PENALTIES.
I
..
I
.J
A. The act specifically grants jurisdiction to the United
States District Courts and provides for recovery of
damages.
Specifically
1.
2.
3.
4.
Actual Damages. Courts have generally held that
actual damages may include injury to credit
reputation, mental anguish, humiliation and
embarrassment.
Punitive Damages. May be recovered up to an
amount of $10,000 in individual suits and $500,000
or 1% of the net worth of the creditor (whichever
is less) in class action suits. Several courts
considering the issue have held that punitive
damages may be awarded even if actual damages are
not recovered.
Court Costs and Attorney Fees.
authorized and allowed by the act.
In determining punitive damage to be awarded in
class actions, the act provides that the court
must look at the following:
E-6
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A.
B.
(a) The frequency and persistence of violations
of the act by the creditor.
(b) The number of customers effected by the
violations.
(c) Whether the violations were intentional.
statute of Limitations. The statute of Limitations is
two years from the date of the violation. However,
violations of the act could occur after the loan is
made and even during the collection process. The
concept of using Regulation B violations as a "recoup-
ment" or "set-off" after the passing of the statute of
Limitations has generally been upheld.
On December 1, 1986, the Federal Reserve Board
published its first proposed revisions to the Qfficial
Commentary to Regulation B. 51 F.R. 43372. It is
anticipated that the first proposed update will be
adopted in final form in March 1987.
The changes and additions are few and there are only
two which are potentially of interest to banks. First,
a new comment 9(a) (1)-3 would be added to explain that
a bank may deny an application missing information that
the applicant needs to provide on the ground that the
application is incomplete. Of course, the bank has the
option of providing a notice of incompleteness as
contemplated by the model form.
A new comment 13(a)-5 would be added to explain the
types of transactions which are excluded from the data
collection requirements of Section 202.13 of the
Regulation. Specifically the comment provides that
"home improvement loans, open-end home equity loans,
and second mortgages (unless the second mortgage is to
purchase a principal dwelling)" are not subject to the
requirements of the cited section.
Generally, there are no cases which had significant
impact. One case of interest, U.s. vs. Meadors (CA-7
1985) CCH Consumer Credit Guide, Paragraph 96376, held
that a wife who had signed as a guarantor on her
husband's loan could not assert a violation of Reg. B
since under the facts she was neither required nor
requested to sign but did so as her own voluntary act.
One other case might prompt a review of the bank's
procedures on Adverse Action Notices. In Jochum v.
Pico Credit Corporation of Westbank, Inc., (CA-5 1984)
730 Fed. 2d 1041, the court held that a lender's
refusal to consummate a loan, intended for home
improvement purposes, because the lender found three
recorded jUdgments which prevented it from achieving a
second mortgage status, constituted adverse action
under Reg. B and obligated the lender to send an
adverse action notice.
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III. UNFAIR CREDIT PRACTICES UNDER THE RULE AND THUS PROHIBITED.
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THE FTC CREDIT PRACTICES RULE
Effective March 1, 1985
REFERENCE SOURCES.
A. The Rule. FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practic-
es. 49 F.R. 7740 (March 1, 1984).
B. Administrative History of the Rule. FTC Initial Notice
of Rulemaking, 40 F.R. 16347 (April 11, 1975); Final
Notice of Rulemaking, 42 F.R. 32261 (June 24, 1977).
SCOPE OF THE RULE.
A. The rule covers only "consumer" transactions which are
defined as credit extended to a natural person who
seeks to acquire goods, services or money for personal,
family or household use.
B. Both sellers and lenders, which are under the j~risdic­
tion of the Federal Trade Commission, are covered by
the rule.
C. Banks and subsidiaries which are governed by the
Federal Reserve Board are covered under a separate
rule, as are members of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System.
A. Taking a non-possessory security interest in household
goods other than a purchase money security interest.
E-9
Taking an assignment of wages or other earnings unless:
Collecting a delinquency charge on a payment which
otherwise is a full payment for the applicable period
and is timely paid, when the only delinquency is
attributable to a late fee or delinquency charge
assessed on an earlier installment.
2. It is pursuant to a preauthorized payment plan or
payroll deduction plan, or
3. It applies only to wages already earned at the
time of the assignment.
Obtaining an executory waiver or any other limitation
of exemption from attachment, execution or other
process on real or personal property, unless the waiver
It is revocable at the will of the debtor, or1.
C.
B.
D.
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applies only to property sUbject to a security interest
given in connection with the obligation.
Obtaining a cognovit or confession of jUdgment, warrant
of attorney, or other waiver of the right to notice and
the opportunity to be heard in the event of a lawsuit.
j
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IV. UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE COSIGNER PRACTICES UNDER THE RULE.
A. Misrepresenting the nature or extent of
liability.
cosigner
B.
C.
obligating a cosigner unless the cosigner is informed
as to the nature and extent of his liability prior to
becoming obligated.
To prevent the above abuses, the rule provides a method
to completely insulate the creditor from liability. To
receive the full protection of this section, the
creditor must deliver a separate document to a cosigner
prior to the time that the cosigner executes the actual
document which legally obligates him. The language and
content of the required notice is mandated by the rule.
The following language appears in the rule:
You are being asked to guarantee this
debt. Think carefully before you do. If the
borrower doesn't pay the debt, you will have
to. Be sure you can afford to pay if you
have to, and that you want to accept this
responsibility.
You may have to pay up to the full
amount of the debt if the borrower does not
pay. You may also have to pay late fees or
collection costs, which increase this amount.
The creditor can collect this debt from
you without first trying to collect from the
borrower. The creditor can use the same
collection methods against you that can be
used against the borrower, such as suing you,
garnishing your wages, etc. If this debt is
ever in default, that fact may become a part
of your credit record.
This notice is not the contract that
makes you liable for the debt.
E-IO
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SCOPE OF THE REGULATION.
REFERENCE SOURCES.
Effective January 1, 1986
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD CREDIT PRACTICES RULE
(Regulation AA)
Reserve System: Unfair or Deceptive
- Credit Practices. 50 F.R. 16695
In pUblishing the Rule, the Federal
furnished a very limited analysis
in the same material.
The Rule. Federal
Acts or Practices
(April 29, 1985).
Reserve Board also
and interpretation
B. Only "consumer" transactions are covered. The credit
must be extended to a natural person who seeks or
acquires goods, services or money for personal, family
or household use other than the purchase of real
property. The Rule applies to the content of all
documentation, all actions of the bank in connection
with extending the credit, and all enforcement proceed-
ings, which appears to make it broader in scope than
the FTC Rule.
A. The Law. The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
Subsection 41 et seq.) requires the Federal Reserve
Board to adopt rules SUbstantially similar to Federal
Trade Commission rules, unless the Board finds that
there is no necessity for a similar rule.
B.
A. The rule applies to all banks and their SUbsidiaries,
except savings banks that are members of the Federal
Home Loan Bank System. Compliance is to be enforced by
the Comptroller of the currency, the Federal Reserve
System or the FDIC, depending upon the identity of the
bank involved.
C. The Staff Guidelines. The staff of the Federal Reserve
Board published guidelines in a questio~ and answer
form addressing many issues created under the original
rule, on November 14, 1985, 50 F.R. 47036. Note:
Technical corrections were later pUblished at 50 F.R.
49524, some of which changed the effect of the material
in the original guidelines.
II.
I.
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III. UNFAIR CREDIT PRACTICES UNDER THE REGULATION.
r
r
A. Obtaining a cognovit or confession of jUdgment, warrant
of attorney, or other waiver of the right to notice and
the opportunity to be heard in the event of a suit or
jUdicial process thereon.
E-ll
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Obtaining an executory waiver or any other limitation
on the customer's right of exemption from attachment or
execution, unless that waiver applies only to property
sUbject to a security interest given in connection with
the obligation.
Taking a non-possessory security interest in household
goods other than a purchase money security interest.
Collecting a delinquency charge on a paYment which
otherwise is a full paYment for the applicable period
and is timely paid, when the only delinquency is
attributable to a late fee or delinquency charge
assessed on an earlier installment.
Taking an assignment of wages or other earnings unless:
1. It is revocable at the will of the debtor, or
...
J
2.
3.
It is pursuant to a preauthorized paYment plan or
payroll deduction plan, beginning at the time of
the transaction, or
It applies only to wages already earned at the
time of assignment.
....
IV. UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE PRACTICES INVOLVING COSIGNERS.
A. The bank is prohibited from:
1. Misrepresenting the nature or extent of cosigner
liability to any person, and
2. Obligating a cosigner unless that cosigner is
informed prior to becoming obligated of the nature
of his liability.
B. A clear and conspicuous disclosure statement must be
given in writing to a cosigner before he becomes
obligated. The disclosure statement must be substan-
tially similar to the "model form" appearing in the
Regulation. Unlike the FTC Rule, the disclosure may be
either in a separate document or included in the
documents evidencing the consumer credit obligation.
The model language adopted by the Federal Reserve Board
is as follows:
You are being asked to guarantee this
debt. Think carefully before you do. If the
borrower doesn't pay the debt, you will have
to. Be sure you can afford to pay if you
have to, and that you want to accept this
responsibility.
E-12 j
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UPDATE: 1986-1987.'
On October 30, 1986, the Federal Reserve Board published an
update to the staff Guidelines on this rule, effective
November 1, 1986. 51 F.R. 39646. Generally, the update
clarified many questions that arose after the implementation
of the original rule. Some of the areas addressed are
summarized as follows:
A waiver of exemption provision, even if generally
qualified, is not permitted. For example a clause that
states "I waive my state property exemption to the
D.
C. There is no distinction under the rule between a
renewal and refinancing. Therefore a refinancing or a
renewal entered into after the effective date of the
rule is SUbject to the rule and therefore may not
contain a contract provision prohibited by the rule.
A bank may not include any of the prohibited provisions
in a separate guaranty agreement if the signer of that
guaranty agreement is obligating himself to pay an
underlying consumer credit obligation SUbject to the
rule.
E.
You may have to pay up to the full
amount of the debt if the borrower does not
pay. You may also have to pay late fees or
collection costs, which increase this amount.
The bank can collect this debt from you
without first trying to collect from the
borrower. The bank can use the same collec-
tion methods against you that can be used
against the borrower, such as suing you,
garnishing your wages, etc. If this debt is
ever in default, that fact may become a part
of your credit record.
This notice is not the contract that
makes you liable for the debt.
A. A lease transaction is covered only if the transaction
qualifies as a "credit sale" as defined under
Regulation Z.
B. If a partnership or corporation cosigns on a consumer
credit obligation, a cosigner notice is not required.
Likewise, where a bank and an automobile dealer, for
example, enter into an agreement whereby the bank
purchases a consumer credit contract from the dealer
and the dealer guarantees the obligation, the bank is
not required to provide the cosigner notice to the
dealer.
v.
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extent the law allows" is prohibited by the rule
because it is an overly broad waiver.
A cosigner notice must be given at the time a guarantor
becomes obligated on the guaranty, that is at the time
the guaranty is executed. If the guaranty is
continuing in nature and encompasses other debts and
obligations to the consumer to be incurred in the
future, new notices need not be given upon the granting
of those subsequent loans. Likewise, the notice is not
required on all future advances made as part of an
open-end credit plan.
F.
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II.
THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD CREDIT PRACTICES RULE
Effective January 1, 1986
REFERENCE SOURCES.
A. The Law. The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
Subsection 41 et seq.) requires the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board' to adopt rules SUbstantially similar to
Federal Trade Commission rules, unless the Board finds
that there is no necessity for a similar rule.
B. The Rule. The Federal Home Loan Bank board: Prohibit-
ed Consumer Credit Practices, 12 C.F.R., Subchapter B,
Part 535.
COMPARISON OF THE RULE WITH REGULATION AA. There are
several technical differences between the two rules but they
are substantially similar.
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TRUTH-IN-LENDING - REGULATION Z
SOURCE OF THE LAW AND REFERENCES.
I
..
j
A. The Act. 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. J
B. Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. 226.
C. Official Staff Commentary.
SPECIAL NOTICE: The original Truth-In-Lending Act was
signed into law in 1968. During the first ten years follow-
ing its enactment, millions of dollars were expended by
creditors in complying with this complex law and the basic
problems were consistently compounded as the law underwent
drastic changes and various courts reached differing inter-
pretations. Millions of dollars were spent on the prosecu-
tion and defense of more than 13,000 suits which were
brought in Federal Courts alone and on countless additional
suits and counterclaims filed in state courts. On March 31,
1980, the so-called Truth-In-Lending Simplification and
Reform Act was signed into law. The original effective date
of Simplification was April 1, 1982, but creditors were
permitted to begin voluntary compliance on April 1, 1981.
The mandatory effective date was later extended by Congress
to October 1, 1982. Thus proper analysis of Truth-In-
Lending issues must first start with the date of the trans-
action. If the transaction date is prior to April 1, 1981,
the "old" law governs; after October 1, 1982, the "new" law
governs; during the 18 month interim, the form of the
creditor's disclosures and procedures will usually determine
which law governs. At the present there are still many
existing transactions governed by the old law. However, the
material in this outline deals with only the "new" law.
II. SCOPE OF THE STATUTE AND REGULATION.
J
J
J
A. General. Creditor is defined as a person who both (1)
regularly extends consumer credit which is payable by
agreement in writing in more than four installments or
for which the paYment of a finance charge is or may be
required and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising
from the credit transaction is initially payable on the
fact of the evidence of the indebtedness. The transac-
tion must involve an extension of consumer credit,
defined as credit extended primarily for personal;
family or household purposes (Reg. Z Section
226.2(a) (12)) SUbject to a finance charge or payable in
more than four installments and extended "on a regular
basis by the creditor" (Reg. Z Section
226.2 (a) (17) (i)).
E~6
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1. Business, commercial, agricultural or organiza-
tional credit.
Exemptions from Coverage. certain transactions are
exempted from coverage (Reg. Z Section 226.3).
1. Even though the plan may not involve a finance
charge or an agreement to repay in four install-
ments, if a credit card is involved, several
sections of the act and regulation are triggered,
including the rules covering issuance of credit
cards, the liability of a card holder for unautho-
rized use and the rules regarding billing error
resolution (Reg. Z section 226.12(a) and (b».
4. Securities or commodities accounts.
,.
f
r
r
r
r
r
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B.
2.
3.
5.
Credit over $25,000 unless it is secured by real
property or a dwelling.
Public utility credit.
certain home fuel budget plans.
r
r
r
,.
,
r
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6. Certain student loan credit.
Types of Credit Extensions. The act and regulation
clearly recognize two different types of credit trans-
actions and set out separate and different disclosure
requirements applying to each type. It is imperative
that a correct conclusion be reached as to which type
of credit extension is involved.
1. Open-End Credit is defined as a credit extension
under a plan in which the creditor reasonably
contemplates repeated transactions; the creditor
may impose a finance charge from time to time on
an outstanding unpaid balance; and the amount of
the credit that may be extended to the consumer is
generally made available to the extent that any
outstanding balance is repaid. (Reg. Z Section
226.2 (a) (20».
2. Closed-End Credit is defined as consumer credit
other than "open-end credit" as defined in the
regulation. (Reg. Z Section 226.2(a) (10».
D. Two Basic Disclosures Required on All Types of Credit.
r
r
1. Finance Charge. Finance Charge is defined
cost of consumer credit expressed as a
amount and includes any charge payable
consumer or imposed directly or indirectly
E-17
as the
dollar
by the
by the
2.
creditor as an incident to or a condition of the
credit extension. (Reg. Z section 226.4(a».
Annual Percentage Rate. For closed-end disclosure
purposes, defined as "a measure of the cost of
credit, expressed as a yearly rate, that relates
to the amount and timing of value received by the
consumer to the amount and timing of payments
made." (Reg •. Z Paragraph 226.22(a)(i». For
open-end disclosure purposes, annual percentage
rate is defined as "a measure of the cost of
credit, expressed as a yearly rate." (Reg. Z
section 226.l4(a». While the definitions are
basically the same they recognize that open-end
transaction require a simple interest method of
calculation while closed-end transactions could
include calculation of interest either on the
simple interest method or the precomputed method.
•..
.J
J
E. General Disclosure Requirements.
1.
2.
Closed-End Credit. The creditor must makedisclo-
sures, clearly and conspicuously, in writing, in a
form that the consumer may keep; they must be
grouped together and segregated from everything
else; and must not contain information which is
not directly related to the required disclosures.
(Reg. Z Section 226.17).
Open-End Credit. The requirements basically track
the closed-end requirements except that the
disclosures need not be "segregated" from all
other information. (Reg. Z Section 226.5).
,
J
.
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F. Specific Disclosure Requirements.
1. Closed-End Credit. The regulation mandates some
18 items which must be included in the segregated
disclosures, if they are applicable to a particu-
lar transaction (Reg. Z Section 226.18). The
disclosures are summarized as:
(a) Identification of the Creditor.
(b) Amount financed.
(c) Itemization of Amount Financed.
(d) .The Finance Charge.
(e) The Annual Percentage Rate. Special disclo-
sures if th~ interest rate is a variable one.
(f) Payment schedule.
E-18
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(g) Total of payments.
(1) Insurance.
(m) certain security interest charges.
if the
mortgage
Assumption p~licy (required only
transaction 1S a "residential
transaction" as defined).
(0)
(h) Total sale price (if a credit sale, as
defined, is involved).
(i) Pre-payment penalties.
(j) Late payment charges.
(k) Security Interest.
(n) Contract reference.
(p) Required deposit balance.
Open-End Credit. Disclosures must be given
generally at two different times. Disclosures are
required in an initial disclosure statement prior
to the first trans~ction and disclosures are also
required on each periodic statement.
(a) The initial disclosure statement must contain
certain information relating to the finance
charge, and the method by which it will be
calculated; must specify the amount of
charges other than a finance charge that may
be imposed as part of the plan; must disclose
the fact that the account is or will be
secured, with a .description of the collater-
al; and must refer to or contain a statement
of the consumer's rights under the Fair
Credit Billing Act. (Reg. Z Section 226.6).
(b) Periodic Statement. A creditor is required
to deliver periodic statements and some
eleven disclosures must be included, if
applicable. The possible disclosures
include: The previous balance;
identification of each transaction; credits
to the account; periodic rates; periodic
rates applied to the account; the balance on
which the finance charge is computed; the
amount of the finance charge; the annual
percentage rate; other charges to the account
during the billing cycle; the closing date of
the billing cycle and the new balance; the
r
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G.
J
free ride, if any; and the address to which
the consumer may send notice of billing ,
errors. (Reg. Z section 226.7). J
RIGHT OF RECISION. The act and regulation provide for
a right of recision if the extension of credit involves
a security interest on the consumer's principal
dwelling.
1.
2.
Closed-End Credit. The right to rescind exists
for.3 days following the delivery of the recision
notice, delivery of all material disclosures or 3
years following consummation, whichever occurs
first. (Reg. Z Section 226.23).
Open-End Credit. A right to rescind exists when
the plan is opened; a security interest is added
to secure an existing plan; or when an increase in
the credit limit on the plan is implemented.
(Reg. Z Section 226.15). The original version of
simplification set out a right to rescind each and
every transaction (suspended until October 1,
1985). However, this right was removed by amend-
ment to the act prior to its implementation date.
.J
J
.~
J
III. CIVIL REMEDIES AND PENALTIES.
A. Damages.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Actual Damages.
Automatic civil Penalty. Equal to twice the
amount of the finance charge with a minimum
recovery of $100 and a maximum of $1,000. Howev-
er, the automatic penalty will be awarded only for
the specific disclosure violations set out in the
act.
Reasonable Attorney Fees in a successful action
plus court costs. (15 U.S.C. 1630(a».
Class Actions are specifically authorized and the
total recovery is limited to $500,000 or 1% of the
creditor's net worth, whichever is less. In
addition to actual damages the courts are mandated
to consider other relevant factors inclUding the
frequency or persistency of the creditor's failure
to comply, the resources of the creditor, the
number of persons- adversely affected and the
extent of which creditors failure to comply was
intentional. (15 U.S.C. 1630(~) (2».
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UPDATE: 1986 - 1987.
A. Refinancings and Recision Prior to Recent Amendment.
The prior Regulation exempted original creditors from
providing the right of recision in certain refinancings
secured by the consumer's principal dwelling. A
refinancing was exempt where no new advances of money
were made by the creditor. The proposed amendment
expanded the scope of the exemption to include the
costs associated with the refinancing and in addition
r
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IV.
B. Defenses Available to the Creditor.
1. A creditor is not liable if, within 60 days after
discovering an error but prior to institution of a
suit or receipt of a written notice from the
consumer about the error, he makes adjustments to
the account and insures that the consumer will not
be required to pay charges greater than those
disclosed. (15 U.S.C. Section l630(b».
2. A creditor is not liable for a violation if he can
establish that the violation was not intentional
and resulted from a "bona fide error and notwith-
standing the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adopted to avoid any such error." (15 U.S.C.
Section 1630(C».
3. There is generally a one year statute of limita-
tions on actions brought for a disclosure viola-
tion. (15 U.S.C. section 1630(e». However a
consumer against whom an action to collect a debt
is brought more than one year after the date of
the occurrence of the violation may assert a
truth-in-leriding based violation as a matter of
defense or by recoupment or set-off in that
action. Generally, the date when the statute of
limitation begins to run is the aate of consumma-
tion of the transaction as defined in the regula-
tion (Reg. Z section 226.2(a) (13».
4. MUltiple Recovery - MUltiple Violations. There
are literally dozens of potential violations
possible in every closed-end disclosure statement
or initial or periodic statement under an open-end
account. the act is very specific and provides
that multiple violations in a single instrument
can result only ina single recovery by a person.
However if a creditor continues to use an open-end
periodic statement after a recovery has been
decreed, that could give rise to subsequent
recoveries. (15 U.S.C. Section 1630(g».
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extended the exemption to any other creditors who
refinanced the existing indebtedness.
On December 17, 1986, the Federal Reserve Board
pUblished a final amendment to Regulation Z (51 F.R.
45296) and the amendments to the Official Commentary
(51 F.R. 45342). The changes were effective December
6, 1986, but reliance by creditors is optional until
October 1, 1987. The final adopted version did not
extend the exemption to anyone other than the original
creditor. It did however expand the number of
transactions which will be eligible for the exemption.
Generally, the new amendment provides that the right of
recision shall only apply to the extent of the amount
which the new Amount Financed exceeds the unpaid
principal balance, any earned unpaid finance charge on
the existing debt and "amounts attributed solely to the
cost of the refinancing or consolidation." The new
Official Commentary explains that these amounts would
include charges, such as attorney fees and title
examination and insurance fees, bona fide and in a
reasonable amount, as well as insurance premiums and
other charges that are not finance charges. Any
charges which qualify as finance charges however would
be considered as new money and thus SUbject to the
right of recision.
B. Variable Rate Mortgages.
J
j
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..Jrequire
certain
mortgage
agency to
agencies
to make
rate
vary from
At the present time, four federal
lenders under their jurisdiction
disclosures in adjustable
transactions. The disclosures
agency.
1.
2. On August 11, 1986, the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Counsel (FFIEC) approved
a proposal to standardize the disclosure
requirements among the various federal agencies.
Generally two type of disclosures were considered:
distribution of an educational booklet about
adjustable rate mortgages; and a more detailed
description of the variable rate feature along
with a historic example of the designated index.
t
..
J
3. On November 11, 1986, the Federal Reserve Board
formally proposed amendments to Regulation Z (51
F.R. 42241) and at the same time formally
pUblished proposed changes to- the Official
Commentary to RegUlation Z (51 F.R. 42248). It is
anticipated that these changes will be adopted in
April 1987 with compliance optional until October
1, 1987.
I
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[v] The fact that the interest rate will be
discounted.
[iii] An explanation of how the interest rate
and payment will be determined.
If the proposals are adopted, several new forms
and procedures will be required.
to all
by the
purchase
loans).
by the
not be
The new amendments will apply
closed-end transactions secured
consumer's principal dwelling (both
money loans as well as home equity
An open-end credit line secured
consumer's principal dwelling will
covered by the amendments.
(a)
[iv] A statement that the consumer should ask
about the current margin value and
current interest rate.
[vi] The frequency of interest rate and
payment changes.
[vii] Any rules relating to changes in the
interest, interest rate, payment amount
and outstanding loan balance including
for example any limitations on the rate
or payment, negative amortization and
interest rate carryover.
[ii] A description of the index or formula
used in making the adjustments and a
source of information about it.
(b) Both the ARM brochure and the detailed
disclosure must be provided when an
application form is first furnished to the
consumer or before the payment of a
non-refundable fee, whichever is earlier.
The disclosures must reflect the program
features, not the terms of the individual
transaction. The specific handbook developed
by the Board and the FHLBB may be used to
fulfill the requirement or the creditors may
provide a "suitable substitute" in its place.
(c) The disclosures must include, as applicable:
[i] The fact that the interest rate, payment
or term can change.
r
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-[viii] A conspicuous statement that there are
not limitations on payment or interest
rate increases.
[ix] A historical example, based on a
$10,000.00 loan amount illustrating how
payments and the loan balance would have
been affected by interest rate changes.
The example must be based on index
values beginning in 1977 and updated
annually until a 15· year history is
shown.
[x] An explanation of how the consumer may
calculate the payments for the loan to
be borrowed based on the most recent
payment shown in the example.
[xi] In loans sUbject to overall limitations,
a statement of the maximum interest rate
and payment for a $10,000 loan
originated at the most recent interest
rate shown in the example.
[xii] The fact that the loan program contains
a demand feature.
.J
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[xiii] The type of information that will be
provided in notices of adjustments and
the timing of such notices. ~
[xiv] A statement that disclosure forms are
available for the creditors other
variable rate loan programs.
(d) The disclosures given to the consumer at
time of consummation must refer to
earlier ARM information and state that
transaction involves an adjustable
feature.
the
the
the
rate 'I
J
(e) A new requirement would be added: a
sUbsequent disclosure form. The new section
would require notice of the adjusted payment
amount, interest rate, index rate, and loan
balance. The creditor also would be required
to disclose the extent to which any increase
in the interest rate has not been fUlly
implemented at the adjustment date.
Creditors would be required to send
consumer's notice at least 30 but not more
than 120 days before the effective date of
each scheduled interest rate adjustment.
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sixth General Update to the Official Commentary.
1. On December 1, 1986, the Federal Reserve Board
published its proposed update to the Official
Commentary. 51 F.R. 43373. It is anticipated
that it will be adopted in March 1987 and
compliance will be optional until October 1, 1987.
2. The proposed changes and new material include the
following:
(a) An addition to clarify that the open-end
credit definition does not require that a
finance charge be included or that the
possibility of a finance charge exists for a
plan to qualify as an open-end credit plan.
(b) An amendment to clarify that in an open-end
credit plan, one time charges imposed when an
account is opened, such as a loan origination
fee, may not be treated as a partiqipation
fee.
(c) A revision to make it clear that an
application fee or membership fee for an
open-end account could be charged prior to
g~v~ng the initial disclosure statement,
provided that it is refunded if the consumer
rejects the plan.
(d) A rev~s~on to clarify issues which have
arisen regarding obtaining a security
interest in the consumer's deposit account,
in order to avoid the restrictions
prohibiting an offset against that account.
The security interest must not be the
functional equivalent of a right of setoff
and as a result, routinely including contract
language that indicates such a security
interest will not avoid the restriction. For
a security interest to qualify the following
conditions must be met:
[i] The consumer must be aware that granting
a secur~ty interest is a condition to
obtain the account and the agreement
must specifically indicate an intention
to grant such an interest, such as a
separate signature or initials or
otherwise separating the security
agreement from the contract terms.
[ii] The security interest must be obtained
and enforceable only through procedures
E-25
which are equally available to other
creditors.
(e) A revision to clarify that if a transaction
involves separate interest and principal
payments at different intervals, the creditor
may disclose the two series of payments
separately in the payment schedule and may
use an abbreviated payment schedule for the
interest payments.
(f) A modification to clarify the circumstances
in which the addition of a security interest
to a pre-existing closed-end obligation is
rescindable. For instance, if a transaction
was previously exempt because it was over the
$25,000.00 limit, and a security interest in
the consumer's principal dwelling is added to
that transaction, then the consumer does have
the right to rescind the addition of that
security interest even if the existing
obligation is satisfied and replaced by a new
obligation.
E-26
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THE FTC "HOLDER-IN-DUE COURSE RULE"
(16 C.F.R. section 433 - Compare with KRS 367.610)
I. REFERENCE SOURCES.
"NOTICE
Introduction.
A. The Act. The Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C.
section 41 et seq.
FTC "Statement of Basis and
41 F.R. 53506 (November 18,
Administrative History.
Purpose" for the Rule.
1975).
C.
B. The Rule. FTC "Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation
of Consumers' Claims and Defenses." 16 C.F.R. Section
433.
From the viewpoint of the financing bank, the conduct of the
seller is extremely important. What warranty obligations has the
seller undertaken? Are there other causes of action between the
seller and the buyer, such as fraud, misrepresentation, etc.?
Consider the effect of the following provision inserted into the
contract between the seller and the buyer:
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE
PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT
EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER."
r
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D. Enforcement. FTC "Statement of Enforcement Policy" for
the Rule. 41 F.R. 34594 (August 16, 1976).r
r
r
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r
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II.
E. Staff Guidelines. FTC "Staff Guidelines on Trade
Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses." 41 F.R. 20022 (May 14, 1976).
F. Proposed Amendments. FTC Proposed Amendment to Rule.
44 F.R. 65771 (September 21, 1979).
THE HOLDER-IN-DUE COURSE DOCTRINE.
A. Negotiable Instruments. The "Ho1der-In-Due Course"
Doctrine has existed for centuries and banks have
"purchased or discounted" negotiable instruments
knowing that if they take the instrument for value, in
good faith and without notice of a claim or defense on
the part of any person, courts would uphold their right
to collect from the maker of that instrument. The same
basic concept is codified in KRS 355.3-302(1).
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C.
Retail Installment Contracts. The drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code early recognized that the shift
in financing of goods and services' was away from
negotiable instruments and that the retail installment
contract device was in wide-spread use. KRS 355.9-206
allows a buyer to agree that he will not assert a claim
or defense which he might have against the seller over
against the assignee of the contract. Such an agree-
ment is generally enforceable if the assignee takes the
assigned contract for value, in good faith and without
notice of claims or defenses.
The FTC Rule Changed the Law in All States.
Since May 14, 1976, all consumer credit contracts must
contain the mandated language or notice which appears
at the beginning of this material. Since the quoted
language becomes a contract provision, the buyer has
obviously not agreed to waive his right to assert
claims and defenses against the assignee but to the
contrary, the assignee is agreeing to permit the
assertion of such claims or defenses to the extent
allowed under the rule and the language of the notice.
-
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III. SCOPE OF THE FTC RULE.
A.
B.
C.
D.
Coverage only to Consumer Transactions. The rule
applies only to consumers, defined as a natural person
who seeks to acquire goods or services for personal,
family or household use.
The FTC has opined, and the courts are likely to adopt,
that a determination of whether goods or services are
being sought or acquired "for personal, family or
household use" will involve the same criteria as set
out in the Truth-In-Lending Act. See the official
commentary to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 226, Section
3(a)(2).
The Purchase of Goods or Services are Covered. The
rule specifically covers services as well as goods.
However, sales of real property are not covered and the
mere fact that a security interest in real property is
taken does not mean the transaction does not involve
consumer goods or services.
Retail Installment Contracts Assigned to a Financer.
The rules specifically provides that the contract
between the buyer and the seller must contain the
mandated notice. While the financer is not directly
covered by the rule, fit is common place for the
financer to furnish the particular form. to the seller.
As a practical matter, the financers will want to be
J
j
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IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS.
UPDATE: 1986-1987.
B. Form of the Notice. The form of the notice would be
changed to the following:
A. The most recent amendments were proposed on September
21, 1979, and adoption is still pending. The proposed
amendments would enlarge the scope of the rule and make
it an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a credi-
tor, as well as a seller, to directly or indirectly
take a consumer credit contract which fails to contain
the mandated notice.
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"This credit contract finances a purchase.
All legal rights which the buyer has against
the seller arising out of this transaction,
including all claims and defenses, are also
valid against any holder of this contract.
The right to recover money from the holder
under this provision is limited to the amount
paid by the buyer under this contract. A
claim is a legally valid reason for suing the
seller. A defense is a legally valid reason
for not paying the seller. A holder is
anyone trying to collect for the purchase."
Purchase Money Loans. Again there is no direct liabil-
ity on the financer but the rules does declare it to be
an "unfair or deceptive act or practice" for the seller
to accept proceeds of a purchase money loan unless the
financer's note contains the mandated notice. The
definition of "Purchase Money Loan" under the rule is
different from the commonly accepted definition. The
definition in the rule provides coverage for an advance
to a consumer which is applied in whole or substantial
part, to the purchase or lease of goods or services
from a seller (a) refers consumers to the lender or (b)
is affiliated with the lender by control contract or
business arrangement.
certain that the mandated notice is included in the
contract to avoid possible liability to the seller.
E.
One recent case affirms a proposition that is consistently
argued "against" by consumer lawyers. The issue is whether
or not the FTC Rule and its "effect" applies to a financer
who accepts assignment of a Retail Installment Contract
which does not contain the mandated notice. In Vietnam
Veterans of America, Inc. vs. Guerdon Industries, Inc.,
U.S.D.C. Del. 1986, 644 F. Supp. 951, the court held that
while the seller may be guilty of a trade practice
violation, the rule had no effect on contracts which lack
V.
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the required notice. The court correctly analyzed that by
its own terms, the rule does not create claims or defenses
but rather provides only that failure to include the notice
shall be an unfair deceptive act.
In the discussion on this issue, "it is clear the court felt
that even if the contracts had contained the required
notice, the rule did not create any new cause of action but
rather it was incumbent to prove that a cause of action
existed independently against the original seller.
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THE FTC USED CAR RULE
Effective May 9, 1985
REFERENCE SOURCES.
r
r
r
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I.
A.
B.
The rule was published November 19, 1984, in 49 F.R.
45725.
The Federal Trade Commission published an extensive
Commentary and Analysis in the material immediately
preceding the rule as published in the Federal Regis-
ter.
II. SCOPE OF THE RULE.
III. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE RULE.
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properly completed and
of every used car offered
that window form must be
the time the sale is
The rule covers all sellers of motor vehicles who sell
or offer to sell a used motor vehicle five or more
times in any 12 mo~th period. It is not limited to a
motor vehicle dealer as defined by state law. A used
vehicle is one which has been driven more than the
limited use necessary to move or road test it prior to
delivery to a consumer. Thus, the rule does apply to a
typical new car dealer's inventory of demonstrators,
executive cars, etc. Under the definition, a "bank or
financial institution" is not covered. If a bank uses
or has a subsidiary company dispose of its repossessed
vehicles, that company is probably covered under the
rule.
Compliance with the rule requires an understanding of
basic warranty law and the effect and implications of
the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Product Warranty Act. The
rule requires special compliance procedures in the area
of written warranties, implied warranties and "service
contracts" as defined in Magnuson-Moss.
Additions to sales contract. All used car sellers must
include two required sentences in their contract of
sale. The contract may be a separate document or it
could be the Retail Installment Contract which the
financer later buys.
A "Window Form". Must be
displayed on the side window
for sale. The original of,
given to the consumer at
consummated.
(NOTICE: The financer must be certain that this
mandated provision is included in the dealer's documen-
tation. )
B.
A.
A.
B.
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WARRANTIES IN THE SALE OF GOODS
I. WARRANTIES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
A.
B.
Scope and Coverage. The warranties in· the Uniform
Commercial Code extend to the sale of goods as defined
in KRS 355.2-102. Generally, the courts have enla~ged
the scope of UCC coverage to cover the sale of serv~ces
as well as goods, particularly where the two are sold
"as a package." See Riffe v. Black, Ky. App., 548
S.W.2d 175 (1977); T-Birds. Inc. v. Thoroughbred
Helecopter, E.D. Ky., 540 Fed. Supp. 548 (1982).
The Four Commercial Code Warranties.
1. The Warranty of Title. KRS 355.2-312. This
warranty exists even though nothing is said. A
seller warrants that it has title to the goods
conveyed and has full right to transfer title free
from the claims of others. Nick's Auto Sales v.
Ratcliff Auto Sales, Ky. App. 591 S.W. 2d 709
(1979).
J
J
j
2.
3.
4.
The Express Warranty. KRS 355.2-313. An express
warranty must be "created" by a seller but may
take either a verbal or written form. An express
warranty is an affirmation of fact or promise by a
seller, a description of the goods or a sample or
a model, which must be part of the basis of the
bargain between the seller and the buyer. The
seller must have the intention of extending a
warranty. Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories.
Inc., 6 CCA, 669 Fed. 2d 1286 (1982); Bell v.
Louisville Motors. Inc., Ky. App., 573 S.W.2d 371
(1978) •
The Implied Warranty of Merchantability. KRS
355.2-314. A sale of goods includes the implied
warranty of merchantability, provided that the
seller is a merchant dealing in that class of
goods. Nothing need be said by the merchant and
the warranty arises by operation of law. Reliance
by the buyer is not necessary. Generally, to be
merchantible, goods must be fit for the ordinary
purpose for which such goods are used. Riffe v.
Black, supra. Belcher v. Hamilton, 475 S.W.2d 483
(1971) .
The Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular
Purpose. KRS 355.2-315. Even though nothing is
discussed between· the buyer and seller, this
implied warranty applies to all sellers who at the
time of sale know or have reason to know of the
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particular purpose for which the goods are ac-
quired. However, reliance by the buyer is neces-
sary. A high level of knowledge on the part of
the buyer may negate this warranty. Price Broth-
ers Company v. Philadelphia Gear Corporation, 649
F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981).
Seller's Ability to Exclude or Modify Warranty Respon-
sibilities.
1. Implied Warranties may be excluded from the sale.
Language to exclude the implied warranties must be
conspicuous and in the case of the implied warran-
ty of merchantability, the actual word "Merchant-
ability" must be used. KRS 355.2-316. Childers'
and Ventors v. Sowards, Ky. 460 S.W.2d 343 (1970);
Greg Coats Cars, Inc. v. Casey, Ky. App. 576
S.W.2d 251 (1978).
2. In some circumstances, a warranty agreement may
modify or limit the remedies available. to an
aggrieved buyer. Likewise, the buyer's right to
recover consequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless such is unconscionable. Cox Motor
Company v. Castle, Ky. 402 S.W.2d 429 (1966);
Waterworks and Industrial Supply Company v.
Wilburn, Ky. 437 S.W.2d 951 (1968). Circumstances
may however cause an exclusion or limited remedy
to fail of its "essential purpose." This has been
the ultimate weapon used by many courts in recent
consumer type warranty litigation and if the court
so holds, all of the rights and remedies under the
code are triggered. Ford Motor Company v. Mayes,
Ky. App., 575 S.W.2d 480 (1978); Carboline Company
v. Oxmoor Center, (1985).
Rights and Remedies of a Buyer for Breach of Warrantv.
The rights and remedies of the Buyer will vary depend-
ing upon which of the four UCC warranties are breached.
The rights and remedies may include:
Rejection of the Goods KRS 355.2-601 & 2-602
Revocation of Acceptance KRS 355.2-608
Retention of Goods and
Recovery of Primary Economic
Loss KRS 355.2-714
r
r
Cost of "Cover"
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KRS 355.2-712
Difference between Market
and Contract Price KRS 355.2-713
Incidental and Consequential
Damages KRS 355.2-715
II. THE FEDERAL MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT - CONSUMER PRODUCTS.
(15 U.S.C. 2301)
A. overview.
..
1.
2.
3.
4.
The act applies to all consumer products manufac-
tured on and after July 4, 1975. The term Consum-
er Product is defined as "any tangible personal
property which is distributed in commerce and
which is normally used for personal, family or
household purposes (including any such property
intended to be attached to or installed in any
real property without regard to whether it is so
attached or installed)." 15 U.S.C. 2301(1).
The test of whether or not a product is a consumer
product and thus covered by the Act is not deter-
mined by the use of a particular product by the
user but rather by a determination of the Federal
Trade Commission as to the normal use for such
product.
If a written warranty is given by a seller or
manufacturer, the act applies. It does not
however require a seller or manufacturer to give a
warranty.
A written warranty is defined as:
(a) "Any written affirmation of fact or written
promise made in connection with the sale of a
consumer product by a supplier to a buyer
which relates to the nature of the material
or workmanship and affirms or promises that
such material or workmanship is defect free
or will meet a specified level of performance
over a specified period of time, or
(b) Any undertaking in writing in connection with
a sale by a supplier of a consumer product to
refund, repair, replace or take other remedi-
al action with respect to such product in the
event that such product fails to meet the
specifications set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or
undertaking becomes part of the basis of the
E- 34
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bargain between the supplier and a buyer."
(15 U.S.C. 2301(6)).
5. The act relies on state law to define "implied
warranties" as no definition is in the act.
6. Service contracts are defined as a "written
agreement to perform maintenance or repair servic-
es on a consumer product for a specified period."
The act also applies to service contracts. The
chief distinction between a service contract and a
written warranty is. that it is not part of the
basis of the bargain between the buyer and seller
but is something in addition, which the buyer pays
for and is entered into at the time of sale or
within 90 days thereafter. (15 U.S.C. 2301(8)).
Substantive Requirements of the Act.
1. written warranties on consumer products costing
more than $10.00 at retail must be clearly and
conspicuously designated as either: Full (state-
ment of duration) Warranty, OR Limited Warranty.
(a) The act requires a seller or manufacturer to
remedy a defect within a reason~ble time and
without charge after notice of a defect or
malfunction if a full warranty has been
given. Remedy is defined to mean repair or
replacement with a new consumer product which
is identical or reasonably equivalent to the
warranted consumer product. If it is not
commercially practical or possible to repair
the product within a reasonable time and the
warrantor is unable to provide a replacement,
then a full refund of the actual purchase
price must be made. 15 U.S.C. 2304.
(b) Any written warranty which does not meet the
federal full warranty requirements is a
limited warranty under the act. 15 U.S.C.
2303(A)(2).
2. A seller may not disclaim or modify an implied
warranty arising under state law if that seller
has included a written warranty with the sale or
within 90 days from the time of the sale enters
into a service contract covering the product. 15
U.S.C. 2301(7), 15 U.S.C. 2308 (A).
3. Any attempt to modify or limit the implied warran-
ty is deemed ineffective for the purposes of
federal and state law. 15 U.S.C. 2308(C).
E- 35
4. However, a warrantor who offers a limited warranty
may limit the duration of the implied warranties
to the same time period as the Limited Warranty
conditioned upon the requirement that the limita-
tion is conscionable and clearly disclosed on the
face of the written warranty. 15 U.S.C. 2308(b).
i
'"-
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Warranty Tie-Ins Prohibited. The act prohibits condi-
tioning warranties on the use of any article or service
which is identified by brand, trade or corporate name
in connection with a purchase product, unless the
article or service is provided without charge under the
warranty. 15 U.S.C. 2302(c).
A "Laundry List" is Contained in the Act setting Forth
Specific Disclosures. Any warranty covered by the act
must meet the disclosure requirements. Failure to
comply with result in civil liability.
civil Remedies.
j
1. Any consumer who is damaged for failure of suppli-
er, warrantor or service contractor to comply with
any obligation under the act or under a written
warranty, implied warranty, or service contract,
may bring suit for damages and other equitable
relief. 15 U.S.C. 2310(d) (1).
J
i
...
Jurisdiction is granted to any court of competent
jurisdiction in any state court or in a district
court of the United states, if the amount in
controversy on an individual claim is more than
$25.00 and if the amount in controversy is more
than $50,000, and in a class action suit and the
class numbers at least 100. 15 U.S.C. 2310(c) (1).
2.
3. If the consumer succeeds in an action under
act, he may recover attorney fees, unless
Court in its discretion shall determine that
an aware of attorney fees is inappropriate.
U.S.C. 2310(d) (2).
the
the
such
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4. Only the warrantor act~ally making a written
affirmation of fact, prom~se or undertaking shall
be deemed to have created a written warranty, and
any rights arising thereunder may be enforced only
against such warrantor and no other person. 15
U.S.C. 2310(f).
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II.
THE FEDERAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Effective March 20. 1978
REFERENCE SOURCES.
A. The Statute. 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq.
B. The FTC has issued numerous unofficial Staff interpre-
tative letters, some of which have been pUblished in
CCH Consumer Credit Guide.
C. In March 1986, the Federal Trade Commission published
proposed Official Staff Commentary interpreting the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 51 F.R. 8019. The
FTC proposed a comment period which expired May 6,
1986. Since that time the final commentary has not
been adopted or released. The reason is probably that
on July 7, 1986, the "Attorney-at-Law" exemption was
removed from the Act. As a result, the final and
adopted version of the Official Staff Commentary will
probably be much more detailed than that published in
March 1986.
SCOPE OF THE STATUTE.
A. The Definition of Debt Collector. Any person who uses
any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails
in any business, the principal purpose of which is the
collection of any debt, or who regularly collects or
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts
owed, due or asserted to be owed or due to another. In
addition, any creditor, who in the process of collect-
ing his own debts, uses any name other than his own
which would indicate that a third person is collecting
or attempting to collect such debts.
B. Coverage Limited To Consumer Debts. Coverage of the
act is limited to the collection of consumer debts,
which are defined as those incurred primarily for
family, personal or household purposes but also
includes those reduced to a jUdgment.
C. ATTORNEYS ARE NOW COVERED. Effective July 7, 1986, an
amendment to the act removed attorneys at law from the
exemption portion of the Act. Thus, attorneys who fall
within the above definition must concern themselves
with the provisions of this act and failure to do so
could result in the civil penalties and liabilities
created by the Act.
E- 37
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** SPECIAL CAVEAT **
THE REMOVAL OF THE ATTORNEY EXEMPTION HAS CAUSED
SOME MAJOR PROBLEMS AND CREATED NUMEROUS QUESTIONS
FOR ATTORNEYS IN PRIVATE PRACTICE AS WELL AS
IN-HOUSE COUNSEL. JUST HOW FAR THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND/OR THE COURTS WILL GO IN APPLYING
THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW
REMAINS TO BE SEEN. SOME OF THOSE ISSUES HOWEVER
WILL BE ADDRESSED IN QUESTION FORM THROUGHOUT THE
FOLLOWING MATERIAL UNDER THE HEADING ~:
Exemptions from Coverage. Some persons who would
otherwise be covered under the definition are exempted
from the act, as follows:
I
..J
,
.J
1. An officer or an employee of a creditor while
collecting debts for the creditor in the name of
the creditor.
3.
2.
E.
An officer or an employee of the United States or
any state to the extent of collecting the debts
due the government.
A person collecting or attempting to collect any
debt owed to the extent that such activity con-
cerns a debt which was not in default at the time
it was obtained by such person, or is incidental
to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or escrow
arrangement.
Special Coverage for certain Forms. Suppliers and
users of deceptive forms are covered. The act makes it
unlawful to design, compile and furnish any form
knowing that such form will be sued to create the false
belief in a consumer that a person other than the
creditor is participating in the collection of a debt,
when in fact such person is not so participating.
Liability for violation of this provision attaches to
all persons, not only debt collectors as defined in the
act. 15 U.S.C. 1692 j and k.
~: Mayan attorney write a special "attorney letter"
for a client which states that an account has been
placed with the attorney for collection and that the
debtor may avoid suit by contacting the client
immediately, when in fact the attorney is merely
writing the letter as a courtesy to the client and the
account has not been placed with the attorney for
collection? If contacted by the debtor, the attorney
will merely refer the debtor to the client and will not
accept payment or arrangements.
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rIII. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS.
A. Validation of Debt. 15 U.S.C. 1692g.
(a) The amount of the debt.
(b) The name of the creditor to whom the debt is
owed.
1. Within 5 days after the initial communication with
a consumer, a debt collector shall, unless the
following information is contained in the initial
communication or the consumer has paid the debt,
send the consumer written notice containing
specified information.
the consumer
of the notice
debt, or any
be assumed to
Th~ statement that, unless
within 30 days after receipt
disputes the validity of the
portion thereof, the debt will
be valid.
(c)
~: If a creditor has salaried attorney employees, may
those employees write debt collection letters on
"attorney letterheads"? The ·proposed Official
Commentary prohibits such activity if the stationery
indicates the attorneys are employed by someone other
than the creditor or are separate or independent from
the creditor.
r
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2.
3.
(d) The statement that if a consumer notifies the
debt collector within the 30 day period that
the debt is disputed, the debt collector will
obtain a verification of the debt or a copy
of the judgment against the consumer, and
that information will be mailed to the
consumer. Also, a statement that upon the
consumer's written request, the debt
collector will provide the name and address
of the original creditor, if different from
the current creditor.
If the consumer notifies the debt collector in
writing within the 30 day period, the debt
collector shall cease the collection of the debt,
or any disputed portion hereof, until the
verification is obtained and a copy of such
verification is mailed to the consumer.
The proposed Commentary establishes that the Act
imposes no particular requirements as to the form,
sequence, location or type size of the notice and
that the debt collector may condense and combine
E-39
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the required disclosures, as long as the notice
provides all required information. If the
collector's first communication with the consumer
is oral then the disclosures may be made orally (a
risk worth taking?).
~: The proposed Commentary states that a formal
legal action against a consumer is not a
"communication in connection with collection of
any debt." Assuming then the attorney does not
write the debtor a letter but merely files a suit,
at what point in the legal proceedings, if any,
are the notice provisions of the Act triggered.
The Official Commentary also states that so long
as the notice requirements are met, the debt
collector need not cease normal collection
activities until a notice from the consumer is
received. Such permitted action also includes the
right to report the debt to a credit bureau.
j
'i
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B. Limitations on Communications.
1.
2.
The word "communication" is defined as the
"conveying of information regarding a debt
directly or indirectly to any person through any
medium." Proposed Commentary explains that the
definition includes oral and written transmission
of messages which refer to a debt but does not
include situations where the debt collector does
not convey information regarding a debt, such as a
request to a third party for the consumer to
return a telephone call or a request to a third
party for information about the consumer's assets,
if the debt collector does not reveal the
existence of the debt.
communication with the Debtor. If the consumer
notifies the debt collector in writing that he
refuses to pay a debt or that he wishes the debt
collector to cease further communication, the
collector must not communicate further with the
consumer except to advise the consumer that the
action is being terminated, or that the collector
will invoke specific remedies.
A debt collector may not communicate with a
consumer at any time or place which is unusual or
known to be inconvenient (8:00 a.m. - 9:00 p.m. is
presumed to be convenient); where he knows the
consumer is represented by an attorney with
respect to the debt; or at the debtor's place of
emploYment if he knows the employer prohibits such
E- 40
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(a) The term "location information" means a
consumer's place of residence and his
telephone number or his place of employment.
communication with Third Parties. 15 U.S.C.
1692c. without the prior consent of the consumer,
the debt collector may not communicate with any
person other than the consumer, his attorney, a
consumer reporting agency, the creditor, the
attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the
debt collector.
that
its
debt
15 U.S.C.
In contacting any person other than the
debtor to acquire location information, the
debt collector is prohibited f~om doing a
number of things.
[i] May not state that the consumer owes a
debt;
[ii] Must identify himself and state that it
is confirming or correcting location
information and, only if expressly
requested, identify his employer;
[iii] May not communicate with a person more
than once unless requested to do so by
that person and unless the collector
reasonably believes that the earlier
(b)
~: Assume that the attorney may talk to the
debtor's employer to make arrangements for
payment, if the telephone contact was initiated by
the employer as a result of a wage garnishment.
Assume payment arrangements are made and the
debtor makes voluntary payments. After a six
month period, the employer calls the attorney and
asks the status. May the attorney respond? May
the attorney discuss the situation with the
employer and arrange for voluntary withholdings of
moneys for payment on the account?
contacts. The proposed Commentary states
this section applies to "communicate" in
commonly accepted meaning, whether or not the
is specifically mentioned.
~: Does this section limit the times that a
sheriff may serve a summons? May a summons be
served at the debtor's place of employment?
Acquisition of Location Information.
1692b.
3.
4.
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c.
response of such person is erroneous or
incomplete;
[iv] May not use any language or symbol on
any envelope or in the contents of any
communication that indicates the debt
collector is in the debt collection
business or that the communication
relates to the collection of a debt.
~: May the envelope state that the
attorney is "an attorney"?
Prohibited Practices.
I
.J
1. Harassment or Abuse. 15 U.S.C. l692d.
(a) General Rule. A debt collector may not
engage in any conduct, the natural
consequences of which is to harass, oppress
or abuse any person in connection with
collection of the debt.
(b) The act lists certain actions as falling
within this prohibition. For example: Use
of threat or use of violence; use of obscene
or profane language; publication of a list of
consumers who allegedly refused to pay debts;
causing a telephone to ring or engaging any
person in telephone conversations repeatedly
or continuously; placement of telephone calls
without meaningful disclosure of the caller's
identity.
I
J
J
I
.J
2. False or Misleading Representations.
l692e.
15 U.S.C.
(a) General Rule. A debt collector may not use
any false, deceptive or misleading
representations or means in connection with
the collection of any debt.
(b) The act lists certain actions which fall
within this prohibition: -For example, false
representation of the character, amount or
legal status of the debt; false
representation of the non-paYment will result
in arrest, imprisonment, seizure,
garnishment, etc.; threat to take any action
that cannot be taken; use or distribution of
written communications which simulate or
falsely represent to be documents issued by a
court or other governmental agency; use of
E-42
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any false representations to collect or
attempt to collect a debt o~ information.
(c) According to the proposed Commentary, a
statement that legal action has been
recommended is a representation that legal
action may be taken, since such a
recommendation implies that the creditor will
act on it at least some of the time. Lack of
intent may be inferred when the amount of the
debt is so small as to make the action
totally unfeasible or when the debt collector
is unable to take the action because the
creditor has not authorized him to do so.
3. Unfair Practices. 15 U.S.C. 1692f.
(a) General Rule. A debt collector may not use
unfair or unconscionable means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt.
(b) The act lists certain activities·· which
constitute unfair practices. For example:
Collection of any amount not expressly
authorized by the agreement or allowed by
law: acceptance of a post-dated check of more
than 5 days, subject to a restriction:
solicitation of a post-dated check for the
purpose of threatening criminal prosecution:
causing charges to be made to any person for
communications such as telephone calls or
collect telegram fees: taking or threatening
jUdicial action to effect disposition of
property if there is no present right for the
creditor to possess said property.
r IV. CIVIL REMEDIES AND PENALTIES. 15 U.S.C. 1692k.
r
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The act specifies and permits specific damages
recoverable against a party who violates the act.
1. Actual damages sustained as a result of the
violation.
3. Court costs and attorney fees.
The act specifically allows class actions and permits
recovery of such amount for each plaintiff as could be
recovered for actual damages without regard to a
minimum individual recovery, but not to exceed the
r
r
r
r
r
r
A.
B.
2. Automatic penalty recovery (similar
Truth-In-Lending) in an amount that the court
allow, not to exceed $1,000.
to
may
statute of Limitations: One
which the violation occurs.
any Federal Court without
controversy.
C.
lesser of $500,000 or 1% of
collector.
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the net worth of the debt
year from the date on
Action may be brought in
regard to the amount in
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SPECIAL NOTE
A REAL ESTATE SECURED - REVOLVING CREDIT PLAN IS A "NEW
PRODUCT" - NEW IN THE SENSE THAT IT COMBINES TWO SEPARATE AND
WELL ESTABLISHED LENDING CONCEPTS. THE FIRST, A REVOLVING LINE
OF CREDIT, HAS GENERALLY BEEN AVAILABLE IN MOST BANKS COMMERCIAL
DEPARTMENTS FOR YEARS AND HAS MORE RECENTLY BECOME AVAILABLE TO
CONSUMERS THROUGH THE FAMILIAR CREDIT CARD. THE SECOND CONCEPT,
SECURING A TRANSACTION BY A REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE, HAS BEEN AROUND
FOR AN EVEN LONGER PERIOD AND GENERALLY REPRESENTS THE MOST
SECURE TYPE OF LOAN FOR THE BANK. WHEN THESE TWO CONCEPTS ARE
COMBINED, THE RESULT IS A "NEW PRODUCT" - NEW IN THE SENSE THAT
THE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE COMBINATION HAVE
GENERALLY NOT YET BEEN TESTED OR REVIEWED BY ANY COURT. IN THE
ABSENCE OF SUCH JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO
OFFER FIRM AND FIXED OPINIONS ABOUT THE MANY POTENTIAL ISSUES.
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS MATERIAL IS TO ALERT THE
USER TO SELECTED STATUTES AND LEGAL CONCEPTS WHICH ARE FELT TO BE
RELEVANT OR WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION IN. EVALUATING AND DECIDING
WHETHER TO IMPLEMENT A REAL ESTATE SECURED REVOLVING CREDIT
PLAN. THE MATERIAL IS LIMITED IN SCOPE TO AN EXAMINATION FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF A BANK AND ASSUMES THAT THE BASIC LENDING
PROGRAM WILL BE COVERED BY THE FEDERAL TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT AND
REGULATION Z. THIS MATERIAL DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE
REGULATION Z REQUIREMENTS
I.
REVOLVING CREDIT INVOLVING HOME EQUITY
STATE LAW CONSIDERATIONS
THE FOUNDATION FOR A PROGRAM.
A bank must first decide whether it is necessary to base its
plan on a particUlar statute and if so, must then consider
the appropriate statute for its authority to maintain the
program. Generally, it appears that there are three such
possibilities in Kentucky.
A. The Kentucky Bank Revolving Credit Plan Statute
(KRS 287.710 - 287.770).
1. Important Definitions within the statute.
(KRS 287.710)
a)
b)
c)
d)
"Bank" means a bank organized under the
banking laws of Kentucky or of the
united States, or any assignee of a
bank's rights under a revolving credit
plan.
"Extend credit" or "extension of credit"
means the right granted by a bank to
defer paYment of debt, incur debt and
defer its paYment, or purchase goods,
services or anything else and defer
paYment thereof, pursuant to a revolving
credit plan.
"Finance Charge" means the sum of all
charges, direct or indirect, imposed by
the bank as an incident to an extension
of credit, which includes interest in
any amount payable under a point,
discount or other system of additional
charges, etc. The term does not include
amounts collected by the bank which are
fees or charges prescribed by law for
filing fees, taxes, etc.
"Revolving credit plan" means an
arrangement under which [i] the bank
extends credit for the purchase of
goods, services or anything of value or
makes loans, from time to time; [ii] the
unpaid balances of purchases and the
principal of loans obtained and the
finance and other appropriate charges
are debited to the debtor's account;
[iii] a finance charge is not
F-2
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pre-computed but is computed on the
outstanding balance of the account from
time to time; and [iv] the bank renders
a bill or statement at regular intervals
(which need not be a calendar month) the
amount of which is payable by and due
from the debtor on a specified date or,
at the debtor's option, may be paid in
installments.
2. Finance Charges and Rates. (KRS 287.740)
a) The finance charge must be computed on
either the average daily unpaid balance
of the account during the billing cycle
or on the balance on the same date of
each billing cycle.
b) A variation of not more than four
from billing cycle to billing
shall be deemed "the same day qf
billing cycle."
days
cycle
each
c) The bank may receive, contract and
collect a finance charge not in excess
of 1-3/4% per month, computed as above.
Presumably, this translates to an annual
percentage rate of 21%.
d) The statute does not expressly state
that the interest rate must be fixed,
nor does it state that the rate may vary
during the term of the plan.
3. Additional Fees, Charges and Costs. In
addition to the charges described above, the
plan may provide for: (KRS 287.750)
a) Annual fees not to exceed $20.00;
b) Delinquency charges not to exceed $5.00
each month if paYments are not made when
due;
c) "All fees and closing costs incurred in
connection with the taking of a mortgage
on real estate, if bona fide and not
retained by the bank";
d) Reasonable attorney fees and court costs
if the Account is referred to an
attorney for collection and the attorney
is not a salaried employee of the bank.
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4.
5.
Limitation on charges. Except for the
charges and fees expressly provided for in
the statute, no further amounts may be
directly or indirectly charged, contracted
for, or received by the bank for an extension
of credit or forbearance of collection of
debt pursuant to a revolving credit plan.
(KRS 287.760)
other statutory Requirements.
a)
b)
For each billing cycle in which there is
an outstanding balance or during which a
charge is imposed, the bank must send a
statement to the debtor. The statement
must contain the information required by
the Federal Truth-In-Lending law. (KRS
787.730(1»
Each statement must contain a "legend"
to the effect that the debtor may at any
time pay the balance owing on the
account. (KRS 287.730(1»
c) A "free ride" is not required unless
some portion of the charges on the
account are incurred by use of a credit
card (which has a specific definition
under the statute). Charges for
purchases from third parties made with a
credit cared are entitled to a 30 day
"free ride." (KRS 287.730(2»
d) The statute appears to
concept of a "change of
plan as it provides that
take the form and contain
as "the bank may from
establish and the debtor
(KRS 287.720(1»
approve the
terms" of the
the plan may
the provisions
time to time
may accept."
e) Before the account is opened, the bank
must mail or deliver a statement of the
provisions of the plan, which must
include the information as required by
the Federal Truth-In-Lending law. (KRS
287.720(2»
-
f) If two or more persons covered by the
plan have the same residence, the
provisions of the plan and the billing
statements may be sent to only one of
such persons. (KRS 287.720(2» (Note:
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Check this against corresponding
Truth-In-Lending requirement.)
6. statutory Penalties for Violations.
a) A bank which violates any provision of
the statute, except as a result of an
accidental or bona fide error, shall be
barred from the recovery of any finance
charges permitted by the statute. In
addition, the debtor or his legal
representative may recover from the bank
any amounts paid to the bank as finance
charge provided that an action is
commenced against the bank within two
years from the date such violation first
occurred. In any event, the bank may
recover an amount equal to the principal
of extensions of credit under the plan.
eKEs 287.990(13»
b) ~ny bank which willfully makes charges
1n excess of those permitted by the
statute is guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction is subject to punishment
by a fine not exceeding $500.00 or by
imprisonment of not more than six
months, or both. (KRS 287.990(12»)
c) The statute also provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of
this section, any failure, other than a
willful and intentional failure, to
comply with the provisions of ... (the
statute) ... may be corrected during the
billing cycle next succeeding the
receipt by the bank of written notice
thereof from the debtor, and if so
corrected, the bank shall not be SUbject
to any penalty under (this
statute)." (KRS 287.990(14»
other Specific Kentucky Statutes. It is now
generally accepted that national banks are not
SUbject to the specific rate limitations and other
limitations set out by specific state banking
statutes. Under the most favored lender doctrine,
national banks are allowed to charge the highest
rate allowed to any lender in the state for a
specified class of loans (12 U.S.C. 85; 12 CFR
7.7310). Under this doctrine, there is one school
of thought to the effect that if a bank bases its
activities on a specific state statute to obtain a
higher rate, it must also accept the limitations
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set out in that statute. state banks in Kentucky
may charge any rate that national banks may charge
(KRS 287.2140 and several federal statutes).
1. The Kentucky Credit Union statute (KRS 290).
i
-
a) The statute expressly permits "a self-
replenishing line of credit, and loan
advances may be granted to the member
within the limit of such line of
credit." (KRS 290.495)
b) The statute
the meaning
"assignment
property."
states that security within
of the statute may include
of an interest in real
(KRS 290.475)
It does not appear feasible to base a
revolving credit plan on other Kentucky
statutes. For example, it is not likely that
a bank could pattern a program under the
provisions of the Consumer Loan statute (KRS
288), the Industrial Loan statute (KRS 291),
the Retail Charge Agreement statutes (KRS
271), or the Pawnbroker's statute (KRS 226).
F-6
2.
c)
d)
e)
f)
The interest rate on loans shall be
determined by the Board of Directors but
may not exceed two percent (2%) "per
month on unpaid balances." (KRS
290.435)
In addition, charges may be assessed "in
accordance with the bylaws, for failure
to meet ••• obligations to the credit
union in a timely manner." (KRS
290.445)
While this statute does not specifically
refer to the recovery of attorney fees
on collection, the general Kentucky
statute appears to allow recovery of
such if proper prov1s1ons are inserted
into the agreement. (KRS 411.195)
The credit union statute does not appear
to specifically address the issues
dealing with methods of computing the
finance charge, a change in terms,
mandatory requirements in the initial
agreement or periodic statement, nor
does it specifically provide for the
collection of "closing costs" in real
estate secured transactions.
J
-
...
The General Usury statute (KRS 360.010).
1. It may be possible to base a revolving credit
plan on the general usury statute, even
though it is arguable that such a plan was
not contemplated by the drafters of that
statute. A recent case from the Kentucky
Supreme Court appears to support such an
argument. See Duff vs. Bank of Louisville &
Trust Company, Ky. Sup. Ky., 705 S.W.2d 920
(1986) •
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
C.
2. The statute states that the "legal rate of
interest" is eight percent (8%) per annum but
any party may agree, in writing, for paYment
of interest in excess of that rate.
3. Limitation on Interest Rate.
b) -If the original principal amount is in
excess of $15,000.00 then the parties
may agree, in writing, to any rate.
c) What is the "original principal amount"
for the purposes of a revolving credit
plan? Is the applicable interest rate
determined by the amount of the credit
line, the amount of the initial draw or
the amount of each draw? Compare the
position of the Kentucky Attorney
General in Opinion 79-169 with the logic
and conclusion in Section 226.3(b) (2) of
the Official Commentary to Regulation Z.
ciyil Penalty for Excessive Interest. A Bank
which takes, receives, reserves, or charges a
rate of interest greater than is allowed,
when knowingly done, shall not be allowed to
collect any interest on the obligation. In
addition, if a greater rate of interest has
been paid, the debtor or his legal
representative may recover twice the amount
of the interest paid provided that an action
is commenced within two years from the time
the usurious transaction occurred. (KRS
360.020(1»
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4.
a) If the "original principal amount" is
$15,000.00 or less, the rate may not
exceed four percent (4%) in excess of
the discount rate in effect at the
Federal Reserve Bank in the district
where the transaction is consummated or
19%, whichever is less.
-;;
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The statute does not address other issues
under a revolving credit plan, such as the
method of computing the finance charge,
whether the rate may be fixed or variable, if
the terms of the agreement may be changed
from time, required contents of the initial
agreement and the periodic statement, and the
collection or recovery of closing costs in
real estate related transactions.
Banks are accustomed to handling clos~d-enq loans
involving a note or other debt instrument signed
under the supervision of a bank officer. In this
type of program, once the "paperwork" is done the
loan officer's job is usually completed.
6.
5.
A.
While the statute does not specifically refer
to the recovery of attorney fees on
collection, the general Kentucky statute
appears to allow recovery of such if proper
provisions are inserted into the agreement.
(KRS 411.195>
THE PHILOSOPHY AND OPERATION OF A REVOLVING CREDIT
PLAN.
II.
B. A revolving credit plan, however, is not a
one-step operation. In addition to developing a
new or modified set of loan policies, the bank
must also educate and prepare its officers to
handle the mechanics of the program, which
continue long after the initial agreement.
1. The bank must develop or evaluate and
purchase an initial agreement which usually
doubles as the Federal Truth-In-Lending
Disclosure Statement.
2. The bank must
purchase a real
been specially
revolving credit
develop or evaluate
estate mortgage which
drafted for use with
plan.
and
has
a
3. The bank must prepare and furnish the
necessary right of reC1S10n notices at
various stages during the plan as required by
Regulation Z.
4. The bank must develop or evaluate and obtain
a periodic statement form, and in addition
have or acquire the operational capability of
completing and processing that form in a
timely and accurate manner.
-
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III. BASIC DECISIONS AND THE INITIAL AGREEMENT.
The form, contents and layout of the initial agreement are
extremely important to the bank since it is the contract
between the bank and the debtor, and as such governs the
rights and responsibilities of each. It must also reflect
the bank's policies on many points and in many areas, some
of which are not relevant to closed-end lending. The
questions in this section are intended to merely summarize
some of the matters which perhaps should be addressed both
as a matter of policy and as a desired contract term.
A. Are the parties properly identified?
F-g
Is the date of the agreement clearly specified?
account
maximum
effect
May the bank make advances on the
which will take the balance over the
credit limit, and if so, what is the
of that action?
5.
1. Is the balance of the account due in full on
the maturity date?
2. Is the maturity date the last day that funds
will be advanced on the account?
3. Is the maturity date the last day that funds
will be advanced permitting the debtor
additional time within which to pay the
balance?
Must the plan have a "due date" or a "maturity
date"?
Does the agreement specify a maximum credit limit?
In addition, the bank must have error
resolution and other procedures in place to
comply with the mandates of Regulation Z.
6. Finally, the bank must establish and monitor
its procedures relative to release of the
mortgages obtained under the plan.
1. Is that maximum credit limit SUbject to
change?-
2.
1. May the account be accessed through
especially encoded checks, through an ATM, by
telephone direction, by direct teller
contact? May it be accessed by a credit card
How may the account be "accessed"?
B.
C.
D.
E.
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
or used to
account?
fund an overdrawn checking
-
2. Are the especially encoded checks treated the
same as "regular" checks?
3. Does the bank have any responsibilities if it
erroneously refuses to pay a specially
encoded check?
F. Is there a minimum amount on each draw under the
account?
-
G.
H.
I.
J.
At the time the account is opened, is an initial
advance required?
Is there an annual fee on the account?
1. If so, when is the fee posted to the account?
2. Is it payable directly by the debtor?
3. If the fee is added to the balance of the
account, is it then sUbject to the
application of a finance charge?
Is there a late charge? If so, what is the amount
and on what day is it assessed?
Are there other initial charges connected with the
account, such as "real estate related" charges?
If so, what is the nature and amount of those
charges?
1. When are they due?
2. May they be added to the account?
K. What finance charge or interest will the
charge and will it be added to the balance on
account?
bank
the
1.
2.
3.
4.
Is there a maximum limit on the rate of the
finance charge?
will the finance charge be computed on a
fixed or a variable rate?
If a variable rate, is there both a floor and
a ceiling? By law or by agreement.
What method is used to compute the finance
charge?
r
r
r
5. If the account can be accessed
card, is the "free ride"
contracted for?
by a credit
specifically
r
L. At what point in time does the account "come into
existence"?
Who can access the account?
1. How are the amounts of payments calculated?
2. Is there a minimum payment?
3. May the plan provide for payment of interest
only?
giveTo whom is the bank obligated to
notices, periodic statements, etc.?
2. What if the debtor requests a "full release"
which clearly states that all advances after
the date will be subordinate to other
mortgages? '
3. What is the status of the real estate
mortgage if the balance of the account is
paid down to "zero" but the debtor has not
requested that the account be terminated?
When is the bank required to release its real
estate mortgage securing the account?
1. What must the bank do if the debtor requests
a "partial release"?
1. If access can be accomplished by only one of
several obligors, are all clearly liable for
the acts of the others?
What payments are required under the plan?
3.
2. Is liability clearly joint and several among
all of the signers?
M.
N.
o.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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r
r
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4. When are the payments due in relation to the
end of each billing cycle or the statement
date?
What is the effect of the debtor's default?
F-ll
r
r,
r
P.
Q.
What are the
agreement? Are
out?-
"events of
"events of
default" under
default" clearly
the
set
R.
S.
T.
U.
V.
w.
x.
If there is a default and subsequent collection
action, including a foreclosure action, is taken,
does the agreement obligate the debtors to pay
attorney fees? Does the agreement clearly provide
that a finance charge will continue, and if so, at
what rate?
Does the bank have the right to cancel the
agreement and refuse to make further advances?
Under what conditions may it do so? If so, is the
bank required to give notice to the debtors and if
so, in what form and manner?
May the debtors cancel the agreement? If so, what
type of notice must they give the bank and what is
the bank's obligation after it receives such
notice? What if notice of cancellation is
received from only one of several debtors?
Does the bank have the right to require updated
financial statements from the debtor from time to
time?
Does the agreement provide the desired waiver of
rights by the debtor?
Does the agreement specify the address to which
notices to the debtors must be mailed or
delivered?
What are banks rights if debtor grants another
mortgage to another creditor? What if bank feels
its priority position is compromised?
-':
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IV. THE PERIODIC STATEMENT.
A.
B.
C.
Generally, Federal Truth-In-Lending law dictates
the form and content of the periodic statement.
However, careful consideration must also be given
to any applicable state statute.
Generally, the terminology on the periodic
statement must be consistent with the terminology
used in the initial agreement. It is possible
that a pre-printed initial agreement may require
additional matters be set out in the periodic
statement form.
Which came first, "THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG"? In
the logical flow of developing a revolving credit
program, the periodic statement should be designed
to conform to the initial agreement (which
generally reflects the policy decisions of the
P-12
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r
r
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v.
r
r
r
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r
r
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bank). However, many banks have an existing
computer program, either in-house or supplied by
an outside service. Therefore in most instances,
the initial agreement must be developed to conform
to the existing computer program, if that program
is in fact usable for a revolving credit plan.
THE SECURITY: THE MORTGAGE FORM AND POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS. The following material is intended to pose
some of the questions and issues which might arise. As
the "new product" matures, certainly the list will
grow. (Selected Kentucky statutes are included at the
end of this outline.)
A. The Mortgage Form.
1. No County Clerk shall record a mortgage
unless "the maturity of the obligations
thereby secured which have already been
issued or which are to be issued forthwith"
is stated. The only exception is for
obligations "due on demand." (KRS 382.330)
2. No County Clerk shall record a mortgage
unless the name and address of the draftsman
appears on the instrument. (KRS 382.335)
3. No County Clerk shall record a mortgage
unless the post office address and the county
and state of the residence of the person or
corporation owning or holding the "evidence
of indebtedness" is stated thereon. (KRS
382.430)
4. Generally, many (perhaps most) of the
provisions found in a conventional real
estate mortgage should be included in the
form. Those may not alone be sufficient.
For instance:
a) Does the form clearly state the "amount"
of the indebtedness which is secured by
the mortgage?
b) Does the mortgage clearly state the
conditions under which the bank will
release the mortgage?
c) Does the mortgage' set out the
obligations of the bank in the event the
balance of the account is paid down to
zero but the debtor does not request a
release of the mortgage?
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5. Most title examiners are not accustomed to
seeing these special types of mortgages.
Should the form be conspicuously identified?
B. Bank Must Release Mortgage When Debt "satisfied".
1. The statute requires that a mortgagee file a
formal release of a mortgage in the
appropriate county clerk's office within
thirty (30) days from the date of
satisfaction of the mortgage (Note: the
statute previously allowed a sixty (60) day
period, but the time was shortened to thirty
(30) days effective July 15, 1986). (KRS
382.365)
3.
c.
2. The statute does not define "satisfaction."
May the parties contract as to when
"satisfaction" occurs and the release is
required?
If the mortgagee fails to record a release as
required, an action may be maintained against
it for a recovery of an automatic Fifty
Dollar ($50.00) penalty plus actual expenses,
inclUding attorney fees incurred in filing
the suit.
Priority Issues. Who will win in a contest
between the bank and a subsequent mortgagee, an
execution creditor or a lienor?
1. Optional or Obligatory Advances? There is
some case law authority in Kentucky to the
effect that advances made by a creditor who
is obligated to make those advances retains a
priority secured position. Should a bank's
revolving credit plan take an obligatory
approach? See Percy Galbreath & Son. Inc.
vs. Watkins, Ky. ct. App. 560 S.W.2d 239
(1977) and cases cited therein.
2. The Kentucky Super-Priority Statute.
382.520)
a) The mortgage may specify additional
indebtedness but must stipulate the
maximum additional indebtedness secured
by the mortgage. The mortgage lien thus
authorized shall be superior to other
liens subsequently created and recorded.
(KRS 382.520(2»
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b) Debtor may request a release of the lien
to "secure additional indebtedness as
exceeds the balance of such additional
indebtedness at the time of such
request." How does this apply to a
revolving credit plan?
c)
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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VI.
The current Kentucky statute allows
debtor to send written notice to bank
requesting a full (?) or a partial (?)
release of the mortgage. If bank fails
to record its release within ten (10)
business days after receipt of written
request then debtor may record his
notice as the release. Does that mean
the debtor can draw up and record his
own release? (KRS 382.520(3) (e)
d) A Debtor has the right to subordinate
all advances on a line of credit type
account after the notice, provided the
notice meets certain specified
requirements. (KRS 382.520(3) (c))
3. Federal Tax Liens. Generally, the Federal
Tax lien will be superior to advances made
more than forty-five (45) days after the
notice of the Federal Tax Lien is filed. How
does the bank protect itself? (26 U.S.C.
6323)
SOME ADDITIONAL MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION.
A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and RegUlation B.
(15 U.S.C. 1691 et seg.; 12 CFR 202)
1. All bankers are generally familiar with the
basic requirements of RegUlation B and its
rules concerning discrimination, the content
and processing of applications, and the
handling and content of adverse action
notices applicable to all loans.
2. As in all real estate secured transactions, a
bank is likely to encounter partiCUlar
prob~e~s with the rule which prohibits
requ~r~ng a co-signer for an individually
creditworthy person, or dictating the
identity of the co-signer if one is required.
It is quite probable that a married person
will apply for a revolving credit plan
account in his or her name only. In that
event, assuming that the applicant is
creditworthy, the bank may not require the
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signature of the applicant's spouse on the
initial agreement (the debt instrument) but
may require the spouse's signature on the ~
mortgage (very few preprinted mortgage forms
provide for this possibility) .
3. If the account is closed by the bank or if
the credit limit is lowered, is an adverse
action notice required?
B. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act - Regulation E.
(Title IX, 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seg.; 12 CFR 205)
1.
2.
The general prov~s~ons of Regulation E
dealing with disclosures, proper
identification of transactions and
limitations on customer liability may apply
to real estate secured - revolving credit
plans if the plan allows access to the
account by certain devices triggering the
regulation. In such instances, the bank must
give special and additional consideration to
the mandates of Regulation E.
Generally the bank may not require that the
required paYments be automatically deducted
from the debtor's checking account.
C. The Federal Reserve Board Fair Credit Practices
Rule and Regulation AA.
16.695)
(12 CFR 227; 15 FR
The 1986 Kentucky Legislature adopted what is now
KRS 371.065. This somewhat unusual statute
requires that certain information be included in
all separate guaranty instruments. If the real
J
...
The general requirements of the regulation
which prohibit confessions of jUdgment,
general waivers of exemption, pyramiding of
late charges and the assignment of wages
apply to real estate secured revolving
credit plans. (The exception is if the
credit is used for the purchase of real
property. See section E for possible
problems if the account can be used for that
purpose. )
1.
2. I£ a co-signer (as defined in the regulation)
is to become obligated on the account, all of
the requirements of the regulation dealing
with the co-signer Notice apply.
The Kentucky Guaranty Statute.D.
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THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.
(The following space is reserved for the user of
outline to keep trac~ of future developments in this
As wi~h any "new product" these are bound to occur.)
E. The ARM Regulations of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Curr~ncy. (12 C.F.R. 29.1)
National banks are SUbject to the ARM RegUlations
of the Office of the comptroller of the Currency
which generally apply to variable rate loans made
to purchase or refinance one to. four family
dwellings. The -typical real estate secured
revolving credit plan does not include the
necessary disclosures and other requirements of
the ARM Regulations. Therefore, it is necessary
that a bank restrict or prohibit the use of such
an account for the purpose of purchasing or
refinancing a one to four family un~t. Are such
contractual provisions sufficient?
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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VII.
'estate secured - revolving credit plan
to be covered by a separate guaranty
the requirements- of this statute
recognized and met.
account is
agreement,
must be
this
area.
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SELECTED KENTUCKY STATUTES
*** *** *** *** ***
KRS 382. 330. INSTRUMENT NOT TO BE RECORDED UNLESS DATE OF ~
MATURITY SHOWN - EXCEPTION. - No county clerk shall record a deed ~
or deed of trust or mortgage covering real property by which the
paYment of any indebtedness is secured unless the deed or deed of
trust or mortgage states the date and the maturity of the ~
obligations thereby secured which have been already issued or
which are to be issued forthwith. In the case of obligations due
on demand, the requirement of stating the maturity thereof shall ~
be satisfied by stating that such obligations are "due on ...li
demand."
-
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KRS 382.335. INSTRUMENT NOT TO BE RECORDED UNLESS NAME AND
ADDRESS OF DRAFTSMAN APPEARS THEREON - (1) No county clerk shall
receive or permit the recording of any instrument by which the
title to real estate or personal property, or any interest
therein or lien thereon, is conveyed, granted, encumbered,
assigned or otherwise disposed of; nor receive any instrument,
provided by law, to be recorded as evidence of title to real
estate; and shall not receive or permit any instrument, relating
to the organization or dissolution of a private corporation,
unless such instrument has indorsed on it, a printed, typewritten
or stamped statement showing the name and address of the
individual who prepared the instrument, and such statement is
signed by such individual, provided, however, that the person who
prepared the instrument may execute his signature by affixing a
facsimile of his signature on the instrument. This subsection
shall not apply to any instrument executed or acknowledged prior
to July 1, 1962.
(2) No county clerk shall receive or permit the recording
of any instrument by which the title to real estate or any
interest therein is conveyed, granted, assigned or otherwise
disposed of unless such instrument contains the mailing address
of the grantee or assignee. This subsection shall not apply to
any instrument executed or acknowledged prior to July 1, 1970.
(3) This section does not apply to wills.
(4) The receipt for record and recording of any instrument
by the county clerk without compliance with the provisions of
this section shall not prevent such record of filing of the
instrument from becoming notice as otherwise provided by law, nor
impair the admissibility of the record as evidence.
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KRS 382.430. INSTRUMENT CONSTITUTING LIEN TO NAME PERSON LIABLE
FOR TAXES THEREON. (1) No mortgage, conveyance or other
instrument or writing constituting a lien or other security for
any note or other evidence of indebtedness shall be received for
record by any county clerk unless such mortgage, conveyance or
other writing gives the county and state of the residence and the
post office address of the person or corporation owning or
holding the note or other evidence of indebtedness, or liable for
the payment of taxes thereon.
(2) Should there be an assignment of such note or other
evidence of indebtedness, of record in the clerk's office, the
assignment shall state the county and state of the residence and
post office address of the assignee. Unless any assignment is
made of record, the original holder or owner shall be liable for
taxes as though no assignment had been made.
F~O
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KRS 382.365. RELEASE OF LIEN WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF SATISFACTION
PROCEEDING AGAINST LIENHOLDER IN CIRCUIT COURT - LIABILITY OF
LIENHOLDER WHEN LIEN NOT RELEASED. - (1) A holder of a lien on
real property shall release the lien in the county clerk's office
where the lien is recorded within thirty (30) days from the date
of satisfaction.
(2) A proceeding may be filed in circuit court against a
lienholder that violates subsection (1) of this section. A
proceeding filed under this section shall be given precedence
over other matters pending before the court.
(3) Upon proof of satisfaction of the lien being
introduced, the court may enter a jUdgment releasing the lien. A
lienholder that violates subsection (1) of this section shall
also be liable to the owner of the real property for fifty
dollars ($50.00) and any actual expense inclUding a reasonable
attorney's fee incurred by the owner in securing the release of
real property by such violation. The jUdgment shall be with
costs inclUding reasonable attorneys' fees.
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KRS 382.520. RENEWAL, EXTENSION OR ADDITIONAL LOAN UNDER
MORTGAGE ON REAL ESTATE - SUPERIORITY OF LIEN - RELEASE OF LIEN,
WHEN. - (1) In all cases where a loan is secured by a real
estate mortgage, the mortgage originally executed and delivered
by the borrower to the lender shall secure payment of all
renewals and extensions of the loan and the note evidencing it,
whether so provided in the mortgage or not.
(2) The mortgage referred to in subsection (1) of this
section may secure any additional indebtedness, whether direct,
indirect, existing, future, contingent or otherwise, to the
extent expressly authorized by the mortgage, if the mortgage by
its terms stipulates the maximum additional indebtedness which
may be secured thereby. Except as provided in subsection (3) of
this section, the mortgage lien authorized by this subsection
shall be superior to any liens or encumbrances of any kind
created after recordation of such mortgage, even to the extent of
sums advanced by the lender with actual or constructive notice of
a subsequently created lien, provided, however, any mortgagee
upon receipt of a written request of a mortgagor must release of
record the lien to secure additional indebtedness as exceeds the
balance of such additional indebtedness at the time o£ such
request.
(3) (a) The written request referred to in subsection (2)
of this section shall be signed by the mortgagor or his agent or
attorney, and shall set forth a description of the real property
to which the request relates, the date, parties to, the volume
and initial page of the record of the mortgage referred to in
subsection (1) of this section, and a description of the nature,
amount and holder of the lien or encumbrance which the mortgagor
intends to place upon such real property. Such request shall be
deemed to have been received by the holder of the mortgage
referred to in subsection (l)of this section only when delivered
to such holder by certified mail, return receipt requested, at
the address of the holder appearing of record on such mortgage or
an assignment thereof;
(b) If within ten (10) business days after receipt of the
written request referred to in this SUbsection, the holder of the
mortgage referred to in subsection (1) of this section fails to
release that amount of the lien to secure additional indebtedness
to the extent described in such request, the mortgagor may record
in the office of the county clerk in which the mortgage referred
to in subsection (1) of this section is recorded by a copy of
such written request upon payment of the same filing fee as
provided for a release of a mortgage;
(c) If, after a copy of such written request is recorded,
an advance is made by the holder of the mortgage referred to in
subsection (1) of this section, the lien of such mortgage for the
unpaid balance of the advance so made shall be subordinate to the
-
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lien or encumbrance described in such request; provided, that any
advance made pursuant to a line of credit shall not be
subordinate to the lien or encumbrance described in such request
unless such request specifically, and not by implication,
describes such line of credit by account or other identifying
number and states that any advance thereafter made pursuant to
such plan is intended to be subordinated as aforesaid.
--
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NATIONAL BANK LENDING LIMITS
I. Purpose of Lending Limits
The purpose of the lending limits statute and regulation is
to promote safety and soundness in lending practices. The
law and regulation prevent anyone customer from borrowing
an unduly large amount of the bank's funds. In certain
situations, the regulations require combining of loans to
more than one person, placing further restrictions on
concentration of loans among related groups of customers.
(12 USC 84; 12 CFR 32)
II. General Rules
III. Combining Loans to Separate Borrowers
r
r
r
r
r
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B.
C.
A.
General Limitation - 15% of Unimpaired Capital and
Surplus
Total extensions of credit to a borrower at one time
may not exceed 15% of the bank's unimpaired capital and
surplus. For example, if a bank has unimpaired capital
and surplus of $1,000,000, its total loans to anyone
person may not exceed $150,000.
Additional Category - Loans Secured by Readily Marketable
Collateral
A category calculated separately from the 15% limitation
allows additional extensions of credit to a borrower if
they are fully secured at all times by "readily
marketable collateral." Loans in this category may not
exceed 10% of the bank's unimpaired capital and
surplus. "Readily marketable collateral" includes
stocks, bonds, and debentures traded on a national
securities exchange; OTC margin stocks as designated by
the Federal Reserve; commercial paper; and negotiable
certificates of deposit.
Example
Assume that ABC National Bank has unimpaired capital and
surplus of $1,000,000. It may lend one person $150,000
under the general rule stated in Section II.A., and an
additional $100,000 under the rule stated in Section
II.B. The second loan would have to be properly
collateralized. If the market price of the collateral
drops to $50,000, the second loan must be paid down to
$50,000 or additional collateral must be pledged, within
five business days.
General Rule
Extensions of credit to one party will be combined with
loans to another party for the purpose of applying the
G - 3
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lending limits, when (1) a "common enterprise" exists
between the persons; or (2) the proceeds of the loans J
are to be used for the direct benefit of the other party.
Common Enterprise
Whether a common enterprise exists must be determined on
a case-by-case basis. "However, there are certain J
situations in which loans clearly must be combined.
1. Loans With Same Source of Repayment
r
-A common enterprise exists between persons relying
on the same source of repayment for extensions of
credit. For example, the bank should combine loans ~
to two individuals whose sole source of income is
a corporation which the two individuals own.
2. Loans to Parties That are Financially Interdependent
and Related Through Common "Control"
A common enterprise exists between two entities if
(a) they are related through common "control",
including cases in which one entity is controlled
by another; and (b) there is substantial financial
interdependence between the two entities.
a. Definition of "Control"
A person is considered to "control" an entity
if the person controls 25% of the voting
stock of the entity; or controls the
election of a majority of the board of
directors of the entity; or exercises a
controlling influence over the management of
the entity.
--
b. Example:
Assume that a bank's lending limit is $150,000.
Smith owns 25% of the voting securities of ABC,
Inc. Smith is in the business of purchasing
coal, and the sale of coal to Smith by ABC
constitutes half of ABC's business. The bank
has a $75,000 loan already to Smith. The bank
can only lend ABC, Inc. $75,000 because the
loans to Smith and ABC, Inc. would have to be
combined for lending limits purposes.
,
.~
....
3. Loans For Acquisition of a Business
A common enterprise exists where a bank extends
loans to a group of otherwise unrelated persons
for the purpose of the group's acquisition of a
G - 4
Loans to Corporations
Loans to corporations may have to be combined under
rules previously outlined. However, even if there is
not a "common enterprise", the regulation imposes
additional limitations on loans to members of a
"corporate group." Such loans may not exceed 50% of the
bank's unimpaired capital and surplus.
business enterprise (or at least 50% of the voting
stock of a business). For example, assume that a
bank's lending limit is $1~0,000. Smith borrows
$100,000, Jones borrows $100,000 and Doe borrows
$50,000. They use the loans to purchase 51% of a
company's voting stock. The three loans would have
to be combined and the bank would be in violation of
its lending limits.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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1. Definition of "Corporate Group"
r
r
r
r
r D.
A corporate group includes a person and all of
its direct and indirect subsidiaries. A
corporation is considered a subsidiary if a person
or corporation owns more than 50% of its stock.
2. Example:
A owns more than 50% of the voting stock of
Corporation X. Corporation X owns more than 50% of
the voting stock of Corporation Y. Corporation Y
is a subsidiary of both A and Corporation X.
Therefore, the total loans by a national bank to A,
Corporation X, and Corporation Y cannot exceed 50%
of the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus.
Loans to Partnerships, Joint Ventures and Associations
r
r
r
,.
J
r
r
r
Extensions of credit to a partnership, joint venture, or
association shall be considered extensions of credit to
each member of such partnership, joint venture or
association. For example, assume that a bank's lending
limit is $100,000. It may extend $50,000 of credit each
to A and B, who are general partners in the partnership
AB. The bank may also loan $50,000 to the partnership.
However, B is also a member of the partnership BC which
wants to borrow $15,000. The bank cannot make this loan
because the loan to partnership AB has been attributed
to B along with B's personal loan. When these loans are
combined with the proposed loan to partnership BC, the
bank would be in excess of its lending limits.
IV. Exceptions to Lending Limits--Selected Examples
A. Loans Secured by u.S. Obligations
G - 5
Loans or extensions of credit secured by U.S. government
obligations will not be subject to lending limits. ~
B. Discount of Installment Paper--Full Recourse
Extensions of credit arising from the discount of
installment consumer paper with full recourse to the
seller are considered extensions of credit to the
seller, but are subject to a limitation of 25% of
unimpaired capital and surplus.
c. Discount of Installment Paper--No Recourse
Installment consumer paper purchased from a dealer will
be considered a loan to the maker of the paper, rather
than the dealer, if (a) the bank has determined and can
document that the financial condition of the maker is
adequate to repay the obligation, and (b) an officer
authorized by the bank's Board of Directors certifies in
writing that the bank is relying primarily on the maker
for repayment.
I
-
D. Federally Related Loans
Loans or extensions of credit to or secured by the
unconditional guarantee or take-out commitment of a
federal government agency will not be subject to lending
limits.
E. Loans Secured by Deposit Accounts
Loans or extensions of credit secured by a segregated
deposit account in the lending bank will not be subject
to lending limits, if (1) the bank's security interest
is perfected, which requires a formal assignment and a
hold on the account; and (2) the bank has set up
internal control procedures to prevent the release of
the security.
V. Definition of Extension of Credit
The term "extension of credit" means any direct or indirect
advance of funds to a person based upon the obligation of the
person to repay the funds or which is repayable from
property pledged by or on behalf of a person.
A. Examples of Extensions of Credit
The term "extension of credit" includes (1) obligations
of makers and endorsers arising from the discount of
commercial paper; (2) standby letters of credit; and (3)
sales of federal funds with a maturity of more than 'one
business day.
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Exclusions From Definition of "Extension of Credit"
The term "extension of credit" does not include the
following:
1. Obligations of. a Guarantor
The obligation of a guarantor or endorser who does
not receive any of the proceeds or the benefits of
the extension of credit, so long as the guarantor
or endorser is not engaged in a "common enterprise."
2. Federal Funds
The sale of federal funds with a maturity of one
business day; or the sale of federal funds under a
continuing agreement that has no specified maturity
and requires no advance notice for termination.
3. Repurchase Agreements
Obligations under a repurchase agreement involving
securities that are obligations of the U.S. govern-
ment, or general obligations of a state or political
subdivision of a state.
4. Non-Recourse Participations
The sale of a participation in a loan on a
non-recourse basis.
5. Interest
Accrued or discounted interest, so long as the
interest is not rolled over into principal of the
loan.
G - 7 -
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EXAMPLE:
KENTUCKY STATE BANK LENDING LIMITS
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS 287.280) control a Kentucky state
bank's lending limits for all types of borrowers. Federal Reserve
Board Regulation "0" (12 CFR 215) also regulates loans to insiders
of Kentucky state banks. Loans to affiliates of Kentucky state
banks (the parent holding company, an~ other bank or non-bank
subsidiary of the parent holding company and any company
"interlocked" with a bank by means of common "control" of both the
banking organization and the other company) are also governed by
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.
KENTUCKY STATE BANK LENDING LIMITS
I. APPLICABILITY
A. The lending limits imposed by state law (KRS 287.280)
govern loans by state banks to all types of borrowers
(individuals, corporations, partnerships, trusts,
estates, associations, etc.). However, certain
additional restrictions apply to loans to a bank's
insiders and will be discussed below.
II. MAXIMUM DEBT
A. 20% Unsecured Maximum
A bank may loan on an unsecured basis to anyone borrower
no more than 20 percent of its capital stock actually
paid in plus its actual amount of surplus.
30% Secured Maximum
A bank may loan to anyone borrower a maximum of
30 percent of its capital stock actually paid in
plus its actual amount of surplus if the entire
indebtedness is fully secured by "good collateral"
having value, exclusive of all other encumbrances, in
excess of the debt secured.
Assume that a Bank's current 20% Unsecured Legal
Lending Limit is $2,000,000 and Bank presently has
an outstanding unsecured loan to Borrower in the
amount of $2,000,000. Bank wishes to lend Borrower
an additional $100,000. The additional $100,000 loan
will exceed the 20% Unsecured Legal Lending Limit
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but will be within Bank's 30% Secured Legal Lending
Limit. Once Borrower's loans will exceed the 20%
Unsecured Legal Lending Limit, all of Borrower's loans
with Bank must be fully secured. Therefore, the entire
$2,100,000 must be fully secured, not just the additional
$100,000.
Definitions (KRS 287.010)
1. "Capital Stock" means the sum of:
(a) The par value of all shares of the
corporation having a par value that have
been issued;
(b) The amount of consideration received by
the corporation for all shares of the
corporation that have been issued without
par value except such part of the
consideration as has been allocated to
surplus in a manner permitted by law; and
(c) Such amounts not included in paragraphs
(a) and (b) of this subsection as have
been transferred to stated capital of the
corporation, whether through the issuance
of stock dividends, resolution of the
bank's Board of Directors under applic-
able corporate law or otherwise by law.
2. "Surplus" means the amount of consideration
received by the corporation for all shares
issued without par value that has not been
allocated to capital stock or the amount of
consideration received by the corporation in
excess of par value for all shares with a par
value or both. (Surplus does not include
undivided profits or allowance for loan loss
reserves.)
Combining Indebtedness
1. The maximum debt permitted by Kentucky law
includes all loans to a borrower plus all
obligations of that borrower as guarantor or
G - 9
2.
3.
F.
surety to the bank for the indebtedness of
others.
The total indebtedness of the borrower to a
bank shall include the aggregate of all
indebtedness to the bank of any partnership in
which the borrower acts as a general partner.
The total indebtedness of the borrower shall
include the aggregate of all indebtedness to
the bank entered into for the benefit of such
borrower.
Exceptions To Maximum Debt Limits (KRS 287.290)
J
t
J
j
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-
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b.
c.
The limitations and restrictions of KRS 287.280 do
not apply to the following:
a. Obligations of the United States or of the
state of Kentucky;
Obligations guaranteed as to principal and
interest by the United States or the State of
Kentucky; or certain other obligations secured r
by guarantees of the Unites States or certain of ~
its agencies;
(1) However, the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions may alter certain lending
limit except10ns set forth in this
subparagraph
Obligations of Kentucky counties and school
districts incurred through borrowing in
anticipation of the current year's tax
receipts as authorized by KRS 68.320 and
160.540.
Federal Funds Transactions (808 KAR 1:020)
a. The sale and purchase of federal funds by
state charted banks is not subject to the
maximum lending provisions of KRS 287.280.
1.
2.
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EXAMPLE
500,000
1,000,000
100,000
250,000
$2,350,000
500,000$
LENDING LIMITS
(a) Unsecured Loans -- 20% Maximum
(1) No one borrower may have unsecured loans
from Kentucky State Bank in excess of
$220,000 (20% of $1,100,000, which
consists of Kentucky State Bank's Capital
Stock ($500M), Surplus ($500M) and
Capital Notes ($100M), but without
Undivided Profits and Allowance for Loan
Loss Reserves).
(b) Secured Loans -- 30% Maximum
(1) Kentucky State Bank may lend to anyone
borrower a maximum amount of $330,000
(30% of $1,100,000, which consists of
Kentucky State Bank's Capital Stock
($500M), Surplus ($500M), and Capital
Notes ($100M), but without Undivided
Profits and Allowance for Loan Loss
Reserves); provided that when indebted-
ness exceeds 20 percent, the entire
borrowing must be secured by good
collateral with a value in excess of the
indebtedness.
(c) Note that in calculating the 20 percent and 30
percent legal lending limit tests, Kentucky
Assume Kentucky State Bank's balance sheet shows the
following accounts:
Capital Stock or Stated Capital
(100,000 shares, $5 par value
per share)
Sur~lus
Undivided profits
Capital Notes
Allowance for Loan Loss Reserves
r
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State Bank's Undivided Profits of $1 million,
and its Allowance for Loan Loss Reserves of
$250,000, are excluded. If Kentucky State
Bank wanted to increase its legal lending
limit base to its borrowers, it could do so by
moving part of the $1 million in Undivided
Profits to the Capital Stock account (which
makes the portion so transferred unavailable
for dividends). This can be done by
resolution of the board of directors. See
KRS 271A.105(4) and KRS 287.0l0(8)(c).
END OF EXAMPLE
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INSIDER LOANS
I. DUAL COVERAGE -- STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
A. KRS and Regulation "0"
1. The regulation of loans by Kentucky state banks to
insiders is complex because such loans are governed
by both Kentucky statutory law (KRS 287.280) and
the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest
Rate Control Act of 1978, which is implemented by
Federal Reserve Board Regulation "0" (12 CFR 215).
In many areas the provisions of KRS and Regulation
"0" are identical. In other areas where the
provisions are not the same, the more restrictive of
the two governs.
II. LENDING LIMITS FOR INSIDER LOANS
A. Kentucky Insider Lending Limits
1. Under Kentucky law, the lending limits for a loan
by a Kentucky state bank to an insider are the same
as the lending limits for a loan to any other
borrower (20% Unsecured or 30% Secured, calculated
on bank's actual capital and surplus.)
B. Regulation "0" Insider Lending Limits
1. Regulation "0" incorporates the national bank
lending limits which are set forth in 12 USC 84
(15% Unsecured plus additional 10% Secured). The
national bank lending limits are more fully
G - 13
discussed in a separate outline in the seminar
materials.
a. National bank lending limits are calculated on
the bank's unimpaired capital and unimpaired
surplus. Unimpaired surplus is very broadly
defined to include undivided profits, loan
loss reserves, other capital reserves and
certain other items.
c. Types Of Insider Loans Regulated By Both Kentucky
Lending Limits And Regulation "0" Lending Limits
Loans to the following types of insiders are regulated
by both Kentucky lending limits and Regulation "0"
lending limits. A bank should calculate its lending
limits under both set of rules and must use whichever
calculation produces the smaller lending limits. The _
Kentucky lending limits generally will be smaller than
the Regulation "0" lending limits because Kentucky
limits are percentages of actual capital and surplus
while Regulation "0" limits are percentages of
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus.
1. Banks own executive officers, or any related
interests of those persons
a. With respect to Kentucky banks which are
members of the Federal Reserve System,
Regulation "0" (at 12 CFR 215.5) prohibits
loans to "executive officers" unless such
loans are first mortgage loans, loans to
finance the education of the executive
G - 14
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officer's children, or loans for any other
purposes if the aggregate amount of such other
loans does not exceed at anyone time the
Definitions
higher of 2.5% of the bank's capital and
unimpaired surplus or $25,000, but in no event
more than $100,000.
Regulation "0" lending limits do not apply to a
bank's own directors, or any related interests of
that person unless the director is also an executive
individuals designated by board resolution
as having major policy making functions.
"Executive Officers" are generally those1.
officer or principal shareholder of the bank.
Bank's principal shareholders, or any related
interests of those persons.
Executive officers and principal shareholders of
the bank's parent holding company and of all of its
other subsidiaries, and the related interests of
those executive officers and principal shareholders.
2.
3 .
4.
D.
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If there is no such resolution, the
chairman of the board, the president,
every vice-president, the cashier, the
secretary, and the treasurer are
considered executive officers.
r
r
2. "Principal Shareholders" are individuals,
companies, partnerships, trusts or any
other business entity that own or control
r G - 15
more than 10 percent of any class o~
voting securities of a bank, its parent
holding company or any other subsidiary
of the bank holding company.
-
a. The percentage is "more than 18 percent"
rather than "more than 10 percent" if the bank
is located in a city, town or village with a
population less than 30,000.
3. "Related Interest" means any form of business
entity that is "controlled" by a person or a ...
political or campaign committee that is
controlled by a person or the funds or services
of which will benefit a person.
4. A person has "control" of a business entity or
campaign committee if that person:
(1) Owns or controls 25 percent or more
of the voting securities of the
entity or committee;
(2) Controls the election of a majority
of directors of the entity or committee,
or
(3) Has the power to exercise control-
ling influence over the management
of the entity or committee.
5. A person is presumed to have control if:
(1) The person is an executive officer
or director of the entity and owns
or controls more than 10 percent of
G - 16
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voting securities of that entity,
or
(2) The person owns or controls more
than 10 percent of voting securities
of the entity and no other person
owns or controls a greater
percentage.
III. OTHER REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO INSIDER LOANS MADE BY
KENTUCKY STATE BANKS
A. Non-Preferential Loans
1. Applicability
KRS and Regulation "0" both have a substan-
tially si~ilar non-preferential loan rule.
This rule applies to loans by state banks to:
a. Bank's own directors, executive officers,
principal shareholders and their related
interests.
b. Directors, executive officers and principal
shareholders of the bank's parent holding
company and all of its other subsidiaries
and the related interests of those persons.
c. The bank's parent holding company and any
other subsidiary of that holding company.
2. Non-Preferential Loan Rule
A state bank may not grant extensions of credit to
the above listed insiders nor permit such insiders
to become obligated to it as guarantor or surety
unless such indebtedness or obligation is made on
G - 17
non-preferential terms. Therefore, such extensions
of credit .must be made on substantially the same
terms, including interest rates and collateral, as
those prevailing at the time for comparable trans-
-
B.
actions with those who are not insiders. Also, the ~
loan must not· involve more than the normal risk of
repayment or present other unfavorable features.
Prior Board Approval
1. Applicability
KRS and Regulation "0" both have a substantially
similar prior board approval rule. This rule
applies to loans by state non-member banks to:
a. Bank's own directors, executive officers,
principal shareholders and their related
interests.
b. Directors, executive officers and principal
shareholders of the bank's parent holding
company and all of its other subsidiaries
and the related interests of those persons.
c. The bank's parent holding company and any
2.
other subsidiary of that holding company.
Prior Board Approval Rule
A state bank may not grant extensions of credit to'
the above listed insiders in any amount which
exceeds a threshold amount, unless the extension is
approved in advance by a majority of the entire
board of directors, with the interested insider
abstaining from participating directly or indirectly
G - 18
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in the approval process. In order to fully comply
with this requirement, the interested party
should leave the board room while the loan is
being discussed and voted upon.
a. Threshold Amount: Prior board approval
is required if the loan to the insider,
when aggregated with any outstanding
credit to that person and to all related
interests of that person, will exceed
(i) the greater of $25,000 or five
percent of the lending bank's actual
capital and surplus, or (ii) in any
event exceeds $500,000.
b. A line of credit must be reviewed and
reapproved at least every 14 months.
c. For purposes of calculating aggregate
indebtedness under the prior board
approval rule, any indebtedness of
$5,000 or less is excluded if incurred
under a credit card, check credit,
interest bearing overdraft or similar
open end credit plan if no specific
prior individual clearance is required
and if the indebtedness is incurred
under terms no less favorable than those
offered to the general public.
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D. Overdrafts -- Regulation "0" Rule
1. Applicability
This rule applies to overdrafts by an executive
officer or director of the state bank on an
account at that bank.
2. Overdraft Rule
A bank may not pay an overdraft on an executive
officer's or director's account at the bank
unless it is paid in accordance with:
3. A bank may also pay an overdraft if:
a.
b.
a.
A written, pre-authorized interest-
bearing credit plan that specifies the
method of payment, or
A written, pre-authori~ed transfer from
another account of the account holder at
the bank.
It is "inadvertent,"
!
..
J
b. It, together with any other outstanding
overdrafts, does not exceed $1,000,
c.
d.
The overdraft paid is not outstanding
for more than five business days, and
The bank charged the executive officer
or director its regular fee for paying
overdrafts.
..
E. Recordkeeping Requirements Regulation "0" Rule
1. The state bank must keep a record of:
a. All executive officers, directors,
principal shareholders and their related
G - 20
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interests, and
b. The amount and terms of all extensions
of credit to these insiders and their
related interests.
2. The state non-member bank must request annually
that these insiders identify their related
interests.
NOTE: This outline has been written for the purpose of
setting forth the various lending limit requirements imposed
by state and federal law upon Kentucky state banks. Please
keep in mind that Regulation "0" requirements are applicable
to any loan made by a bank to insiders at another affiliated
bank (one which is also owned by the same holding company).
This outline, however, does not present a comprehensive list
of all Regulation "0" requirements. It only presents those
which are applicable to state banks which are not members of
the Federal Reserve System. There are certain additional
Regulation "0" requirements that apply to national banks and
to state banks which are members of the Federal Reserve
System.
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DIRECTORS' LIABILITY FOR LENDING LIMIT VIOLATIONS i
..J
STATE-CHARTERED BANKS .
.j
...
I.
A. Loans in excess of the "20% limit," if not adequately
secured, will result in director liability for the entire j.
loan. See Wickliffe v. Turner, Ky., 157 S.W. 1125 (1913).
1. Directors may also be liable for the whole debt if
they "negligently take collateral security or a
mortgage which is insufficient under the statute."
See Wickliffe, Supra, at 573.
J
B.
C.
D.
E.
Loans in excess of the 30% limit will subject directors
to liability for the amount in excess of the limit.
Cunningham v. Shellman, Ky., 175 S. W. 1045 (1915); See
also Wickliffe, Supra; and Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, Ky.,
21 S.W.2d 994 (1929).
Liability is for directors who "knowingly" violate, or
knowingly permit any officer or employee of the bank to
violate ... " the lending limits. In such case, the
directors "shall be jointly and severally liable to the
creditors and stockholders for any loss or damage
resulting ... " KRS 287.990(5).
Under the above cited cases, suit may be brought against
directors by creditors, depositors and shareholders.
Under KRS 287.990(18), any officer or director who
violates the lending limit provisions of KRS 287.280(1)
and (3) "shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars
($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each
violation; and any officer or director who violates the
provisions of KRS 287.280(2) shall be fined not less than
five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than two thousand
dollars ($2,000) for each violation. The fine shall be
assessed by the Commissioner by written notice." (Query:
Does this mean that the scienter element in KRS
287.990(5) need not be present in order to levy a fine?)
Also, under KRS 287.990(15) and 287.690, the Commissioner
would appear to have the authority to order banks and
their directors and officers to cease and desist from
lending limit violations and to assess a fine of up to
$1,000 per day for each day a violation continues.
The FDIC appears to have similar authority under 12 USC
1730 and 12 USC 1818.
J
II. NATIONAL BANKS
A. If directors "knowingly violate, or knowingly permit any
of the officers ... to violate" the lending limit statutes,
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"every director who participated in or assented to the
same shall be held liable in his personal and individual
capacity for all damages which the association... shall
have sustained." 12 USC 93(a); See also 12 USC 84
Where there are a number of loans involved, it has been
held that only the funds paid out by the bank after the
total borrowings have reached the lending limit are
regarded as the damages sustained. See First National
Bank v. Keller, 318 F. Supp 339 (N.D. Ill. 1970)
Where the violative loan was the result of a single
transaction, it has been held that the entire amount
loaned, plus interest and less salvage, constitutes
damages. See Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, Supra.
(The court noted that it could not presume that the
borrower would have agreed to a loan under the lending
limit had the excessive loan been rejected).
1. Where loans were made without the knowledge of or
participation by directors, they may not be
personally liable. See Corsicana Nat'l Bank v.
Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 64 L.Ed. 141, 405. S.Ct. 82
(1919); and Holman v. Cross, 75 F.2d 909 (6th Cir.
1935); provided the director has not neglected the
duty to investigate. See Prudential Trust Co. v.
Brown, Mass., 171 N.E. 42 (1930)
It has been held that non officer directors were not
guilty of a knowing violation of the statute where
loans were made to an investment banking firm which,
when aggregated with loans to persons later discovered
to be officers of that firm were excessive. See
Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936);
revd. on other grounds, 302 U.S. 643.
2.
C.
B.
r
I
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
D.
E.
Even if a bank director is not liable under the statute
because he did not have knowledge of the bank's loans,
his negligence in failing to supervise the bank's
affairs Inay subject him to liability under a common law
negligence doctrine. See 11 ALR Fed at 613.
Directors may be sued for lending limit violations by a
receiver, by shareholders, by regulators or by the bank
itself. See 11 ALR Fed at 613.
r
r
F.
G.
Directors have been held to have a right of contribution
against other directors. Cache Nat. Bank v. Hinman, 626
F. Supp 1341 (D. Colo. 1986).
Under 12 USC 93(b), the Comptroller can assess a civil
money penalty against a national bank or an officer or
director for a violation of a number of provisions of
Chapter 12 of the U.S. Code, including 12 USC 84.
r
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This penalty can be levied against officers as well
as directors; and, there appears to be no scienter
requirement in the statute. Also, the penalty may
be assessed regardless of whether the bank suffers
any damage or loss. See Glidden, National Bank
Lending Limits: Interpretative Issues and Practi
cal Considerations, Banking Law J., Sept.-Oct., 1984, ~
at 575.
Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982)H.
1.
2.
3 .
del
1.
2.
3 .
4.
The penalty may be up to $1,000 per day for each day
during which the violation continues. It may be
"assessed and collected by the Comptroller of the
Currency by written note."
In determining the amount of the penalty, the
Comptroller must take into account the financial
resources and good faith of the bank or person
charged, the gravity of the violation, the history
of previous violations, and such other matters as
justice may require. 12 USC 93(b)(1).
This case held that directors must see to it that an
unsecured, legal loan is paid off prior to secured,
illegal loans.
Directors were held liable for (a) the illegal
loans; (b) the collection costs of the illegal
loans; (c) interest on the illegal loans; and (d)
attorney fees paid by the bank for the directors'
defense against the Comptroller's cease and desist
action.
The Comptroller's ability to use the 12 USC l8l8(b)
cease and desist route and avoid the "knowingly"
standard of 12 USC 94 was called into question, but
held moot in this particular case.
Should the principles of this case not also apply to
lending limit violations of state-chartered banks?
Are you ever totally safe until all of the
borrowers' debt is paid off or sold?
Example: First State Bank has a 30% limit of
$500,000 and made a $500,000 loan to John Jones
secured by a farm valued at $1,000,000 at the time
of the loan on 1/1/80. In 1982, First State made an
illegal $100,000 loan to Jones secured by $200,000
worth of G.E. stock. Today, the farm land is worth
$250,000, and the G.E. stock is worth well over
$200,000. Should the directors be allowed to pay
off the stock loan and remove their liability under
the lending limit statute?
i
-
~
-
J
J
-
r
r I. Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F. 2d 1244(7th Cir. 1986)
III. Dealing With Lending Limit Violations
A. How To Remedy Violations:
r
,.
t
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
1.
2.
1.
2.
3 .
4.
5.
The Comptroller, in this case, sought to impose
personal liability upon a bank's directors under 12
USC l8l8(b) for violations of the lending limit
statute. He ordered the directors to indemnify the
bank for all losses that had been incurred or that
might occur as a result of the excessive loans.
The court held that the Comptroller did not have the
authority to unilaterally impose personal liability
against a bank director and must first institute an
action to seek damages in the proper district court
under 12 USC 93 (a). The district court must' then
determine if the director has "knowingly" violated
the banking laws. (Query: Would the Comptroller
have the authority to levy fines under 12 USC 93(b),
as opposed to imposing personal liability for
damages, without going through the Courts? It
appears so. See Larimore at 1253-1254. However,
the statute does provide for a judicial appeals
procedure) .
Transfer of the borrower's notes to another
corporation. See Corsicana Nat. Bank v. Johnson,
Supra.
Transfer of all notes or just part?
Charging off the amount in excess of the lending
limit will not cure the violation.
Release of guarantors or parties obligated on a
separate loan that has been "aggregated" under the
lending limit statutes will not cure the problem.
Reduction of the loan by the borrower to the bank's
lending limit does not cure the violation. Director
liability ceases only when the bank is completely
repaid.
r
r
r
,.,
B. Liability avoidance Techniques.
1. Establishment of audit procedures to guard against
lending limits violations.
2. Periodic reports to the board from auditors and
counsel regarding the bank's lending limits under
state and federal law, both to outside borrowers and
to insiders; also, reports regarding the threshold
amount for prior board approval of insider loans.
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3. Proper notations in minutes regarding non-voting and
non-participation by insiders in the discussion of ~
their loans.
J
.J
-
-
-
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II. AFFILIATE
GENERAL RULE
r
r
,
r
r
r
r
r
I.
A.
B.
TRANSACTIONS WITH AFFILIATES
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 USC 371c)
applies to national banks and to state chartered insured
banks.
Section 23A is designed to protect banks from abuse
in financial transactions with affiliates. It
restricts "covered transactions" between a bank and
its affiliates.
"Affiliate" includes:
3. Any bank subsidiary of a bank
.r
,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
...
t
A.
1.
2.
4.
The parent holding company of a bank, or
Any other bank or non-bank subsidiary of the
parent holding company, or
a. Non-bank subsidiaries of a bank are
excluded from the definition of
"affiliate." Therefore, transactions by
a bank with its own non-bank subsidiaries
are not restricted by §23A.
Any company interlocked with a bank either through
a shareholder or director interlock. A company is
interlocked with a bank where:
a. A group of shareholders controls 25% or more
of the shares of both a bank (or its holding
company) and a company, or
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b. A majority of the directors of a bank (or its
holding company) also constitute a majority of
the directors of a company.
III. COVERED TRANSACTIONS
A. "Covered transactions" with respect to an affiliate
include:
1. A loan or extension of credit to the
affiliate.
2.
3 .
4.
5 .
A purchase of assets, including assets subject
to an agreement to repurchase, from the
affiliate.
The issuance of a guarantee, acceptance or
letter of credit, including an endorsement or
standby letter of credit, on behalf of an
affiliate.
A purchase of securities issued by the
affiliate.
Accepting securities issued by an affiliate
as collateral for a loan to any person or
company.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSACTIONS WITH AFFILIATES
A. Special Lending Limi~s
1. A bank and its subsidiaries may engage in covered
transactions with an affiliate only if:
a. In the aggregate, covered transactions with a
single affiliate are limited to not more than
10 percent of the lending bank's capital stock
and surplus, and
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Collateral Requirements
b. Covered transactions by the bank and its
subsidiaries with all affiliates combined are
limited to not more than 20 percent of the
lending bank's capital stock and surplus.
1. Each covered transaction involving a loan or
extension of credit to, or guarantee, acceptance or
letter of credit issued on behalf of, an affiliate
by a bank or its subsidiary must be secured at the
time of the transaction by collateral having a
market value equal to:
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
B.
a.
b.
c.
d.
100 percent if u.s. or Agency obligations
or guarantees, or a segregated, earmarked
deposit account with the lending bank ..
110 percent if State or political
subdivision obligations.
120 percent if other debt instruments,
including receivables.
130 percent if stock, leases or other
real or personal property.
r
r
r
r
r
r
2.
3.
If any collateral is subsequently retired or
amortized, it must be replaced by additional
eligible collateral where needed to keep the value
of the collateral relative to the amount of the
outstanding transaction at least equal to the
minimum percentage required at the inception of the
transaction.
A bank is prohibited from taking its bank holding
company stock as collateral for such transactions.
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a.
A bank is prohibited from accepting "low quality
assets" as collateral for such transactions.
Low quality assets include those which are
"classified," on "nonaccrual," more than 30
days' past due, or "renegotiated.
C. Qualitative Requirements
oJ
1. The Qualitative Requirements apply to all
covered transactions and all transactions
which may otherwise be exempt from §23A
requirements between a bank and its affiliates.
The Qualitative Requirements are as follows:
..
-a.
b.
All transactions between a bank and its
affiliates must be on terms and
conditions which are consistent with safe
and sound banking policies.
A bank and its subsidiaries may not purchase a
low-quality asset from an affiliate unless the
bank or such subsid~ary, pursuant to an
independent credit evaluation, had committed
itself to purchase such asset prior to the time
such asset was acquired by the affiliate.
V. EXEMPTIONS
A. Special Lending Limits and Collateral Requirements do
not apply to:
1. Transactions between sister bank subsidiaries
within a multibank holding company which owns
80 percent or more of each sister bank.
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2.
3 .
4.
5 .
Transactions between a bank and its bank
subs~diary. NOTE: As discussed earlier,
transactions between a bank and its
non-bank subsidiaries are not restricted
by Section 23A.
Deposits by a bank in an affiliated bank i~
the ordinary course of business.
A bank's giving immediate credit to an affiliate for
uncollected items received in the ordinary course of
business.
A bank's making a loan or extension of credit
,
to, or issuing a guarantee, acceptance or
letter of credit on behalf of an affiliate
that is fully secured by
The purchase of securities issued by any
affiliate company engaged in furnishing
services to the bank or its holding company.
The purchase of loans on a non-recourse basis
from affiliated banks, subject to the rule
that the purchase of low-quality loans
The purchase from affiliates of assets having
a readily identifiable and publicly
available market quotation at that market
quotation.
r
r
r
r
r
r
<
r
r
r.
t
6 .
7.
8.
a.
b.
u. S. or Agency obligations or
guarantees, or
A segregated, earmarked deposit account
with the bank.
r
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is prohibited unless the bank, subject to an
independent credit evaluation, had earlier
committed itself to purchase such loans.
The purchase from an affiliate of a loan or
extension of credit that was originated by
the bank and sold to the affiliate subject to
a repurchase agreement or with recourse.
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PURPOSE
REPORTS OF CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS
Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency
and Foreign Transactions Act
31 C.F.R. 103
1. The regulations require a report to be filed of each
deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other
payment (including loan payments) or transfer by,
through or to a bank which involves a transaction in
United States or foreign currency of more than $10,000.
(Multiple transactions by or for any person which in any
one banking day total more than $10,000 should be
treated as a single transaction, if the financial
institution is aware of them). 31 C.F.R. 103.22 (a) (1)
NOTE: Verification shall be made by examination of
a document other than a bank signature card.
Filing The Report 31 C.F.R. 103.26 (a)
Within 15 days following the date on which a transaction
occurred, the bank must complete and file a Currency
Transaction Report ("CTR") using Form 4789. A copy of
the form is attached as Exhibit I. (Note the form was
revised December, 1985 and use of the new form has been
required since July, 1986).
(a) The bank must ve~ify and record the name, address
and Social Security Number/Tax 1.0. Number of the
individual presenting the transaction and of the
individual or organization for whose account the
transaction is being made.
(b) To verify the above information, the bank must use a
passport or similar document for aliens or non-
residents of the United States. Drivers licenses
are acceptable for others. In each case, the bank
must record on the CTR the method of identification
used.
(c) Improper completion and failure to complete Form
4789 are the most common violations of the
regulation.
Transactions Not Covered by the Regulation: 31 C.F.R.
103.22 (b) (1)
(a) Transfers of funds by bank check, bank draft or
wire transfer which do not involve the physical
transfer of currency from one person to another.
1.
2.
A.
B.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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r
r
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3.
(b) Transactions with the Federal Reserve or with
Federal Home Loan Banks.
(c) Transactions between domestic banks.
Exemptions 31 C.F.R. 103.22 (b) (2)
Exemptions may be authorized for the following
transactions:
(a)
(b)
Deposits or withdrawals of currency from an
existing account by an established depositor who is
a United States resident and operates a "retail type
of business" in the United· States.
(1) A "retail type of business" is one "primarily
engaged in providing goods to ultimate
consumers and for which the business is paid
in substantial portion by currency."
(2) Dealerships which sell automobiles, boats or
airplanes are not exempt.
Deposits or withdrawals of currency from an
existing account by an established depositor who is
a United States resident and operates a sports
arena, race track, amusement park, bar,
restaurant, hotel, check cashing service licensed
by state or local governments, vending machine
company, theatre, regularly scheduled passenger
carrier whose stock is publicly traded or any public
utility company supervised by a state or federal
regulatory agency.
I
....
J
4.
(c) Deposits or withdrawals, exchanges of currency, or
other payments and transfers by local or state ~
governments, or the United States or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities.
(d) Withdrawals for payroll purposes from an existing
account by an established depositor who is a United
States resident and operates a firm that regularly
withdraws more than $10,000 in order to pay its
employees in currency.
Records For Exemptions 31 C.F.R. 103.22 (d)
Records must be maintained for each exemption granted
and must comply with the following requirements:
(a) Explain the reason for the exemption.
(b) Maintain a central file of all exemptions. (31 C.F.R. ~
103.22(f» (A sample of an exemption form is
attached as ExhibitII).,
.J
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(1) The name, address, business, taxpayer I.D.
number and account number of the customer.
(d) The exemption form must include the following
information:
(c) The names and addresses of all banks accepted under
the exemption for transactions between domestic
banks must be included.
• Note that this requirement means that the
Authorizing Officer must exercise some
judgment.
In many, if not most, cases, the exemption
should not be available for withdrawals.
EXAMPLE: Movie theaters customarily
deposit large amounts of currency, but
they do not customarily make large with-
drawals of currency. Therefore, the
exemption might exempt deposits up to
$15,000 (assuming such amounts are
customary in that line of business) but
the exemption for withdrawals would be
zero.
Even for deposit exemptions, some reason-
able limitation must be set on the amount
of currency deposits exempt from reporting
requirements.
•
•
Whether the exemption covers withdrawals,
deposits or both and the dollar limit of
the exemption. BANKS MAY EXEMPT ONLY
THOSE AMOUNTS WHICH DO NOT EXCEED "AMOUNTS
COMMENSURATE WITH THE CUSTOMARY CONDUCT
OF THE LAWFUL, DOMESTIC BUSINESS OF THE
CUSTOMER." 31 C.F.R. 103(c)
•
(2)
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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(3) Whether the exemption is limited to certain types
of deposits or withdrawals (e.g. withdrawals
for payroll purposes);
(4) A written statement signed ~ the customer
describing the customary conduct of the lawful
domestic business of the customer and
detailing the reasons why such person is
qualified for an exemption.
r
r
•
•
The signature shall include the title and
position of the person signing.
Immediately above the signature line the
following statement shall appear: "The
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information contained above is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief. I understand that this
information will be read and relied upon
by the Government."
f
...
(e) The bank is responsible for independently verifying
the activity of the account and determining the J
dollar limits for exempted deposits or withdrawals. ~
This evaluation should include a review of the
history of the frequency and amount of cash
transactions. ~
5. Requests For Special Exemptions 12 C.F.R. 103.22 (e)
Note that the Bank may apply to the Treasury Department
for exemptions to cover depositors not specifically
exempted in the regulation.
C. RECENT AMENDMENTS
Effective October 27, 1986 the Omnibus Drug Enforcement,
Education and Control Act of 1986 created new statutory
provisions to curtail money laundering. The following
highlights certain provisions of the Act:
• money laundering was made a federal criminal offense
(18 U.S.C. 1956).
•
•
•
•
"knowingly" engaging in a monetary transaction (i.e.
deposit, withdrawal or transfer, etc.) in criminally
derived property in excess of $10,000 has been made a
criminal offense (18 U.S.C. 1957).
12·USC 1353 of The Right to Financial Privacy Act was
amended to allow reports to the federal government if a
financial institution suspects a statute or regulation
has been violated.
civil and criminal penalties can be imposed on a person
who causes or attempts to cause a financial institution
not to file a report or to file an incorrect report or to
structure a transaction to evade the reporting require-
ments of the Bank Secrecy Act.
Example: An individual who converts $18,000 in currency
to cashier's checks by buying two $9,000 cashier's
checks from two banks with the intent that the banks not
be required to file currency transaction reports.
customers will be required to sign and attest to
statements exempting them from currency transaction
reporting (See B. 4 above).
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TRANSPORTATION OF CURRENCY OR "MONETARY INSTRUMENTS" -
31 C.F.R. 103.23
The regulations also require each person who physically
transports, mails or ships or causes to be physically
transported, mailed or shipped (or attempts to transport or
cause to be transported), currency or other monetary
instruments in an aggregate amount exceeding $10,000 on any
occasion from the United States to any place outside the
United States, or into the United States from any place
outside the United States, to file with the Commissioner of
Customs Customs Form 4790. A copy is attached as Exhibit III.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
D.
•
•
•
1.
a penalty of $500 may be imposed for negligent violations
of the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act.
the civil and criminal money penalties have been
increased.
12 U.S.C. 1818 was amended to require each Federal
banking agency to prescribe regulations requiring insured
banks to establish Bank Secrecy Act Compliance programs.
The regulations were published January 27, 1987 in the
Federal Register beginning at p. 2858 and require a
written compliance program to be approved ~ the board
of directors, noted in the minutes and actually be
in place by April 27, 1987. The program shall, at a
minimum:
(a) provide for internal controls to assure compliance
(b) provide for independent testing of compliance by bank
personnel or an outside party.
(c) designate an individual responsible for monitoring
and coordinating day-to-day compliance
(d) provide for training
Any person who receives in the U. S. monetary
instruments in an aggregate amount exceeding $5,000
which have somehow been transported to such person from
any place outside of the United States must also file
Form 4790.
r
r
r
r
•
•
Although the regulation states that this category
does not have to be reported if a report has been
filed by someone else, it would be difficult as a
practical Inatter to determine whether a report has
been filed, and therefore a bank should simply file
Form 4790 whenever receipt of such monetary
instruments occurs.
Also, if someone has brought monetary instruments
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3.
into the country and then given them to the bank or
deposited them in the bank, and the bank has
knowledge that the monetary instruments are from any
place outside the U.S., a Form 4790 should be filed.
A transfer of funds through normal banking procedures
which does not involve the physical transportation of
currency or monetary instruments is not required to be
reported by this section. In addition, banks need not
report currency or other monetary instruments mailed or
shipped through the postal service or by common carrier.
"Monetary instruments" are defined as coin or currency
of the U. S. or of any other country, travelers' checks,
money orders, investment securities, and negotiable
instruments (like checks or notes) that are in bearer
form or in a form that allows ownership to pass upon
delivery. For example, a check or travelers' check or
money order that is signed but has a blank named payee is
a monetary instrument. However if such checks or money
orders are payable to the order of a particular person,
and have not been endorsed or have a restrictive
endorsement, such as "for deposit only," they are not a
monetary instrument.
Ij
-
Ij
,
-
J
E. FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS 31 C.F.R. 103.24
Anyone having an interest in or signature authority for a
bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign ~
country must report this fact to the Treasury Department each
year on a form prescribed by the Treasury.
F. TRANSACTIONS REQUIRING BOTH FORMS 4789 AND 4790
If the requirements for both kinds of reports are met, both
reports should be filed. ~
G. FILING OF FORM 4790
Reports for transactions involving shipment into and out of
the United States must be filed on or before the date of entry
or departure, mailing or shipping. 31 C.F.R. 103.26 (b) In
the case of persons receiving currency or monetary instruments, ~
the reports must be filed within thirty days after receipt.
31 C.F.R. 103.26 (c)
H • PENALTIES
There are civil and criminal penalties for willful violation
of any requirements of the regulation. The Justice
Department of the United States has obtained several
convictions of individual officers and banks under the
provisions of this regulation. -
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OMS No. 1545-0183
Expires: 10-31·88
If amenclecl report. '"
in~and Clleck 0
htre. . . . ~
........ ~ 0
•0 CCjMoney market redeemed
u0 From wire trlnsf1Ir
•0 Shipment abroICl
'0 Other cuI'l out (specify) ••••••••••
11 Country (if not U.S.)
Z2 OCCuPlltion.ll'Ofession. or busi~
2. Country (if not U.S.)
a Exchanp made 0 for or 0 from U.S. currency
Id Total amount of each foreiIn currency (in U.S... dollars). .• $
30 CASHOUT:
c 0 CMck cashed
T 0 Security redeemed
• 0 Withd.....1
110 ZIP code
Exhibit I
Financial Institution where curren transaction took
2 Wt mime I 3 First mime 4 Middle init~1 I 5~I iUrity num~ber1 If multiple individuals involved. see instructions and check here. . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ....•.
I Address (number and street) 7 OCcupation, profession, or business
• City I I State
• Dmwer of check Drawee bank and MICR number
35 If a check or wire transfer was involved in this transaction. pluM fumish the followi"l information (see instructionS):
a If more than one check or wire nnsfer is involved, see instructions and check here . . . .
b Cate of check or wire nnsf1lr c Amount of check or wire transfer (in U.S. d~
dollars)
$
Customer's account number(s) affected bv transaction
II a Name ofOlpltizltion Ib Check if: (1)0 broker/dealer in securitl•• or 20 Employer identification number
(2)0 f1Mncial institUtion (see instNctiorll
14 If multiple individuals or orpniZltions are inYOlYed. see instructions and check here . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21 Address (number and strHt)
Deity
b 0 Savinp and loan association cD Credit union d 0 Security broIcer/dealer e 0 Other
37 Ham. of financial iMtitution 31 Employer identification number
Libertv National 'R ... n1l' ...n~ '1'........ - 61 ~ 0259676
31 Address (number and street) 40~I security number
41 City 42 State 143 ZlPcode 44 MICR number
0830 0013 7
45 Siptur. (pntparer) f4t Title 47 Date
511" ~H.... 41 Type or print preparer's mime 14' ~"I~I (sipature) !OCate
27 Savinp • •••••••••••••••••••••••• T 0 Securities.•••••••••••••••••••••••• "0 CD/MOney manc.t ~ ••••••••••••••••••••••••
c 0 Checki"l • L Loen. 0 OtIw(speclfy).
T of transaction. Check a lcabte boxes to describe transactions
3. Check IpjHicable boll to indicate type of financial institution ••••••J .
12 Method used to verify identity: a Describe ~
b Issued by • ···························c·Numbe;··.·················· .
13 Ruson items 2·12 are not completed: a 0 Armored car service (enter name) ~
b 0 Mail deposit/shipment c Niatrt deposit or ATM transaction d" •M~itipie'traniKtions'(He',nst;uCtici~i)""""'".
Individual or or anizatlon for whom this transaction was com
15 Individual's last mime /1. First name 17 Middle init~1 1. Soc~1 security number
34 If other than U.S. currency is ilMlMd. pi-. fumish the foItowinc information:
It CurrMCY Mme Ic Country
2. 0 Currency ac:hanp (cunency tor currency)
2t CASH IN: ' 0 CD/Money market purchaMd
D 0 Deposit "0 For wire nnsf1lr
'0 Security purchased A 0 Ree.ipt tram abroad
, 0 Check purchased II 0 Other cah in (specify) •••••••••••
31 Total amount of currencytranuction (in U.S. 3Z Amount in Item 31 in $100 bills or hiItW 33 Dntoftrlnuctlon (rnonttl. day, and year)
doIlats). .• $ $
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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Form 4789 Currency Transaction Report
r
(Rev. o.c.mllet 1985) ~ File a separate report for uch transaction. ~ PI.... type or print.
. 0epIrtrnent of tile Trusury ~ For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see pap 3-
Intlmll RlVwaue SeMce (ComDlete ,/1 'DDlicable 118m-See instructions)
Identity of Individual who conducted this transaction with the financial Institution
r
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r
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Farm 4789 (RIY. 12·85)
• Add,.. (number Ind street)
• City 'State 10 ZIP code
I Social HCUrity number
7 Occupation. profession. or businas
11 Country (If not U.S.)
PI.. 2
12 Method used to verify identity:
.. Issued by ~
• Deleribe ~
I3 FIrst name
...•.......................•..c-Nu,;,-.;;;_·.· e •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 011 •• Q •••
7 Occupation. profession, or businlll
• City \ 'State 110 ZIP code
11 Country (Ifonot U.S.)
12 Method used to verify identity:
.. Issued by ~
• DeIc:tlbe ~
······························c·Nu.,;i~··~············· .
.J
Contlnued-ComDletelf box 14 on D.ae III cheeked
l' a Name of orpnizltion I' Check If: (1)0 brolutrldealet in sacurit... or ZO Emplayer identlflc:atlon number
I (2)0 financial instttutlon (see II'IItnIctIons
21 Address (number and street) 22 Occupation. profession, or business
I
.J
23 City \24 smte 125 ZIP code 21 Country (If not U.S.)
15 Individual's lat name
l' . Name of orpniZlltion
\1. FIrst name 17 Middle initlaf II Social jUrity numrer
I,Check If: (1)0 bnlker/dee.... in securities. or ZO Empl~ identifICation number(2)0 flnandll institution (seelnstnlctlons' :
22 Occupation, profession. or business .J
23 City \24 State 125 Z1Pcode 21 Country (if not U.S,)
Contlnued-ComDlete If box 35. on Dale 1 II checked
35 .. Date of check or wire trensfer c Amount of check or wire trensfer (In U.S. ..~
dol...)
$
• ere,.. of check
35 .. Oate of check or wire transfer
I f 0,..... blink and MICR number
c Amount of chICk or wire t,..nsf. (in U.S. " Payee
doliIt'S)
S
I f
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0,..... blink and MICR number
;
Ii
.,j
r
r
r
r
r
Exhibit II
EXEMPTION FOR REPORTING
CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS OVER $10,000
Account Number Tax Identification Number
Name and Address Type of Business
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
This exemption covers:
( ) Deposits
( ) Withdrawals
( ) Deposits & Withdrawals
Maximum Exempt
Transaction
Deposit
$-----------
Deposit-Reason for Exemption
( ) Deposits ( ) Withdrawals for
the following specific purpose
Maximum Exempt
Transaction
Withdrawal
$-----------
Withdrawal-Reason for Exemption
The information contained above is true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and belief. I understand that this information will
be read and relied upon by the Government.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
(customer signature)
·Date
Reviewed by:
Compliance Officer
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(Title and Position)
Exemption Requested By (Title)
Branch or Department
Exhibit III
Quto",. IJ. Only
!
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ea. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Form~:.o[oVedg,in . UNITID STATaS CUSTOMS SIRVlca Till' form II to De flleO wit" t,.-,~ REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL UnltedState,Cu,tom, Servlc IcO;~~:;'53111 31 CFR 103.2:1 and 103.25 TRANSPORTATION OF CURRENCY PrlftC1 Act Notification ....
PI... T , Prln OR MONETARY INSTRUMENTS on rllYefM
':. FOR INDIVIDUAL DEPARTING FROM OR ENTERING THE UNITED STATES i
1. NAME/1M' or '.".Il~. ,,,,,,0tt4 m"'''} 2. IDENTI~INGNO. (SH llUmu:tlolU) 3.DATC OF 81RTH (Mo./DtotIy.,J
4. PERMANENT ADDRESS IN UNITED STATES OR A8ROAD
I.ADDR
i
..J
S. u.s. VISA DATE 9. PLACE UNITED STATES V ISA WAS ISSUED 10. IMMIGRATION ALIEN NO.(I' OIly)
11. CURRENCY OR MONETARY INSTRUMENT WAS: (Com"",. llA or UB}
A.EXPORTED 8. IMPORTED
"Deouted From: (Clay III U.S.) ArrlveO At. (Forw"n City/Country} From: (Po,.."" Clay/Country) At: (Clay III U.s.) J
n
.J
••• • FQR PERSOfll SHIPPING. MAILING OR RECEIV.ING CURRENCY OR MONETARY INSTRUMENTS ;
12. NAME (lMt or 'amlly, ,,,., 0114 mUU,.) 13. IDENTIFYING NO. (SH m-truc:tIoq 14. DATEOF8IRTH(Mo.IDl&In-J ~.
I I .J
15. PERMANENT ADDRESS IN UNITED STATES OR A8ROAD 11. OF WHAT COUNTRY ARE
YOU A CITIZEN/SU8JECT? I
J
17. ADDRESS WHILE IN THE UNITED STATES lL PASSPORT NO.. COUNTRY
j
19. U.s. VISA DATE 20. PLACE UNITED STATES VISA WAS ISSUED 21. IMMIGRATION ALIEN NO.(/foro)
22. CURRENCY OR 23. CURRENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ~4. IF THE CURRENCY OR MONETARY INSTRUMEN1J
MONETARY OR MONETARY WAS MAILED. SHIPPED. OR TRANSPORTED COM.
INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENTS PLETE 8LOCKS A AND e.
DATE SHIPPED A. Met"oe of 5" loment (Auto. U.S.IIGl, hblle CGI"ler, .tc.}
osnloo" JToDATE RECEIVED 8. Nlrne of TransoorterICarrl., •
o ReceivedFrom
• • • CURRENCY AND MONETARY INSTRUMENT INFORMATION (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE) To be 'completed bY everyone Ii
25. TYPE AND AMOUNT OF CURRENCY/MONETARY INSTRUMENTS Value In U.s. 00111,. 21. IF OTHER THAN U.s.CU~
RENCY IS INVOLVED. P\.EAS
Coin, •••••••••••••••___.........................._..................................... 0 A. ~ $ ~OMPLETE BLOCKS A AND B.(Slflf SPBCIA£ INSTRUCTIONSJ
~
DB.
A. CurrencY Name ~,CurrencY ........_••__..__........___•••___..........__••••_••_••_ ~ I,
Ot"., In'truments (Specify Ty".}~ .-.................................. 0 C. ~ 8. Country t
1::
(AM Una A. B on.- C} .--••---.............................. A:;~~T~$ ....I •
• • • GENERAL· TO BE' COMPl.ETED BY Al.l. TRAVEl.ERS. SHIPPERS AND RECIPIENTS l
rI• ..... YOU ACTING AS AN AGENT. ATTORNEY OR IN CAPACITY FOR ANYONE IN THIS
CURRENCY OR MONETARY INSTRUMENT ACTIVITY? (If ..y .... com",.t. A. B alld C) DYe,
PERSON IN
WHOSE •••
HA"" YOU
Aft. ACTING
A.NAme B. Aeldr... C. Bulin... activity occuoatlon or
orofelllon
UnCS., oenaltle, of O.,jury. I e1eclare tnat I nave examlnlO tIlls r.port. and to t"e De. of my knoWI__ AncllMllef It I' true, COrrect al14 complet..
(1I."lace.,RS Porm 41110 UlIINII .. oo.o.,.} Customs Form 4790
"
(120384:11
..Ii
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r GENIRAL INITRUcnONS•. ThIe ,.,.,. II NqUhd "" Tf'HIUfY o.p 131 Code fIA ,..,.. Idone 1.
WI-. - r.ch,... who """....., meila, eo be~~ meiIed.~.f'lCelwcI~ .ottMrmon••
r.
.. 1IIlI1n 1ft.....,... - ....dIng 110.000on enyone fNlft the Untted StICee eo eny.....outIIde the United sc.t...._ .... United.....fNlft 1ft
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A TItAN..11I 0' PUNDI TM"OUGH NOftMM. aANlCJNQ PftOCIDUIIU WHICH DOli NOr INVOLVI TMI PHY8tCAL TRAN..-GIITAnoN 0' CUMINCY or
MONErAIIY INaTIIUMINn II NOr "IQUtRID TO lllIlPOIITIO.
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by (8).~ eftGeoed...bualM..1nthe~ofcumMY. fIICIMtMY,"""",antlend__~I"lMtMNwithI'Mpecttothe~ofClUlNftCY.odM
I\'lOMt8IY lMtrutnantl oveItend IletwMn ....bIlaltad office. of ben.. or ............... In ...1ritIea end toNign ,.....
WHIN AND WHIIII TO PlU:
r·. A. It....... - &ell ,.,.. who receiwa cumMY 01otIter-r.r inatIunMntlI lit.. fli. Fomt4790. wltHn 30daya aft.,Ncelpt. with "'. amom. ofIIc:.,1n cit... It .npoIt of antIy 01 depaltln 01 by mail wi'" "'. CommIeIioMt of CuatOma. AttemIon: CulNncyT~donR.potta, WMtllngton. o.c. 20221-
........or M.....-If....cumMY 01 _.,monetary lnatNrnentdoe. not accompeny the JMNOft ....erinG 01 dapertlng the Ullhed Statea. Form 4790 mey be flied by IN
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M eddIdoNJ repoIt of • p..ucut., tnn8poltaClon.INilinGo or .ltiooina 01CUlNftCY 01"'. monlt.8ry 1n1tlUm...... 1e not requftd If.cornoIlte and '"""lui rapolt lIM....ady be.'
tiled. Howfter. no petIOft o"'arwia. rwquIred to fiI....pot1"'-'l·be ....... from liability far feUure to do aolf.ln tKc. • COftlIIIetalftd tNdIfuI ,...ort h..not IlftII tiled. Porm
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.., ~ '03.47; t03. 103 the , ..
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AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE NINE
OF THE UNIroRM COMME~CIAL CODE
and
THE FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985
John T. McGarvey
Morgan and Pottinger
Louisville, Kentucky
Section 11
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BACKGROUND OF SENATE BILL 28:
The 1977 amendments to Article 8 are almost as s'ubstantial
as the changes in Article 9. 't'he changE¥s primarily relate to the
use of uncertificated ~e~urities and will nbt be covered in this
seminar.
The 1966 amendments were essentially cle~n-up amendments
scattered throughout the Code. The 1966 amendments have been
adopted in their entirety with the exception of additional
alternative sections provided for Article 2 Section 318 which
relates to seller's watranties in relation 1:I.o persons not in
privity with the seller.
Kentucky was one of the first states in the natiop to adopt
the Uniform Commercial Code. The first enactment of the Code in
Kentucky was in ~958. Kentucky adopted the Code at s~ch an early
stage that in 1962 and 1964 it adopted charlges tihioh had been
made in the official text before the Code becam~ 'generally
accepted. With rare exception the Uniform Commercial Code in
Kentucky has remained unchanged ai/nee 1964. II'hereJ:.l.ave been
various atte~pts at ehacting portions of the 1912 amen~~ents all
,
, ~
KENTUC~Y AM~NDMENTS TO ARTICLE NIN~
OF RE UNiFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. SENATE
B LL2B OF THE 1986 LEGISLATURE
SCOPE:
Although Senate Bill 28 has been and will continue to be
referred to as t~ addption of the 1972 amendments to the Uniform
Commercial Code the scope of the Bill is much brOader. In
addition to the 1972 amendments, th~ 1966 and· 1977 amendments
promulgated by the American Law Ihstitute and the National
Conference of Conunissioners on Uniform State Laww~re also
adopted by the Bill. In the enactment of the i972 amendments
relating to Article 9 (KitS 355.9) the Bill additionally made
substantial changeS in the perfection of security interests in
motor vehicles .under Chapters 186 and l86A of Itentucky's stat-
utes. I
The 1972 amendments constitute an overhaul but not a radical
modification of the original Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Article 9 replaced the law of chattel mortcjages in the
various states and was originally the most imaginative and
innovative articles of the Code. The fact that Article 9 started
from the beginning rather than adaptin9 various principles of
existing law resulted in some degree of donfusion conc~rning the
meaning of its various provisions and the discovery·:,that some
subjects were left untreated. '1'he 1972 amendments attempt to
rectify both of these prOblems in Article 9 and additionally make
changes in Articles I, 2 and 5 as those articles relate to
Article 9.
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of which have met failure. The primary changes in Article 9
since 1964 have been the adoption of various non-Uniform pro-
visions primarily relating to the protection of the sellers of
particular kinds of goods. (KRS 355.9-307)
In 1984 Kentucky remained one of six states which had not
adopted the 1972 amendments. (Louisiana has never adopted the
Code in its entirety.) Two of Kentucky's neighbors, Indiana and
Tennessee, were among states which had not adopted the 1972
amendments but were in the process of enacting them. The Legis-
lative Research Commission created the Special Study Commission
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Senator David Karem of
Louisville was named as Chairman and members included Representa-
tive Thomas M. Jones, Representative Ernesto Scorsone; attorneys
John T. McGarvey, Francis MelJ.on, Jr., M. Brooks Senn, and Paul
J. Vesper; and Mack J. Morgan, President of the Kentucky Retail
Federation, Inc. The LRC assigned staff members Gregory
Karembellas, Robert S. Sherman and Robert Fallon to the project.
Professors Harold R. Weinberg of the University of Kentucky
College of Law and David Leibson of the University of Louisville
School of Law became ex officio members of the Commission and
provided substantial drafting and scholarly assistance.
Various persons and groups who were thought to have an
interest in the field of commercial law were placed on notice of
the creation of the Commission and its various meetings. Rep-
resentatives of eighteen groups provided input at one or more
meetings of the Commission. The resulting Bill, particularly
where it deviates from the language of the uniform statute,
reflects input received from the individuals whd~testified before
the Committee. A special subcommittee was set up to handle
matters relating to the perfection of security interests in motor
vehicles. Substantial input and testimony on motor vehicle liens
was received from the Kentucky County Clerk's Association and the
Kentucky Automobile Dealers Association.
Strong opposition from the County Clerks resulted in no
attempt to set up a central filing system for security interests
in Kentucky. Meetings with representatives of the County Clerk's
Association during and since the legislature may result in a 1988
Bill to make additional changes in Part 4 of Article 9 'relating
to the filing and perfection of liens and other changes which may
be mandated by the federal enactment of the Food Security Act of
1985.
THE AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 9:
1-201, 2-107, and 5-116. Changes were enacted in each of
these articles and subsections to reflect the changes made in
Article 9. These changes primarily ,relate to the charac-
terization of minerals (including oil and gas), timber, and
contract rights as they r~late to commercial transactions.
References to "contract rights" often found in security instru-
ments in Kentucky, are being deleted throughout the Code. The
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intent of the amendment is that all areas previously covered by
the term "contract rights" be merged into the term lIaccounts."
9-103. Substantial changes were made in this section to
help clear up questions of where the perfection of a security
interest must take place. The original section was drawn before
it was known how widely the Uniform Commercial Code would be
accepted and concentrated on conflict of laws. The latter
question is now primarily handled by Article 1, Section 105 and
Article 9, Section 102. The new text of 9-103 provides that
questions of perfection are now governed by law of the jurisdic-
tion where the collateral is located when a conflicting claim
comes into existence. The only exceptions to this rule relate to
purchase money security interests, mobile goods, and collateral
subject to a title statute. The law of the state in which a
debtor I s chief executive office is located will determine per-
fection on accounts.
9-104. This subsection defines the scope of Article 9
coverage. Security interests created by government debtors are
now specifically excluded from coverage as are transfers of a
single account in satisfaction of a pre-existing indebtedness.
The exclusion of railway equipment trusts has been deleted thus
adding that mode of financing to the scope of Article 9 as well
as rights represented by a judgment taken on a right to payment
which was collateral.
9-105. The definition section of Article 9 has been expand-
ed through additions to prior definitions and the addition of
several new definitions. New definitions include: Transmitting
Utility, Deposit Account, Pursuant to Commitment, Encumbrance,
and Mortgage. Additions have been made to the scope of existing
definitions including warehouse type receipts to the term "Docu-
ment" and minerals (including oil and gas) before extraction and
standing timber to be cut to the term "Goods."
9-106. References to "contract right" have been removed
from this definition section. Reference to "money" is deleted
from the definition of general intangibles. The latter change
avoids the possibility that a security interest in money may be
perfected by filing.
9-114. An entirely new section is added to Article 9
recognizing the use of consignment sales as a financing vehicle.
In order to protect his ownership of consigned goods a consignor
must file a financing statement prior to the time the goods come
to rest on the premises of the consignee, give written notifica-
tion to the holders of conflicting inventory security interests,
(much like a purchase money lien holder under 9-312), state in
the notice that the transaction is a consignment and describe the
goods involved by item or type, and made sure that the holders of
other interests have received a notification within five years
before the consignee origi~ally receives possession of the
consigned goods and at five year interv~ls thereafter.
H - 3
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9-203. Additions to this section add requirements to the
formal requisites of a security agreement. The elements of
agreement, value, and rights in collateral are combined with the
requirement of a written agreement. A new section is added to
ma.ke it clear that a security agreement need not refer to pro-
ceeds in order to cover proceeds.
9-204. Kentucky deviated from the uniform language due to
its concern for agriculture and the protection of the farmer.
Kentucky law provides that no security interest attaches to crops
under an after acquired property clause which become crops more
than one year after the security interest is executed (see
9-402) •
9-301. There is a small but important change in the objec-
tive versus subjective test imposed by the Code. Paragraph l(b)
has been amended to eliminate the element of knowledge in the
conditions under which a lien creditor may defeat an unperfected
security interest. Knowledg~ of the security interest will no
longer subordinate the lien creditor to the unfiled security
interest. A new Subsection 4 deals with the question· of the
extent to which a.dvances made under a perfected security interest
after the rights of a lien creditor have attached to the collat-
eral will cOme ahead of the position of the lien creditor. The
new section must be read in conjunction with 9-307(3) and
9-312 (7) • The priority of the security interest for future
advances over the judgment lien is absolute for forty-five days
without regard to any knowledge of the secured party that the
judgment lien exists.
9-302. The provision exempting purchase money security
interests in farm equipment having a purchase price of less than
$500.00 has been eliminated. A new exemption takes its place at
Paragraph l(c) which exempts security interests created by
assignments of beneficial interests in trusts and estates from
the filing rules.
9-304. A change in Subsection I corrects an inadvertent
omission from the former official text and makes it clear that a
security interest in money cannot be perfected by filing. A
provision has been added to Subsection 5 making it clear that the
twenty-one day periOd referred to therein deals only with per-
fection but that there must be compliance with the notice pro-
visions of 9"'312 (3) in order to achieve priority over earlier
inventory financers.
9-306. A new second sentence of Subsection 1 is intended to
overrule various cases to the effect that proceeds of insurance
on collateral are not proceeds of collateral. The ambiguity
concerniI\9' insurance proceeds has been clarified in favor of an
automatic right to proceeds. The requirement of claiming pro-
ceeds in a financing statement has been eliminated. A filed
claim for the. original collateral. is treated as constituting a
filing as to proceeds.
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9-307. All of the various non-unoiform provJ.sJ.ons of the
existing Kentucky law which provide protection to such entities
as stockyards, tobacco warehouses, thoroughbred auctions, etc.,
were left unscathed. The only changes to this section are
conforming changes necessary due to amendments in other sections
of the Code. [See section on Federal Food Security Act at the
end of this material.]
9-308. The primary changes are for clarity purposes. The
section provides that the holder of a negotiable instrument who
may not qualify as a holder-in-due-course may nevertheless
qualify for the protections of this section.
9-312. This is the primary conflict resolution section of
Article 9. The principal changes begin in Subsection 3 and
attempt to answer unresolved questions under the former Code.
Subsection 3 relates to the perfection of purchase money security
interests often used in floor plan financing of wholesale and
retail businesses. The amendments provide that notice to the
holder of a conflicting security interest must be given within
five years of the time the debtor receives possession of the
goods where the PMSI is claimed.
Another issue answered by the amendments concerns the
conflicting claims of the inventory financer and the creditor
holding a security interest in the debtor's accounts. The new
Code rules that a prior right to inventory does not confer a
prior right to any proceeds except identifiable cash proceeds
received on or before the delivery of the inventory and without
the intervention of an account.
A new Subsection 5 of 9-312 ranks conflicting security
interests by their priority in time dating back to the respective
times when without interruption the security interests where
either perfected or were the subject of appropriate filings.
9-312(6) has been replaced with new language to make it
clear that (subject to some limitations) the time of filing or
perfection as to original collateral is the time of filing or
perfection as to proceeds.
9-313. The original enactment of this section left numerous
questions in its application to construction mortgages and in the
sections failure to clearly state that the filing of fixture
security interests was to be in the real estate records where
they could by found by a standard real estate records search.
The 1972 amendments were drafted to meet these criticisms and to
make a substantial shift in the law in favor of the construction
mortgages. A fixture filing in Kentucky is. to be made "in the
office where a mortgage on real estate would be filed or recorded
"...
9-401. Subsection 1 has been rewritten to provide that when
collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like or
H - 5
accounts, or when the financing statement is filed as a fixture
filing and the collateral is goods which are or are to become
fixtures that the proper place to file is in the office where a
mortgage on the real estate would be filed or recorded.
The remainder of the amendments to 9-401 are designed
to provide direction on where to file as to individuals and as to
various types of business entities from which security interest
might be obtained.
The Commission attempted to clear up the current
controversy in Kentucky on where to file against a corporation.
There is federal case law to the affect that a filing should be
made in the county where a corporation's resident agent is
located [see National Cash Register Co. v. K.W.C., Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 82 (E.D.Ky. 1977).L.• The federal decision is not binding on
the state courts and prudent practitioners, in situations where
the principal place of business and the registered agent are in
separate counties, h.ave usua.l1M filed in both counties. Central
filing was politically unacceptable as to corporations and in
order to provide clarity and certainty it will be a matter of
Kentucky law that "a corporation organized under KRS 271(A), 273
or 274 shall be deemed to be a resident of the county in which
its registered office is located, as set forth in its most recent
corporate filing by the Secretary of State which officially
designates its current registered office."
9-402. The requirements that a financing statement be
signed by a creditor and state whether or not it secured an
indebtedness of $200.00 or more have both been eliminated. These
requirements frequently caused problems for Kentucky creditors
and their counsel.
Non-standard language has been adopted concerning
financing statements on crops. A financing statement on crops
"shall not describe more than one production season." A presump-
tion is built into the statute that if a production season is not
described the financing statement shall be deemed to describe
crops produced in the production season which ends within twelve
months after the filing date of the financing statement. The
non-standard language of 9-402 places a substantial burden on
creditors engaged in agricultural financing and was enacted
following strong input to the Commission from farmers and their
representative groups.
ConformingchanC:Jes have also been made in 9-402 to
respond to complaints that the original version failed in several
ways to tie fixture fi1inqstOi:herea1estate search system.
It must be remembered that the d.ebtor' s signature is
still required on a financipg sta.tement. Only the requirement as
to the signature (not other identification information) of the
creditor has been deleted~
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9-403. Changes have been made in Subsection 2 to make every
financing statement (except those described by Subsection 6)
effective for a full five years. A new Subsection 6 provides
that when a real estate mortgage is effective as a fixture filing
(meets all the other requirements of 9-402) it remains effective
as a fixture filing until the mortgage is-released or terminated.
When a financing statement covers timber to be cut or
minerals (including gas or oil), or is a fixture filing , it
should be indexed under the names of both the debtor and any
owner of the real estate on which the collateral is located.
Subsection 7 should be closely examined in its entirety at the
time of the recording of any financing statement covering fix-
tures or other property related to the real estate.
9-404. Additions tQSubsection 1 of the statute require the
filing of ter.mination statements in the case of consumer goods
even without a. demand by the consumer. If a termination state-
ment is not filed within 15 days after a secured transaction is
terminated the creditor shall be liable to the debtor for $25.00
and any actual loss proved by the debtor. Actual loss could
conceivably be interpreted to mean damage to credit reputation
and attorney's fees.
The scope of the change is not as great as it first
appears because filing is not required for purchase money securi-
ty interest in consumer goods, except in the case of motor
vehicles, and perfection of security interests in most motor
vehicles is governed by certificate of title laws and not by the
provisions of Article 9.
9-407. This section requires a filing officer (County Clerk
or Secretary of State) to issue his certificate as to whether or
not a financing statement is on file in his or her office as to a
certain debtor and particular collateral. This was an optional
provision in the original Code which has now been adopted in
Kentucky. A specific exemption is provided to the filing officer
and employees exempting them from any personal liability which
may arise due to information furnished on the certificate. The
official form for requesting a filing officer report is the
UCC-ll.
9-408. At the time of the enactment of the original UCC
leasing was a little known means of acquiring rights in personal
property. As leasing has become more important the creditor has
been faced with the problem of filing a financing statement for
protection but running the risk of having the lease transaction
deemed a disguised installment sale and covered entirely by
Article 9. 9-408 allows protective filing but specifically
provides that the filing shall of itself not be a factor in
determining whether or not the lease is intended as security.
The same provisions apply to protective filings for consignments.
If for any reason it is determined that the consignment or lease
transaction is a disguised secured transaction the security
H - 7
interest is deemed to be protected by a filing under this sec-
tion. Filing as to true leases is not required but since the
question of whether a lease is a true lease may be a close one
filing is permitted.
9-501 and 9-502. The changes are purely technical and
conforming changes to the other amendments to the Code.
9-504. Under the current Code a repossessing creditor must
not only provide a notice of sale to the debtor but to every
other person who had duly filed a financing statement indexed in
the name of the debtor and who still claimed a security interest
in the collateral and additionally to any other person known by
the secured party to have an interest in the collateral. Under
the 1972 amendments a notice of sale must only be sent to the
debtor and such persons as have notified the secured party in
writing of their claim of an interest in the collateral prior to
the notification of sale sent to the debtor. The model form of
the 1972 amendments allows any debtor to waive a notice of sale
after default. Non-standard language was adopted by Kentucky
which allows a waiver of notice of sale except in the case of
consumer goods.
9-505. The remedy of strict foreclosure has been made much
more valuable to the creditor. Changes in this section have
shortened the notice period to the debtor from thirty to twenty-
one days and begin the notice period on the date the notice is
sent as opposed to the date notice is received. New language in
the section also recognizes a written post-default waiver by a
debtor of rights to notice under this section. The creditor is
also relieved of notifying other claimants to the collateral
unless the creditor has been put on written notice of a claim of
an interest in the collateral.
TRANSITION:
All of the new amendments· become effective July 1, 1987.
Any financing statement or continuation statement filed prior to
July 1, 1987, and which has not lapsed prior to that date shall
remain effective for the full period as provided in the old Code
but not less than five years. A security interest in new collat-
eral acquired by a debtor after July 1, 1987, will only be
effective if the financing statement, and its continuation
statements, are filed in the office deemed appropriate under the
new Code.
Any financing statement or continuation filed prior to July
1, 1987, may be continued by a continuation statement as permit-
ted by the new Code except that if the new Code requires a filing
in an office where there is no previous financing statement a new
financing statement must be filed in that office. This provision
will more than likely relate to timber, minerals, fixtures, etc.
If the record of a mortgage of real estate would have been
effective as a fixture filing if the new Code had been effective
H - 8
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on the date of the recording of the mortgage the mortgage shall
be deemed effective as a fixture filing under Subsection 6 of
9-402 as of July 1, 1987. If a security interest was perfected
prior to July 1, 1987, without filing or recording, and the new
Code requires filing a recording, the perfection and priority
rights of the security interest continues for three years after
July 1, 1987. This three year provision also applies to security
interests perfected under a law other than Article 9 which
require no further filing.
MOTOR VEHICLE LIENS:
The Kentucky title law (KRS Chapter 186A) established the
Certificate of Title as the sole means of determining the priori-
ty of liens on motor vehicles. Perfection on the title was not
in lieu of perfection under the Code but in addition to the
filing of a financing statement. The original enactment of the
title law even referred to the financing statement. Kentucky
creditors were thus faced with a dual perfection system. Priori-
ty was determined by the order of recording on the title but
perfection also requir~d a UCC filing.
The new version of KRS 355.9-302 specifically provides that
perfection on a motor vehicle must be by notation on the title
and the filing of a financing statement will not be effective. A
single but important exception is the perfection of a lien on
motor vehicles held as "inventory."
Other than perfection of the lien, Article 9 will still
apply to all aspects of secured transactions involving motor
vehicles.
The County Clerk's Association requested that the new
statute provide them with a document to be filed in their office
so that the local filing officer would have proof of why a lien
had been placed on a motor vehi9~~.•.....• Because. perfection was no
longer necessary under Article 9 it was decided that a financing
statement would be inappropriate. The Department of Transporta-
tion is to promulgate a new form to be used when recording a lien
on a motor vehicle which will be denominated as a Motor Vehicle
Lien Statement.
A secured party seeking a lien on a motor vehicle must
tender the Motor Vehicle Lien Statement, an application for first
title, or existing title, and the appropriate fees in order to
have a lien recorded. The lien should be recorded in the county
of the residence of the debtor , or for non-residents, in the
county of principal operation of the vehicle.
Where a security interest is taken in vehicles already
titled it should be presented within fifteen (15) days of the
execution of the security agreement or the secured party will be
required to pay a $2.00 penalty.
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FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985:
This law became effective on December 24, 1986, and is
entitled "Protection for Purchasers of Farm Products." The
federal statute pre-empts the Uniform Commercial Code and all
other state law relating to the enforcement of security interests
against the purchasers of farm products. Article 9, Section 307
of the UCC has always protected buyers in the ordinary course of
business of goods from person who ordinarily sell the type of
goods purchased by the buyer. The UCC created a "farm products"
exception to this rule. In essence the federal law extends 9-307
type protection to all purchasers of farm products.
The effect of the Federal Legislation in Kentucky is not as
dire as it is in some states in that Kentucky has attempted
through various amendments to 9-307 to protect warehouses,
stockyards, horse auctions, etc. The Act, titled "Protection for
Purchasers of Farm Products," became effective December 24, 1986.
It sets up two systems for creditors to attempt to enforce
security interests in farm products. The creditor must notify
the buyer of the farm product, commission merchant, or selling
agent of the existence of the security interest prior to the date
of sale or the state where the farm products are grown or pro-
duced must have set up a central filing system for liens against
farm products.
There is no form of central filing in Kentucky (except
Secretary of State filings for liens against corporations which
have no principal place of business in Kentucky). The discussion
of any form of central filing in the most recent legislation was
cut-off by the County Clerks. The Clerk's Association has now
indicated that they are willing to discuss legislation for the
1988 legislature which might establish a central file in Frank-
fort so long as the filing was made through the local filing
system.
In the interim Kentuckycreditqrl:5 mUl:51: comply with the
pre-notification provisions of the Federai.Act if they are going
to preserve their perfected security interest in farm products.
Compliance requires that written notice of the security interest
be received by the buyer, commission merchant, or selling agent
within one year prior to the date of sale. If the buyer or
seller is put on notice of the lien but fails to make proper
payment arrangements the security interest is not effected and
the secured party may proceed against the buyer, commission
merchant or selling agent.
The federal law provides that receipt shall be determined as
a matter of state law. KRS 355.1-201 (26) provides "a person
'receives' a notice or notification when (a) it comes to his
attention; or (b) it is duly delivered at the place of business
through which the contract was made or at any other place held
out by him as the place for receipt of such communications." If
a buyer, commission merchant, or agent rejects a certified mail
H - 10
~,
J
j
J
j
'(
J
J
J
J
fj
J
J
j
J
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
notice the envelope should provide proof of receipt at the place
of business.
The notice itself must contain: (1) the name and address of
the secured party; (2) the name and address of ~he person indebt-
ed to the secured party; (3) the social security number of the
debtor or, in the case of a debtor doing business other than as
an individual, the Taxpayer Identification Number of such debtor;
(4) a description of the farm product subject to the security
interest created by the debtor including the amount of such
products, where applicable, crop year, county, and a reasonable
description of the property. I f the secured party wishes to
impose any particular payment terms or obligation on the entity
notified they must be so stated in the notice.
A metes and bounds description of real estate should not be
necessary. Any description which reasonably identifies the real
estate should suffice. See Bank of Danville v. Farmers National
Bank of Danville, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 160 (1980). A material change
in the description of collateral requires resending the notice
within three (3) months of the change. The federal statute
forces creditors to guess as to what constitutes a "material
change." Documents between the lender and agricultural borrower
should be modified to require the borrower to provide the lender
with the necessary information for the sending of the required
notice and to update the information as there are changes in the
collateral.
One remedy for the creditor is to use the provision of the
Federal Act which requires a farmer to furnish a list of buyers,
commission merchants and selling agents through which he may
dispose of his farm products. If the products are not sold to or
through a person on the list the farmer is subject to a fine of
$5,000.00 or 15% (whichever is greater) of the proceeds of sale.
The farmer may go outside of the list originally provided to the
creditor if the creditor is notified of the new place of sale
seven days prior to the sale qr the creditqr is paid within ten
days after the sale.
The ability of the farmer to go outside of the list orig-
inally provided the creditor on only seven (7) days notice is an
operational problem for lenders. A procedure should be set up
within all agricultural lenders to quickly respond to such a
notice received from a borrower i.n order that a notice is re-
ceived by the new seller within the seven (7) day period. One
obvious question which is unanswered in the statute is when the
seven (7) day period commences.
It must be remembered that compliance with the Federal Food
Security Act is in addition to the perfection of the lender's
lien under Article 9. Compliance with the Act does no more than
prevent a notified seller from invoking the Act to relieve the
seller of secondary liability. A lender which has complied with
the Federal Food Security Act but has not perfected under Article
H - 11
9 does not havE\' a p~~f,qi~4 ;L~en SUfficient to notify a seller j
much less prevai;L aga~n~t 'ft ,,,~,,t., .\~ Bankruptcy.
JOHN T. McGARVEY
MORGAN & POTTI~G~~
601 West Main Str~~t
Louisville, Kentuq~y
(502) 589-2780
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"FARM BANKRUPTCY"
1987
I. Introduction
A. "The Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986" became available
to farm Ds filing after November 26, 1986.
B. Chp 12 is to make farm reorganizations mo~e achievable, so as
to encourage the continuation of small farms.
C. Until this change, family farmers in need of financial re-
habilitation could proceed under either Chp 11 or Chp 13.
1. Most family farmers had too much debt to qualify under
Chp 13 and were thus limited to relief under Chp 11.
2. Family farmers have found Chp 11 needlessly complicated,
inordinately expensive, and unworkable.
D. This is the third major change to bankruptcy law in the past
eight years:
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
2. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal JUdgeships Act of 1984.
3. The Family Farm Bankruptcy Act of 1986.
E. Most of Chp 12 has been lifted from Chp l3,and the rest has
come from Chp 11.
II. Chp 12 - Overview
A. Advantages to D of Chp 12 over Chp 11.
1. Less adequate protection (such as inte~est and
depreciation) need be given secured Cs during
preconfirmation period. (Fortunately, this period will
be less than 6 months.)
j'
2. It will be far easier to get a plan confirmed.
a. D need not acquire C consent, no C voting rights.
Sl126.
b. D need not comply with absolute-priority requirement.
Sl129(b) (2) (B).
3. There is no creditors' committee to oversee the D's
operation. Sll02-S1l03. (But a Chp 12 Tee is
, automatically appointed to handle receipts and
distributions.)
4. D can "downsize" by selling encumbered collateral even if
C objects.
5. D has the exclusive right to file a plan. S122l.
6. There is a codebtor stay, but only as to consumer debts.
7. No disclosure statement is required, which means:
a. Less work for D's attorney, and
b. All the more reason to take discovery to get all the
facts. See Mapother, Strategic Use of Discovery in
Bankruptcy (Including 260 Questions to ask a Chapter
11 or 12 Debtor).
B. Disadvantages to Ds of Chp 12 over Chp 11.
1. Appointment of Tee.
a. Farmers do not like outsiders snooping.
b. Farmers are often poor managers with few records.
2. Having to pay a commission to Chp 12 Tee increases D's
debts.
3. D must file a plan within 90 days of the petition, and
there is no deadline in Chp 11.
4. Tax benefits in Chp 11 are lessened in Chp 12.
C. Advantages to Ds of ~hp 12 over Chp 13.
1. D is given 90 days, ratheIthan 15 days in Chp 13.
2. There is no requirement that D commence payments within
30 days after plan is filed. S1326.
a. There is no deadline at all inChp 12.
b. It will be important for Cs' counsel to push for
deadlines by local rule or in the confirmation
orders. S1226 contemplates payments will commence
within the preconfirmation period. Cs should insist,
because those who do not ask often dO-not receive.
c. Only payment requirement is that D have sufficiently
stable annual income to fund plan. SI09(f) and
SlOl(17).
3. The restrictive $450,000 debt ceiling is removed.
4. Secured Cs receive less adequate protection during
preconfirmation period.
D. Disadvantages to Ds of Chp 12 over Chp 13.
1. Cs do not lose, as in Chp 13, their right to seek
nondischargeability of their claims based upon fraud.
2. Many courts have a local rule requiring monthly reports.
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III. Eligibility - "only a family farmer with regular annual income
may be a debtor under Chp 12 of this title." Sl09(f) and
SI01(17).
A. "Regular annual income" means income that is sufficiently
stable and regular to enable such family farmer to make
payments under a Chp 12 plan. §101(18).
This definition contrasts with that in Chp 13 of "an
individual with regular income," without reference to
"annual." This should make it clear that Chp 12 is
available to crop farmers as well as dairy farmers.
B. "Family farmer" is defined in SlOl(17) as:
1. An individual engaged in a farming operation whose
aggregate debts do not exceed $1.5 million, and
2. Not less than 80% of whose aggregate, noncontingent,
liquidated debts arise out of a farming operation owned
or operated by the individual.
a. A debt for the principal residence is excluded unless
such debt arises out of a farming operation.
b. Presumably, this would mean that if farm land and
house were purchased and financed as a unitary tract,
the "principal residence" debt would be included in
the 80% computation for Chp 12.
3 •... And: Such individual receives from such farming
operation more than 50% of his gross income for the
taxable year preceding the taxable year in which the
case was filed.
C. The definition of "family farmer" also includes a corporation
or partnership in which:
1. More than 50% of the outstanding stock or equity is held
by one family, and
2. More than 80% of the value of its assets consists of
assets related to the farming operation, and
3. Its aggregate debts do not exceed $1.5 million and not
less than 80% of its aggregate debts ••• arise out of
the farming operation.
D. "Farmer" (SlOl(19)) and "farming operation" (SlOl(20» are
narrowly defined to exclude agribusiness corporations, hobby
.farmers and tax shelters.
E. Questioning eligibility will be a critical strategy for Cs.
See Mapother,
1. Chapter ·12 strategies for Agricultural Creditors.
2. Chapter ~2 Legal Forms for Agricultural Creditors.
1-3
IV. Basic framework of CllI?_._~~..?_..-.::.. .Qffi_cers, Administration, and the ..,j
Estate. I~
A. Oper~tion of the farm with Tee supervision - 51202-1204.
1. Although a Tee will be appointed, a Chp 12 D will be
allowed to op~rate the farm much as a Chp 11 DIP. 51202
and S1203.
a. Chp 12 D has all rights and powers of Tee and performs
all duties of Tee, except investigative duties
specified in §1106(a)(3),(4).
(1) D must file list of Cs, schedule of assets and
liabilities, and statement of financial affairs.
(2) D must cooperate with Chp 12 Tee.
(3) D must surrender such property as is required by
conii r:rned plan.
b. Tee serves as disbursing agent unless otherwise
provided in plan. Tee fulfills other administrative
and investigative duties. S1203.
(1) Investigate financial affairs of D. 5704(4).
(2) Furnish such information concerning the estate and
its administration as is requested by a C. 5704(7).
(3) Investigate acts, conduct, assets, liabilities,
financial condition and operation of D'S
business. §ll06(a) (3), (4).
J
-
2. Removal of D. If fraud or gross mismanagement is shown,
a C or Tee may move to have Tee placed in sale control of
the estate property.
a. Factors would include commingling of assets, failure
to keep adequate records, numerous asset transfers,
continuing loss and inability to obtain necessary
future financing. See Hammel & Sons, Inc., 20 BR 830
(S.D. Oh. 1982).
b. Although a Tee may be placed in charge of operating
D'S farm! Tee will not have power to file a plan.
c. Tee can file a Motio~to Dismiss or Convert to Chp 11
or 7. §1208(c)!(d). .
ij
...
,
-
B. Property of the estate - SS41 and 1207.
~1. Definition of property of the estate is so broad that pre-
petition repossession by C can be set aside, and C can be
compelled to return the property before it is sold by C.
a. D can force c to return repossessed collateral unless
C can show grounds for relief from stay.
U• S~~~!'ih:l:~Lf~9 ..!?~~P 1.2. , 10 3 S. ct. 2 309 (1983) , he1d
that §542 permits D to~o[ce return of collateral.
("Although congress might have safeguarded the
interests of secured creditors outright by excluding
from the estate any property subject to a secured
interest, it chose instead to .•• provide secured
creditors with 'adequate protection' for their
interests.")
If D's property is repossessed by a C prior to
commencement of case, it remains property of the
estate and subject to turnover under S542 in a Chp 13
case. The same will app] in Chp 12.
rGrounds for dismissal S1208(c}.
Adequate protection - S1205
2. Exemptions - just as Ds in Chp 13 cases are entitled to
claim exemptions, Ds in Chp 12 will also be entitled.
a. The justification is the need to de·termine liquidation
value of the estate for confirmation purposes.
b. Exemption of property from the estate does not affect
the validity of CIS security interest.
1
T., r:
Secured Cs are said to be entitled to "adequate
protection" if their collateral is bei.ng used in a
reorganization case.
Most Circuit Courts have said this meatlS that secured Cs
are entitled to depreciation and interest.
Chp 12 has severely limited the right df secured Cs to
receive depreciation and inte~est, and :this will be
discussed later. /
The issue arises in the temporary (prec4)nfirmation)
period between the filing and confirmatIon. Since this
period is only 4-1/2 months in Chp 12 (as opposed to the
open-ended period in Chp 11), having le~,s adequate
protection in Chp 12 should not be as dm naging as in Chp
11. ;
b. Tee spends little effort on discovery of prepetition
transfers, partly because recovery is likely to be
only for the benefit of the D who made the transfer.
D usually prosecutes turnover in r.ehabilitation cases.
c. C faced with turnover motion by D, should respond with
motion for relief. Better yet, C should take
initiative and file motion for relief upon learning of
Chp 12. Same grounds to resist turnover as
prosecuting motion for relief.
Tip: Evaluate position in terms of chances of
prevailing on Motion for Relief. If success is
questionable, use this opportunity to negotiate
settlement with D. This is an excellent chance to
establish repayment schedule, vali(jity of lien, and
"drop-dead" stipulation. \
1. In addition to the ability to seek the clppointment of a
Tee, Cs have the right to move for the qismissal of the
case for:
a. Unreasonable delay or gross mismanagement,
b. Failure to timely file a plan, or mark E.' payments under
the plan, or
c. "Continuing loss to or diminution o'f the estate
and absence of a reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation."
2.
3.
1.
4.
C.
D.
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v. The Plan - S1221-1222
A.
B.
The plan must be filed within 90 days after the filing of the
petition. The Court may grant an extension if such an
extension would be "substantially justified."
The court is required to promptly hold a hearing on con-
firmation, and "except for cause, the hearing shall be
concluded not later than 45 days after the filing of the
plan."
1. The Legislative History suggests that "cause" be limited
to a backlog of cases.
2. Congress expected "this exception to be used sparingly in ~
order to facilitate the proper operation of Chapter 12
which proper operation depends on prompt action."
C. Only D can file plan. S1221. C plans are not permitted as
they are in Chp 11.
1. D must submit all or part of future income.
E. Mandatory requirements of any plan - §1222(a).
D. The plan will generally be 3 years, but court "for cause"
approve a longer period up to 5 years.
,
-
The plan must provide for full payment of all claims
entitled to priority under §507, such as administrative
expenses allowed under S503(b}, the most common of which
are postpetition expenses of "preserving the estate,"
such as administrative rent and debts for goods or
services purchased on credit by D.
If the plan classifies claims, it must provide the same
treatment for each claim within a class.
2.
3.
F. permissive requirements of a Chp 12 plan.
1. D may designate classes of unsecured claims, but D may J
not discriminate unfairly against any cJass so designatet..J
a. Administrative convenience - classification of
unsecured claims based solely on amount is allowed,
if court finds such classification reasonable and
necessary for administrative convenience.
b. Priority claims - are entitled to pay~ent in full
and are properly classified separately from other
unsecured claims~
-
-
! . WIc. Debts upon which there is a codebtor. A Chp 12 D is
not prohibited from discriminating among unsecured Cs
on the basis of the existence of a codebtor. It is 1
not "unfair discrimination" to pa~ 100% of cosigned ~
debts and a lesser percentage to other unsecured Cs.
:f-6
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d. Objecting Cs - S1225(b)(1) is intended to benefit
objecting C so that such different treatment should
not be found to unfairly discriminate against others
who do not object.
2. D may modify rights of unsecured claims.
3. Plan may provide for the curing or waiving of any default.
a. Curing of default ("reinstatement") should have no
importance in Chp 12, because all secured Cs are
subject to cram-down. (Right to cure is important in
Chp 13 because of cram-down limitations on real estate
lender under §1322(b)(2).)
b. Where default is waived, there will be a "modified"
payment schedule.
4. D may pay unsecured claims concurrently with secured
claims.Cs routinely accept that secured claims are paid
first, with unsecured claims deferred. Where plan does
not so propose payment, unsecured C may wish to oppose
plan, because:
a. D will resolve problem which caused Chp 12 and then
convert to Chp 7.
b. D may convert previously non-exempt property into
exempt property and then convert to Chp 7. See
Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984), where D filed
a Chp 13 and owned a farm which was nonexempt because
he did not live on it. During the Chp 13, D moved to
farm. court allowed D to convert to Chp 7 and claim
farm as exempt.
5. D may cure default within reasonable time on secured
claims where the final payment is due after completion of
Chp 12 plan.
While this provision is important in Chp 13 because of
the special residential real estate lender protection and
three-to-five-year plan limitation on "cram-down", it
will have little significance in Chp 12.
6. D may assume or reject executory contract. Most common
form of executory contract is a true lease. D or Tee has
option to assume or reject, and "ipso facto" clause
(i.e., "this lease terminates if lessee files Bk") in
executory contract is not valid.
a. In Chp 12, there is no deadline to assume or reject,
other than that it must be done prior to confirmation,
so promptly file motion to compel assumption or
rejection. Mauro, 681 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1982). See
Form 6 in Mapother, Chapter 12 Legal Forms for
Agricultural Creditors.
b. Strategy for lessor's attorney is to file, as quickly
as possible, a "combination" motion seeking:
(1) A deadline for D to assume or reject lease under
S365(d)(2);
(2) Prompt curing of default under §365(b)(1)(A);
(3) Adequate protection under S363(e);
(4) A request that D abandon property and vacate farm,
or release collateral under S554.
i-7
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
c. D is required to assume or reject unexpired lease on
nonresidential real property within 60 days, and,
until assumed or rejected, all rent must be promptly
paid. S364(d)(3).
D may provide for payment of a claim from property of the
estate or property of D.
D may provide for sale of encumbered property.
a. §1206 allows D to sell collateral preconfirmation
after "notice and a hearing," but without C's
consent. (C's lien will attach to sale proceeds.)
b. S1206 only applies to "farmland or farm eq~ipment."
D may provide_for~ment of secured claims over a period
longer than the length of the plan.
a. Unlike Chp 13, D need not provide to cure default ~
within a "reasonable time" or maintain future payments
at regular contract rate to utilize this provision.
b. This is a big change from Chp 13 and has profound
implications for secured Cs. It will be discussed
under "cram-down."
c. The general rule is that a Chp 12 plan can run three , .
to five years. ..J,~,
d. Despite this rule as to duration of Chp 12 plan, aD ..
may modify secured obligations and provide for payment Jt~
on such secured obligations during a period in excess .~~
of five years. ~.
D may provide for vesting of property of the estate in D I
or in any other entity. !
D may include any other appropriate provision not incon~ ~
sistent with Chp 12.
a. This gives D certain flexibility.
b. It also can serve the secured C who requests:
(1) A drop-dead provision as to this C's collateral
and payments, or
(2) A provision that if D sold c's collateral after
confirmation for more than the crammed-down
figure, that C would get excess.
VI. Confirmation of the Plan.
receive ff
d
....
j
The liquidation test. J
a. The plan must provide that the amount distributed to
each unsecured C is not less than that C would
as a dividend if D were liquidated in Chp 7.
b. This will discussed in B below.
The good-faith test.
a. The plan must be proposed in "geod faith."
b. This has been the most litigated issue in Chp 13, and ~
will be discussed in C below.
The cram-down test.
a. Each secured C must at least be paid the value of its J
collateral.
b. This will be discussed in D below.
1.
Confirmation requirements. Section 1225 provides that the ~
court shall confirm D's plan if it meets 5 tests (and 2 other
minor requirements):
2.
3.
A.
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4. Tbe disposable-income test.
a. D must at least pay Tee for 3 years ,all of D's
"projected disposable income."
b. This is the famous test that was added into Chp 13 by
Congress in 1984 and will be discussed in E below.
5 L The feasibility test.
a. The D must be able to make all payments under the plan
and to comply with the plan.
This is a relative of the S1208 rehabilitation test, and
both feasibility and rehabilitation are profitability
concepts, all of which was discussed earlier.
6. The plan complies with the provisions of Chp 12 and other
applicable Code provisions. The most relevant such
provisions are contained in:
a. Sections 362 - 364 relating to adequate protection, and
b. Section 1222(a), which recites that the plan shall:
(1) Provide for the submission to the supervision and
control of the Chapter 12 Trustee of whatever
portion of future income is necessary for the
execution Qf the plan;
(2) Provide for full payment of S507 priority claims;
(3) If the plan classifies claims and interests, provide
the same treatment for each claim or interest within
a particular class.
7. All required fees or charges have been paid.
B. The liquidation test.
1. The plan must provide that "the value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the
plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less
than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the
estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7."
2. This is a mathematical test that means that the amount to be
paid on each unsecured claim must not be less than the
amount which would be paid if the D's nonexempt assets were
liquidated and distributed to unsecured Cs. Since unsecured
Cs receive little in most Chapter 7 cases, such a C can be
given the same treatment in Chp 12.
3. This test requires totaling the value of the D's assets and
subtracting the amount of secured claims and exemptions to
determine what would be left for distribution to general
unsecured Cs in a Chp 7. The D's Chp 12 plan must propose
to pay unsecured Cs at least that amount.
4. The Sixth Circuit has held that confirmation of Chp 13 plan,
under which all allowed unsecured claim would be paid in
fUll, but without interest, was properly denied, where D's
equity in house was more than sufficient to cover unsecured
debts upon immediate liquidation of the estate. In re
Hardy, 755 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985).
C. The good faith test.
1. Thia is the acid test that has generated tons of litigation
in Chapter 13. Seven Circuit Courts have addressed the
issue, and all of them have said that the Bk Court must
inquire on a case-by-case basis into whether the plan abuses
the provisions, purpose or spirit of Chp 13.
I -9
a. The leading explanation of the rule is in In re Estus,
695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982), in which the court said:
••• in addition to the percentage of
repayment to unsecured creditors, some
of the factors that a court may find
meaningful in making its determination
of good faith are:
(1) the amount of the proposed payments
and the amount of the debtor's surplus;
(2) The debtor's employment history,
ability to earn and likelihood of future
increases in income;
(3) the probable or expected duration
of the plan;
(4) the accuracy of the plan's state-
ments of the debts, expenses and per-
centage of repayment of unsecured debt
and whether any inaccuracies are an
attempt to mislead the court;
(5) the extent of preferential
treatment between cl~sses of creditors;
(6) the extent to which secured claims
are modified; ..
(7) the type of debt sought to be
discharged and whether any such debt is
nondischargeable in Chapter 7;
(8) the existence of special circum-
stances such as .inor.di.nat.e·::medical·'······
expenses;
(9) the frequency with which the debtor
has sought relief under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act;
(10) the motivation and sincerity of the
debtor in seeking Chapter 13 relief; and
(11) the burden which the plan's admin-
istration would place upon the truste~.
-
b. Congress intended to provide Bk courts with the
discretion to examine and question D's motives. Bad _
faith need not be based upon an actual finding of fraud,
requiring proof of malice, scienter or an intent to
defraud. In re Waldron, 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986).
2. Cs want a mathematical formula to be followed by all
concerned, rather than a case-by-case approach. The latter
means time and expense for Cs in protecting their rights
in every case. In some districts being at the mercy of Tee
and Judge is not so bad. In others, it is dreadful.
D. The cram-down ·test.
1. The plan must provide as to each secured claim that:
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a. The plan provides that the secured C retain its lien and
be paid the value of its collateral "as of the effective
date of the plan," or
b. The D surrenders the collateral to the secured C.
2. This requirement means that if the secured C does not accept
the plan, then the D must return the collateral or cram his
plan down the secured CIS throat by agreeing to pay in the
plan to the secured C an amount equal to the value of the
collateral held by the secured C.
3. For example: C has balance of $150,000 secured by
collateral worth $100,00 on a 20-year loan.
a. CIS claim will be bifurcated into two claims:
(1) A secured claim of $100,000.
(2) An unsecured claim of $50,000.
b. Secured claim will be paid in the amount of $100,000 plus
interest in deferred cash payments over a period not to
exceed 20 years.
c. Unsecured portion of the claim ($50,000) will be lumped
in with all other unsecured Cs and paid in accordance
with the plan over the term of the plan.
E. Disposgble Income Test.
1. If the Tee or an unsecured Cobjects'to·.the plan, the court
may not approve any plan calling for less than 100%
repayment unless the plan provides:
a. That all of the>D's "projected disposable income be paid
to the trustee," and
b. That it.be paid for a three-year period beginning with
the first payment due.
"Disposable income" is defined as that "which is not
reasonably necessary to be expended -
(a) For the maintenance or support of the D or a
dependent of the D; or
(b) For the payment of expenditures necessary for the
continuation, preservation, and operation of the D's
business."
2. In short, D must pay 100% of his debts or commit 100% of his
disposable income over a three-year period. But this
requirement only applies if Tee or ~n unsecured C objects.
3. One of the most difficult tasks for Cs anp courts in imple-
menting the disposable income test is to find what expenses
are necessary for the maintenance and support of the D or
his dependents. An unsecured C should attack any budget
providing for unnecessary luxury expenses where such expen-
ditures are more than nominal.
~4. For example, D with family of 4 listed expenses inclUding
$500 per month college tUition,. $500 per month secondary
school education, $515 per month food, $989 housing expenses.
Expenses were found to be not "reasonably necessary." court
explained that this test means that amount of money suffi-
cient to pay the D's basic liVing expenses not related to
D's former status in society or life style to which D has
been accustomed. In re Jones, 55 BR 462 (Minn. 1985).
T':""lL
VII. What if a Plan is Confirmed?
A. Effect of confirmation. Once a plan is confirmed, the terms of
the plan govern the rights of each C and the obligations of D.
1. Confirmation eliminates issues involving adequate protection,
confirmation standards, etc.
2. A confirmed plan becomes binding upon the D and each C in
the same manner as if they had contracted for that result.
If the D completes the payments specified under the plan,
the portions of the debt which then remain unpaid will be
discharged (except support and long-term debts reinstated
unde~ ~he plan).
3. Confirmation is a court order and must be strictly complied
with by all parties.
4. Confirmation revests all property of the estate in the D.
In the absence of default, after confirmation a secured C
is barred from seeking relief from stay.
B. Lien survival
1. S1227 provides that property vesting in D is free and clear
of claims or interests of the C, but this is different from
liens. Liens survive.
Secured Cs must retain liens, and this should be expressed
in Order of Confirmation. SI225(a){5){B){i).
2. If secured C fails to file a secured claim or is tardy in
doing so, the C may lose its debt but not the underlying
lien. See In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1984), and
In re Bradshaw, 14 BCD 1346 (M.D. N.C. 1986).
C. Postconfirmation modification.
1. At any time after confirmation of plan, but before
completion of payments, plan may be modified upon request
of D, Tee, or unsecured C to:
a. Increase or reduce amount of payment.
b. Extend or reduce time for repayment.
c. Alter amount of distribution to Cs.
2. The plan as modified may not provide for payments for more
than five years after that of first payment.
D. Dismissal of a confirmed plan.
1. The court may dismiss a confirmed plan for the following
reasons:
a. Unreasonable delay or gross mismanagement.
b. Failure to commence making timely payments required by
the plan.
c. Material default by D as to a term of the plan.
d. Continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and
absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation.
2. The court may dismiss the case if D has committed fraud in
connection with it.
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PUBLIC LAW 99-554 [n.R. 5316J; October 27,1986
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BANKRUPrCY JUDGES, ttNITEDSTAT£S TRUSTEES, AND
FAMILY FARMERS BANKRlJPTCY ACT OF 1986
For Legislative History ofAct ,ee Report for P.L.99-S54 in
Legislative History Section, post.
All Ad to -... title 21 .f tho UnItocI St CotM to ptO¥llIo ,., the of .ddl"'"
~ Iud.... to""'" "'th f.Unltollisw..'tru to it
.....krvpky _ In JudIchd dlatrtctl th...,..."" tho Unltod ....... to Mollo cortaln chan...
wItlt ...... to tho .....f Unltod S'ato. !""J'HS In ....-. .nd for ether ,.".......
. ......-..
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Unit«l States ofAmerica in Congress assembled, That this I\ct may
be cited as the "BankMlptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and
Family Farmer BankMlptcy Act of 1986".
TITLE I-AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 28 OF
THE UNITED STATES CODE
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Subtitle B-DebtorsWho Are Family Farmers
SBC. 111. DEf'INmON9. ~ ...
Section 101 of title 11, United Stat. Code, as amended by section
201 of this Act, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (17) by iueriinJl' "(except when such term
appears m the term 'famify fami~ after "means",
(2) by redesignating par88'I'a~ (17) through (49) 88 para·
graphs (19) through (51), 1'81 . vely, and
(3) by inserting after paI'l!lI!'aph (16) the following new
~¥!:jJy f~~ means- .
"(A) individual or individual and spouse engaged in a
farming operation wboeeagregate debts do not exceed
$1,500,000 and not leu than 80 percent of whose aggregate
noncontingent, liquidated debts (ezcluding a -debt for the
principal residence of IUch individual or such individual
and spouse unless such debt ariIes out of a farming oper-
ation), on the date the cue is filed, arise out of a farming
operation owned or operated by lUeh individual or su~h
individual and SpoUR, aadtuCh individual or such individ·
oal and spouse receive from such farming operation more
than 50 percent of such individual's or such mdividual and
spouse's grosa income for the tuable rear preceding the
tauble year in which the cue concernmg such individual
or such individual and IJ)CMJI8 was rued; or
"(B) corporation or p8:rtnenhip in which. more than 50
percent of the outltrih:a, st.oek or equity is held by one
family, or by onef~._relativesof the members of
'such family, and such family or such relatives conduct the
farmin§, operation, and
• (i) more than .80~t of the value of its assets
consists of usetI related to the (arming operation;
"(ii) its aggregate debts do not exceed $1,500,000 and
not less than 80 percent of its aggregate noncontingent,
liquidated debts (excludiDl a debt for one dwelling
which is owned by such corporation or partnership and
which a shareholder or partner maintains as a prin-
cipal residence, unless .uch debt arises out of a farming
operation), on the date the cue is rued, arise out of the
farming operation owned or operated by such corpora·
tion or such partnership; and
"(iii) if such corporaticm issues stock, such stock is
not publicly traded;
"(18) 'family farmer with regular annual income' means
family farmer whose annual income is sufficiently stable and
regular to enable such family fanner to make payments under a
plan under chapter 12 of'this title;...· .
SEC. %52. AP.PLICABILITY OF CllAl"l'ERS.
Section 103 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in su~ion (a) by striking out "or 13" and inserting in
lieu thereof "12, or 13",
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following:
"(i) Chapter 12 of this title applies only in a case under such
chapter....
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SEC. IA. WHO MAYBE A DEBTOR.
Section 109 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (t)-
(A) by inserting "or family farmer" after "individual",
and
(B) by redesignating such subsection as subsection (g), and
(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
"(f) Only a family farmer with r~lar annual income may be a
debtor under chapter 12 of this title.' .
SEC. 254. INVOLUNTARY CASES.
Section 303(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inserting ", family farmer," after "farmer".
SEC. 255. FAMILY FARMERS.
Title 11 of the United States Code is amended by inserting after
chapter 11 the following new chapter:
"CHAPTER 12-ADJUSTMENT OF DEBTS OF A
FAMILY FARMER WITH REGULAR ANNUAL
INCOME
''SUBCHAPrER I-oFFlCERS. ADMINISTRATION, AND THEISTATE
"Sec. -
"1201. Stay of.mcm apinat codebtor.
"1202. TrwItee.
"1203. Richta and powera of debtor.
"1204. Removal or debtor u debtor in~OD.
"1205. Adequate protection.
"1206. Sa1eI free of intereltl.
"1207. Property of the estate.
"1208. Conversion or di,mi..J.
"SUBCHAPI'ER U-THE PLAN
"1221. Filing or plan.
"1222. Contenta or plan.
"1223. Modification of plan before confirmation.
'.'1224. Confirmation hearing.
"1225. CoaflflDation of plan.
"1226. Paymenta.
"122'7. Effect or confirmation.
"1228. Dilcharge.
"1229. Modification or plan after confirmation.
"1230. Revocation of an order of confirmation.
"1231. Special tax proviIiona.
"SUBCHAPTER I-omCERS. ADMINISTRATION, AND THE
~ATE ..
"'1201. Stay of action against codebtor .
"(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section,
after the order for relief under this chapter, a creditor may not act,
or commence or continue any civil action, to collect all or any part of
a consumer debt of the debtor from any individual that is liable on
such debt with the debtor, or that secured such debt, unless-
"(1) such individual became liable on or secuied such debt in
the ordinary course of such individual's business; or
"(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under
chapter 7 of this title. .
lOA U.S. Cong.~ '86-3
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"(b) A creditor may present a negotiable instrument, and may give
notice ofdishonor ofsuch an instrument.
"Cc) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearm" the court shall grant relief from the stay provided by
8ubeection Ca) of this section with respect to a creditor, to the extent
_that-
"(1) as between the debtor and the individual protected under
sublection Ca) of this section, such individual received the
consideration for the claim held by such creditor;
"(2) the plan filed by the debtor propoees not to pay such
claim; or
"(3) 8uch creditor'8 interest would be irreparably harmed by
continuation of luch stay.
"Cd) Twen~ claya after the filing of a request under luPsection
(c)(2) of this section for_~ from the stay provided by subsection (8)
• of this section, such stay is terminated with I'eII*t to the party in
'interest making luch ~uest, unlea the debtor or any individual
that is liable on such debt with the debtor til. and lerves upon such
party in interest a written objection to the takina of the proposed
action.
... 1202. Trutee
"Ca) If the- United States trustee has appointed an individual
under section 586(b) of title 28 to sene as stan~ trustee in cases
under this chapter and if such individual ~es as a trustee
under section 322 of this title, then such individual shall serve as
trustee in any cue tiled under this chapter. Othenriae, the United
States trustee shall appoint one disinterested pel'llOn to serve as
trustee in the case or the United States trustee may serve as trustee
in the case if necellal'Y.
"(b) The trustee lhall-
"(1) perform the duties BPeCified in eecUons 704(2). 704(3).
704(5),704(6),704(7), and 704(9) ofthil title;
"(2) perform the duties specified in section 1106(a)(3) and
1106(a)(4) of this title if the court, for cause and on request of a
party in interest, the trustee, or the United State. trustee. so
orders; .
"(3) appear and be heard at an1h~ that concem~
"CA) the value of property subject to a lien;
"(B) confirmation ofa plan;
"Ce) modification of the plan after confirmation; or
"CD) the sale of property ofthe estate;
"(4) ensure that the debtor commenc. making timely pay-
menta required by a confirmed plan; and
"(5) if the debtor ceases to be a debtor in po_ellion, perform
the duties specified in -=tions 704(8), 11000a)(1), 1106<a)(2),
1106(a)(6), I106(a)(7), and 1203.
"(c) If the number of cases under this chapter commenced in a
particular judicial district 80 wammts, the court may appoint one or
more individuals to serve as standing trustee for 8uch district in
casea under this cha~.
"(d)(l) A court that has appointed an individual under lubsection
(a) of this section to serve .. standing trustee in eases under thiI
chapter shall Bet for such individual-
"(A) a muimum annual compensation not to ezceed the
lowest annual rate of~c pay in effect for~e GS-16 of the
General Schedule prescribed under section 5332 of title 5; and
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"(B) a ~rcentage fee not to exceed the StUD of-
"(1) not to exceed ten percent of the payments made
under the plan of such debtor, 'with respect to payments h1
an a~gregateamount not to exceed $450,000; ana
"(il) three percent of payments made under the plan of
such debtor, with respect to payments made after the aggre-
gate amount of payments made under the plan exCeeds
$450,000;
based on such maxim'urn annual compensation'and the actual,
necessary expenses incurred by such individual as standing
trustee.
"(2) Such individual shall collect such percentage fee from aU
paYments under plans in the cases under this chapter for which
such individual serves at! standing trustee, Such individual shall
pay annually to the Treuury-
"(A.) any amount by which the actual compensation re-
ceived by such individual exceeds five percent of all ~ch
pa~entsmade under plans iIi cases under this chapter for
which such individual serves as standing tnistee; and
"(B) .my amount by which the percentage fee fixed 'mder
paragraph (1)$) of this subsection for all such cases ex-
ceeds- -
"(i) such individual'!!! actual compensation for such
cases, as adjusted under subparagraph (A) of this para-
graph; plus .
"(m the adual, necessary expenses incUl'l"erl by such
individu~las standing trustee in such cases,
'" 1203. RightS and powen of debtor
"Subject to such limitations as the court may prescribe, a debtor
f.n possessior. shall have aU the rights, other than the right to
compensation under section 330, and powers, and shall perform all
'the functio:IU' and duties, except the dutiea specified in paragraphs
(f) and (4) of section 1106(a), of a trustee serving in a cue under
~pter 11. induding operating the debtor's fann.
'" 1204. Removal of debtor as debtor in possession
"(a) On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall order that the debtor shall not be a debtor
in possession for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence,
or greg mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor, either before or
after the-commencement of the case. •
"(h} On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a
hearing, the court may reinstate the debtor in possession.
"0 1%05. Adequate protection
"la} S;ction 361 does not apply in a case under this chapter.
"(h) In a case under this chapter, when adequate protection is
rtquil'ed under section 352, 363, or 364 of this title of an interest of
an entity in property, such &dequate prof.eetion may In provided
by-
"(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic
cuh payments to such entity, t.o the extent that the stay under
eection 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of
this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title
multo! in a decrease in the value of property securing a claim or
of an entity's ownership interest in property;
1-18
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U(2) providiDi to IUCh entity aD additional or replacement lieft
to the extent that luch ltay, UN, l81e, leue, or lI'aDt J'8Iulti in a
decrease in the value of property HCUnn, • claim or of an
entitY'1 ownenhip interest in property;
"(3) paying to luch entity for the UN of farmland the reason·
able rent customel')' in.tb.e community where the property iI
located, bued upon the rental value, net income, and eamina
ca~cityof the property; or
'(4) grantm, IUch other relief', other than entitling luch
entity to compensation allowable under MCtion 503(b)(l) of'thil
title .. an administrative expense, as will adequately protect
the value of' property IeCUnn•• claim or of luch entity',
ownership interest in property.
".1206. Sales free of tnterestl
"After notice aDcf'~ hearinl, in addition to the authorization
contained in section 363(0, the trustee in a case under this chapter
may 1811 property under section 363 (b) and (c) free and clear of any
interest in such property of' an entity other· than the estate if the
pror:"Y is farmland or farm equipment, except that the proceeds of
sue sale shall be subject to IUch interest.
.., 1207. Property of the estate
"(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property
specified in section 541 of this title-
"(1) all property of th.r kind apecified in luch section that the
debtor acquires after the commencement of'the cue but before
the case is cloeed, dismissed, or converted to a case under
chapter 7 of this title, whichever occurs fint; and
"(2) earnings from aervices performecl by the debtor after the
commencement of the cue but before the cue is eloeed, dis-
misled, or converted to a cue under chapter 7 of this title,
whichever occurs first.
0' "(b) Except 81 provided in aection 1204, a confirmed plan, or an
order confirming a plan, the debtor Ihall remain in po....ion of all
property of the estate.
4'1'1208. Conyenion or dismlual
"(a) The debtor may convert a cue under this chapter to a case
under chapter 7 of this title at any time. ADy waiver of the right to
convert under this subaection is unenforceable.
"(b) On request of the debtor at any tiJzle, if the cue hu not been
converted under aection 706 or 1112 of this title, the court lball
disms a case under this chapter. Any waiver of'the right to dismiss
under this lubsection is unenforceable. •
"(c) On request of a party in intereet, and after notice and a
hearing, the court may diamiIa a cue under this chapter for cause,
including-
"(1) unreuonable delay, or IJ"OII mismanagement, by the
debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
"(2) nonpayment of'any feea and cbarpl required under
chaptel" 123 of title 28;
"(3) failure to rue a plan timely under aec:tion 1221 of' this
title;
"(4) failure to commence making timely paymentl required by
. a confirmed plan;
1-19
"(5) denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1225 of thiJ
title and denial of a request made for additional time for ming
another.plan or a modification of a plan;
"(6) material default by the debtor with respect toa term of a
confirmed plan; .
"(7) revocation of the order ofconfirmation under section 1230
oUhis title, and denial of confirmation of amedified .plan under
section 1229 of this title;
"(8) termination of a confirmed plan by re8llOllof the oceur·
renee of a condition specified in the plan; or
"(9) continuing 1011 to or diminution of the estate and tbsence
of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation.
"(d) On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a
hearing, the court may dismiss a case under thisc!hapter or convert
a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title upon
a showing that the debtor has committed fraud in connection with
the case.
"(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this~, a case
may not be convertedto>acase under another cha,. of this title
unless the debtor may be a debtor under such cha~.· . •
":,:,'."'--"<;
"SUBCHAPTER U-THE PLAN
"'1221. Filing of plan
"The debtor shall me a plan not later than 90 days after the order
for relief under this chapter, except that the court m.,-fttend such
period if an extension is substantially justified.
'" 1222. Contents of plan
"(a) The plan shall-
"(1) provide for the submission of all or such portion of future
earnings or other future income of the debtor totheaupervision
and control of the trustee as is necessary for tbeexecution of
the plan;
"(2) provide for the full payment. in deferred eashpayments,
of all claims entitled to priority under section 507 of this title,
unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different
treatment ofsuch claim; and
"(3) if the plan classifies claims and interests. provide the
same treatment for each claim or interest within a particular
class unless the holder ofa particular claim or inteMt agrees to
less favorable treatment.
"(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan
may-
"(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as pro-
vided in section 1122 of this title, but may nOt ~inate
unfairly against any class so designated; however,nch plan
may treat claims for a consumer debt of the debtor if an
individual is liable on such consumer debt with the debtor
differently than other unsecured claims;
"(2) modify the rights of h!>lders of secured claims, or of
holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of
holders ofany class of claims;, "
U(3) provide for the curing or waiving of any d~f.ult;
Oet. 27 BANKRUPTCY Acr OF 1986 P.L. 9t-6M
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"(4) provide for payments on any unsecured claim to be rn~
concurrently with payments on any secured claim or any other
U1UIeCUred claim;
"(5) provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable
time and maintenance of payments while the caeis pending On
any U1UIeCUred claim or secured claim on which the last pay.
ment iI due after the date on which the final payment under
the plan is due; . • .
"(6) lUb'ject to section 365 of this title, provide for th, assurnp.
tion, rejection, or &Mignment of any executory contract or
unexpired 18818 of the debtor not previously rejected under such
section;
"(7) provide for the payment of all or part of a claim against
the debtor from property oft~ estate oPfJl'Operty of the debtor'
"(8) provide for the sale of all 01' any part of the property of
the estate or the distribution ofall or any part of the property or
the estate among those having an interest in such property;
"(9) provide for payment of allowed secured claims consistent
with section 1225(a)(5) of this title, over a period exceeding the
period permitted under section 1222(c);
"(10) provide for the vesting of property of the estate, on
comumation of th.etlan or at a later. time, in the debtor or in
any other entity; an
"(11) include any other appropriate provilion not inconsistent
with this title.
• "(c) Except 81 provided in .ubeectiODS (b)(5) and (b)(9), the plan
may not provide for payments over a period. that is longer than
three years unless the court for caUle approves a longer period, but
the court may not -approve a period that is longer than five years.
"§ 1223. Modification of plan before eonflnnatlon
"(a) The debtor may modify the plan a"any time before confirma·
tion, but may not modify the plan 10 that the plan as modified fails
to meet the requirements ofsection 1222 of this title.
• "(b) After the debtor rues a modification under this section, the
plan as modir18d becomes the plan. '
"(c) Any holder of a secured claim that has accepted or rejected
the plan is deemed to have accepted or rejected, as the.case may be,
the plan as modified, unless the modification provides 'for a change
in the rights of such holder from what such' rights were under the
plan before modification, and ,uch holder changes such holder's
previous acceptance or rejection.
"§ 1224. Confirmation hearinr
"After expedited notice, the court shall hold a hearing on con·
firmation of the plan. A party in interest, the trustee, or the United
States trustee may object to the confirmation of the plan. Except for
cause, the hearing shall be concluded not later than 45 days after
the riling of the plan.
"§ 1225. Conftnn.tion of plan
"(a) Except as provided in "Subeection (b), the court shall confirm a
plan if-
"(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and
with the other applicablt' provisions of this title;
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1/(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 128 of
title 28, or by the plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been
paid;
1/(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any
means forbidden by law;
1/(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property
to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed
unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid
on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date;
"(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for
by thee,lan- .
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
I/(BXi) the plan provides that the holder of such claim
retain the lien securing such claim; and
I/(li) the value. as of the effective date of the plan, of
property to be distributed by the trustee or the debtor
under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim; or
I/(e) the' debtor surrenders the property securing such
claim to such horder; and
"(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the
plan lnd to comply with the plan.
"(bX1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim
objects to the confirmation of the plan. then the court may not
approve the plan unless. as of the effective date of the plan-
I/(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan
on account of such claim is not less than the amount of such
claim; or
, "(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected dispos-
able income to be received in the three-year period, or such
longer period as the court may approve under section 1222(c),
beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the
plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.
1/(2) For purposes of this subsection. 'cljsposable income' means
income which is received by the debtor and which is not J:'eIl8Onably
DlCell8ary to be expended-
I/(A) for the maintenance or support of the d6btor or a depend-
ent ofthe debtor; or
1/(8) for the payment of expenditures necessary for the
continuation, preservation, and operation of the debtor's
business.
"(c) After confirmation of a plan, the court may order any entity
from whom the debtor receives income to pay all or any part of such
income to the trustee.
"01226. Payments .
"(a) Payments and funds received by the trustee ehall be retained
~y the trustee until confirmation or denial of conflrmation ofa plan.
Ha plan is confirmed, the trustee shall distribute any such payment
in accordance with the plan. If a plan is not conrmned, the trustee
8ball return any such payments to the debtor, after deducting-
"(I) any unpaid claim allowed under section 503(b) of this
title; and •
"(2) ifa standing trustee is serving in the case, the percentage
fee raed for such standing trustee.
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"(b) Before or at the time ot each payment to creditors under the
plan, there shall be paid-
"(1) any unpaid claim ot the kind specified in eection 507(a)(1)
of this title; and
"(2) if a standin, trustee appointed under eection 1202ld) of
this title is servin, in th..caH, the percentap fee med for such
standin, trustee under section 1202(e) of thiS title.
"Ie) Except as otheJ'\\ise provided in the plan or in the order
confirming the plan, the trustee ,ball make payments to ereditors
under the plan. .
.., 1227. Effect oreonflrmatlon
"(a) Except as provided in eection 1228(a) of this title, the provi-
sions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, 88th creditor, each equity
seeurity holder, and ~'lc;b reneral partner in the debtor, whether or
not the claim of such Creditor, such equity seeurity holder, or such
general partner in the debtor is provided for by the plan, and
whether or not such creditor, such equity security holder, or such
reneral partner in the debtor baa objected to, _ accepted, or has
rejected the plan.
"(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirm-
ing the plan, the confirmation of a plan vesta all of the property of
the estate in the debtor.
"(c) Except as provided in section 1228(a) of this title and except as
otherwise provided in the plan or in the order conrmning the plan,
the property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this
sec:tion 18 free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor
provided tor by the plan.
... 1228. Dlseharp
"(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all
payments under the plan, other than_ ~YJ.D8!lts to holders of allowed
claims provided for .under section l222<bX5) or 1222<bXI0) of this
title. unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge exe-
cuted by the debtor after the order for relief under this chapter, the
court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by
the plan allowed under section 503 of this title or disallowed under
section 502 of this title, except any debt-
"(1) provided for under IeCtion 1222(1)(5) or 1222(bXI0) of this
title; or
"(2) of the kind SPecified in section 523(a) of this title.
"(b) At any time after the confirmation of the plan and after
notice and a hearing, the court me,: grant a disch~e to a debtor
that has not completed payments under the plan only if-
"(1) the debtor's failure to complete such payments is due to
circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held
accountable;
"(2) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property
actually distributed under the plan on· account of each allowed
unsecured claim is not I.. thaD the amount that would have
been paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor had been
li~uidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date; and
'(3) modification of the plan under sec:tion 1229 of this title is
not practicable. .
"(c) A discharge granted under subsection (b) of this sec:tion
discharges the debtor from all unsecured debts provided for by the
plan or disallowed under sec:tion 5G2 of this title, except any debt-
1-23
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U(1) provided for under section 1222(b)(S) or 1222(b)(10) of thfa
title; or
U(2) of. kind Il*ified in leCtion 528<.) of thiI title.
"(d) On request ot' a party in inte~ before one year after •
diJehal'p under this MCtion iI rranted. and after notice and •hearinf.. the court may revoke lOch dilcharn only if'-
(1) luch cliIcharge W8I obtained by the debtor throurh fraud;
and
"(2) the requesting party did not know of lOch fraud until
after lOchdiIc~ W8I rranted.
lICe) After the debtOr is rranted a _ham. the court Ihall
ter'lllinate the services ofany trustee _rving in the cue.
"'1229. Modification 01 plan after conftrmatlon
"Ca) At any time after coDflrmation 01 the plan but before the
completion of plymentl under lOch plan. the p18n may be modified,
on requelt of the debtor. the trustee. or the holder Of an allowed
~ claim. to- .
"C'1) increase or reduce the amount ofpayments on claima of.
~eularc1uI provided for by the plan; .
"(2) utend or reduce the-time for such payments; or
"(3) alter· the amount of the distribution to a creditor whOle
claim is provided for by the .plan to the atent n...,..ry to take
account Of any payment·of such claim other than under the
1~~'seeti0D81222(a). 1222(b). and 1223(c) of thiI title and the
requiremeDtI of section 1225(a) of this title apply to any modifica-
tion UDder lUblection (a) of this section. -
"(2) The plan 81 modified becomea the plan unl-. after notice
aDd. heariD& such modification iI disapprOved.
liCe) .A plan modified under this leCtion may not ~de for
~tI over a period that empires after three yeara after the time
that the first payment under the orilinal confirmed Dlan W8I due,
.we. the court. for cause, approvea a longer period,Dut the court
mAy not approve a period that upirea after five yeara after such
time.
"1•.ReYocation 01an order ofconftrmatlon
"(l) On~ of a party in interest at lID}' time within 180 da,.
after the dlte of the entry of an order ofconfirmation under section
1226 of tbiI title, and after notice and a~. the court may
mobsuch order if'such order was procured by fraUd.
"(b) lithe court revokea an order ofconfirm8tioD under lUblection
'-> of tbilIICtiOD, the court shall diapoee of the cue UDder leCtion
1J)'J of tbiI title, UDl-. within the time fixed by the court, the
...~ and the court confirms a modification of the plan
'*IICtiOD 1229 of this title.
"11231. Speeial tax pmVilloDl
"fa) For the~ of any State or local lawim~ a tax on or
~ by mcome. the taxable period of a debtor that iI an~~.•~al1 terminate on the date of the order for relief under
• -t"C1", unl_ the case W8I converted under section 706 of thiI
..") The tnJstee aha1l make a State or local tax return of income
the -.ate ofan individual debtor in a cue under this chapter for
I-24
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each taxable period after the order for relief under this chapter
during which the case is pending.
"(e) The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or the
making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan
confirmed under section 1225 of this.title, may not be taxed under
anl.law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.
'(d) The court may authorize the proponent of a plan to request a
determination, limited to questions of law, by a State or local
governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or
determination of a tax on or measured by income, of the tax effects,
under section 346 of this title and under the law imposing such tax,
of the plan. In the event of an actual controversy, the court may
declare such effects after the earlier of- .
"(1) the date on which INch iovernmental unit responds to
the ~l!estunder this sub18Ction; or
"(2) flO days after such reque&t.".
SEC. 1M. CONVERSION'FROM CHAPTER lITO CHAP'l'ER II.
Section 1112(d)'ofiitlelf;"tiDit.eiStates Code, is amended-
(1) by inserting "12 or" before "13",
(2) in paragraph (1) by strikinJ out "'and" at the end thereof.
(3) in paragraph (2) by st~ out the period at the end
thereof and inserting "; and", and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
"(3) if the debtor requests conversion to chapter 12 of this
title, such conversion is equitable.".
SEC. 257~ CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) Title 11 of the United States Code is amended in the table of
chapters by inserting after' the item relating to chapter 11 the
following new item:
"11. AIQUltment of Debts of Fami'" r.....,. with RepIar Annual Income .. 1201".
(b) Section 108 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (b) by inserting "1201 or" before "1301", and
(2) in subsection (c)- .
(A) by striking out "section 1301" and inserting in lieu
thereof "section 1201 or 1301", and
(B) b inserting "1201," after "722,". .
(c) Sections ~1(a), 329(bXl)(B), and 1l06<aXS) of title 11, United
. States Code, are each amended by striking out "or 13" each place it
appears and inserting in lieu thereof", 12, or 13".
(d) Sections 322(a) and. 546(aXl) of title 11, United States Code. are
each amended by striking out "or 1302" each place it appears and
inserting in lieu thereof "1302, ot 1202".
(e) SeCtion 327 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (b) by inserting ", 1202," after "section 721....
and
(2) in sub6ection (c) by inserting ", 12," after "section 7",
<0 Section 33()(c) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inserting "12 or" before "13". .
(g) SeCtion 346 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (b) by inserting ", 12," after "chap-ter 7".
(2) in subsection (g)(l)(C) by inserting "or 12" after 'chapter
11", and
(3) in sub6ection (iX1) by inserting ", 12," after "chapter 7".
(hi Section 347 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (a)-
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(A) by inlertiDg ", 1226," after "NCtion 726", and
(B) by inlertiDg ",12," after "chapter 7", and
(2) in subsection (b)-(A) by striking out "or 11" aDd inlertiq in lieu thereof ",
11, or 12", and(B) by 8trik.i.Jll out "or 1178" and inlertiDI in lieu thereof
"1173, or 1225".
(i) Section 348 of title 11, United State. Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (b)-
(A) by 8triking out "and 1828<a)" and inlertiDI in lieu
thereof "1201(a), 1221, and 1228(a)", and
(B) by 8triking out "or 1807" and iDlertiDg in lieu thereof
"1307, or 1208",
(2) in subsections (c) and (e) by striking out "or 1307" each
place it appears and in8ertiDg in lieu thereof "1807, or 1208",
and .
(3) in subsection (d) by strikinI out "or 1307" and iDlertiDg in
lieu thereof", 1307, or 1208".
(j) Sections 362(eX2XC), 365(dX2), and 502(g) of title 11, United
States Code, are each amended by striking out "or 13" each place it
appears and inserting in lieu thereof "12, or 13".
(k) Section 363 of title 11, United State. Code, is amended-
(1) in 8ubeection (eXl) byIt~out "or 1304" and iDlertiDg
in lieu thereof "1304,1203, or 1204 ,aDd
(2) in subeection 0> by atrikinc out "or 18" and iJ:uJertiDg in
lieu thereof",12, or 13". .
0> Section 364(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
strikiDI out "or 1304" and inIertiDc in lieu thereof "1304, 1203, or
1~~ -
(m) Section 365(g) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
. (1) in pa~ph (1) by s¢kinr out "or 18" and iDlertiDg in
lieu thereat" 12, or 13", IlIld
(2) in paragraph (2)- .
(A) by striking out "or 13" lind iDlertiDg in lieu thereof
"12, or 13", and .
(B) by rtriking out "or 1307" each place it appean and
inserting in lieu thereof ",1307, or 1208".
(n) Section 523(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
striking out "or 1328(b)" and inserting in lieu thereof ", 1228(a),
1228(b), or 1328(b)".
(0)' Section 524 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-=
(l) in subeections (aXl), (eX1), and (d) b,Yltriking out "or 1328"
each place it appe8ra and inserting in lieu thereof "1228, or
1328", and
(2) in lublection (aX3) by stri.Idng out "or 1328(aX1)" and
inserting in lieu thereof". 1228(8)(1), or 1328(aXl)".
(p) Section 557(dX3) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inaerting "1202," after "1104,".
(q) Section 706 of title 11, United Statel Code, is amended-
(l) in lublection (a)-
(A) byst~out "or 1307" and iJ:uJertiDg in lieu thereof
", 1307, or 1208 ,and
(B) by striking out "or 13" and inserting in lieu thereof",
12, or 13",ADd .
(2) i1l'8Ubsection (Q) by iDlerting "12 or" before "13"•
. (r) Section 726(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
IDIerting "1208," after "section 1112". .
r":26
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Subtitle C-Miseellaneous Amendments and
Technical Corrections to Title 11
SEC. ZlII. SUPPORT OBLIGATION&.
Section 523(a)(5) of title 11, United State. Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out "decree," and inIerting in lieu thereof
"decree",and
(2) by inserting ", determination mede in accordance with
State or territorial law by a governmental unit," after "record".
SEC. Z8Z. DISCHARGE.
Section 524<d) of title 11, United State. Code is amended-
(1) in the first sentence by striking out "aball" the first place
it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "may",
(2) in the second sentence by inserting "any" after "At", and
(3) in the third sentence by inserting "the court shall hold a
hearloA' at which the debtorehall appear in perlOn and" after
"then'':"
(s) Section 727(a)(9) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inserting "1228 or" before "1328".
(t) SeCtion 728(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inserting "or 1208" after "eection 1112".
(u) Section 1306(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1) by Itrikinr out "or 11" and inserting in
lieu thereof", 11, or 12", and(2) in paragraph (2) by~ out "or 11" and inserting in
lieu thereof", 11, or 12".
(v) Section 1307 of title 11, United State. Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (b) by striking out "or 1112" and inserting in
lieu thereof", 1112, or 1208",(2) in subsection (d) by jnserting "or 12" after "chapter lI",
an(~) in subsection (e) bi"Sirwng out "or 11" and inserting in
lieu thereof", 11, or 12".
Oct. 27LAWS OF 99th CONG.-2nd SESS.
SEC. ZlI3. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
(aX1) Section 101(43)(A)(zv) of title 11, United States Code, as
amended bysec:tion 251, is amended by striking out "secuity" and
inserting in lieu thereof "security".
(2) Section 101(51) of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 251, is amended by striking out the .emicolon at the end
thereofand inserting in lieu thereofa period.
(b)(l) Section 303(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended br
striking out "subject on" and inaerting in lieu thereof "subject or .
(2) Section 303(h)(l) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
striking out "that".(c)"Section 346(j)(7) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
. striking out "owned" and inserting in lieu thereof "owed".
(d) Section 362(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (6) by striking out "financial institution,"
each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof", (mancia}
institutions",(2) striking "or" after the semicolon in the first paragraph (9),
P.L. 99-664
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. (3) striking out "(9)" in the second paragraph (9), and "(10)" in
paragraph (10) and inserting in lieu thereof "(10)" and "(11)",
respectively, and
(4) in paragraph (10), as 80 redesignated, by striking out the
period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof "; or".
(e)(l) Section 365(c) of title 11, United States Code, ja amended
by- (1) striking "or and assignee of such contract or lease" in
subparagraph (1 XA), and
(2) in paragraph (3) bv-
(A) inserting "is'" after "lease", and
(B) inserting "and" after "property".
(2) Paragraph (1) of section 365(h) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by inserting "or timeshare plan" after "lease" the fourth
place it appears. .
(3) Section 365<m) of title 11, United States Code, is amended br
striking out "362lbX9)" and inserting in lieu thereof "362(1)(10)' .
(fl(l) Section 502(b)(6)(A)(ii) of title 11, United States Code, ja
amended by striking out "reposessed" and inserting in lieu thereof
"re sessed". ~(~Section 502(i) of title 11, United States Code, is amended br
striking out "507(8)(6)" and inserting in lieu thereof "507(a)(7)' .
(g) Section 503(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subparagraph (1)(B) by striking out "507(a)(6)" and
inserting in lieu thereof "507(a)(7)".
(2) in paragraph (5) by inserting "and" after the semicolon,
and
(3) in paragraph (6) by striking out "; ana" and inserting in
lieu thereof a period.
(h) Section 521(4) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inaerting ", whether or not immunity is granted under section 344 of
this title" after "estate" the second place it appears.
m(1) Section 522(h)(1) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by striking out "tittle" and inserting in lieu thereof "title".
(2) Section 522(i)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
Itriiing out "his" and inserting in lieu thereof "this".
(jXl) Section 523(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(A) in subparagraph (1 )(A) by striking out "507(a)(6)" and
inserting in lieu thereof "507(a)(7)", and
(B) by redesignating the second paragraph (9) 88 paragraph
(10).
(2) Section 523Cb) of title 11, United States Code, is amended bv
Itriking out "Services" and inserting in lieu thereof "Service'''.
ea) Section 524<d)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
ItrikinI out "subeection" the second place it appean and il1lerting
ill lieu thereof "section".
0) Section 54&e) of title 11, United Statee Code, is amended by
iDIerting • comma after "stockbroker".
....(m) SeCtion 547(b)(4XB) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
tq inlerting "and" after the semicolon.JIl) ~ion 548(d)(2)(B) of title 11, United States Code, is amended,=~~t1t :'~ancial ~itution," and inserting in lieu thereof
• lDStltutlon".
(0) Section 549(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
..~~r. striking out "that occurs" ,and inserting in lieu thereof
, 1-28
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(2) by strikinl out "ia valid ~ainst the trustee to the extent
of" and inlerting in lieu thereof 'to the extent", and
(3) by inserting "ia" before "given".
(p.) Section 554(c) of title 11, United Statel Code, is amended by
strik.41g out "521(aX1)" and inaerting in Ueu thereof "521(1)".
(q) The items relating. to leCtiona:0i7, 558, and 559 in the table of
sections for IUbchapter m of chapter 5 of title 11, United States
Code, are amended to read as follows:
"SS7. Expedited cIetermiDaUon 01 in..... in, and abIuIdcmment or other dilpoej.
tion or II'8in .-ta.
"m. Dere... or the 8Itate.
"569. Contnetual riBht to liquidate • I'eJIW'Cb-.....nt....
(r) Section 724(bX2) of title 11, United Statel Code, is amended
by- ., .
(1) striking out "or", 8DII
(2) inaertin ", or 507(a)(6)" after "507(aX5)".
(I) Section 7268,) of title 11, United States Code, is amended bv
striking out "or (6)" and inaerti.nc in lieu thereof "(8) or (7)'''.
(t) section 743 of title 11, United SteW Code, ia amended by
striking. out "(d)".
(u) section 1121(d) of title 11, United States Code, ia amended by
strikinl out "subsection" and~ in lieu thereof "subsections(b)and .
(v) Section 1129(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (7) by ItrikiDa out "of' the fmt time it
appears,
(2) in subparagraph (9)(B) by~ out "or 507(aX5)" the
first time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "507(aX5) or
507(aX6)", and .
. (3) in~ph (9XC) by ItrikiDc out "(6)" and inserting in
lieu thereof' rt)' .
(w) Section 1302(eXl) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
striking out "fIX" and ineerting in Ueu thereof "set for such
individual".
(x) Section 1324 of title 11, United States Code, is amended in the
88COnd sentence by striking out "the" the first place it appears.
(y) Section 1325(b)(2)(A) of title ll;United States Code, is amended
by striking out "or" after the semieolon and inserting in lieu thereof
"and".
(z) Section 1326(a)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended bv
striking out "payments" and iDlerting in Ueu thereof "payment'''.
(aa) Ofrlcial Bankruptcy Form No. f, referred to in RUle 1002 of
the Bankruptcy Rules, ia amended-
• (1) in~ph (6) by strpr.in« out ''1 or 13" and iDlerting in
lieu thereof ''1,11,12, or 13", ana
(2) by striking out "7 or 13" and iD8erting in lieu thereof "7,
11,12, or 1a" in the statement to be made by the attorney in
"Exhibit 'B'''.
TITLE In-TRANSITION AND
'ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
uc. JOI.INCUMBENT UNITED STATES 'I'IWSTEES.
(.) ABEA POR WHICH APPoINftD.-Notwithstanclina any paragraph
of section 581(a) of title 28, United States Cocfe, as in effect
1-29
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before the effective date of this Act, a United Statal tI'UItee ..mill
in IUch office on the effective date of thil Act Iha1l ..rve the
remainin, term of luch office .. United States truItM for th'!'8fPon
lpecified in a pal'8f:l'8ph of IUch section, .. amended by this Act,
that includes the lIte at which the primary official station of the
United States truatee is located immediately before the effective
date of this Act.
(b) TuM OJ' Omc&-Notwithltandin, lletion 581(b) of title 28,
United States Code, .. in effect before the effective date of this Act.
the term of offtce of any United Statel trustee limn, in tueh office
OD the date of the enactment of this Act Ihall upire-
(1) 2 yean after the expiration date of such term of office
under .uch section, .. 10 in effect, or
(2) 4 yean after the date of the enactment of this Act,
whichever occurs tint.
SIC. aot.lFFEtTIVB DATES; APPLICATION or AMBHDIIBN'I'IL
(a) GDDAL EJrr&cTrv. DA1'&-Except .. provided in aubeeetioDi
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (I), thiI Act and the amendments made by thiI Act
aball take effect 30 days after the date of the enactment of thiI Act.
(b) AlmmJaN'l'lRa..tTING TO BANDt1P'I"CY JVDGa AND IHCUM-
111ft' UNlDD STATI:S TavlTDI.-Subtitle A of title I, and eectioDl
301 and 307(a),1ha1l take effect on the date of the enactment of this .
Act.(c) AlmmJaN'l'l Ra..tTING TO FAIIJLY FARMZRII-(1) The amend-
ments made bYlUbtitle B of title D ahall not apply with respect to
ce.- commenced under titl. 11 of the United Statel Code before the
efFective date of this Act. .
(2) Section 1202 of title 11 of the United Statal Code (al added by
the amendment made brlletion 255 of this Act) Ihall take effect on
the effective date of thiI Act and before the amendment made by
MCtioD 2Z1 of this Act.
(3) Until the amendmentl made by lubtitle A of title D of this Act
become effective in a district and apply to a C8II8, for purpoees of
1IlChcue-
<A)(i) any reference in lletion 326(b) of title 11 of the United
Statel Code to chapter 13 of title 11 of the United Statel Code
Ihall be deemed toDe a reference to chapter 12 or ehapter 13 of
title 11 of the United Statel Code,
(ii) any reference in lUeh aection326(b) to aeetion 1302(d) of
title 11 of the United StatelCode aha1l be deemed to be a
reference to aeetion 1302<d) of title 11 of the United States Code
or lIeCtion 586(b) of title 28 of the United StatelCode, and
(iii) any reference in lUeh lNlCtion 326(b) to lletion 1302<a) of
title 11 of the United States Code shall be deemed to be a
reference to section 1202(a) or aection 1302(a) of title 11 of the
United States Code, and
(B)(i) the flJ'lt two refeiencea in Ieetion 1202(a) of title 11 of
the United States Code (u added by the amendment made by
lICtion 255 of this Act) to the. United Stll* trustee Ihall be
deemed to be a reference to the court, and
(ii) any reference in luch lletion 1202(a) to section 586(b) of
title 28 of the United States. Code Ihall be deemed to be a
reference to section 1202(c) of title 11 of the United StatM Code
(MIO added). .
lei) APPuCATION OJ' AlmNDJaN'l'I TO JUDICIAL DarraIC'l'B.-
1-30
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(1) CDTAIN DOION8 Nor Ct1BUNTLY SDVBD BY 'UHJTm STATII
TRU8TU8.--(A) The amendments made by subtitle A of·title U of
this Act, and section 1980<a)(6) of title 28 of the United States
Code (81 added by section 117(4) ofthil Act).lhall not-
(i).beco~eeffectivein or with reapect to a judicial district
specified m lubpaJ'8ll'8ph (Il) until. or
(ii) apply to cues while pending in such district before,
the expiration of the 27O-day period beginning on the effective
date of this Act or of the 8lktay period beginning on the date
the Attornel General certifies under section 803 of this Act the
region 8pecifie4 in a paragraph of section 581(a) of title 28.
United States Code. 81 amended by section l11(a) of this Act,
that includes such district. whichever occurs rU'lt.
IB) Subparagraph (Ahlpplies to the following: .
(i) The judicialdfstrict established for ttie Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico.
(ii) The District ofConnecticut.
(iii> The judicial districts established for the State of New
York (other than the Southern District of New York).
(iv) The District ofVennont.
_ (v) The judicial districts established for the State of Penn-
sylvania.
(vi) The judicial district establilhed for the Virgin Islands
of the United States.
(vii) The District ofMaryland.
(viii) The judicial districts establilhed for the State of
North Carolina.
(ix) The District ofSouth Carolina.
(x) The judicial districts established for the State of West
Virginia. .
(xi) The Western District of Virginia.
(xii) The Eastern District ofTex8l.
(xiii) The judicial districts established for the State of
Wisconsin.
(xiv) The judicial districts established for the State of
Iowa.
(xv) The judicial districts established for the State of New
Mexico.
(xvi) The judicial districts established for the State of
Oklahoma.
(xvii> The District of Utah.
(xviii) The District of Wyoming (including those portions
of Yellowstone National Park situated in the States of
Montana and Idaho).
(xix) The judicial districts established for the State of
Alabama.
(xx) The judicial districts established for the State of
Florida.
(xxi) The judicial districts established for the State of
Georgia.
(2) CDTAIN UllAlNlNG Jt1J)ICIAL DIBI'RIC'I'S Nor CUJUlENTLY
SERVED BY 'UN1ftD STATES TRtJSTD8.-(A) The amendments made
by 8ubtitle A of title n of this Act. and section 1930<a}(6) of title
28 of the United States Code (81 added by section 117(4) of this
Act), shall not-
(i) become effective in or with respect to a judicial district
specified in 8ubparagraph (B) until. or
1-31
Oct. 27 BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1986 P.L. 99-554
See. 302
(ii) apply to cases while pending in such district before,
the expiration of the 2-year period beginning on the effective
date of this Act or of the 3o-day period beginning on the date
the Attorney General certifies under section 303 of this Act the
region specified in a paragraph of section 581(a) of title 28,
United States Code, as amended by section 111(a) of this Act,
that includes such district, whichever occurs first.
(8) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following:
(i) The judicial districts established for the State of Louisi-
ana.
(ii) The judicial districts established for the State of Mis-
_if-Pi.
(iii) The Southern District of Teus and the Western
District ofTexas.
(iv) The judicial districts established for the State of
Kentucky.
(v) The judicial districts established for the State, of Ten-
nessee.
(vi) The judicial districts established for the State of
Michigan.
(vii) The judicial districts established for the State of
Ohio. ,
(viii) The judicial districts established for the State of
Dlinoit (other than the Northern District of Illinois).
(ix) The judicial districts established for the State of
Indiana.
, (x) The judicial districti established for the State of Ar-bmu. .
(xi) The judicial distriet.aestablished for the State of
Nebnska.
. (xii) The judicial districts established for the State of
MisIouri.
(xiii) The District of Arizona.
(xiv) The District of Hawaii.
(xv) The judicial district established for Gqam.
(xvi) The judicial district established for the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
(xvii) The judicial districts established for the State of
California (other than the Central District of California).
(xviii) The District of Nevada.
(xix) The District of Alaska.
(D) The District of Idaho.
(ui) The District of Montana.
(uii) The District ofOregon.
(uiii) The judicial districts established for the State of
Washington.
(3)'JUDICIAL DISTRICTS FOR THE STATES 011' ALAILUIA AND NORTH
COOUNA.--{A) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2). and any
otherj)l'OVision of law, the amendments In8de by subtitle A of
title nof this Act, and section 193()(a)(6) of title 28 of the United
Sta_ Code (as added by section 117(4) of this Act), shall not-
(i) become effective in or with respect to a judicial district
specified in subparagraph ,(E) until, or
(ii) apply to cases whilE! pending in such district before,
~cUstrict elects to be included in a bankruptcy region estab-
, in section 581fa) of title 28, United States Code, as
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amended by leCtion 111(a) of tbia Act, or October I, 1992-
whichever 0CCUl"I first. \
(I) Any election under IUbparqraph (Allhall be made upon
a nuVority vote of the c~erMe or lUeb diltrict and each
~Pte7 judge inlUChj~ dittrict in ravor of such
election. • ....
(c) Notice that an election has been made under .ubpara.
II'8ph (A) shall be liven, pot later th.Im 10 days after such
election, to the Attorney General and the appropriate Federal
Circuit Court of Appeala foreuch dittrict.
(D) Any election made W)derlJ.lbR8J'H1'8ph (A) shall become
effective on the date the amendme!1ta~e by eubtitle A of title
II of this Act become effective in .t!le "liC)n that includes such
district or 30 days after theA~ ~eral receives the
notice required und~bpe.rqraph (C),whichever occurs later.
(E) Subpar8f!1!ph (A) applies to th...e 11.on.owing:
(i) The Judicial districta~ed for the State of Ala-
bama.
(li) The 1;:'~cW~ ..~l.Whed for the State ofNorthCaro' .
(F)(i) Subject to claUle (u), with~ to CNe8 under chap.
terl7, U, 12, and 13 of title 11, U.uted States Code-
a> commenced berore t1le~ve 4ate or this Act, and
(D) pendinl in a judidal.....m.n.• . ....ct. .in. the. State. of Alabama
or the State or NOrth~ .Wore any election made
under eubpar~ph (A.) by.~ dittrict becomes effective
or October I, 1992, whichever 0CCUl"I firlt,
the amendmenta made ~Yc.uon 11.3 and .ubtitle A or title II of
this Act. and section 193O(aX6) or title 28 of the United States
Code (as added by leCtion 117(4) or this Act), shall not apply
until October I, 1993, or the ~iration or the I-year period
beginning on the date .uch election becomes effective, which-
ever occurs rust.
(li) For purpoees of claUle (I), the amendmenta made by
section 113 and .ubtitle Aor .~~ U or this Act. and section
193O(aX6) of title 28 of the UDittd States Code (as added by
section 117(4) of this Act), shall not apply' with respect to a case
under chapter 7,11,12, or 13 of title 11, United States Code, if-
(I) the trustee in the CN8 (11. the final report and
account of administration of the te, required under
section 704 of .uch title, or
an a plan is confirmed ~rlection 1129. 1225, or 1325
ofsuch title,
before October I, 1993, or the exPiration of the I-year period
beginning on the date eueb election~mes effective, which-
ever occurs first.
(G) Notwithstandinl aection~ of title 28, United States
Code, as added by l8ction 115 or thit Act. funds collected as a
result of the amendments made byteetion 117 of this Act in a
judicial district in the State or "'I,,~~. or the State of North
Carolina under section 1930<,) Of title 28, United Statell Code.
before the date the amendmepta DIMe by eubtitle A of title II of
this Act take effect in euch district tbaJl be cleposited in the
general receipta of the Tre-.ury.
(H) The repeal made by MCtion 231 of this Act shall not apply
in or with respect to the Northern Dittrict of Alabama until
I-33
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March 1, 1987, or the effective date of any election made under
subj)aragraph (A) by such district, whichever occurs rll'Bt.
(I) In any judicial district in the State of Alabama or the State
of North Carolina that has not made the election deeeribed in
subparagraph (A), any person who is appointed under regula-
tions issued by the Judicial Conference of the United States to
administer estates in eases under title 11 of the United States
Code may-
(i) establish. maintain, and supervise a panel of private
trustees that are eligible and available to serve as trustees
in eases under title 11, United States Code. and
(ii) supervise the administration of eases and trustees in
eases under chapters 7, 11. 12, and 13 of title 11, United
States Code,
until the amendments made by subtitle A of title n take effect
in such district.
(e) ApPUCATION or UNITED STATU TRUSTD SY8TBM AND QuAR-
TIlLY Fus TO CDTAIN CABE8:-
(1) IN GBNDAL.-5ubject to paragraph (2), with respect to
cases under chapters.7, 11, 12, and 13 of title 11, United States
Code-(A) commenced before the effective date of this Act, and
(:8) pending in a juQicial district referred to in section
581(a) of title 28, United States Code, as amended by section
111(a) of this Act, for which a -United States trustee is not
authorized before the effective date of this Act to be
appointed,
the amendments made by~section 113 and IIUbtitle A of title II of
this Act, and section 193O(aX6) of title 28 of"the United States
Code (as added by section 117(4) of this Act), shall not apply
until the expiration of the 3-yeai period beginning_on the
effective date of this Act, or of the I-year period beginning on
the date the Attomey General certifies under section 303 of this
Act the region specified in a paragraph ofsuch section 581(a), as
10 amended. that includes such district, whichever occurs first.
(2) AMENDMENTS INAPPUCABLE.-For purposes of paragraph
(1), the amendments m,de by section 113 and subtitle A of title
n of this Act, and section 1930(aX6) of title 28 of the United
States Code (as added by section 117(4) of this Act), shall not
apply with respect to a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of title
11. United States Code, il-(A) the trustee in the case files the rmal report and
account of administration of the estate, required under
eection 704 of such title, or
(13) a plan is conflnned under section 1129, 1225, or 1325
ofsuch title, .
before the expiration of the 3-year period, or the expiration of
the I-year period, specified in paragraph (1), whichever occurs
firs&.
(3) RULB or CONSTRUcnON UGARDING nBS roB CABES.-This
Act and the amendments made by section 117(4) of this Act
Iball not be construed to require the payment of a fee under
fUllraph (6) of section 1930(a) of title 28, United States Code,
~~ cue under title 11 of the United States Code for any
-u.et Or period occurring before such paragraph becomes
elective in the district in which such case is pending.
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(n RDMJ. OJ' CRAPra 12 OJ' Tm.II 11.- Chapter 12 of titl. 11 CIt.
the United Sta. Cod. fI repealed OIl October I, 1998. All~
collllDenced or pendinl unci=: 12 ot title 11, United Stater.
Code. and aU mattenl Ud in or relatinl to IUCh~
.Iball be conducted and determined under web chapter u if 1\lCb-:
chapter had not been repealed. Th. IUbltantive rilhtl of parti. ift
couection with auch cueI, matteii. and praceedinplbalf continue
to be IOvemed under the laWi apD1icable to weh CUll, matten. and
proceedinp u ifwch chapter bid not been repealed.
SEC. aoa. CERTlFlCAnON OJ' IUDICIAL DISftlCI'S; Noria AND PUa:LJCA.
nON or CERTlnCAnON.
(a) CDTmCATlOH BY AftOlUUY Gama.u..-The Attorney General
may certify in writing a "lion lJ*ified in a paJ'Bll'aph of 1eCti0D
581(a) of title 28, United S~t.Qxle (other than pa1'8Ir8ph (16»...
amended by eection 111("'-ol tm. Act, to the appropriate court of
appeala ol the United Stat., for the purpoIe ol informing such court
that certain amendmentl made by thfI Act will become effective in
accordance with aection S02 ol tm. Act.
(b) NO'I'ICK AND PuauCATlON or CaTmCATlON.-Whenever the
Attorney General tranamitl a certif1eation under IUbIection (a). the
Attorney General Ihall limultan8OUl1y-
(1) tranamit a copy of web certlftcation to the Speaker ol the
HoUle of Repreeentativee and to the Prelident pro tempore of
the Senate. and .
(2) publish IUCh certification in the Federal RePter.
SIC. IN. ADIIINJ8'I'ItA'I'IV8PROVl8JONS.
(a) CooPDATIW AauNGDmmI.-The Attorney General and the
.Director of the Adminiatrative Office of the United Stat. COurta
may enter into qreementa under which United Stat. tru8teeI
may-
(1)u..- "
(A) the I8rVices, equipment, penoue1. recorda, reports,
and data compilatiOD8, in any form. ol the courtl of the
United Stat., and
(B) the faciliti. ofwch COUI'tI, and
(2) cooperate in the UIe by the courtl of the United Stat. ol-
(A) the ..mee.. equipment, pel'lOllne1. recorda, reports.
and data compilatiOD8, in any form. ol United Statel trust-
.... and
(B) the faciliti. ofsuch truateee,
to prevent duplication d11l'iq the 2-year period befrinninl on
the eft'ective date ol thiI Act.
(b) INFoRMATION AND DocuY&N'rS Ra.ATlNG TO BANDUPl'CY CARl
AND UNlftD STADII TaVI'I'DI.-The Director of the Adminiltrative
Oftice of the United Sta. QNrtI Ihall make available to UDited
Stat. trustees. at the request ol the Attorney General and on a
continuina buia, aU recorda, reportl, and data compilations relating
tA»-
(1) c.- and~inpunder title 11" ol the United States
(bIe,and
(2) the duU. ol United Stat. truIteeI under titl. 11 and 28
of the United Stat. Code.
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sEC. 305. APPLICATION OF CERTAIN BANKRUPTCY RULES.
(a) RUUS RELATING TO THE UNITED STATIlS TRUSTIlE SYSTIlM.-If a
United States trustee is not authorized. before the effective date of
his Act. to be appointed for a judicial district referred to in section~1(a> of title 28. United States Code, as amended by section l11(a) of
. Act. then part X of the Bankruptcy Rules shall not apply to
=. in such district until the amendments made by subtitle A of
title II of this Act become effective under section 302 of this Act in
uch district.
S (b) RuLIS RIlLATlNQ TO CHAPTER 12 OF Trru: n.-The rules pre-
scribed under section 2075 of title 28, United States Code, and in
fleet on the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply to cases~L1ed under chapter 12 of title 11, United States Code, to the extent
practicable and not inconsistent with the amendments made by title
nof this Act.
sEC" SALARY OF INCUMBENT umTED STATES TRUSTEES.
For service as a United States trustee in the period beginning on
the effective date of this Act and ending on the expiration under
_on 301 of this Act of their respective terms of office, the salary .
.Jl818b.le to United. States trustees serring in such offices on the
effective date of this Act ahall be fixed in accordance with section
587 of title 28, United States Code, as amended by section 114(a) of
thilAct.
sEC m. PRESERVATION OF UNITED STATES TRUSTEE SYSTEM DURING
PENDENCY OF LEGISLATION; REPEALER.
(a) TIMJ'ORARY DELAY OF R8PEAL OP UNITED SrATBI TauSTD
SYST£M.-EtTective immediately before November 10, 1986, section
408(c) of the Act of November 6. 1978 (Public Law 95-598; 92 Stat.
2687>' ia amended by striking out "November 10, 1986" and inserting
in lieu thereof "30 days after the effective date of the Bankruptcy
J~United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
ofl986".
(1) CoNJ'ORMING AMENDMENT.-8ection 408 of the Act of Novem-
ber 6, 1978 (Public Law 95-598; 92 Stat. 2687), is repealed.
SEC. 308. CONSIDERATION OF CURRENT PRIVATE TRUSTEES FOR
APPOINTMENT BY UNITED STATES TRUSTEES.
lalTRuST!lS IN BANKRUPI'CY CASES UNDER CHAPTER 7.-lt is the
tense of the Congress that individuals who are serving before the
fffective date of this Act, as trustees in cases under chapter 7 of title
11, United states Code, should be considered by United States
truItees for appointment under section 586(a)(1) of title 28, United
States Code, to the panels of private trustees that are established as
• result of the amendments made by this Act.
lbl9rANDING TRUSTEES IN BANKRUPTCY CASES UNDER CHAPTER
13.-It is the sense of the Congress that individuals who are serving
bfrore the effective date of this Act, as standing trustees in cases
IlDdtr chapter 13 of title 11, United States Code, should be consid-
~~ by the United States trustees for appointment under section
5864~1 of title 28, United States Code, as standing trustees who are
Ippomted as a result of the amendments made by this Act.
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SEC. 3ot. APPOINTMENT or UNITED STATES TRU8'tD8 BY THE AnoR.ltii!y
GENERAL
It is the sense of the CoD1J'811 that indivtduall othenriM qualified
who are serviDl, before the eft'ective date of thiI Act, u ettate
adminiatraton under title ll.o£.th, Unitld Statel Cod, .howd be
coDlidered b-, the Attorney~General for apintment under lICtioDi
581 and. 582 of title 28, United Stattl COde, to new poeitiol1l of
United States trustee and aailtant United Statel truItet ,.wtinc
from the amendments made by thiI Act.
SEC. 310. ELECI'RONIC CASE MANAGEMENT DEMONSTRATION PROJEer.
(a) EaTABI.IIIDONT 0,. PaoacT.-Not later than 1 year after the
effective date of this Act, the Director of the Executive Oftice for
United States Trusteee'in coniu1tation with the DirectOr of the
Administrative Office'(,f£he United StateeCourtB, lhall ettablish an
electronic case manageD1ent demoDltration project to be ,carried out
in 3 Federal judicial districts that have- aaUfficiently large and
varied bankruptcy caseload 10 88 to provides meaningful evaluation
of the cost and effectiven.. of IUCh QItem. A contract for such
project shall be awarded-
(1) on the buia of competitive bids lubmitted by qualified
nongovernmental entiti. that are able to desi:pJ an automatedjoint information syatem for OM bY'the United States courts and
by United States trusteel, and
(2) in accordance with the. Federal Pro~rty and Administra-
tive Services Act of 1949, the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy Act, and title 31 of the United States Code.
(1) STtiDY BY GBNDAL ACCOUNTING omCE.-Not later than 1
year after the electronic case management .,.wn beIinJ to operate
. in all of the judicial districts participating in the demonstration
project carried out under sub8ection (a), the General Accounting
Office shall conduct a study to compare the cost and effectiveness of
such syatem with the cost and eft'eetiveneas of case management
systems used in Federal judicial distrietI· that are·not participating
in such project.
. (c) TUM 0,. Pao.Jzcr.-The demonstration project required by
subsection (a) shall be carried out until-
(1) the expiration of the 2-year period ~ing on the date
the electronic case management system begins to operate in all
of the judicial districts participating in IUch project, or
(2) legislation is enaCted to extend. upand, modify, or termi·
nate the operation ofsuch project,
whichever occurs first.
(d) USlr BY CLaD 0,. THE CotrKTl.-The electronic case manage.
ment system demonstrated under the project required by subsection
(a) shall provide the clerk of court in each diltriet in which such
system is operated, with a means of-
(1) maintaining a com~lete electronic case rue of all relevant
information contained m petitions and. lChedules (and any
amendments thereto) relatiDa to debtorain CUll under title 11
of the United States Code, including-
(A) a complete list of creditors in each such case, as listed
by the debtor,
(B) a complete list of .... scheduled by the debtor, .the
value of such 8IIIt, and any action taken by the trustee or
debtor in po81MlIIion with iegarcl. to such 8118t during the
pendency of IUch case,
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(e) a complete list of debts and, with respect to each
debt-
(i) any priority of such debt under title 11 of the
United States Code.
(ii) whether such debt is secured or unsecured, and
(iii) whether such debt is. contingent or
noncontingent, and
(0) the debtor's statements of current expenses and
income, and .
(2) maintaining all calendars and dockets and produc~ all
notices required to be sent in cases under title 11 of the United
States Code.(e) USE BY UNITED STATES TauSTDS.-The electronic case manage-
uaent system demonstrated under the project required by subsection(al shall provide. at a minimum, the United States trustee .in each
district in which such system is operated with- ~
(1) complete electronic case files which contain. in addition to
the information listed in subsection (d), records ofcase openings.
case closinp, hearings, and the filing of all motions, trustee
appointments, pleadings. and responses, as well as a record of
the reeponses by the United States trustee to those motions,
trustee appointments, and pleadings,
(2) a means to generate stanaardized forms for motions,
appointments, pleadinp, and responses,· .
(3) a means to generate standard management reports and
Ietten on an exception basis.
(4) • means to maintain accounting records, reports. and
information required to be maintained by debtonin poIIJefJIion
and trustees in cases under title 11 of the United States Code,
(5) a means to calculate and record distribution to creditol'8.
ftDa1 applications and orden for distribution. and final case
closing reports. and
(6) a means to monitor the payment of fi1inI and other
required fees.
(f) AvAlWllLlTY TO CurAIN GoVBRNMBNTAL ENTmI:s.-Unlim-
iIId__ to information maintained in the electronic case manage-
_tQItem demoDltrated under the project required by subeection(a)1haD be p1'O!ided at no charge to the following:
(1) The C'mIgreu•
•<2> The Ezecutive Office for the United States Trustees.
(3) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
(4) The clerks of the courts in judicial districts in which such
.,am is operated and pel'8Ons who review case information. in
IIlIlOrdanc:e with section 107(a) of title 11. United States Code, in
tbe oftic:ea of the clerks.
(5) The judges on the bankruptcy and district courts in dis-
tridI in which such system is operated.
. (6) TruItees in cases pending in districts in which such system
• operated. .
fI) FIll fOR 0rHn USDS.-(1) The entity which is awarded a
-..:t to provide the electronic case D1anagement system dem-
~er this project ~y. under guidelines established by
. or the Ezecutive Office for the United States Trustees
: tile IlIOtiIions ofsuch contract, collect reasonable fees from assets~ .-ate or the debtor in bankruptcy for providing notices and
..... to the court and trustees under the demonstration project.
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(2) Aeee. to information maintaiDed in e1eetroDic cue m. purq. ,
ant to the demollltration project~ be provided to penona other
than thOll specified in lUblection (I), but luch aee-Iball be limited
to viewinl lucb information only. A. reucmable cham for luch
8cceII may be collected by the~8Iltitywhich iI awarded a contract
under thilleCtion, in accordance with the lUideliD. eltablilbed by
the Director of the Eucutive Oftlce for the UDited Stat.- Trustees in
such contract. A reuonable portion of any charlre 10 collected may
be required by the Director to be remitted to the Executive Office for
UDited Sta* 'l;'ruItees and depolited in the UDited States Trustee
System Fund establisbed in eection 589a of title 28, UDited Stata
Code.
(h) SIlCt7BlTY.-ACC811 PlO"ided under subeection (I) to an entity or
an individual shall be~ to such eecurity limitations .. may be
impoeed by the Congrell or the head of the affected entity.
SEC. '11. CA8BS PENDING UNDD TIm 8ANIUWPTCY Aer.
At the end of one calendar year foll~ the date the amend-
menta made by subtitle A of title U of~ Act take effect in a
district in which any cue illtill pending under the Bankruptcy Act,
the district court shall withdraw the reference of any such cue and.
after notice and a beariDI, determine the ltatus of the cue. Such
cue shall.be remanded to the bankruptcy judp with JUCb instruc-
tions as are nec:e8l8l')' for the prompt clOlinl of the cue and with a
requirement that a.c-r- report on the cue be provided by the
bankruptcy judp such interval .. the district court deems
appropriate.
Approved October '1:1, 1986.
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LENDER LIABILITY
PART I
"Sue the Lender"
Videotape
Bankers Training and Consulting Company
St. Louis, MO
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Viewing Guide lor "Sue the Lender!"
The video tape "Sue the Lender!" is designed for both selHnstruction and
group viewing. Here are some suggestions to help you get the most out of this
video program.
Self-Instruction
We encourage sell-instruction viewers to stop the tape when exhibit numbers
appear and refer to the appropriate section of this handbook. It summarizes
the material and contains additional material and advice There is also space
to write notes for future reference
Many aspects of "Lender Liability" are new and we encourage you to have a
senior loan officer or legal counsel available for "debriefing" and discussion.
Sue The Lender! IIJ - 1
Group Viewing
"Sue the Lender!" is also an excellent group discussion aid. The lively; enter-
taining format will teach your loan personnel with minimal advance preparation
Although the program is designed primarily for commercial loan officers, we
encourage you to have other loan personnel attend the viewings...consumer
lenders, credit analysts and note tellers. When everybody is sensitive to the pit-
falls of lender liability: they can help each other detect potential problems
before it IS too late.
We also encourage you to have a senior loan officer or legal counsel present
when the tape is shown.
• Discuss how the program advice relates to your organization's loan policy
and lending practices.
• How do the cases discussed during the show compare to some of your
war stories?
• Use role playing to practice responding to credit inquiries on your
organizations deteriorating accounts.
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-NOTICE-
The field of lender liability is changing rapidly Although we have made
every effort to present accurate and up-to-date information. this handbook
and accompanying video tape are not substitutes tor sound legal counsel.
What is "Lender Liability"?
Certain actions by lenders may make them liable for the damages that result.
both to borrowers and to third parties like suppliers and investors. Some of the
pitfalls have emerged recently while others have existed for a long time.
Why is lender liability important?
There has been a rapid and disturbing rise in the number at lawsuits alleging
lender liability It has become one of the "hottest" areas at the law
The costs of lender liability can be staggering
• Multl·mIllion dollar jUdgements
• Voided security agreements
• Subordination of claims to other creditors ...
• Bad publicity in the commumty .
• Lost customer loyalty ...
• Wasted management time.
• Decreased employee morale.
• Large legal expenses
Lenders do win the majority of lawsuits alleging lender liability ...but win or
lose. the cost to all creditors is high.
What this program covers
"Sue the Lender!" focuses on three of the most common. and important. areas
of lender lJabllity
I Controlling and 10terfenng 10 a borrower's affairs
2 Not dealing wllh a borrower 10 "good faith"
J MIsrepresentatIon and Fraud
It revIews many of the cases 1Ovolvmg lender liabIlity and 10cludes numerous
suggestions to help you mmlTTIlze trouble
What this program does not cover
There are other areas of lender liability not covered in this program. including:
• Fraudulent conveyances
• EqUitable subordination
• Violations of federal security laws
• The racketeer influenced and corrupt organization act (RICO)
We encourage you to seek qualified counsel on all these issues.
Copynght© :985 by Bankers Trmmng and Consulting Company Ali rights reserved Printed In the United
States ot America No part ot thiS handbook may be reproduced. stored in a retrieval system. electronic.
mechamcal photo copy recording or otherWIse. without the prior written permission ot Bankers Trainmg
and Consulting Company
For additIonal copIes of thiS handbook please call or wnte
Bankers Trmnmg and Consulting Company. 1695 South Brentwood Blvd. Suite 206. Sl Louis. MO 63i44.
(314) 968·0220
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Trouble spots
Every case is different. but there are still some general trouble spots to beware ot
It can add up to a lot of mone"
The legal concepts of control and interference are sometimes ditticult to grasp
because every lending relationship contams some degree of "control" and
"interference': Both security agreements and loan agreements restrict the
debtor in a number of ways. Therefore. loan officers need to understand which
controls and restrictions are sate and which ones may constitute "control and
interterence" in a legal sense
What 15 the Problem?
When a credit starts to deteriorate. the lender has a natural desire to get involved
with the debtor to protect its loan.
However. in the process of working with- the debtor to solve its problems,
lenders occasionally exercise excessive control over management. or intertere
unreasonably in the operations. When this happens. the lender may become
liable for any resulting damages, including financial losses suttered by the
debtor, missed opportunities. and punitive damages. A lender in control of a
debtor may also become liable for the debtor's other obligations.
Bane.
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CONTROL AND INTERFERENCE
What actions and restrictions constitute Control and Interference?
Unfortunately; no court or commentator has yet put forth a workable definition
of what constitutes "control" and "interference': Every case is different, and
many courts interpret the issues differently. It is too early to tell how the creditor
control doctrine will evolve until the appelate courts sort out the legal issues
and competing interests.
Ask yourself these questions:
• Are the restrictions I impose necessary to protect my loan?
• Are these restrictions applied in a consistent. reasonable manner?
• Are they reasonable commercial practices in my industry and in my
community?
If the answer is "no", you may have crossed the line into "Control and
Interterence".
A finding of 'Control and Interterence' will depend on the cumulative impact
of the facts in each case, the circumstances surrounding the facts and the over
all relationship between the lender and the debtor. Just because your loan
documents give you the right to impose certain controls and restrictions
does not protect you from becoming liable for "Control and Interference".
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1. Restrictive Covenants: Every loan agreement contains some restrictions on
the borrower. and the courts agree that the mere existence of restrictions does
not constitute control or interference in the legal sense. It has been widely
accepted that most of the "normal" loan covenants are an integral part of the
lender-debtor relationship. For example. having the right to veto a debtor's
large financial transactions. such as mergers and large capital expenditures. is
usually safe.
Also. the courts recognize the lender's need to get more involved in a
deteriorating company; including imposition of additional restrictions.
However. making management decisions or exercising a veto over normal
day to day activities (such as hiring and firing employees. purchasing and
marketing) is strong evidence of control. Any daily involvement in the debtor's
business is evidence of control and interference.
2. Controlling the composition of the debtor's board of directolS: Loan
agreements sometimes give the lender the right to veto changes on the board
of directors. By itself. this is not proof of control. ..but if the lender uses that veto
power to get its own people elected to the board. people who are there to
serve its interests rather than the shareholders. this is very strong evidence of
control and interference. Also. as we will see shortly; it is very dangerous for a
lender to use its veto power over the board to coerce the borrower to do other
things that it wants done.
Occasionally loan agreements give the lender the right to fill specific board
seats. Avoid that situation whenever possible. And remember that being a
director is one of the tests of being an insider under the bankruptcy code
3. Improper use of economic coercion to effect management changes or to
control operations is otten used to substantiate allegations of control and
interference.
Although mere dependence by the debtor on the creditor is not proof of control.
threatening to call (lloan to control a debtor or get him to do your bidding
will definitely be used against you in court.
Also. it the lender uses economic coercion to induce the debtor to do things
that are clearly intended only for the lender's benefit. such as selling off assets
to the competition to pay down bank debt. it will be used as evidence of control.
Lesson: Having the right to call a loan does not give you the right to threaten
to call a loan in order to control your borrower's course of action.
4. Control over finances: Restricting major financial transactions. such as mergers,
acquisitions. and capital expenditures. is usually safe. The courts recognize that
such transactions can undermine the quality of a loan and that it is
reasonable for a lender to restrict them.
However. the lender should not get into a position where he/she controls all
cash disbursements. It you approve every payment. either directly or through
an agent. it is strong evidence of control. It is also very dangerous for a loan officer
to assure other creditors that they will be paid... it may make you responsible to
do sa.
-
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5. Counseling: When a loan begins to deteriorate, debtors otten seek their
lender's advice. In most circumstances, it is sate tor the lender to give such
counsel. It the borrower tallows your advice, it does not constitute control and
intenerence...even it your advice is "bad" and damages result you won't
normally be held liable tor the results.
However, trouble arises when the lender uses the threat at detault to get the
debtor to tallow its advice, or when the advice is clearly intended solely tor
the lender's benefit.
6. Control over management appointments: Many loan agreements give
lenders the right to veto changes in management (usually called a "manage·
ment change clause"). This is especially important in smaller companies
which are heavily dependent on one or two people.
With or without a management change clause, it is normally sate tor the lender
to express dissatistaction with existing management and suggest possible
replacements. But don't select those replacements, whether OJ not you have a
management change clause.
And be reasonable in the way you apply the management change clause:
• Don't keep saying "no" until they select the person you preter:
• Be especially careful saying "no" it the debtor isn't in detault or is only
in "minor" detault
• Don't use the management change clause to coerce the debtor to do
other things you want done (see Farah case below tor illustration);
Lesson: It the lender selects management or inteneres unreasonably in its
selection, it may become liable tor the damages that result.
7. Hiring consultants: When a company hits upon hard times, a lender will otten
suggest the use ot a consultant to help till the gaps in existing management
and/or turn the tirm around.
Suggesting that a debtor hire a consultant does not by itself constitute control.
A lender can, and should, give suggestions on possible candidates and relate
his/her knowledge and experience about each. However, it you make the
selection, or pressure the debtor to accept your choice, you are vulnerable to
charges at control and interference
On the other hand. lenders do have the right to hire their own consultant to
visit the debtor's premises. meet with management. and monitor its activities.
Just be sure the consultant doesn't get involved in day to day management...
controlling the checkbook, tiring and hiring people, countermanding
management decisions and so on.
8. Inducing the debtor to renege on an obligation. or to breach an existing
contract is very dangerous. This can arise with employment contracts or when
a lender knowingly obtains a pledge at collateral that violates a negative
pledge to another creditor.
9. Having voting power 01 debtor's stock may be tantamount to control.
10. Taking possession 01 the debtor's facilities will almost certainly be
deemed "control".
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11. Requiring your borrower to provide information: To date, the courts have
not questioned the lender's right to require detailed reports, financial
statements, and other pertinent information.
Remarks: _
,-_._-------
I An example to illustrate control and interference
One of the most widely publicized cases of lender liability involved the Farah Manufacturing
Company Even though it had some unique characteristics that limit its application
elsewhere. the case illustrates many of the pitfalls posed by workout loans,
Farah Manufacturing Company (FMC) made men's apparel. Originally family owned
and run. FMC had grown to become a publicly held company with professional
management. When the business got into financial difficulty; one of the founders. Mr.
William Farah. tried to get elected Chief Executive Officer. but the lenders used a
management change clause in the loan agreement to prevent his election.
, Instead the lenders used the threat of default to induce FMC to hire consultants selected
by them. one of whom was later elected CEO. As CEQ he took over day to day management
of the firm. controlling disbursements. hiring and firing, limiting capital expenditures and
selling oft assets to pay down bank debt. The lenders also got 2 of their representatives
elected to FMC's Board of Directors,
Despite these changes. FMC continued to decline and eventually Mr, Farah did become
Chief Executive Officer. He turned FMC around. sued the lenders. and won a judgement
of over Sl8 million for the lender's "fraud. duress and interterence",
!
...
--- ...
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Here are some lessons we can learn from the FMC case and others like it:
Lesson #1: Don't coerce the borrower. In the FMC case, the lenders used the
threat of default to:
1) ?revent Mr. Farah's return to management
2) Pack the board of directors. and
3) Install a hand chosen consultant
This constituted duress and "unlawful interference with Farah's right to lawful
management and proper corporate governance", They told FMC's board that
they would "bankrupt" FMC and "padlock it the next day" if Mr. Farah was
elected CEO. Even though the loan agreement gave the lenders the right to
approve management changes. this did not give them the right to coerce the
debtor to do other things they wanted to have done. such as hire a consultant
or change the composition of the board.
To quote the court on this issue: "acceleration clauses are not be used offensively
such as for commercial advantage of the creditor. They do not permit acceler-
ation when the facts make its use unjust or oppressive".
(please see Exhibit 12 for a discussion of how fraud also affected this case)
Lesson #2: Avoid personality conflicts with the debtor. Personality conflicts
played an important role in the outcome of the Farah case. The plaintiffs showed
that one of the loan officers who handled the account probably held a
grudge against Mr. Farah for something that happened when he had once
III Sue The Lender' J - 6
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Other examples
Here is a brief summary of other cases that help illustrate some of these problems:
worked for FMC. This raised the possibility that his actions were motivated by
malice rather than the economics of the situation Also. the counsel for one of
the lenders engaged in theatrics during the loan negotiations. pounding the
table and shouting that he would put the company into bankruptcy if necessary.
Any signs of malice. vindictiveness. or callousness by a lender or its counsel
will definitely be used against it in court. Most juries perceive banks as the
"big" guys and borrowers as the "underdogs". Unprofessional displays of
emotion aggravate that perception
Lesson #3: BorroweIS will go to great lengths to sue their lendeIS when they
feel they have been wronged FMC spent over a million dollars and many
months preparing for this trial They used 8 full time data processing
employees to process all the information for the trial and conducted extensive
market research to develop a computer model of the "ideal" juror. They even
built a replica of the actual court room where their witnesses could practice
their testimony.
Footnote: Any personality conflicts or emotional outbursts by the lender fuel
the debtor's desire for "revenge", All the more reason to have someone handling
workouts who can assess the facts objectively.
Lesson #4: When you are wrong, look tor opportunities to settle with the
borrower early. A leading attorney for borrowers in "lender liability"
lawsuits believes that 90% of the cases leading to big judgements could and
should have been settled out of court for small amounts. For example. a law-
suit in Kansas City could have been settled for 5250.000 but the bank insisted
on going to trial where they lost about 53.000.000, In another lender liability
case. the borrower oHered to settle for 5100.000 but ended up winning
510.000.000 in court. And the Farah case could have been settled for a.
restructured credit line before going to court.
Lesson #5: Teach lendeIS how to maintain credit files. In the Farah case. the
court determined that the lender's threat to call the loan if Mr. Farah was
elected Chief Executive Officer was fraudulent. How did they know? By the
lender's own credit memos! Notes prepared by a junior loan officer reflected
the feeling that if Farah were elected he should be strongly controlled and
have life made miserable for him. In other words. they hadn't decided to call
the loan But the next day they informed FMC's board that they would call the
loan if Mr. Farah was elected.
Be sensitive to how your credit memos might be construed later. or taken out of
context.
Remarks: _
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1. A lender had an agreement to finance the construction of a housing project
but refused to make further advances unless the debtor agreed to pay addi-
tional loan fees. They were found guilty of economic duress.
11!J!!!!1EJ2. The article reprinted as Appendix A tells the story of a farmer who won a
large judgement from a bank that controlled his marketing decisions.
3. When a company got into financial trouble. the bank required them to:
A. Cut the president's salary in half;
B. Hire a new accountant selected by the lender;
C. Get its approval on all checks;
The court found this proof of control and interference. Discovery of a 13 point
program in the credit file to "salvage whatever is possible" from the debtor
was important evidence against the bank.
Lesson: Don't get involved in day to day management decisions.
Lesson: Keep your credit memos professional and stick to the facts. Do not say
things that might be construed later as control or interference
4. A lender pressured a problem debtor to hire a consulting firm The court
found that the bank, through its hand picked consultant. "implemented or
caused to be implemented strict and oppressive credit policies. sales pro-
cedures. and inventory policies", that they "acted without regard to wishes or
approval of directors and stockholders" and that they were "negligent in
management."
Remarks: _
JZ!irr!fTE1 Avoidance techniques
I Counsel your borrowers, but don't make the decisions for them or get
involved in every day operating matters. It's their business ... they've got to
run it and be responsible.
2 Be sensitIve to the style you use when advising your debtors
Good "MIke. thIS business plan you drew up looks good. I see you've made
some deCISIons to cut back on expenses that should help your cash flow
considerably in the next year. I did have a question about your advertising
budget .. _do you think a 15% cutback is enough given your highest priority
which is .
Bad' 'Mike, you just can't go on like this. Now, I've written up some things
that you've got to do to keep our support and get back on target. As you'll
see, the advertising expenses will have to be cut way back and we
certainly can't justify buying that new equipment at this time ... "
As long as communications don't break down, loan officers can usually
convince a borrower of the wisdom of their advice without being autocratic.
III Sue :'"he Le.-:.:ierl
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3. When it comes to giving advice. admit what you don·t know: Loan officers can't
expect to know all the answers to all the problems. and should be willing to introduce
debtors to other sources of expertise
4. It you feel that management is the problem, by all means make your feelings
known. But don't select new managers, and if you make recommendations. make
m~~~o~ .
If you have a management change clause and you believe in good faith that a
management change has undermined your loan by all means refuse to make fur-
ther advances until the situation is rectified. But don't use your veto power to dictate
the new choice. or to win other concessions from the debtor.
5. In a workout situation. it is normally safe for the lender to hire a consultant or use
one of its own employees to visit the premises, meet with company management
and gather information. But if they give advice or make management decisions,
you may be held liable for the consequences. And remember that the jury will
seldom believe that a $2,000 a day consultant was installed to merely monitor the
debtor's activities.
If you help your debtor find a consultant don't coerce them to choose the one you
prefer. And if they choose someone that you did recommend. spell out in writing
what the consultant's responsibilities are.
6. Don't use the threat of calling a loan to coerce the debtor to do your bidding. It the
loan is in default either call it or don'L.don't use it as a club to control the debtor for
your own benefit.
7. Occasionally you may feel that the composition of the board of directors is a
critical part of your credit. It so. by all means put a clause in your loan agreement
giving you the right to call the loan if you disapprove of changes. But apply the
clause reasonably and don't use it to get your own people on the board. And stay
out of political power struggles.
8. Many experts adVise lenders to take closely held stock as collateral only as a last
resort.
9. Act professionally at all times. Don't get emotional when dealing with a debtor, no
matter how frustrated you become or how many times they don't live up to their
promises. If the account officer has personality problems with a borrower. switch the
account to someone else immediately. There's a lot of ego involved when one of
your own loans turns sour. and it's hard. if not impossible, to stay professional and
unemotional. Any sign of malice or callousness by the lender will definitely be used
against you in court.
10. Seek qualified advice before calling a loan, threatening to call it or taking any
enforcement action. This is especially true if the borrower is not in payment default.
No matter how many events of default are written in your loan documents, many
juries won't believe that the actions you take to protect your loan are justified if
payments are current.
11. Train all loan personnel how to write memos and maintain a credit file Be aware
"that everything you write will be scrutinized in court
r J - 9 Sue The Lender! II
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• Make sure the file supports the actions you took:
• Stick to the facts:
• Do not use emotional or vulgar language or make subjective com-
ments about the borrower;
• Keep good notes of your conversations with borrowers. especially if
you are dealing with a problem loan. If it comes down to your
memory against their memory; a well maintained credit file will
usually bolster your position.
And always keep in mind that when it comes to questions of control and inter-
ference. the jury responds very poorly to any signs of arrogance on the
lender's part. Lenders already have 2 strikes against them in many juror's eyes...
don't give them the third one!
12. Seek legal counsel and be especially cautious if you are making a loan
where you have an equity interest in the outcome of the project. Mixing those
two roles may put you in a position of control and interterence. Lenders taking
equity positions need to segment the two roles clearly.
13. Don't let the fear of "control and interference" paralyze you into inaction or
laziness. Be sensitive to the pitfalls. but don't roll over dead at the first sign of
trouble. There are times when strong enforcement action is still required to protect
your loan.
Remarks: _
-
-
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GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
What is the problem?
The common law and Uniform Commercial Code impose upon every party
to a contract an implied covenant of "good faith". What this means is that
lenders, like everyone else. have an obligation to treat their borrowers fairly
and reasonably, no matter what the loan documents may say.
Good faith and fair dealing are not well defined and this makes their
application to loan transactions unpredictable.
Although all parties have an obligation to act in good faith. it is especially
important to lenders because the courts are just now interpreting many "standard"
loan practices as violations of "good faith". Although some courts have been
more aggressive than others in how they apply the good faith obligation to
loan transactions. it is a growing problem everywhere.
For lenders. good faith issues usually revolve around three issues:
I. Discretionary advance clauses
II. Demand and acceleration clauses
III. Actions taken during work out loan negotiations
J
-
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I. Discretionary advance clauses ~
What are they: Many notes and loan agreements give the lender the right to
stop advancing funds or change the advance formula under a line of credit.
Discretionary advance clauses protect the lender in the event that the borrower's
credit worthiness suddenly declines.
What's the problem: If the lender has established a pattern of advancing the
funds. which the courts call "course of dealing", and then stop making advances,
or cut back the advance formula, they may be held liable for the damages
caused. no matter what the loan documents say.
An example to illustrate the problem:
The debtor was a wholesale food broker with a line of credit of about $3.5
million. The bank regularly used the line of credit to cover overdrafts, although
the loan documents clearly gave them the right to stop making advances
anytime they chose to. The company became unprofitable and the lender
cut off further advances, even though room remained on the line of credit.
Checks bounced and the debtor suffered in two ways: Suppliers stopped dealing
with them and a potential buyer for the company was scared away. The court
found the bank in violation of its "Good Faith" obligation and awarded the
debtor $7.5 million in damages.
Two things in particular hurt the bank's case:
First, the loan officer told the potential buyer of the company that he was cutting
off the line of credit even though he knew they "were very well secured";
Second, the bank's normal policy was to give notice before cutting off a line of
credit:
Lesson: Your "course of dealing" can neutralize the rights given you in your
loan documents.
Lesson: Give "reasonable" notice before you change the way you administer
a loan. especially it your action is likely to cause considerable harm.
Lesson: In the case described above, the court noted the lender's general vin-
dictiveness toward the debtor as further evidence of their lack of good faith. If
personality conflicts arise. switch loan officers immediately.
Lesson: Never tell third parties that you are cutting oft a loan "even though you
are tully secured", And be sure your credit file and loan policy support your
enforcement action.
Remarks: _
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An interesting sidelight: In the case described above. the debtor waived its right to a
jury trial in the loan documents. However, the court disregarded this waiver because the
debtor "could not. and did not knowingly; voluntarily and intentionally waive its constitu·
tional right to trial by jUry". There was evidence that the loan oUicer had told the debtor
at closing that the bank only enforced such waivers in the event of fraud.
LeSSOll: Do not undermine your loan documents with verbal assurances.
Lesson: In some jurisdictions. waivers of jury trials are not enforceable. Lenders should
consider instead the use of limited waivers. which waive jury trials only on particular
issues. And don't make these waivers a "boiler plate" part of every loan. If you negotiate
the waiver each time. giving up something in return this should make them more enforceable
Another example
There was a case in Nebraska in which the loan documents gave the lender
sole discretion over whether to make further loan advances, going so far as to
say "nothing shall be construed to obligate (lender) to make advances".
The loan commitment was to allow the debtor to enlarge his livestock herd.
Atter about hal! the money was loaned the lender decided that further advances
would be imprudent. Unfortunately; the debtor had spent a lot of money
improving the farm in anticipation of the larger herd, and now they could not
get the necessary economies to scale. The farm lost money; defaulted on the
loans, and sued the lender for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of -the lender but the appeal court overruled. They
sent the debtor's claims back to the trial court to determine liability and
damages, including punitive damages.
Interestingly; the court found that the lender's own internal operating procedures
did not support the manner in which they cut otffurther advances. (The policy
called for the decision to be made at a higher level than it was made.) This
was important evidence in the final outcome.
Lesson: Even it your loan documents give you the right. be careful reneging
on a commitment if you know it will cause hardship to the borrower. Give
them adequate time to line up additional financing whenever possible
Lesson: A lender's written loan policies and operating procedures will be
scrutinized by the court to find evidence of "bad faith". Your loan policies.
documents, and actions should mirror one another.
Yet another example
The newspaper article printed as Appendix B describes another case in
which the lender was found to have violated its obligation of good faith.
Remarks: _
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II. Demand and acceleration clauses j@tt!tttlJ
What are they: A demand clause gives the lender the right to demand tull
payment of a loan anytime it desires, An insecurity clause gives the lender the
right to call the loan if it deems itself "insecure", Other acceleration clauses
give the lender the right to call a loan upon the occurance of other events of
default.
What's the problem: A lender's course of dealing can neutralize the demand
feature of the note. and acceleration clauses must be applied fairly and in
good faith. no matter what the loan documents say.
Here is the language from the Uniform Commercial Code that applies to this issue:
"Option to accelerate at will. A term providing that one party...may accelerate
payment, ..or require additional collateral 'at will' or 'when he deems himself
insecure' or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall
have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of pay-
ment...is impaired." .
CP.S. Some courts are even applying an "objective" standard to the
application of insecurity causes ". the lender may have to demonstrate
quantitatively how the prospect of repayment has been impaired.)
Part of the problem with demand loans is that they otten contain a number of
specific events of default. things like payment default. cross default. negative
covenants. reporting requirements and so on. If the lender uses the demand
clause to accelerate the loan, the obvious question in court is:
"If the parties had really intended it to be a demand note, why did you include
all those specific events of default?"
Lesson: Your "course of dealing" can neutralize the demand feature of a note.
The other problem with demand notes is that loan officers sometimes ignore
events of default. They continually accept late payments, or ignore violations
of the loan agreement. until a course of dealing is established which the borrower
comes to rely on. Then one day the loan officer gets fed up and calls the loan.
Even though the loan documents clearly gave them this right. it violates their
good faith obligation because of their course of dealing.
An example
In Chicago there was a company that constantly made late loan payments,
which the bank accepted. When the credit deteriorated the two parties
negotiated a revised repayment plan which called for a specific payment on
November 15. When the payment didn't arrive, the bank accelerated the loan
the following day. The borrower sent in the late payment. but the bank retused
it. The borrower sued them, charging a violation of good faith, and won a
sizeable judgement. The court decided that a one day delay on the payment
was not a material breach and noted thaUhe debtor had enough money in
the bank to make the payment.
Lesson: Demand clauses are not foolproof. They must be applied .'reasonably' "
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r J - 13 Sue The Lender! m
--- --- -~---------"--,-_.,-------~_.__._--_ .. _-
Bane.
""-" "-"-""----------""""-"--------------
-
Lesson: Give reasonable notice before changing the rules of a loan relationship,
regardless of what the loan documents say
Lesson: It you neglect events of default, be especially careful to give
reasonable notice before accelerating a loan.
Another example
In another recent case the court held that a bank's breach of good faith in
accelerating a loan and setting ott accounts can result in the imposition of
punitive damages where malice, oppression or fraud is proven. In that situation,
the loan otticer told an out-of-work borrower that the bank would convert a
balloon note to an installment loan. Since he was leaving on vacation the
otticer said he would talk to his associates in the bank so the necessary paper-
work could be drawn up. This he neglected to do, and his colleague refused
to "term out" the loan due to the borrower's lack of income. When the borrower
protested he set ott their account without notice and applied the funds to pay
down the loan. Since the debtor was temporarily out of work, he was relying
on the money in the offset account to live on. He sued in court and won a
sizeable judgement.
Lesson: Write memos about pending transactions so other officers know what
you have agreed to.
Lesson: Don't make oral agreements without some written follow-up to the debtor.
Lesson: It one loan officer makes an agreement with a customer, stick to it until
you give reasonable notice and change it in writing.
Another example
The loan documents provided for payment of interest and prmcipal on the first
day of the month and for the payment of a late charge if not received within
10 days of due date. The late charge could be paid in cash or added to the
principal balance (at the discretion of the borrower). The lender accepted late
payments for about a year and then sent a letter stating that it would foreclose
on the collateral if any more late payments were received. The following
month, the payment was not received on time and five days later the lender
commenced foreclosure. The court issued an injunction against the lender.
finding that their use of the foreclosure remedy to coerce payment on the first
day of the month was an illegal penalty analogous to an excessive late
charge. They concluded with the following observation, which has relevance
to all lenders considering enforcement actions:
"One of the most important tunctions of the law is to maintain a proper balance
between creditor and debtor. To this end. it attempts to match the creditor's
remedy to the debtor's default. Major default justifies drastic remedies; minor
defaults only warrant lesser remedies. "
Lesson: 30 days may not be SUfficient "reasonable" notice that you intend to
change your course of dealing.
Lesson: A lender's obligation of good faith can neutralize the rights granted in
your loan documents.
...
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Lesson: Avoid actions that appear to be coercive.
Yet another example
The collateral was a private aircraft and the documents forbid the debtor
from leasing the plane. Nevertheless, he violated that agreement. Two years
later the bank discovered the violation, accelerated the .loan and a lawsuit
ensued. The court said that the bank could only accelerate the loan if it
believed in good faith that the default impaired the borrower's repayment ability.
Since the violation occured two years earlier. and payments were current. it
was hard to believe that the violation impaired the loan.
This case represents a significant expansion of the "good faith" obligation in
loan transactions. To date, most other courts have not been as "aggressive", but
the ground has been broken and the decision bears careful watching.
A final example
In a recent case in California, the court ruled that the lender's approval of the
farmer's 7 year business plan implies an obligation to make loans available
during that entire period even though the loan documents were short term in
nature!
Warning: Seek legal counsel and be especially cautious when accelerating a
loan that is current on payments. No matter how many other events of default
they have violated, it is hard to convince a jury that your enforcement actions
were "in good faith" when the loan is current.
A final waming: Collecting a commitment fee on a loan can also raise issues ot "good
faith". Acceptance of a loan fee implies an obligation to make the loan for a
"reasonable" period of time. no matter what your loan documents say.
In conclusion: Courts don't like demand notes. Use them with caution. and only
when they are appropriate to the transaction.
Remarks: _
III. Workout negotiations IZJ1J!!JJlJ
Just as lenders have an obligation to act in good faith when it comes to dis-
cretionary advance clauses and demand notes. they also have an obligation
to act fairly and reasonably when engaged in workout negotiations.
To illustrate the problem let's look at a specific court case out of Alaska:
A retail store had several loans from their bank, secured primarily by inventory:
Business wasn't good and they were unable to make payments on time The
lender offered to extend the payments in return for additional collateral: a
second deed of trust on the owners' homes. The owners made a counter-oifer
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which did not include their homes as collateral. Without prior notification. a
representative fron1 the bank showed up at the store with a policeman and a
locksmith. told the employees and customers to leave. and padlocked the
doors. The court found this action to be a violation of good faith. and awarded
actual and punitive damages to the borrower.
The bank claimed that its action was necessary to protect its collateral but the
court noted that they had routinely accepted late payments in the past and
pointed to a memo in the credit tile which indicated that extending the loan
payments until after Christmas was advisable if they obtained additional
collateral.
Lesson: In this case. the loan documents clearly gave the bank the right to
seize the collateral:
"If borrower shall fail to pay when due any amount payable on any of the
loans made hereby or on any other indebtedness of borrower's secured
hereby; or shall fail to observe or perform any of the provisions of this agree-
ment. borrower shall be in default hereunder When borrower is so in default,
all of such loans and other indebtedness secured hereby shall become
immediately due and payable at bank's option without notice to borrower,
and bank may proceed to enforce payment of the same and to exercise any
or all rights and remedies afforded to bank by the Uniform Commercial Code
of Alaska or otherwise possessed by bank."
Lesson: Oral statements and a lender's course of dealing can modi1y the written
loan documents.
Lesson: Put deadlines in writing.
Lesson: The court noted the fact that the loan officer acted "arrogantly" when
he entered the store to repossess the collateral. Act professionally at all times. It
personality conflicts arise with the debtor. switch loan officers immediately.
Lesson: Do not use collateral to coerce the borrower. In this case. the bank
apparently enforced its security interest not to protect its loan but rather to
force the debtors to pledge their homes as additional collateral. There was no
evidence that the store inventory was about to disappear...seizure was not
necessary to protect the loan.
Remarks: _
lZ!1!!!1Jl!J Avoidance techniques
1. Be reasonable and act fairly: Good faith and fair dealing issues are largely
common sense.
• It you've established a course of dealing. give fair notice before
changing it.
,
...
...
,J
-
J
m Sue The Lender' J - 16
....
Bane.
• If you've neglected events of default in the past. give reasonable written
warning before enforcing them in the future. Make sure your deadline
gives the borrower time to move its loans. If you can wait until the next
maturity date. use that for your deadline and notify the debtor as soon
as possible.
• Do what you say you will do.
• Never accelerate a loan without reasonable written notice. no matter
how long they've been in default. unless a delay will really erode
your position Many experts advise that lenders should make at least
one extension before taking enforcement action against a debtor.
• Be careful about calling a loan for slightly late payments unless a
minor delay will really undermine your position. and the documents
spell out that fact (a "time is of the essence clause").
• Unless your collateral is in danger. always make demand before
repossessing it.
• If you call a loan and accept a partial payment. make another written
demand with fair notice before calling the loan again...
• Make sure your borrower understands. and you understand. all the
fine print in the loan documents. Getting their signature on the bottom
line isn't enough. Take the time to go over eachpoint. andhave someone
witness what you did put a memo in the file describing the discussion.
and/or send a followup letter to the customer.
• Remember that collateral is intended to secure repayment of the
loan. Don't use it as a club to coerce the debtor to do other things you
want them to do...
• Think twice before suing for a deficiency where the deficiency is
small and the probability of collection is slight. Your legal action may
force the debtor to seek counsel. and provoke a cross complaint...
Remember: Good faith does not mean the lender is trapped into a certain
course of dealing once it is established. It just means you've got to give
reasonable notice before you change the rules of the game.
2. Seek legal counsel before taking any enforcement action against a
debtor. It costs money; but an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure ...
• It will give you a chance to review the file and uncover weaknesses
in your position while there is still time to rectify them.
• The case law on "good faith and fair dealing" is changing quickly;
and qualified counsel is necessary
• Following the advice of counsel is usually an absolute defense to certain
"intentional torts". including the charge that you intentionally inflicted
emotional distress.
• When litigation is likely; interview everyone who was involved in the
transaction. including people who may no longer work for you Uncover
all the agreements and understandings. written or oral. that were made.
J. Stress to all loanpersonnel the importance of maintaininggood credit Wes.
• A lender's own credit file is often the best ammunition the borrower's
attorney has in lender liability cases.
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• Make sure your credit file supports your enforcement action. For example.
it·s easier for a jury to find a violation of good faith if you accelerate a
loan tor late payments but there is no mention of your concern in the
credit tile. and the loan isn't on the problem list.
• Remember that the courts will scrutinize internal loan reviews, policies
and manuals. They should tit your actual loan practices.
• Make thorough notes of all conversations. especially in a workout
situation. Keep them professionaL stick to the facts. and don't use
subjective statements. slang, or vulgarity. Any sign of malice or
vindictiveness in the memos is evidence of "bad faith".
4. Act professionally at all times
Any personality conflicts or emotional displays by the lender will become
evidence that it didn't act fairly and in good faith. We have stressed this
point throughout this handbook because it is otten a problem in these
lawsuits. A lot of ego is involved when people deal with their own mistakes
· .. and it can distort their fairness and objectivity.
Lenders do not agree whether to bring in a new officer to handle a workout
loan. or whether to let the original loan officer work out his/her own prob-
lems. Whichever strategy you choose you should immediately appoint a
new loan officer at the first sign of a personality conflict or breakdown in
communication. We recommend that 2 people be assigned to each workout
loan. Make sure each of them knows all the agreements made by the other.
5. Never make oral agreements on the side, and if you do, put them in
writing and abide by them until you give adequate notice and change
them in writing.
6. Don't use loan documents that aren't a necessary part of the
transaction. They will muddle what your true intentions were. For example,
use of a demand note for term loans can become troublesome it someone
later relies on the demand clause to call the loan.
And don·t write letters which contradict the provisions in the loan
documents. There was a case in Missouri where the lender sent the
guarantor a letter explaining that the bank would probably only act against
his collateral after all other remedies were exhausted. The letter somehow
never made it into the credit file and caused havoc for the bank later in
court.
7. If you have a team of lenders handling a workout loan, make sure the
right hand knows what the left one is doing. Some borrowers are adept at
playing one officer off another. and if you give them conflicting signals. they
may use it against you in court someday. Use of the "good guy/bad buy"
negotiating tactic may also become evidence of "bad faith".
8. Maintain lines of communication directly between the lender and the
borrower during a workout loan. Seek advice from counsel before sitting
down. but try to avoid the syndrome of "your attorney talking to my
attorney' '. Many experts believe that ongoing direct communiction is the
best protection against problems with good faith. Most borrowers know that
the lender is not their enemy ... it's only when we stop talking that the big
animosities build up.
Sue The Lender!
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Other avoidance techniques:
MISREPRESENTATION ... AND FRAUD G:JJ!!J!II
What is the problem?
Misrepresentation and fraud are legal ways of saying you told a lie. you didn't
tell the whole truth. or you gave misleading information. Perhaps it goes
without saying. but honesty is not just the best business policy...it is also a require-
ment of the law: Engaging in misrepresentation and fraud will ruin your
reputation in the community and make you liable for the damages caused
by your deception. Suppliers. investors and the debtor himself are some of the
parties that may be damaged by lender misrepresentation and fraud.
The problem arises otten when answering credit inquiries.
I. Credit inquiries
Third parties otten contact lenders for credit information
• Suppliers may call before extending trade credit.
• Buyers may can before placing a large order.
• Banks and finance companies will usually call you before making a
loan to your customer.
• Parties considering an investment in your debtor may call you for in-
formation before making a decision.
Books have been written on the proper way to answer credit inquiries. We
recommend in particular 'Information on Deteriorating Accounts" published
by Robert Morris Associates. The bottom line is: third parties have a right to rely
on the accuracy and completeness of the information lenders give them. so
we have an obligation not to give out false. misleading or incomplete informa-
tion. It you withhold key information. or make misleading statements. you can
be held liable for any damages that result.
There has been an increasing number of court cases involving exchange of
commercial credit information. and problems tend to be big ones.
Misrepresentation with credit inquiries usually arises on deteriorating accounts.
The borrower has problems and the lender may be trying to get out of the
credit. Another organization calls to get information.. .if you tell the truth about
the debtor. you might scare the other creditor away and accelerate the prob-
lem. On the other hand. it you give an incomplete or misleading answer. you
will be held responsible for any harm this causes the inquirer. In the short run.
we may be tempted to withhold some of the bad news to get someone else to
share or take over our exposure.
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There are two types of misrepresentation: fraudulent and negligent.
A. Fraudulent misrepresentation arises when the lender knowingly gives out
false or misleading information. If the inquirer acts on your misrepresentation
and is harmed, you may become liable for the damages.
Occasionally fraudulent misrepresentation entails an outright lie:
Example #1: A factoring company gave out false and glowing reports regarding
one of their customers in order to induce another creditor to take over the
loans. The court awarded over $1 million in damages.
Lesson: Honesty is the best policy.
Example #2: An oil promoter gave his lender's name as a credit reference to
a potential investor, who called the bank and was told that he was a
competent oil driller and operator. that he was financially sound, and that
he was one of the bank's most successful customers. In fact. however. the oil
company was operating in a negative working capital position, had
negative cash flow from operations, and was generating cash from the sale
of leases. The investor relied on the bank's response, invested heavily in the
oil company, and lost a lot of money. They sued the bank and the jury
awarded him over $ 10,000,000 in damages. (As of this writing, the trial judge
overturned the award but the plantiffs have appealed his decision).
Lessons: Tell the whole truth.
Otten, however, fraudulent misrepresentation is more subtle ... involving
statements that are not outright lies but rather intended to mislead ...
Example #1: A lender answered a credit inquiry by giving the normal
information about the account balances and loans. When asked about the
debtor's credit worthiness, the lender repsonded by saying lightly that' 'they
are occasionally short of working capitaL but what small company isn't. " In
fact. however, the debtor was in default on two loans and the bank was
trying to push them out the door. The inquirer. in this case a customer, relied
on the lender's positive assessment and sent in a deposit toward the
purchase of a customized piece of equipment. The bank used the money to
pay down its loans. Later, the second progress payment went to the attorney
to file bankruptcy! The customer successfully sued the lender for damages.
Lesson: Third parties have a right to rely on the accuracy and completeness
at credit inquiries. You can't just tell the good stuff and gloss over the prob-
lems with misleading statements like "they are occasionally short of working
capital. but what small company isn't ... It you respond to a credit inquiry,
be accurate and complete.
Other examples of potentially fraudulent statements:
"They've been late occasionally in the past. but we were never worried about it"
"Like all companies, they do get into cash binds every now and then but the
credit is basically sound"
"The main reason we've asked them to move their loans elsewhere is a
personality conflict"
-
-
-
I
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"We don't really have a problem with that company...we just want to reduce
our exposure in that industry"
Remarks: _
B. Negligent Misrepresentation arises when a lender unknowingly gives out
false or misleading intormation. Carelessness is usually the cause ... not
intentional deception. Negligent misrepresentation is not as dangerous as the
fraudulent kind, but still makes the lender liable for the damages it causes.
Example It A supplier called the lender to do a credit check on a meat com·
pany. The loan officer said he thought it would be safe to extend between 6
and 8 thousand dollars in credit and that the bank was "going along with them
and hoping that they would do a good business and be a credit to the community".
However, the meat company did not have an account at the bank...only the
parent company did, and the bank was found guilty of negligent
misrepresentation
Lesson: In finding the bank guilty of negligence and misrepresentation the
court said:
..... where a bank office through its of/icer undertakes to give advice. even
gratuitiously; that officer is bound to use the skill and expertise which he has or
which he could be presumed to have"
Lesson: Loan officers aren't paid to give advice...so don't give it.
Example #2:
Imagine the following conversation:
Lender: "Hello"
Inquirer: "I'm running a credit check on XYZ company and they gave me
your name as a reference" .
Lender: "Oh. yeah. I've been handling that account for about 2 years ... now let's
see. I think their loans total about mid-five figures right now ... account
balances, the last time I looked, were in the low five figure range, although
the owners do keep pretty good personal balances with us also. They've always
handled their accounts as agreed ... great people really. Mr. Johnson founded
the company and has an excellent reputation around town. He's a first rate
engineer . .. always on the forefront in innovation. Character is first class . .. "
Lesson: Determine the purpose of a credit inquiry before responding to it.
Either call them back to verity their identity or have a policy of responding only
to written requests.
Lesson: Don't respond to credit inquiries ~thout checking the facts first.
Answering credit inquiries off the cuff is dangerous CI think" ... "The last time I
looked"). Giving "out of date" intormation can make you liable for negligent
r
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misrepresentation... even it the information is only a month or two old.
Lesson: It you decide to answer a credit inquiry; stick to the facts: account
balances. loan balances. type of collateral and payment history. It you address
things like the debtor's character and competence and they later go bankrupt.
whoever relied on your advice is likely to take you to court. They may or may
not win but when lenders go before juries...anything is possible
Another example of misrepresentation
A supplier called the bank to check the credit of a furniture store The bank
responded with a form letter which said that the company had a 6 figure line
of credit. 2 deposit accounts in a certain range, that they had handled their
loans satisfactorily; and had "demonstrated sound business judgement".
However. at the time ot the inquiry the actual accounts were significantly less
than the letter indicated. and they were haVing trouble keeping current on
their loans. The supplier shipped SIO,OOO worth of merchandise and the store
went bankrupt a tew months later. They successfully sued the bank for damages.
Lesson: Make sure the loan officer who handles an account reviews the
response to credit inquiries before they are sent out.
Lesson: The courts will hold lenders responsible to exercise reasonable care
and diligence to see that the information provided is accurate and up to date
Lesson: It you provide opinions about the borrower. ("They have exercised
sound business judgement") make sure these are clearly designated as opinions
and separated from the facts.
I1J!J!!!!II!f1 Avoidance techniques-credit inquiries
1. It you choose to respond to a credit inquiry. you must be accurate and
complete. Not telling a lie is not the same as telling the truth.
2. Verify the source of the inquiry and determine the purpose for the call.
3. If the purpose of an inquiry involves potential litigation against the
borrower, seek legal counsel before replying.
4. Verity your facts before giving out information.
5. Don't address subjective issues like character and competence. And don't
make predictions about the future.
6. If you respond to credit inquires on the phone, put a memo in file
regarding what was said.
7. Be sure that credit inquiries are routed to the right loan officer. especially
when dealing with a problem loan.
a. Spend some time training your loan personnel how to answer credit
inquiries. Role playing is especially effective. On-the-job training is too risky.
9. Be especially careful it you are called by parties who are considering an
investment in your borrower's business. (See the information on Federal
Security Laws below.) With the rapid increase in limited partnership "deals",
this has become an increasing problem tor lenders.
m Sue The Lender'
J - 22
...
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
~r
r
r
r
r
•
• Do not give investment advice. and tell that explicitly to potential investors
who call you. ("Mr. Jones. this bank has a strict policy ot not advising
people on investments").
10. There are even some precedents that say a lender may be obligated to
keep a third party updated on any changes on the debtor's condition ot the
debtor after a credit inquiry. This is true. tor example. it you discover that you
had earlier given out talse or misleading information. Seek legal counsel
when taced with such situations.
Remarks: _
A word about Federal Securities Acts
The 5ecUIities and Exchange Commission has promulgated rule IOB·5 which provides in part:
"It shall be unlawtullor any person... to make any untrue statement 01 a materiallact or
to omit to state a materiallact necessary in order to make the statements made. in the
light 01 the circumstances under which they were made. not misleading...in connection
with the purchase or sale 01 any secUIity"
A review of the Federal SecUIities Acts is beyond the scope 01 this program Be aware.
however. that lenders occasionally run afoul of these laws because many cedit inquiries
are "in connection with the purchase or sale 01 securities". That is one reason we stressed
the importance 01 determining the purpose 01 every credit inquiry. Uthere is any connection
with a secUIity; nomatterhow remote. you have a special duty to be accurate and complete.
For example. a bank was liable under Federal SecUIities Laws (and state fraud statutes)
lor not disclosing to a business broker the lact that a borrower was behind on its loans
and had doctored its books.
In addition a lender in control 01 a debtor may become liable lor the debtor's violations
01 Federal Security Laws. especially it the lender had knowledge 01 the violations or was
recklessly oblivious to them.
And be extremely careful it you have any material inside information about the borrower...
in those situations. consult legal counsel.
Discussion,
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Misrepresentation and fraud by the lender to the borrower
So tar we have talked about the problems that arise when lenders misrepresent
things in credit inquiries. We tum now to some ot the problems that arise when
lenders misrepresent tacts to their borrowers.
Example 1: Threatening to call the loan
"Tom. if you hire your brother in law as president, we're going to have to call
the loan"
r
r
r
r
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"Mike. if you go through with that large capital expenditure we've got no
choice but to call our loans"
"Joe, if you don't cut back on your marketing and other overhead, you leave
us no choice but to get out of this credit"
Situations like that occur in every lender's career: the borrower violates a covenant
in the loan agreement or contemplates an action that will do the same thing,
and we are tempted to "get them into line" by threatening to call the loan
The problem with threatening to call a loan is that too often a lender hasn't
really decided to do it. It's a bluff designed to gain their cooperation or affect
their decision. Such "bluffs" have been construed by some courts as fraud,
even it your loan documents give you the right to carry out the ''threat''.
Fraud was a key issue in the Farah case discussed earlier. The lender told Mr.
Farah that they would call the loan if he got elected as CEO, when in fact their
own credit memos showed that they had not yet made that decision. Mr. Farah
believed their threat. stayed out of management. and the lenders were held
responsible for the damages caused by their deception.
Lesson: Don't threaten to call a loan unless you really mean it. And don't put
things in the credit memos that might later be used as evidence of fraud or
misrepresentation.
For example. the following statement in a credit memo might become important
evidence of fraud:
" ... as always Mr. Roberts was stubborn about his decision and did not want to
consider our suggestions. I had to put the heat on by making him believe that
we might call the loan if he... "
Other examples of statements that might be construed as fraudulent:
-
1
..J
Example 2: Misrepresenting your loan policy
Many loan officers have said. or been tempted to say; something like: ...
''Joe. I wish I could be more flexible. but our loan policy requires that you... "
On the surface, it sounds innocuous enough. But there have been some cases .J
which indicate that such statements. if not true. open up the lender to charges
of fraud and misrepresentation.
For example. a lender in Nebraska used the "loan policy" to justify certain -
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things they wanted the debtor to do. The debtor didn't like it. sued them and
subpoenaed the bank's written loan policies. The most recent version was
over 10 years old, and contradicted what the lender said were their policies.
This helped prove misrepresentation.
Lesson: Know your loan policy; and make sure it corresponds to your current
practices. Don't use it as the "scapegoat" for getting the borrower to do what
you want them to do.
Discussion: _
Example 3: Misrepresenting your capabilities as a lender I1!JJ!!J!lE1
To illustrate this problem lets eavesdrop on the tail end of a not-so-imaginary
sales call:
Lender: 'Mr. Miller. I'm glad that I've convinced you to move your loans to our
organization. Our newly tormed asset based lending division is one ot the
tinest in the region. and will be able to meet all your financing needs in the
years to come"
Sound like a typical sales call? Well, that segment refers to a recent decision
out of Florida in which a debtor won a S12 million judgement against a bank.
The bank had represented itself as an expert in the field of asset based lending,
when in fact they had recently formed the division with only one professional,
who it turns out. had been terminated from his previous joh They induced a
small company to move its loans from another organization. The company got
into problems which apparently the loan officer aggravated by allowing
them to draw too much money against their inventory and receivables. When
he discovered his error, he tried to cut the debt back quickly to the "proper
amount", which helped ruin the company
Some lawyers call this the "lenders malpractice case". In effect. the lesson is
that lenders, like doctors, have an obligation to handle their customers with
the ability and expertise that they purport to have. If they are negligent or
incompetent. they will be held liable for the damages. Although it is too soon
to tell how this case will stand up on appeal. or how widely it will be applied,
it is a disturbing case that deserves close watching by every financial institution.
Another sidelight: One of the things that undermined the bank's position was
a memo in the credit file which said:
"We must torce them (the borrower) down during a time when it will cause
them the most problems".
Lesson: Be sensitive to how your comments could be construed later by a jury
r
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A fight for control of decision Dlaking
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Appendix A
DENNIS VS. BANCOHIO
~
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T he ailht belore the trial,Keith and Janie Dennis de-cided to tell their thFft 30ns
- Brian. 10, Brent, 8, and B,.ej, 6
- the buies.
Janie took Brian aside to talk to
him first. &Skinl il he knew what
would be l\appenilll.
"Oh yeah. you'w been havinl
trouble with the b&nk. You're hav·
illl a hearilll this week."
"Is there anythilll else you want
to tell me about it?" was Janie's
MlURl re:sponse.
What the Io-year-old simplified
in a lew words was the belinninl
ot a complu cue whose verdict
and its impliations would attnet
MtiOn&! attention. (See adjoining
story.) FOl in Dennis YS. BancOhio
National Bank in Pelry County
Common Pleas Coult. the jury
lound in lavol 01 the Dennise5.
and on Feb. 20 awalded them
$1.039,032.02.
To those who ~n't built up
$1 ~ million in debt, that might
seem the jackpot 01 a liletime, To
others it is an undeselvinl award
made to a young tiger who grew
too big 100 last. spent too much
and sued to get out 01 payinl his
debts. Some applaud the judlment
as a victory lor one 01 the many
victims 01 the larm economy.
The Dennises would have 30me
problems with all those views.
First. their ~tt1e is IlIlrom over.
BancOhio has filed motions asking
the judIe to overturn the judgment
or grant a new trial. If the motions
are denied the bank might appeal.
Second. it the Dennises do reo
ceive the $1 million judgment. it
WIll be used to pay larm debts and
legal lees.
Also. Dennis doesn't see himself
as a radical or "victim 01 the larm
economy: Rather he says he's a
businessman who wants to make
his own decisions and pay 101 his
own mistakes.
"We never denied we owed
them the money: Dennis says.
The judge's instructions to the jury
show the Dennises did not dispute
the creditors' claims. The court
granted the bank a judlment 01
S717.964.79 plus interest Irom
Feb. 4. \985, tor a term loan. (The
Dennises had paid back opetlting
and hedge lines.) The coun also
awarded the Dennises' mongate
holders, Farmers Home and Law.
renee and Betty Wolfinger, a total
01 $793.137.91 plus interest.
When the Dennises filed suit
Dec. 23, \983, they were not in
default. They were in a "work out'
situation with their term loan due
Dec.31.
The Dennises liIedthe suit to re·
lain control ot their larm business.
Dennis says. -\ wasn't gainl to go
another year with them (bank
oIficiall) cunnin. the business and
running the debt up. It's my busi·
ness and\'m lOins to make the de-
cisions.- 11M! Dennises believe the
~k overseepped its right to ·rea·
30nably raarict' the use 01 its loan
funds.
That translated into the lollow.
ing chllges by the plaintills. out-
lined in the judge's instructions 10
the jury. BancOhio denies all these
claims:
• The bank was negligent in
structurinl the Dennises' \982
operating loan. By rolling over
1981 losses into 1982's line 01
credit. instead 01 in a lerm loan,
the bank stilted the snowball roll·
ins toward escalating debt. the
Dennises claim.
• The ~k used economic duo
ress to torce the Dennises to make
marketinl decisions that de·
creased returns..
• The debtor-ereditor relation·
ship became a fiduciary one.
which the ~k violated.
A liduciary relationship exists
when a person places trust and
conlidence in the integrity and
loyalty 01 another. An example
would be the bond between a doc·
tor and patient. The Dennises'
attorney. J. Stephen Teetor, says
his clients relied on the bank's suo
perior knowledge ot tinance. U the
ties were liduciary, the bank would
have been required to act in the
best interests ot the bonower.
The Dennises claim the bank did
not act in their interest when it set
the 1982 line 01 credit and con·
trolled their marketing decisions.
• The bank misrepresenled provi·
sions 01 a 1983 term note. The
Dennises claim they were told the
$620,000 note was lor 10 yellS at a
10" rUled tlte. 11M! note was actu-
ally a I-yell note amonized over
10 years.
BancOhio's vice president 01
corpotlte aaribusiness. Tom Peo-
ples. and counsel James Moats 01
the firm ICinaid. Palmer and Ran-
daU. cannot comment on the case.
11M! bank's llsuments presented
here are lrom court documents.
The Dennises. on the other
hand, teel IFft to talk now th.at the
trial is over. When they filed the
suit. they didn't even tell their par'
ents until about a month later.
Then they gave none 01 the details.
·It was just us a,ainst (he bank.
and we didn't want to involve any·
one else.' Janie Dennis says.
The beginnings
The Dennises lirst borrowed
money trom BancOhio in 1980.
Dennis explains he was lookins lor
a lender who could provide a
bigger opetltingline.
In 1981 the Dennises signed an
agreement with the bank lor a
$340.000 operating line. The
money lollS used to plan! about
1,600 acres ot corn. 609 acres
owned and the balance rented
lrom landlords in Perry. Fairfield
and Ucking counties.
Dennis. 34. Slarted his tarming
business in 1969 on about 200
acres. He and Janie. married in
1972. bought and moved to their
current 'arm near Rushville in
1976,
Yields on the acruge usually
averllged between 120 and 130
bushels per acre. Althou~h it
started that way u Dennis leni-
lized and readied his fields, 1981
was not an avenae year.
It rained.
Six hundred muddy acres. lying
ready tor seed. went unplanled.
The \.000 acres that were planted
awraged 1\2 bushels per acre.
The loss 01 the crop, plus a
S12.0oo loss trom a poor mar'
keting decision. added up to II
$300,000 shon'all.
In May 1982 the Dennises signed
a creditlllreementlor $440,000 on
a nrvolvin, credit line. Alter Ply-
inl 0" 1981 losses, only about
$140.000 remained tor 1982
opetlting.
BancOhio's trial briet says:
"Despite the lact that the monies
extended by the Bank under the
1982 I'eVOMIlI credit line were 10
be used to pay lor 1982 operating
expenses. it wu discovered that
the Dennises actually had not paid
30me ot their opetlting expenses
lor 1981 and that they had used
some 1982 operating monies to
pay these prior debts. This lollS
done without the approval 01 the
bank. •
Dennis says the bank Itnew
S3OO,OOO would be used to cover
1981 losses. The Dennises also
claim the ~k did not structure
the loan properly. According to
depositions 01 8ancOhio's em-
ployees. the ~k's policy manual
recommends such losses should
be termed out. (A deposition is a
swom statement taken belore the
trial.)
1
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To market or DOt
Following 1981's losses. Dennis
decided he wanted help with the
finances and marketing SAvvy
needed to nm 1.600 acres. So 10
March 1982 he hired an ~ consul·
tanto Jim Martin 01 Allied Man~e­
ment Services 10 Reynold.sburg.
MartlO recommended in April
1982 that Dennis sell com futures
at $3.10. The ~k. according to
Dennis, said "no: it was below his
break even. The mancet climbed to
$3.1 S. then dropped to $1.90. "So
we weren't able to make the
hedge. That was the li~ marketing
decision they (bank officials)
made: he s.aid.
SeYeral more points of conflict
on manceting followed during the
next 2 years:
• fn January 1983 the Dennises
say the bank ordered them to sell
their com. An internal bank memo
prepared by account manager
Dave Kelley and dated Jan. 10.
1983. states: "Customer has been
ordered to liquidate all gralO and
£~llin positions and apply such
funds to L.O.c. (line of credit):
At a meeting between Kelley.
Peoples. Martin and the Dennises
aI their farm Jan. 24. the bankers
again told Dennis to sell their
corn. A$ Dennis recalls. Manin
responded: "He's making money.
Why does he have to sell the com?
The price IS rising."
• In March 1983 Dennis claims
the bank would not allow him to
lilt a hedge at $2.85.
• When the bank froze the Den·
nises' line of credit Dec. 6. 1983,
bank officials qain ordered the
Dennises to sell their grain. 13,000
bushel£ not in PIIC. Dennis saY$-
This time he complied. using the
money to pay end-of-the-yur bills.
He says this was the only time he
didn't take the money to the bank.
In the delendant's trial brief. the
bank denies the Dennises were
ordered to sell their corn crop.
"Since the Dennises, in both cases.
did not have the com priced. they
were simply wanting to sit righr
and speculate that the price 01
com was going to go up. As long
as they did this. the Bank was
unable to complete its considera·
tion 01 the loan requests. Since the
Bank would not finalize the Den·
mses' loan requests lor the next
year. the Dennises apparently felt
'forced' to sell their grain:
In trust
Besides the question 01 lorce and
orders is that 01 advice and counsel.
"It is the contention of the Bank
that even il there was advice and
counselling ollered to the Den.
nises that that does not create a
liduciary duly owed by the Bank 10
the Dennises: the bank says in its
trial briel. It claims the relationship
was that of any debtor to creditor,
The Dennises claim BancOhio
as.sumed a liduciary relationship
wllh them by advising them in
Iil'ancial and marketing mailers.
'The Bank went so lar as to order
that plainulls lire their IOdepen.
dent marketing consultant. telling
plainulls that they were 'a no·lrills
operation.' that they could not
alford this expense, and that the
Bank would provide this marketing
and consulting service at no COSI
(0 Dennis,' according to the plalO'
tills' tnal brief.
An Internal bank memo daled
Feb. 22. 1983. Irom Peoples and
Kelley to the Special Markets and
Products Division Credit Commit.
tee says: -Mr. Dennis appears to be
a good larmer but has had dillicul.
J - 27
ties in linancial management 01 the
operation .. , (Hiring the consul-
taJ'll) has proved to be an asset to
Mr. Dennis: however. due to the
expense involved with the consult-
ing linn. it was decided to eliminate
farming income to pay debts. thelt
notes were accelerated and lore·
closures were filed.
The price
The Dennises knew the rislu. They
knew lilinS the suit would mean at
least a year wllhout operatins
money. and therel~e no crop.
They knew no crop would mean
no income to pay 01/ debt. so
debts would be accelerated and
the semee. It is our: Opinion that
this service will no lonller be
needed. as we will be able to
monitor the credit throullt our
depanment as weU as throush the
LoRan ollice per our instruction."
The Oenni.ses believe if they had .
been able to follow their cONUI,
tant's advice and ma.ke their own
decisions. they could have met all
expenses.. continued operating'
and reduced tbftr debcs.
Instead. Dennis says the bank
cost them about $400.000 in lost
marlteling oppommities. Aher the
Dennises filed suit and had no
10reci0lUn!S filed.
They knew a court cue would
be ei:pensive. with no guarantee of
winmng. They knew the suit would
take time - years - to settle.
They knew even il they won the
suit. they could still lose all they
had worked lor the past IS years.
They sued anyway, because
Dennis also knew he couldn'l
conlinue farming while leeling he
had no control over his business.
Says Teetor: "It had to be an
qonlZing decision lor the two 01
them to make." The DenniJes did
look at other alternatives. But.
'There was never any doubt in
their mind that this was the right
thing to do."
Besides the Denni.ses· unswerv·
ing sense of purpose, Dennis's
"incredible memory' was a plus.
according to Teetor. As bank doc·
uments became available. Teetor
discovered Dennis's recollection
of 3 years 01 bank meetings and
transactions was lIawless.
Another asset was Dennis's
credibility. 'He's a very honest.
srraighllorward type IIUY." In dep0-
sition belore the trial and in 12
hoon on the SI.\Ild durinllthe trial,
his story never changed.
Despite the uncertainties and
stress. 'We tried really hard to
keep life as normal as possible,'
Janie saY$- That job lell mostly to
her. as Dennis focused on the suit.
Custom work and trucking kept
food on the table.
When things got lough. Janie
reminded hersell she and DennIS
were teaching their boys to stand
up tor what they believe is right.
"We lelt we were right and had to
stand up lor our rights. " Janie says.
The light isn't over. The Den.
nises are now trying to secure
operating money to plant some
acreqe this year. .
II things go as planned, Brian -
"10 going on II t: according to
his mother - will ll()( need to ask
why Dad isn't planting this year.
CaroI)'ll ERlj:roth and
5b.aroa M1Dot
nw OftIO ra""~'
@
(Reprinted by permission)
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Yolo's longest trial
Jury awards $1.5
million to rancher
By Susan Stem
Antr 1II0rt lh,n four monlhs. Iht 10nCtst
Irial in Yolo Counly hislory tndtd Wednes-
d.y whtn I jury .w,rdtd iust oyer $1.5
.lIlIion to • Surallltnto utlle"'ln who sued
the woodl.nd Produdion Credit Assoc:iatioD
(WI'CAI for deslroyinc his busilless.
TIlt II·WO""II. one·II\'1I jury deli~nted
thrff d.ys btfort dttidinc th,t the WPCA
both inlelltion.lly .nd IItCIiCtlltly illtedem
wilh Nitoli G. Nicholas' taltle breedinc
buainrt. when t~y fortflosed 011 their 1m
10.11. Stllinc hi. tattle to rrp.y Ihe debt.
While WPCA .1I0rllty Willillll G.II.cbtr
eretled the Yerdicl with I lerse "110 eoIII-
lIItnl" Nicholls larned tile Yolo COlIIIl,
court"... i.to wh.1 looked like I weddillll
I'tt'eptio. 1I11t.
A. tht It"'" trooped out with III ludi_1e
aich of rtlitf, Nicholas stood i. the coult·
roolll lisle "lkillC eult Ollt's hind. Mollltllls
1.ltr, h, dlrmbled tit,.. III for. PlrtinC
.hot-I croup photoCnph on the Su~rior
Court IItps.
Thouch winnine .lIorney Jot Ctnshln had
s.id his ditn!'. herd would h.ye betll worth
$2 3 "'illioll today had the WPCA nol liqui·
d.ttd it In 1m, h, railed the $1.515,000
Iw,rd ". deOnil, will."
for Ih, WI'CA, th, Iri,I, whith rln Ihe
wnU loneer t.h.1I elperted. w.. • double
lOll, whirh il will probably DOl Icccpl willi-
out I"pral.
first, the Jury rerused 10 ordtr Nicholas 10
PlY Ihe WI'CA his $421,7ZS ouuI.ndillC debl
Ihe credil lss«i.IiOIl lutd 10 reCOYfr.
Srrond, Ihe jurors acrepltd Nitholas' roo·
lelliioll 111.1 Ihe tredit .ssoc:i.lioll delibrr·
Ilfly unde""illtd his busintSl, crt.tinc the
Ip~.rall(e 01 • bed 1011 wh,rr nollt fl·
1.ltd.
TIle credil ISsoc:i.lioll. NichollS cI.imed.
w.. under prrssurf frolll its parelll orC.llil••
linn, Ih, federal Inlermediale Cmit B.llk
(f1CBI, to cI,ar III boob 01 nUlllfroll. \r2d
lo.ns.
Though lhe ryclir downlum ill tile uUle
market shortly Iner the WI'CA illilialfd Ih,
10.11 rendered Nitholas ulI.ble to m.ke hi.
illiti.l p'ylllenls, h, el.imed he would hlYe
t.sily pulI,d inlo Ihe black h.d the tredit
Issoc:i.lion stood by hi.. while til, alrkc(
ftfoyrred.
But illstead. h, said. tile WPCA plnltked.
IIld dumped Ilis .nd IIIOst other IiYesloc:k
loins i. I JliSCUided .Utllp! to pl,ase the
flCB.
Nicholas rI.imed Ihe WPCA toot. stepa to
make his fin'Mial .ilu.lioll look worse till.
it WIS. Whell tIIty solitiltd his bIIsillfSl i.
1m. h, said they appnised hia elltle ..
lheir hichrst tllut. Bul whell thry souehl to
dutllp Ihe 10.11 four ,un I.lt,r, Ihry poul,
underv.lu,d his stoc:k-
Wh,. Nichol.s' pl.n to buy Gl,nn Count,
cnzillC I..d f,lI throuCh. h, s.id he rtlled
Iud Ih,re and in COlltn Costa CounC\'. The
'A'l'CA SOlIII yoid,d thos, leas,s. forr:nc
NlChol.s to eonsohd.tr bis h,rd 011 • plfe,
of Suner COUlIlY property beloncing to blS
faDllly's estat,.
But .ddillC illsult to injury. Nicholas
d.imed th, 'A'I'CA thro IlIaed .round .nd
added til, leu, C1lSU to his debt. m.kine his
fiuncrs look fYfll worse on p.per.
finally. Nicbolas said. cOllsolidatioll was
followed by rortflosure. when til. 'A'I'CA s,ld
orr his cattle at "hamburger pncrs" 10 dear
thfir boou .r • had 10.0 tII,y th,ms,lns
mattd.
Tht Wl'CA h.d al1\led Ihat Nicholas rorred
thelll to ror«los, throuell IIi' own mismall-
'g,m,nt. H.~ be ~tD .1I0wed 10 ronllnue
borrowillg. Gallacller S.Id. he would haY,
betn .Imost 54 million in debl by 1981
"He would hIY' owed us so much money
the ¥llu, of his htrd wouldn'l hIYe iliad' .ny
dirrerrllce," Gall.cher told the jury.
EYfll If Nicholas h.d succeeded in incrt.5-
inc his h,rd to 3.200 bud by 1981. Call.cher
said. th, rural credit org'lIlZ.tion would still
b." brell stuck with. SL& to S:U Dlillion lIet
deficit.
Thoup the Vl'l'CA lo.ned Nicholas II
million in 1975••lld M5.~ in 1976. addinc to
their oriClul 1m C1lDllllltlllenl or S6!lI.OOO.
Gall.cher said Nichol.s was IItYfr promlscd
1II0re tIIan • 00' Yflr loan. H, said tile 'ftPCA
tradiliolSllly flIttndtd 011' yur lo.ns if •
busilless w.s profitable. thoup in Nicholas'
cas. h, said th, money continued to Oow iD
In .ttempt to h,lp Nicholas rtfo"r rrom •
Yfnlurt whicb b.d soured almost from the
becinninc.
The slump in th, rattle markel dttreased
til, ¥llu, of NichollS' unl,. Gallacher Ie·
bowltdcrd. But he d.inaed tile SuralD,nto
rancher .Iso lost DIOney throuCh his own
lIIism.lI.celD,nt .nd mad' purrhases ""lIicll
weren' .1I0wed ill th, lou acrrem,n\f1o
The jury. howrver. fouad th, ,,"peA-
D1.d~llld broke-th,ir 'emlDent to pro-
vide Nicholas • se~en,yur capilli in'·est·
ment loan to almost double his 1.800 bud
herd.
Btt.use Ihis .~ement WIS broktll. the
jury .....arded Nicholas SiSO.OOO. Thtr addtd
another ~.OOO in dam.gts for WI'CA·nn·
lentlonal" inttrference With Sicholas' busi'
OtiS plus $SOO.OOO ror punishmtnt. As lIIe
lCinc on the cake. tllty ordered the C!'fdlt
.uomuon to p.y Nicbol.s SU.OOO ror -lItC'
hcence:
Beroff the trial. G.lI.gber had said Ibf
IliI'CA's 400 (armer·members rrom Yolo. So-
lano and Sacramtnto counues wopld bavt to
pa~ tbe prtce o( a ltgal loss tillh higbtr
Inttrest rates on thtlr OWII loans. But sinct
WPCA.....hlcll med numtrous motions ror •
1IIlstrt.l 's uprettd to .ppnl th, yer<hcL
there I. no tellinc when til, .ward Will be
p.id.
III .ny case. an" 74 d.ys or tri.1. Ihe Yolo
County Su~rtor Coun IUry IS tllrouclt w,th
tile d,spute. Tod.y. thty return to tht h,n
J
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"It was almost hazardous," Fish-
man said of the deliberations. "We
didn't start reaChing agreements
until probably Wednesday of tbls
week. Then things began to speed
,fill"
He said the panel took the first
five days going through inlorma-
tlon and defining the complex
Issues they were charged wltb
resolving and then began making
decislon.c;.
Basically. the jury was asked to
determine wbether the bank com-
mitted fraud against the two com-
panies by manipulating its lending
policies and then pulling its finan-
cial support out from under them.
Daniel O'Connell operated his
late father's business. the James
E. O'Connell Co. apple dehydrat-
ing plant.
George M. Jewell was once a
leading independent grower, bra-
kt'r nnd trucker in the Sebastopol
apple industry, and his son operat-
ed orchards and a fresh apple
packing plant.
Allorneys for borh families
presented evidence alleging thatl
the bank withdrew credit lines
from rhe O'Connell company In
the 19705 and then caused 8
lawsuit to be flied against the
O'Connells which threatened the
family business with a sheriff's
sale to payoff debts.
Immediately after tbe Y'tf'dltf
wac; announced, 8nomt'y 11lIvtd
Flinn SIlid thE' bank .111 C'oltff'tl
the verdict.
"The bank 1et"1s t~ ••ard It
exce!l'llve. The dollar 8,"oun~ Are
tn nevflr, neVf'r land. We otl\'I(I'J~ll'
Intend to appeal," Flinn said
The a.ord topped a .~k f\r
bad ne"", for the San Frnnclt;('~
based bank Which b08Sl' U biJlIOll
1ft -a and recorded about S345
IftUlloa tn eamln~ last year.
"'Ue the Sonoma County apple
CMe Jury wa.o; deliberating. the
.", t..... a $14.2 million fra1ld
raw In ff'l1f'ral C'ouJ't In Lot' An-
1"'1" .nd a $2 I million p.W:.lr<!
IltDlnq n,f' hank W8~ uri e,d bv
'"f' !!tatf' Supreme lourt. "".-:11 ttt~n
" dt' nMday. thf' bank repui-te(. a
SJ38 million loss In the second
quarter of 1985 and forecasted
continuing losses through the
year.
The Sonoma County verdict
could have been worse.
One juror, Joanne Graham, said
Ihat at one point jurors were
("onsldprlng awarding (;corge M.
Jewell $30 million in punitive
damages alone.
Jury foreman Sol Fishman !;nid
the panel plowed through hun-
dreds of hours or documentc; and
testimony before beginning to
come to some conclusions during
deliberations.
AppendixC
DEMOCRAT
46 million award
in apple case
By BOB KLOSE
A Superior Court jury Friday
ordered the largest damaRe
nward in Sonoma County hi$tory,
$466 million to two St-bastopol
npplf' frlmilies who jurors dt"cic1("t1
were defrauded by the Dank of
America.
After ei~ht days of deliberation,
the panel of seven women and
five men concluded the bank
mantpulated Its loan pollcl~ to
drive the apple companies of the
families of George M. Jewell and
Daniel O'Connell to financial ruin
and bankruptcy.
The jury ordered the bank to
pitY SJI.7 million to George M.
and Laura Jewell; $5.5 million to
the Jewell's son, George R.
"Shorty" Jewell; and S!U million
to O'Connell and his mother, Irene
O'Connell Kru~.
The award includes $26.6 mil-
lion In punltlvf' damages.
The two families llad asked Ihe
jury for $120 million in damages.
The totAl figure InclUded seven
separart" verdicf5, made tn 9-3 and
10-2 ballot.; by the Jurors, makin~
II the lar~est ever In a Sonoma
County courtroom and follows
what i~ bellt"vp.d to have been the
lon~~t Jury trial In thi"! county.
The juror.: IIstf'nf'd to thN'e
monlhs of t("!iltlmony and argu-
menlo; ~fore finally retiring to
the deliberation room a week 8RO
Wednesday.
Sant:l Roc-a. Calif., Saturday. July 20. 1985
J - 29
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
Banc. i
------------------------------------"
Appendix C
DEMOCRAT
The Jewell~ and O'(onnrlls
c1nimcd the bank's action was
motivated by ito: d~ire to elimi·
nate the competition they sup-
plied for the struggling Seha~topol
Apple Cooperative. The co-op at
about the S<"lme time was deeply In
dE-bt to the bank. The bank eventu-
ally liquidated the co-op in 1983 to
recover almost $22 million In bad
loans,
Crucial to both sides In the case
we,-e tbe testimonies of former
Sebastopol branch manager Wil-
liam SUlJlvan and bls successor,
Roger "ROCky" BunCh, who took
over In 1979 when Sullivan lert the
bank on medical leave.
The plaintiffs contended SUlli-
van and Bunch set the two fami-
lies up to fall by manipulating
them into untenable financial p0-
sitions and then reneging on
promi~es.
Both m8na~e~ denied the bank
madE' promi~es of lon~·term loane;
or acted to deliherately harm the
ramillp-;' (Irms.
But acconllng to one juror,
"rTlO,r (If lhe jury (('It l/H'j' WI'I I'
nlll Idling"ht' truth."
"Tht'y wt'rt' (I)und w;Jnlinr. 100
nl<lny till1t'~ on tt". veracllv or
what lh('~' Wf'rt' saving. Tht'lr
l~limonj' didn't slan,1 up unrh'r
cro~~-examlnation:' the juror
said.
Neither Sullivan nor Runch
werr in the courtroom to hear
Friday's verdict.
O'Connell, who has waited with
his mother for a verdict since Ille
jury got the case lae;t week, wrpt
a~ the declslon.c; were read hy
Judge William Beltint"lIi.
Bettlnelll presided over the case
after deliberations got under way
and trial JUd~e Laurence Sawyer
went on vacalion.
Sue The Lenderl
"I think it is a fair award,"
O'Connell said.
His mother winked to her
daughters when she heard lhe
judge read that the jury hnd
awarded her $100,000 for the
emolional distress caused her
when ~he thought her home would
bp ~lIld out (rom under her fi~t in
n sherifr~ ~Ie and then in hank·
ruplcy
"lhl'Y ran't tOllch our propcl1v
until 'hNe'~ a final judgment."
O'Connell ~aid laler. Ife said he
hopl''; Ihl' bnnk'~ nppt'al '),'ill t>"
';pl'('lIl't1 up becallse of. hiS
rnnlht'r's 71 years. •
"We can n~k for a pri('rity
review," he S<1id.
Gcor~c .Jf'well and his wife and
son displayed little emotion as the
jUd~e read off the record awards
for hi~ family.
"WI' ~ot apples to harvest," hP
Mid ahout immediate plans, Indi·
ratin~he'll reserve nnal judgment
unlll the case Is ultimately reo
~oh'('d in hi~her courts.
After the Jury was excused.
Flinn ae;ked the court to delay
eXl'culing the verdict for 60 days
Whlll' Ihl' bank studies ite; options.
"Thi~ is the beginning of a long
Ii!'t of delays," said Jewell attor-
ney Barry cappello, wbo, along
wilh the O'Connells' lawyers. opo
po~ed the bank request.
BUI Bettinelli granted the stay
or execution for 60 days or until
the bank (iJes its appeal.
It was a small I~ for Cappello.
who on Friday recorded his sec-
ond record verdict in Sonoma
County.
("appello rt"presrnted Lumbt'r-
mall's Al'('l'planrp ('orr Wllf'n II
won a $i.4fi million dam;}:.:" rl:lIITl
again~t lIni!'n Hank 10 I f1H I, Ihl'll
J - 30
the larJ!est judgment on record.
Beltinelli later said he bt'lieves
the trial Is the long~t heard by a
jury in county history.
"You've given away better than
th rf'e months of your IIvpq. nlmnd
Inn much to the system," he said
:IS hI' ")!cused the jurors.
(Reprinted by permisSIon)
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AppendixD
A word about "Quasi·Loan Commitments"
Occasionally a loan officer gives a "handshake" approval to a loan request
before receiving the necessary committee approvals. Although this is not a
new problem, it has become more important with the increased interest in
"good faith and fair dealing". There was a recent case, for example, where a
loan officer sent a letter which discussed a potential loan and included a proviso
that "any financing arrangements were conditioned upon documentation being
satisfactory in substance and form to all parties". The customer claimed it was
a commitment but the bank said it was just a proposal for discussion purposes.
The court sided with the customer and said that the bank had an obligation
to make the loan after a "good faith" review of the documentation.
Lesson: Notify your customers, preferably in writing, of the loan approval process
at your organization.
Lesson: Be careful drafting any proposal or commitment letter.
Lesson: If it isn't a commitment letter, write "this is not a commitment letter" at
the top of the page.
Another example
Imagine this conversation:
Lender: "Mr. Jones, the bank is very supportive of your effort to buy Smith
Manufacturing Company They've been a long standing customer of our
bank, and I don't see any reason that we wouldn't continue the same financing
arrangements with you if you do buy them out."
The lender has represented pretty clearly; although casually. that the current
financing arrangement will continue in place if Mr. Jones buys Smith
Manufacturing Company If Mr. Jones buys the company based on that
assurance, and the bank changes its mind, he will have a cause of action
against the bank. A case in Missouri involving a "quasi-commitment" ended
with an award of over 53 million against the bank.
Lesson: The court may determine that the customer had a right to rely on
your commitment. no matter how informally it was presented.
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LENDER LIABILITY
PART II
Banks in Litigation
Gregg Neal
Neal & Davis
Shelbyville, Kentucky
Section K
J-
j
1. Fraud
B. COMMONLAW THEORIES OF LIABILITY
1. Work - outpractices of financial institutions are
coming under closer scrutiny. Recent cases of lenders
responsible for damages when the lender has assumed or exercised
excessive control over the debtor's business. Loan documents
give financial institutions broad authority over the affairs of
the other debtors and sometimes these provisions are enforced if
for illegitimate purposes.
a. Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F.Supp. 1146
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) - Remanded & Appeal Dismissed 511 F.2d 1030 (2d
Cir. NY 1975) Opinion Affd. 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. NY 1975) -
Fraud was claimed in this ac tion where a credi tor induced
resignations of directors and officers with a fraudulent promise
not to call loans. State National Bank of El Paso v~ Farah
Manufacturing Company, 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex:-I984), DismTssed by
agreement 3/6/85. In this case, the jury found that a bank
acting alone or in conspiracy with other lenders committed acts
of fraud, duress, and interference resulting in damages to the
Farah Manufacturing Company. The jury awarded damages to Farah
in the amount of $18,947,348.77. The appellate court reduced the
judgment by $300,105.00 and affirmed the judgment as reduced in
the amount of $18,647,243.77 with interest at the rate of 9% per
annum from the date of judgment until paid.
LENDER LIABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
CONTROL AND INTERFERENCE IN BORROWER'S AFFAIRS.I.
The facts in the case are complicated. The lender used a
management change clause in a $22,000,000 loan agreement to
coerce the board of directors into taking action which was
del!.rimenl!.aL I!.o Farah. The fraud action was based UPOIl false
represenl!.ation made by the lender's thaI!. a default would be
declared, add Farah would be bankrupted and padlocked if William
Farah was elected I!.he chief executive officer. The acl!.~on of
duress was based upon letters and statements made by I!.he lender
represenl!.atives blocking the election of Farah as the CEO and
also blocking I!.he election of additional directors who favored
Farah. There was evidence that the loan I!.o Farah was not in
defaull!. when I!.he warnings were issued without justifical!.ion by
the lenders. The tort of interference action was based upon the
lenders interference with the lawful management and proper
corporate governance by Farah of its own board by (1) installing
a lender representative as CEO: (2) forcing Farah's resignation
as a board member: (3) sUbstitUl!.ing a lender representative as
chairman of the board: (4) preventing the election of Farah
supporters to the board: (5) causing the board resignations of
Farah supporters: (6) packing the board with lender supporters:
K - 1
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.. (~installing a "consultant" as CEO, and (8) encouraging and
financially supporting the costly litigation in a proxy fight
against William Farah when he sough!!. to restore lawful of
management to Farah.
2. Duress.
~~~ a. In most jurisdictions, duress is used to avoid
a contractual obligation rather than as an affirmative tort but
it has been recognized as a tort in several jurisdictions. Pecos
Construction Co., Inc. v. Mortgage Investment Company of El Paso,
459 P.2d 842-rN:M--:-T969), Fizzell v. Meeker, 339 F.Supp.~4
(W.D. Mo. 1970). Sanders v. RepublicNational Bank of Dallas,
389 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1965L Continental-Illinois National Bank &
Trust Company of Chicago v. Stanley, 606 F.Supp. 558 (N.D~l~
1985). In Continental, Bank was granted a summary judgment when
it sued Stanley seeking to recover on his personal guarantee of
loans made by the banks to four operations controlled by him.
The Court found that the guaranty was supported by consideration
as it was executed simultaneously with the original credit.
Subsequent amendments to the credit agreement increasing the
amount of the credit, without the consent of Stanley did not
exonerate him since the guaranty covered all present and future
obligations. Stanley failed to establish by affidavit that there
was any agreement to extend credit up to $750,000,000 (the
maximum set forth in the credit agreement). Stanley's
allegaltions of economic duress were not supported, and Stanley's
claims of misconduct by the banks with respect to borrower were
insufficient to exonerate him from liability since the guaranty
provided he would be liable notwithstanding any claim or defense
that the borrowers may assert upon the invalidilty of the
underlying obligation.
3. Interference.
a. Interference may support a claim against a
creditor if it is used to gain control or the, conltrol
deltrimenta'lly affects the debtor's financial condition. Farah,
Supra, Restatement (2nd) of Torts, Section 767. In the case of
Melamed v. Lake Counlty National Bank, 727 F.2d 1399 (CA6 1984).
A ban~representing a trustee brought an action for damages
against a bank based upon an alleged fraudulent transfer of
asselts Ito the bank and for the bank's tortious interference with
the debtor's business. A jury awarded the Plaintiff $30,000
based upon the fraudulent transfer claim and $475,000 based upon
the interference claim. The Court reversed their jury award
based on fraud since the bank held a lien on the assets
preventing any diminution of the debtor's assets which is an
essenttial element of a fraudulenlt transfer. The Cour t upheld l!:.he
interference since the bank had required the presidenlt of the
debtor to take a 50% reduction of salary: required the debtor to
replace its accountant with one chosen by the bank: the bank's
approval was required for all payments by the debtor: the bank
had set fort':.h a "13-point':. program" to "help salvage whatever is
possible" from the debtor: and the bank suggested that the
K - 2
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landlord change the locks on the debtor's prernises. However, the
Courlt did reverse the damage award because ~he f~vidence was too
general and imprecise. The Court held the measure for this
tortious interference as the difference between i::':.he value of I!.he
business before and after the injury. The proper method would be
to capitalize its earnings over a reasonable period. The jury
could not consider claims brough~ by other creditors of the
debtor, in determining damages.
Restatement (2nd) of Torts, Section 767
.. In de ltermining whe lther an ac tor's c()rlc11.1C~ h:. is in ten tionally
interfering with a contract or a prospective contractual
relationship of another is improper or no~. consideration is
given to the following factors~
(a) The nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other ',d.t,li ..."hich l!.he actor's
conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interesl!. in protecting ~he freedom of an
action of an actor and the contractual interest of the
other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of ahe actor's conduct to
the interference, and
(g) the relations between t.he parties".
Restatement (2nd) of Torts, Section 769:
"one Who, having a financial interest in the business of a
third person, intentionally causes e.hat person nol!. lto enter
into a prospective contractual relation wilth another, does
not interfere improperly with the other's relationship if
he:
(a) does not employ wrongful means, and
(b) acts to protect his interest from being prejudiced by
the relation.
See Lowell v. Mother's Cake and Cookie Co., 79 Cal. App., 3d
13, 22 (1978), andDel stal!:.e Bank v. ~·al~~.lOn, 548 P.2d 1024 (Okla.
1976) •
K - 3
4. Negligence/Join~ venture
a. Dunson v. Stockton, Whatley, Davin & Co., 346
So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1977). Lender was held liable as- a)oint
venturer of borrower. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
Association, 69 Cal. 2d 850 t1968). Lend:er held liable in tort
for borrower's negligence in failing to conduct proper soil tests
for construction.
5.
Comment "a":
principal/Agent
a. Restatement (2nd) of Agertcy, Section 14-0,
"A security holder who merely exercises a veto power over
the business acts of his debtor by preventing purchases or
sales above specified amounts does not thereby become a
principal. Howev.er ,if he takes over the management of the
debt.or's business either in person or t.hrough an agent, and
directs what contracts mayor may not be made, he becomes a
principal, liable as a principal for the obligations
incurred t.hereafter in the normal course of business by
debtor, who has now become the general agent. The point at
which the creditor becomes a principal is that at which he
assumes de facto control over the conduct of his debtor,
whatever the terms of the formal contracE of his debtor may
be".
See A. Gay Jenson Far~! C~mpany ~ C~rgill, Incorporated,
309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981), Kr~vo Industr~al Supply Company v.
National Distillers & Chemical Corporation, 483 F.2d 1098 (CAS
1973), Rev. Denied 490 F.2d-9l6(1974). ~ REi7= prim~ Company, 98
F. 2d 952 (CA7 1938).
6. Fiduciary.
a. Justice Cardozo defined the bank customer
relalionship as "not. honesty alone, bUlL a punctilio of honor, the
most sensilive". Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
A fiduciary relationship-ma.y r"i'quire more lLhan juslt a
debtor/creditor relationship bUlL one where the parties understand
lLhe special customer confidence that has been reposed. Umbaugh
Pole Building Co., Inc., 390 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ohio 1979). See
Commercial ColtiOnlC9Sl)any ,. Inc, v. unilted California Bank, 163Cal:- App. 3d, 511 (1 • - -
J
J
7. Waiver of Jury Trial.
a. Some states allow the waiver of jury trial by
statute. Jury trial waiver dan be enforoed under basic contract
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principal. Annotation, Validity and Effect of Contractual TATaiver
of Trial by Jury. 73 ALR 2d 1332 (1976). However, courks are
reluctant to enforce the waiver of jury trial as j s would
rather have a jury decid~ng the issue rather ~han ~he court
itself.
II. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A. UCC
1. INTRODUCTION
Section 1-203 qf the UCC provides:
"Every contract or duty within this ac~ imposes an
obligation of good faith in i~s performance or
enforcement".
"Good Faith" is defined in UCC, Section 1-·201 (19):
"Hones ty in fac l!. in t.he conduc t or tl:ansac tion
concerned".
B. Lender's Good Fait.h.
1. Yankt.on Production Credit Association v. Larsen,
365 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1985). In this case, the Court x'e,>e-r's'ecI the
summary judgm,ent granted in favor, of the lender finding triable
issue as to whether (1) PCA had made commitments to finance C'.he
expansion of the borrower's livestock feeding operation which
could be enforced against the lender applying principles of
promissory estoppel, despite provisions in the loan documents
making all advancements discretionary: and (2) whether the PCA
acted in good fail!.h within the meaning of uec Section 1",203, when
it refused to loan the borrower l!.he amount of the budgeted loan.
2. First National Bank in Libby v. Tombley, 689 P.2d
1226 (Mont. 1984). A bank officer promised theborrovler that it
would convert an indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note into
an installment obligat.ion if the principal amount was reduced and
interest was brought current. The bank officer l!.hereaftt?'x: 1ef!!.
town. A new officer on t.he account disclaimed knov/ledqe of the
commit.ment and, after consulting with the president of the bank,
elected to off-set the debtor's bank account. The Courl!. held
that the Trial Court erred in refusing to permit a punitive
damage claim to be asserted against !!.he bank for breach of. the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in UCC Section 1-203.
The Court noted that breach of this obligatr.ion could be a tort as
well as a breach of a contract:.. The Cour t also observed thaI.'. the
punitive damages claim could be based upon allegations of fraud.
3. securit~ Trust Company v. Wilson, 307 Ky. 152. 210
S.W.2d 336 (1948). Aiduciary dulty i'XisEs ib all cases '",,,here
there has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity
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and good conscience is bound ~o ac~ in good fai~h and with due
regard to the interest of one re~osing confidence.
4. Henkin, Inc. v. Berea Sank & Trust Company, Ky.
App., 566 S.W.2d 420 (l9~ A fiduciary dU~y be~ween a bank and
its customer fosters pUblic confidence in the banking sys~em. In
~his case, Henkin, Inc. gave a promissory note for $160,000.00
payable in installmen~s to Tinker, tnc. for the purchase of a
radio station. The note was secured by a mortgage on real
esta~e. Tinker offered to accept a 22.36% discount if Henkin
would pay the note in fUll. Henkin applied ~o the bank for
$100,000.00 to payoff Tinker, and the bank turned down the
application. The bank purchased the Henkin note from Tinker
which had a balance of $118,000.00 fat $95,000.00 in receipt of
the assignmen~ of ~he mortgage securing the nolte. Henkin was a
few days la~e with its firs! installment payment to the bank, and
the bank accelerated all future payments and started foreclosure
proceedings against Henkin.
5. Bale v. Mammoth Cave production Credit
Association, Ky.-;-652 s.w.2aS"S1.-ri1}s1r'--:tn-l:Krscase;- aoreacn
of fiduciary duty to its customer did noll enti~le the customer to
an affirmative defense in a suit to enforce payment of a
promissory note. However, it did afford the customer a basis for
asserting a counterclaim for damages and lost business profits.
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6.
states that:
The Restatement 2nd of Contracts, Section 205, I
.J
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and i~s
enforcement. II
Comment "d" provides:
"A complete catalog of types of bad fai~h is impossible
but the following types are among those which have been
recognized in jUdicial decis:l.ons: evasion of ~he
spir it of ~he bargain, lack of diligence and slacking
off, willful rendering of imperfect performance,
abusive of a power to specify ~erms, and interference
with or failure to codperate in the other par~yls
per formance II •
7. Fraud in the Irtdudemenl!..
J
J
J
a. First National ~ank in Lennox v. Brown, 181
N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970). A bank has a dulr.y to reveal faci'S to a
borrower before consummation of aiban transaction by which a
loan would relieve the unfavbrab1e position of a bank on a prior
improvident loan. The breach of this duty by the bank gives rise
to avoidance of the loan on ~he parI!. of the borrower.
8.
752 (CA6 1985).
K.M.C. co., Inc. v. Irvin Trust Co., 757 Fed.2d
The Court at"rrrfiiid a' $1,500,OOO.OOjury verdict::.
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B. Lender to Borrower.
III. MISREPRESENTATION ANn ~RAUDi
A. Credit Inquiries.
Reliance upon credit inquiries is important to the
commercial transactions be~ween banks. Likewise, it will apply
to businesses who ask for information or references. Two areas
of liability are fraud and negligence~
Johnson v. Cormway, Ky. App., 586' S"W.2d 23 (1980).
may be eSlla6Tts ea by evidence whiCh is fully
K - 7
1. Sabin Mey~r Regiona~ ~~~es. Corporation ~ Citizens
502 F. Supp. 557 (N.n. Ga. 1980).
2. Nevada Nation~l Bank v. Gola star Meat Co~pan~
89 Nev. 427, 514 P. 2d 651 (19731. ----
against Irvin Trust for dam~ges to K.M.C.'s business caused by
the bank's termination of a revolving credit. The bank agreed to
make discre h.ionary advance men kS Up to a maximum credi t line of
$3,500,000.00 subject to a formula based upon a percentage of the
value of inventory and eligible receivables. on March 1, 1982,
the bank refused to advance $800,000.od reques~ed by KMC which
would have increased th~ loanbalande to just under the
$ 3,500,000.00 maximum. The batik !then called the loan which was
on a demand basis.
The Court held the jury trial waiver clause, in the
financing agreement was not enforceable applying federal law
since KMC had not knowingly, nor vOluntarily and intentionally
waived the right to a jUry trial. Tha Court upheld the
obliga~5.on in good faith ~ith regard to both the bank's
discre ttionary decision as to whe lther !to advan6e funds and its
power ~o demand repayment of lthe loan. perSdnalil:.y conflicts
between officers of the banking KMc ~ere noted. The bank was
adequately secured and would nol have sdffered losses in the
event of liquidation. II!. was the bank's policy Ito provide notice
before terminating finances, and the bank made a $700,000.00
advance just three days after refusing the $800,000.00 request in
advance.
9. Roberts v. Parsons, Ky., 242 S.W. 594 (1922),
where confidential relationships exisl, the burden is on the
defendaEt seeking to retain the benefits of the contract to show
the perfect fairness of the ~ransacl:.ion.
Bank,
Inc. ,
Fraud
Hall v. Carter, Ky., 324 S.w.2d 410 (1959). Fraud and
deceit are not~imited to affirmative or active aclts if the
circumstances surrounding the transaction impose a duty or an
obligation on one of the parties ho disclbse material facts known
to him and not known tb lhe other patly.
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circums tan Idal, even i feach bill!.. of eireurns !tan ltial evidence in
and of itself may seem !trivial andtiltlccmviheing, a combinal!.ion of
all circumstances considered l!.o~ijther may be decisive.
Suing the lend.r is a eo~piex *fid ekpensive l!.ransacl!.ion.
The law is unseltltled in many areas~ 11efensivE! lending may be
considered. However~ the key to any good creditor - debl!.or
relationship is good faith and fairness. Overreading is
l!.olerated. Profit.ing from l!.he debtt-dr's business is forbidden.
Common sense, nol:. greed, sho'uld dicttate,
K ... 8
r
J
J
i
oJ
Ij
J
I
.J
I
:1
J
-
J
j
J
J
